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What are the causes of the wealth and poverty of nations? Why are some
countries rich while most of them remain poor? To answer this question, this
book posits the thesis that the emergence of a new kind of growth must be
explained; economists normally characterise this growth as modern economic
growth, the essence of which consists in its sustained if not self-sustaining
character. Those countries that knew it became rich, while the rest continued to
be poor. The book will deal primarily with the question of how this global gap
between rich and poor – a gap that continues to confront economists and eco-
nomic historians with such a huge challenge – actually emerged. That such huge
differences exist between poor and rich in countries may not be that surprising
but what is striking is that wealth is also not evenly or randomly spread over the
world and that we see huge differences in wealth between countries. Most of the
poor in rich countries still live in better circumstances than the bulk of the
people in poor countries.1 That the wealth of the world should be spread so
unevenly across nations is anything but obvious. Actually, the fact that there are
rich countries at all is quite surprising in the sense that it is unusual. Over most
of global history, poverty has been the normal state of affairs for societies.
From a scholarly perspective the real intellectual challenge is to explain how
some countries, for a long time, almost exclusively Western countries apart from
Japan, managed to escape from poverty at all. They did this in the nineteenth and
twentieth century in a process that started in Great Britain in the eighteenth
century and that often is described as industrialisation but that can be better
characterised as a take-off into modern economic growth2 that created a huge
gap between rich countries that had growth and poor countries that lacked it.
Countries with this modern growth became much wealthier than countries
without it. Ever since the publication of the book by the American economic
1 See e. g. Milanovic, The haves and have-nots, vignette 2.2.
2 See for some comments why it is not correct to simply equate industrialisation with the
emergence of modern economic growth, pages 64 – 66.
historian Kenneth Pomeranz, the coming into being of this gap has been called
the Great Divergence.3 Before that divergence, the average inhabitant of the
wealthiest countries of the pre-industrial world, Great Britain and the Dutch
Republic in the eighteenth century, had a real per capita income that at best
would have been some five times as high as that of inhabitants of the world’s
poorest countries. When it comes to levels of development, defined as “societies’
capabilities to get things done”4 that are at the basis of their incomes and growth,
differences between the most developed societies of the pre industrial world, let
us say the Roman Empire, Song China, the Dutch Republic during the sev-
enteenth century or pre-industrial Britain of the eighteenth century were fairly
marginal. They in any case did not cause substantial income gaps. Nowadays, as
this table for real incomes shows, differences are far greater.
Table 1: Regional purchasing power as a percentage of global purchasing power
Regional purchasing power
GDP, % of total, 2011
Regional purchasing power
$ per head, 2011
World 100.0 World 11,480
Advanced economies 51.1 Advanced economies 39,320
G7 38.5 G7 40,890
Euro area (17) 14.3 Euro area (17) 33,790
Asia* 25.1 Asia* 5,510
Latin America 8.7 Latin America 11,860
Central & Eastern Europe** 7.8 Central & Eastern Europe** 13,280
Middle East & N. Africa 4.9 Middle East & N. Africa 9,900
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.5 Sub-Saharan Africa 2,380
* excludes Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan
** includes Turkey
Source: The Economist. Pocket World in Figures 2013 Edition (London 2012) 25.
An enormous global gap emerged, as will be illustrated more in detail further on
in this book, not just in terms of incomes, but also in terms of accumulated
wealth and development, as can be seen, for example, in energy use, in the field of
transportation and telecommunication, the level of technology, science and
education and in many other respects. This enormous gap between ‘the West’
and ‘the Rest’ emerged over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries mainly as a
product of the industrial revolution. In many respects, it is still with us. The
relative position of the West in the world is clearly changing. Its share of the
global population is dwindling. It no longer is a colonial power. Several parts of it
3 See Pomeranz, Great Divergence.
4 For this definition, see Morris, Why the West rules, 24.
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are in a deep and deepening crisis whereas other regions in the world show a
striking dynamism and growth. In that sense, the West clearly is past its prime.
Figures 1 and 2: Developed and emerging economies
Source: The Economist, August 6th 2011, Economic Focus
We should, however, not exaggerate its ‘decline’. In terms of per capita income –
and that is what really counts for most people – there still is a lot of catching up to
do for ‘the Rest’, even for the famous BRIC countries. When we put the real per
capita income of the USA for the year ending with December 31 2010 at 100, that
of Brazil would be 23.8; that of Russia 42.2; that of India 7.3 and that of China
16.1. For the United Kingdom, which plays such a prominent role in this book,
the figure would be 75.7.5 And even more importantly : all those emerging
economies are emerging because they are beginning to beat the West at its own
game, i. e. they become richer by exploiting the mechanisms of modern eco-
nomic growth like increased investment, innovation, the improvement of their
human capital and the expansion of their trade, just as the West did; at the
moment, they are making more progress in doing so than the West. This means
that the question of what causes such growth to emerge and continue has lost
nothing of its relevance. Far from it.
Most economists and economic historians would agree that poverty and
stagnation have always been normal in global economic history. This makes the
question dealt with in this book why and how certain societies in the West and
first and foremost north-western Europe and the United States escaped from that
‘normal’ state of affairs one of the central questions of their discipline. How, after
so many hundreds of years of long-term relative stagnation and stability, did
5 The Economist. Pocket World in Figures 2013 Edition (London 2012). For the claim that global
convergence would be a myth see Sharma, ‘Broken BRICs.’ The Economist of July 27th–August
2nd does nor exclude the possibility of a serious ‘Great Decelaration’ i. e. an emerging-market
slowdown that would mark a turning point for the world economy. See pages 9 and 17 – 19 of
that issue.
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certain countries manage to take off into what up until now has been sustained
growth? How were they able to break away from the constraints that had always
kept growth in check and then turn growth into something systemic? Why did
the take-off occur in north-western Europe, first and foremost in Great Britain, a
region that for most of history had been something of a backwater as compared
to, for example, the great civilizations of the Mediterranean, or the Middle or Far
East? How and when was north-western Europe able to slip from the grip of
poverty and what was or were the driving force(s) behind its then continuing
development and growth?
The debate on the Great Divergence clearly is not a recent fad. It is one of the
central questions of history and the social sciences and is as old as those dis-
ciplines themselves. Up until quite recently it was usually discussed in terms of
‘the rise of the West’.6 It has become quite vigorous again because a lot of the
assumptions it used to take for granted, have become highly contested with the
emergence of the so-called ‘California School’, a group of scholars so called
because most of them at one time or another were based in California.7 Their
‘Californian’ core consists of Kenneth Pomeranz (now in Chicago), Roy Bin
Wong, who recently published a book on the Great Divergence together with Jan-
Laurent Rosenthal who is also working in California, Jack Goldstone, Dennis
Flynn and Arturo Girldez, Richard von Glahn, James Lee and Wang Feng, and
Robert Marks. Quite similar ideas were defended by scholars whose Californian
base is much weaker or simply non-existent, such as Andre Gunder Frank, James
Blaut, John Hobson, Jack Goody, Peter Perdue and Li Bozhong, the last one
working in Beijing. Over the last fifteen to twenty years, many other scholars
with often very different backgrounds in a very lively and innovative way have
rekindled what seemed to be an old and somewhat tiring debate. One might
think of, in alphabetical order, Robert Allen, Paul Bairoch, Gregory Clark, Jared
Diamond, Ricardo Duchesne, Niall Ferguson, Eric Jones, David Landes, Timur
Kuran, Alan Macfarlane, Deirdre McCloskey, Ian Morris, Prasannan Partha-
sarathi, Matt Ridley, Erik Ringmar, Jeffrey Williamson, Robert Wright, Jan
Luiten van Zanden and all the members of the Global Economic History Net-
work.8 The fairly recent but immense popularity of economic divergence and
convergence as objects of study and in particular the California School’s view on
it tie in neatly with the main theme in economic development of our age: the Rise
of the East, in particular of China, accompanied by a clear (relative) decline of
the West. The Californians, moreover, experiment with a new kind of com-
6 For that debate see Vries, ‘Global economic history : a survey’.
7 For that ‘school’ and its views see Vries, ‘The California School and beyond’.
8 For GEHN see http://www2.lse.ac.uk/economicHistory/Research/GEHN/Home.aspx. The
network was created by Patrick O’Brien, Kenneth Pomeranz, Kaoru Sugihara and myself.
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parative reciprocal history that suits global historians who not only want to
juxtapose but also connect. The emphasis on ecology and environment as we see
it in the work of, for example, Pomeranz is not only very much en vogue, it also
allows politically correct historians to be non-judgemental in their claims about
what causes wealth and poverty.9
The point of departure of our analysis will be the revisionist approach by
scholars of the California School who claim that the economically most ad-
vanced parts of Asia in the early modern era were just as rich and developed as
Western Europe at the eve of industrialisation if not more so. If that indeed were
the case, it would severely undermine the basis of most traditional ‘rise-of-the-
West-stories’, that almost without exception believed in some kind of European
exceptionalism and assumed that Europe during the modern era was in any case
quite different and economically more advanced or at least advancing more
rapidly. The California revisionist thesis, in a nutshell, can best be described in
terms of ‘surprising resemblances’ and ‘Eurasian similarities’. The idea of
‘surprising resemblances’ is presented in Part One of Pomeranz’s trailblazing
The Great Divergence, in which he describes parts of Western Europe and
Eastern Asia in the early modern era as ‘a world of surprising resemblances’.10
The popularity and immense impact of Pomeranz’s view needs no further
comment.11 Peter Perdue presents basically the same view in his ‘Eurasian-
similarity-thesis’ that tries to transcend the insistence on East-West dichoto-
mies.12 Publications by, e. g. in alphabetical order, John Darwin, Jack Goody,
Victor Lieberman or Prasannan Parthasarathi show the increasing popularity of
focusing on similarities instead of differences in comparing parts of Eurasia.13 It
has to be added though that the debate on the Great Divergence, which initially
focused on Western Europe and Eastern Asia and basically still does, has now
begun increasingly to include (Latin) America and Africa in what is becoming a
truly global economic history.
A number of scholars have even begun explicitly to describe early modern
Europe as ‘backward’. Andre Gunder Frank (1929 – 2005) in his famous ReOr-
ient. Global economy in the Asian age i. e. the period 1400 – 1800, systematically
hammers home one message: Economic historians studying the early modern
9 De Vries, ‘The Great Divergence after ten years: justly celebrated yet hard to believe’, 13.
10 Pomeranz, Great Divergence.
11 For my views on this book, see Vries, ‘Are coal and colonies really crucial?’
12 Perdue, China marches West, 536 – 542.
13 For Lieberman’s ideas in this respect, see Lieberman, ed., Beyond binary histories, 1 – 18, and
19 – 102; idem, Strange parallels, Volumes I and II. For Jack Goody’s views, see his Capitalism
and modernity ; Theft of history ; Eurasian Miracle and Renaissances: the one or the many. For
John Darwin’s see his, After Tamerlane e. g. pages XI, 12 – 13, and 104 – 105. Prasannan
Parthasarathi in his Why Europe grew rich and Asia did not rejects “simplistic classical
dualisms” (page 84) and prefers to think in terms of “parallels in Eurasia”. (page 4).
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era must focus on the East, in particular China, the world’s most developed
economy. To focus on ‘rising’ Europe is a Eurocentric mistake. Until the second
half of the eighteenth century : “… Europe remained a marginal player in the
world economy with a perpetual deficit (i. e. in its trade with Asia, PV) despite its
relatively easy and cheap access to American money, without which Europe
would have been almost entirely excluded from any participation in the world
economy.”14 According to Frank “… the Europeans did not do anything – let
alone ‘modernize’ – by themselves”.15 When they in the end rose, they did so by
“climbing up on Asian shoulders” with money they had somehow found, stolen
or extorted.16 He thinks “… on the evidence, the European and even Atlantic
economies, not to mention their polities, were no more than backwaters in the
world economy.”17 Robert Marks writes in a popular textbook that Europe was
“… a peripheral, marginal player trying desperately to gain access to the sources
of wealth generated in the East”.18 Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, in his Pathfinders.
A global history of exploration, describes Europeans as “dregs of history”.19 John
Hobson, in his The Eastern origins of Western civilisation, tells us time and again
that the West, apart from the last two-hundred years, has always been backward
and only became rich by lots of luck, racism, war and imperialism.20
But even Californian revisionists of course have to admit that there was a
period in history when the West was by far the richest and most powerful part of
the world. In their view, it was the Industrial Revolution that made the difference.
That is not exactly a new idea. That revolution, that they without further ado
tend to regard as the essence of the Great Divergence, however, in their view
needs to be interpreted anew and quite differently. Let me illustrate this by two
quotations, the first one by Peter Perdue, the second one by Jack Goldstone, both
members of the California School:
14 Frank, ReOrient, 75. This is a quite silly statement. I fully agree with Lieberman and his
comment: “One may well ask how a region that conducted an extensive internal commerce,
and that in 1750 dominated the trade of West Africa, the entire New World, and much of
maritime Southeast Asia and coastal India, could have been marginal to the world economy.”
See Lieberman, Strange parallels. Volume 1, 74, note 109.
15 Frank, ReOrient, 259.
16 Frank, ReOrient, 277.
17 Frank, ReOrient, 333.
18 Marks, Origins of the modern world, 43.
19 Fernandez-Armesto, Pathfinders, 19.
20 Hobson, Eastern origins of Western civilisation. Just one typical quote from page 218:
“Moreover, without these Chinese contributions Britain would in all likelihood have re-
mained a small, backward country floating on the periphery of an equally backward con-
tinent, that in turn had been floating on the periphery of the Afro-Asian-led global economy
ever since 500 CE.”
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In the light of this recent research, the Industrial Revolution is not a deep, slow evo-
lution out of centuries of particular conditions unique to early modern Europe. It is a
late, rapid, unexpected outcome of a fortuitous combination of circumstances in the
late eighteenth century. … acceptable explanations must invoke a global perspective
and allow for a great deal of short-term change.21
Instead of seeing the rise of the West as a long process of gradual advances in Europe
while the rest of the world stood still, they (i. e. members of the California School PV)
have turned this story around. They argue that societies in Asia and the Middle East
were the world leaders in economics; in science and technology ; and in shipping, trade
and exploration until about AD 1500. At the time Europe emerged from the Middle
Ages and entered its Renaissance, these scholars contend, Europe was well behind
many of the advanced societies elsewhere in the world and did not catch up with and
surpass the leading Asian societies until about AD 1800. The rise of the West was thus
relatively recent and sudden and rested to a large degree on the achievements of other
civilizations and not merely on what happened in Europe. Indeed some of these
scholars suggest that the rise of the West may have been a relatively short and perhaps
temporary phenomenon, as other societies are now catching up to or even surpassing
Western societies in their growth.22
Not to fight straw-men, I immediately should add that the most important
Californian, Kenneth Pomeranz, very recently admitted that he probably over-
stated the lateness and suddenness of the Great Divergence and that economic
parity between the two extremes of Eurasia probably had already disappeared in
1750 if not in 1700. The Great Divergence, so he now writes, may indeed have
been somewhat more of a drawn-out process instead of a quite sudden break.23
But he does not abandon the idea that a long-term parity between the most
advanced economies in the world would have existed and that they were char-
acterised by surprising resemblances until quite late in the early modern era.
1. The emergence and non-emergence of modern economic
growth
As indicated, we are dealing here with one of the central questions in history and
the social sciences. The problem at hand is very complicated and multi-facetted.
Many debates in which it purportedly is analysed turn out in the end to be quite
sterile because the discussants actually are talking about different things. It
21 Perdue, China marches West, 537. This interpretation is strikingly different from that of most
economic historians who study Britain’s industrialisation in detail.
22 Goldstone, Why Europe, VIII.
23 See De Vries, ‘The Great Divergence after ten years: justly celebrated yet hard to believe’ and
Pomeranz, ‘Ten years after’.
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therefore is essential to indicate exactly what one wants to explain and what
assumptions and facts one takes as point of departure. I will dedicate quite a few
pages to indicating what exactly in my view the debate on the Great Divergence is
about and what that means for the way in which it has to be held.
Let me first provide some empirical data to indicate what phenomena we
actually want to explain and begin by emphasizing that only the economic side of
the Rise of the West will be discussed, i. e. how and why the West became so much
wealthier than the Rest, not the politico-military side i. e. not the question of how
and why the West came to rule so much of the world, a connected but certainly
not identical subject. The focus here will be on wealth, development and growth.
The following tables and graph should be quite informative.
Table 2: Population of Europe (without Russia) as a percentage of world population
Year World (Mil.) Europe (Mil.) Europe (%.)
1000 267 31 12
1500 438 71 16
1820 1,042 170 16
1913 1,791 341 19
2003 6,279 561 8
Based on: Angus Maddison, Contours of the world economy, 1 – 2030 AD. Essays in macro-
economic history (Oxford 2007) 376 and 378. The figures are rounded.







Based on: Angus Maddison, Contours of the world
economy, 1 – 2030 AD. Essays in macro-economic history
(Oxford 2007) 381. The figures are rounded.
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Table 4: Average per capita income in US dollars, 1990 international Purchasing-Power
Parity (PPP), in 1820 and 1913
1820 1913
Western Europe 1,232 3,473
Eastern Europe 636 1,527
Western off-shoots 1,201 5,257
Latin America 665 1,511
Asia without Japan 575 640
Japan 669 1,387
Africa 418 585
Source: Angus Maddison, The world economy. A millennial perspective (Paris 2001) 264.
For an explanation of the concept of purchasing-power parity see http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Purchasing_power_parity
Graph 1: Real income per capita in 1990 international PPP dollars
Based on information in: Angus Maddison, The world economy. A millennial perspective
(Paris 2001).
Table 5: Colonies of Western European states, United States, and Japan






Source: Jane Burbank and Frederic Cooper, Empires in world history. Power and the politics
of difference (Princeton 2002) 288.
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Table 6: Relative shares of world manufacturing 1750 – 1900 (%)
1750 1800 1830 1860 1880 1900
Europe as a whole 23.2 28.1 34.2 53.2 61.3 62.0
United Kingdom 1.9 4.3 9.5 19.9 22.9 18.5
Habsburg Empire 2.9 3.2 3.2 4.2 4.4 4.7
France 4.0 4.2 5.2 7.9 7.8 6.8
German States / Germany 2.9 3.5 3.5 4.9 8.5 13.2
Italian States / Italy 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5
Russia 5.0 5.6 5.6 7.0 7.6 8.8
United States 0.1 0.8 2.4 7.2 14.7 23.6
Japan 3.8 3.5 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.4
Third World 73.0 67.7 60.5 36.6 20.9 11.0
China 32.8 33.3 29.8 19.7 12.5 6.2
India / Pakistan 24.5 19.7 17.6 8.6 2.8 1.7
Source: Chris Freeman and Francisco LouÅ¼, As time goes by. From the industrial revo-
lutions to the information revolution (Oxford 2001) 183.
Table 7: Per capita levels of industrialisation, 1750 – 1900 (relative to UK in 1900 = 100)
1750 1800 1830 1860 1880 1900
Europe as a whole 8 8 11 16 24 35
United Kingdom 10 16 25 64 87 [100]
Habsburg Empire 7 7 8 11 15 23
France 9 9 12 20 28 39
German States / Germany 8 8 9 15 25 52
Italian States / Italy 8 8 8 10 12 17
Russia 6 6 7 8 10 15
United States 4 9 14 21 38 69
Japan 7 7 7 7 9 12
Third World 7 6 6 4 3 2
China 8 6 6 4 4 3
India / Pakistan 7 6 6 3 2 1
Source: Chris Freeman and Francisco LouÅ¼, As time goes by. From the industrial revo-
lutions to the information revolution (Oxford 2001)183.
Table 8: Capacity of all steam engines (in thousands of horse-power)
1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1888 1896
Great Britain 620 1,290 2,450 4,040 7,600 9,200 13,700
Germany 40 260 850 2,480 5,120 6,200 8,080
France 90 370 1,120 1,850 3,070 4,520 5,920
Austria 20 100 330 800 1,560 2,150 2,520
Belgium 40 70 160 350 610 810 1,180
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(Continued)
1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1888 1896
Russia 20 70 200 920 1,740 2,240 3,100
Italy 10 40 50 330 500 830 1,520
Spain 10 20 100 210 470 740 1,180
Sweden – – 20 100 220 300 510
Netherlands – 10 30 130 250 340 600
Europe 860 2,240 5,540 11,570 22,000 28,630 40,300
U.S.A. 760 1,680 3,470 5,590 9,110 14,400 18,060
World 1,650 3,990 9,380 18,460 34,150 50,150 66,100
Source: David S. Landes, The unbound Prometheus. Technological change and industrial
development in Western Europe from 1750 to the present (second edition; Cambridge 2003)
221.
Table 9: Regional distribution of World Trade, 1876 – 1913 (%)
Region
1876 – 80 1913
Exports Imports Total trade Exports Imports Total trade
Europe 64.2 69.6 66.9 58.9 65.1 62.0
N. America 11.7 7.4 9.5 14.8 11.5 13.2
Latin America 6.2 4.6 5.4 8.3 7.0 7.6
Asia 12.4 13.4 12.9 11.8 10.4 11.1
Africa 2.2 1.5 1.9 3.7 3.6 3.7
Oceania 3.3 3.5 3.4 2.5 2.4 2.4
Source: A.G. Kenwood and A.L. Lougheed, The growth of the international economy,
1820 – 1960 (London 1971) 93.
Table 10: Extension of the railway net, in km
Year Great
Britain
France Belgium Germany Habsburg
Empire
Italy Spain Russia Europe U.S. World
1850 9,757 2,915 854 5,856 1,357 620 28 501 23,100 14,400 37,600
1870 (20,000) 15,544 2,897 18,876 6,112 6,429 5,454 10,731 101,300 85,400 205,200
1890 27,820 33,280 4,526 42,869 15,523 13,629 10,163 30,595 208,000 249,700 566,900
1913 32,623 40,770 4,776 63,378 44,800 18,873 15,351 70,156 321,600 400,197 925,300
Source: Antonio di Vittorio, ed., Historia econûmica de Europa. Siglos XV – XX (Barcelona 2003 and 2007) 271.
The table is taken from the contribution by Giovanni Luigi Fontana on the nineteenth century.
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Table 11: Inventions and innovations per country 1750 – 1950, % of total
Total Great Britain France Germany USA Other
1750 – 1775 30 46.7 16.7 3.3 10.0 23.3
1776 – 1800 68 42.6 32.4 5.9 13.2 5.9
1801 – 1825 95 44.2 22.1 10.5 12.6 10.5
1826 – 1850 129 28.7 22.5 17.8 22.5 8.5
1851 – 1875 163 17.8 20.9 23.9 25.2 12.3
1876 – 1900 204 14.2 17.2 19.1 37.7 11.8
1901 – 1914 87 16.1 8.0 17.2 46.0 12.7
1915 – 1939 146 13.0 4.1 13.0 58.6 11.3
1940 – 1950 34 2.9 0.0 6.7 82.4 8.0
Source: Giovanni Gozzini, Un’idea di giustizia. Globalizzazione e ineguaglianza dalla
rivoluzione industriale a oggi (Turin 2010) 25.
The Great Divergence was caused by the economic rise of some and the non-rise
and sometimes even economic decline of many regions. More specifically, the
gap emerged because the economies of parts of the world began and continued to
grow, which was abnormal, whereas in the rest they did not, which was quite
normal. The fundamental fact to be explained is the beginning or origin of a
historically novel kind of growth that economists tend to call ‘modern economic
growth’. This book deals with: ‘How it all began’. Such growth involves a per
capita rise in real income.24 It is defined as substantial, of course a qualification
that is a matter of debate, but most importantly as sustained. The Great Di-
vergence is studied here as the effect of the fact that some regions in the world
came to know this growth, whereas most of the others didn’t or did only much
later. Discussing the Great Divergence means discussing quite persistent dif-
ferences in development. It is very unlikely that the persistent and increasing
differences as shown in Tables 2 – 11 and Graph 1 could be sufficiently explained
by reference to a punctuated rupture, a sudden coincidence or windfall, whose
effects then continued and increased over time. Surprisingly enough, however,
several scholars think they can. I will return to differences about what can count
as an adequate explanation later on. First some further elucidation is in order
with regard to the explanandum of my analysis.
That explanandum of this book thus is the emergence of modern economic
growth. That type of growth is regarded here as fundamentally distinct from
traditional forms of economic growth, which is not uncontested. Not all scholars
think in terms of a sharp analytical distinction between traditional growth and
modern economic growth as I do in my analysis. In my view though, at least
analytically, the distinction is clear: when modern economic growth emerged, it
24 Such per capita growth usually is referred to as intensive growth in contrast to extensive
growth that refers to an increase in total income.
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was, in contrast to growth in all preceding organic, ‘Malthusian’ economies, based
on a massive and new use of energy sources and raw materials, on new tech-
nologies and new institutions.25 It could become sustained because innovation in
production became all but uninterrupted. To be more specific: with in-
dustrialisation there emerged an economy in Great Britain that was based on
minerals and on fossil fuel, with fossil fuels now also providing power, and in
which technological and institutional innovation was sustained. In particular,
when it comes to the use of minerals and fossil fuel and to technological in-
novation, the economy that emerged with industrialisation in Britain is to my
mind fundamentally different from even the most advanced preceding organic
economies.26 In reality of course, in particular during the first ‘transitional’ phase
of industrialisation, we see continuity and change, a mixture of old and new, but
to my view with the massive use of fossil fuels and minerals an entirely new kind
of economy became possible. Berkeley economic historian Jan de Vries and his
late friend from Wageningen University in the Netherlands, Ad van der Woude,
for example, would not agree. They claimed in their collective magnum opus that
the Dutch economy as the first economy in the world already went through a
phase of modern economic growth (in Dutch the subtitle of their book is: The
first round of modern economic growth) before industrialisation in Britain.27 Jan
de Vries expanded on this thesis and its implication in several articles.28 Ac-
cording to them, the Netherlands actually industrialised fairly late because its
economy already was so modern.29 When one looks at indicators such as ur-
banisation, schooling, mobility, monetisation, political environment and its
system of law or at the behaviour of its economic agents – perfect homines
oeconomici – it indeed already had a modern institutional setting. De Vries and
25 I explicitly want to point out that I use term ‘Malthusian’ here in a general ‘loose’ sense,
referring to the limits to growth in a pre-industrial society and the general tension between
population and resources, and not in the more technical sense in which demographers use it
and in which very specific correlations are postulated between income, mortality and fer-
tility. See for a brief introduction and test of that approach, Crafts and Mills, ‘From Malthus
to Solow’, and Craig, ‘Comment on ‘From Malthus to Solow’, and the references in these texts.
The Malthusian demographical model has three variables: a fertility or birth rate that is
supposed to go down in a period of increasing scarcity and up in a period of decreasing
scarcity, a mortality or death rate that does the opposite and income that is determined by
labour and that over the long run is assumed to be quite stable.
26 See for these concepts Wrigley, Continuity, chance and change, and idem, Energy and the
English Industrial Revolution.
27 De Vries and Van der Woude, The first modern economy, ‘Epilogue’.
28 See for this thesis Jan de Vries, ‘The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution’;
‘Economic growth before and after the Industrial Revolution; ‘The industrious revolution
and economic growth, 1650 – 1830’; The industrious revolution: Consumer behavior and the
household economy, 1650 to the present and ‘Industrious peasants in East and West’. This text
is a comment on Saito, ‘An industrious revolution in an East Asian market economy?’.
29 A point also made by Mokyr, Enlightened economy, 169.
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Van der Woude do not deny that growth as such did peter out in the Dutch
Republic. But in their view, that was not because of some kind of Malthusian
constraint30, e.g. lack of modern sources of energy. Very substantial amounts of
peat were used, in the nineteenth century as much as in the two previous centuries
combined. It moreover was just as cheap to transport coal from Newcastle to
London as from Newcastle to Rotterdam. One may indeed claim that the country
failed to make the transition to the latest energy system. For quite some time the
use of steam engines in production was rare. The initially restricted use of coal,
however, had good economic reasons and when those after a couple of decades no
longer existed, the country soon caught up with the most advanced technologies.
De Vries and Van der Woude regard industrialisation senso stricto, in terms of
steam and factories, as only a – non-indispensable – part of a much broader
process of modern economic growth, and that much broader process in their
view had already started in the Dutch Republic. Moreover, as they wonder, is the
sustained growth of the industrial world indeed sustainable? Is not the post-
industrial modern world now in a position similar to that of the Netherlands in
1700? Basically we are dealing here with a debate about the relative importance of
various motors of growth. My view would be that with coal and especially steam
Britain entered a new economic regime with unheard of potential for growth,
whereas the Dutch Republic with all its institutional modernity ‘only’ presented
the highest but finite last stage of traditional economic growth. In reality, of
course, all distinctions are floating and blurred, but analytically I think that with
steam a new economy was born. I in any case hope to show in the rest of book that
in the eighteenth century in Britain something really novel emerged with huge
and worldwide consequences.
Identifying the Great Divergence with the emergence of modern economic
growth has some important implications. It means that explaining it is not
identical to explaining capitalism as is often simply assumed in texts about ‘the
rise of the West’. Not only because conceptually modern economic growth and
capitalism – here for the sake of convenience and to some extent erroneously
defined as ‘the market economy’31 – are two distinct phenomena, even when they
in practice are often related. There are several examples of capitalist societies (a
very complex, multi-facetted and debated concept anyhow) that did not ‘auto-
matically’ take off into modern economic growth. Adam Smith (1723– 1790) never
discussed the transition from what we here for the sake of convenience and brevity
call ‘mercantile’ to ‘industrial’ capitalism and to modern economic growth be-
30 See for the meaning of that term page pages 66 – 79.
31 For an analysis of the concept and its many meanings see pages 329 – 335. For me capitalism
is not identical to the market economy as it is often loosely described as in capitalism all
goods and services are commodified not just those meant for consumption.
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cause he never thought growth could really be sustained over a long period of time.
Most modern economists following in his footsteps seldom if ever discussed that
distinction and transition, in their case because they came to think that market
competition would sooner or later inevitably bring technological innovation.32
Most followers of Weber also tended to explain the rise of the West in terms of the
rise of capitalism and to look at industrialisation and the growth that accompanied
it as just a phase in that rise. The same goes, be it for quite different reasons, for
scholars such as Fernand Braudel (1902– 1985) and Immanuel Wallerstein. How
exactly the transition from feudalism to capitalism and then to industrial capi-
talism was made, continues to divide Marxist scholars.33 While recognizing that
mercantile capitalism is fundamentally different from industrial capitalism, they
as a rule claim that the former, somehow, produced the latter. Karl Marx (1818–
1883) himself distinguished between two routes in the transition to modern in-
dustry : the really revolutionary one, where the producer may become a merchant,
and a second one in which the merchant takes control over production.34 For him
capitalism before industrialisation was fundamentally different from industrial
capitalism, but still the first one somehow ‘contained’ the second one. Although I
think Wrigley is exaggerating – I personally do see a clear and strong tendency for
modern economic growth to result from the logic of capitalism  la Marx – his
comment that the relationship between capitalism and industrialisation (and
modern economic growth) would be casual rather than causal is in any case a
welcome reminder that industrialisation and modern economic growth are not as
such necessary outcomes of capitalism.35 Not by accident, in current debates the
issue tends to be discussed in different terms, to wit as the transition from ‘Smi-
thian’ growth to ‘Schumpeterian’ growth.36
Identifying the Great Divergence with the first emergence of modern economic
growth also implies that explaining it is not per se identical to explaining in-
dustrialisation either as Marx, Weber and many others tend to suggest. In any
case not if that term is meant to refer solely to the rise of mechanised factory
production. C. Knick Harley rightly points out that “we often loosely, but mis-
takenly [italics mine] use the term “industrialisation” as a synonym for modern
32 See for examples pages 110, 132, 323 – 324.
33 See, for example, the already somewhat dated publications by Holton, Transition from feu-
dalism to capitalism and Hilton, The transition from feudalism to capitalism and the more
recent ones by Wood, Origin of capitalism and Epstein, ‘Rodney Hilton, Marxism and the
transition from feudalism to capitalism’.
34 Karl Marx in Marx Engels Werke (Berlin 1956 – 1990) Volume 25, page 347. From now on
referred to as MEW.
35 Wrigley, Continuity, chance and change, 115. This is true for ‘Smithian’ as well as ‘Marxian’
capitalism. See for those terms pages 329 – 335.
36 See the previous note.
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economic growth.”37 In Britain the emergence of modern economic growth to a
large extent coincided in time with the rise of the factory and the machine, and
probably can also best be symbolised by them, but it clearly was not identical to
their rise as, for example, Parthasarathi assumes in his recent book when he even
goes as far as identifying that revolution solely with what was happening in cotton
and iron production.38 A very substantial part of Britain’s growth over the period
1750 – 1850 occurred in other sectors of manufacturing, outside factories, and not
to forget, in other sectors of the economy like agriculture and services, including
transport.39 The country not only had a relatively large, highly productive sec-
ondary (i. e. manufacturing and industrial) sector but also, which in the end is just
as important for explaining its high GDP per capita, a relatively small, but highly
productive primary (i. e. agricultural) sector. The importance of the service sector
for Britain’s economy at the time can hardly be overestimated, and over time it
further increased.40 That also was the case in countries that industrialised later.
Many countries developed a modern economy with modern economic growth
without going through a phase of massive industrialisation in the literal, re-
stricted sense of the word.41 Some sectors knew more growth and dynamism than
others but to have growth and change in the orders of magnitude we see in Britain
in the long nineteenth century, innovation in terms of hard technology and the
way in which production was organized simply must have occurred over a very
broad front.42 Quite often, moreover, in manufacturing, modern growth ‘created’
increasing productivity as much as or even more than the other way around. One
must be wary anyhow of talking as if the different sectors of modernising
economies can be clearly separated and contrasted with each other in terms of
‘modern’ and ‘non-modern’. Many if not most developments in the service sector
37 Harley, ‘Trade: discovery, mercantilism and technology’, 195.
38 Parthasarathi, Why Europe grew rich, e. g. page 12.
39 See e. g. Harley, ‘Reassessing the Industrial Revolution’, chapter 8, ‘Conclusion’, and Griffin,
Short history of the British Industrial Revolution chapter 6.
40 See e. g. Cain and Hopkins, British imperialism, 1688 – 2000, chapter 3, and Chapman,
Merchant enterprise in Britain, passim. See for the relative share of the service sector in total
employment and GDP Table 19. Eisenberg, Englands Weg in die Marktgesellschaft is entirely
devoted to showing the crucial importance of the service sector in Britain’s economy during
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Around 1800, more people worked in the service
sector than in the manufacturing and industrial sectors combined. Overall, in several esti-
mates for the period 1700 – 1860, growth in Britain’s service sector is estimated to have been
somewhat higher than in the manufacturing and industrial sectors. (See tables 4 and 5 in the
book on pages 113 and 115). For a brief synthesis and evaluation, see her concluding
comments with many relevant references on pages 107 – 118.
41 One might think of the Netherlands, the Scandinavian countries and to some extent even
France.
42 Bruland, ‘Industrialization and technological change’ in particular page 146. See also Mokyr,
Enlightened economy, chapter 7.
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in particular its further ‘globalisation’ were only possible thanks to technological
breakthroughs like trains, steamships, the telegraph and the telephone. The same
goes for agriculture where the introduction of all sorts of machinery and artificial
fertilisers had a huge impact. That it is quite misleading to associate modern
economic growth exclusively with industry of course also shows in the fact that
currently the rich and developed world is ‘post-industrial’ with the bulk of added
value generated in the service sector.43
This does not mean that industry would be just another economic sector in
the process of economic growth. It as a rule has a fundamental role to play in the
process of taking-off for all economies, except maybe for very small city-states
that can focus almost entirely on services. The introduction of machines and
factories in pre-industrial society makes it possible to generate big increases in
productivity, employing masses of not very highly skilled, relatively cheap la-
bourers. Expenses in terms of building up human capital in that stage are still
relatively low, as only a mall group of highly skilled specialists is needed to run
production processes. To a certain extent this can also apply to the modern-
isation and mechanisation of agriculture, in case it turns into a large-scale
business. Industrialisation can so create relatively high economic gains at rel-
atively low economic costs. Services, overall, require a higher level of skills
whereas increases in their productivity tend to be lower and more costly than in
manufacturing. An additional advantage of industry over services is the fact
that, again overall, it is much easier to export commodities than services.44
As indicated, the question I want to tackle here has usually been discussed in
terms of a ‘rise of the West’, or at least a ‘rise of Western Europe’. Even now many
authors still simply juxtapose ‘the West’ or (Western) Europe and ‘the Rest’. That
the category ‘the Rest’ is rather strange should be obvious. But actually, when it
comes to the economic history of early modern Europe – and that is the period the
majority of my comments will refer to, there is no such thing as ‘(Western) Eu-
rope’. Fundamental differences existed between regions. The trajectory taken by
‘Western Europe’, roughly the part of Europe to the West of an imaginary Saint
Petersburg-Trieste line, was very different from that taken by Central and Eastern
Europe in almost all relevant respects, e. g. agricultural development, urbanisation,
the rise of free labour and a bourgeoisie, the importance of intercontinental trade
43 See e. g. The Pocket World in Figures 2013 Edition, 47. Data, unless otherwise indicated refer
to the year ending 31 December 2010. See, however, Ha-joon Chang’s claim that we should be
careful not to underestimate the importance of industry even in so-called ‘post-industrial
economies’. See his 23 things they do not tell you about capitalism, chapter 9.
44 I am paraphrasing Studwell, How Asia works, 59 – 61. For the difficulty to increase pro-
ductivity in services see note 331.
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etc.45 But even if we leave out East and Central Europe, and focus only on ‘Western’
Europe during the early modern era, we are still faced with such differences in
terms of wealth and development that Robert Allen described them in terms of yet
another Great Divergence.46 During the early modern era the South – roughly, the
Mediterranean world – was increasingly surpassed in terms of dynamism, de-
velopment and wealth, by the Northwest, i. e. the region on the shores of the North
Sea. Real wages for ordinary labour in the South decreased substantially and the
region showed clear signs of stagnation and impoverishment.
45 See Aston and Philpin, The Brenner debate and Chirot, The origins of backwardness in
Eastern Europe.
46 Allen, ‘The Great Divergence in European wages and prices from the Middle Ages to the First
World War’.
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Source: Robert C. Allen, ‘The great divergence in European wages and prices from the
Middle Ages to the First World War’, Explorations in Economic History 38 (2001) 411 – 447,
page 428.
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What also tends to be brushed over in rise-of-the-West stories is the fact that
economic development insofar as it manifested itself in economic growth in the
West before the first Industrial Revolution, even in Western Europe, was not
linear. Even in Western Europe – that scarcely knew any per capita income
growth for skilled and unskilled labour over the period as a whole anyway – the
economy did not grow uninterruptedly. It did so with ups, downs and phases of
stagnation, and with differing trajectories. The early modern period from 1500 –
1800 was definitely not a period of a permanent unprecedented rise in the West as
e. g. Acemoglu and his colleagues suggest.47 The economies of Western Europe
undeniably became further developed in the centuries before Britain’s economy
took off but that development overall did not yet create substantial growth nor a
real gap in terms of wealth between various regions.
Table 12: Comparative levels of GDP per capita (United Kingdom in 1820 = 100)
c. 1500 c. 1700 c. 1750 1820 1870
UK 57 73 87 100 187
Netherlands 67 109 109 107 162
Belgium 58 69 76 77 158
France n.a. n.a. n.a. 72 110
Italy 83 71 76 65 88
Spain 63 61 58 62 71
Sweden 64 66 67 70 97
Poland 50 – 54 38 – 42 34 – 37 41 55
Russia n.a. n.a. n.a. 40 55
Turkey n.a. 35 38 40 52
Source: Stephen Broadberry and Kevin H. O’Rourke, ‘Introduction to Volume 1’ in: Ste-
phen Broadberry and Kevin H. O’Rourke, eds. , The Cambridge Economic History of
Modern Europe. Volume I: 1700 – 1870 (Cambridge 2010) 1 – 4, page 2.
Table 13: Growth rates of GDP per capita (% per annum) in European countries, 1500 – 1870
1500 – 1700 1700 – 1750 1750 – 1820 1820 – 1870
UK 0.12 0.35 0.20 1.25
Netherlands 0.24 0.00 –0.02 0.83
Belgium 0.09 0.19 0.02 1.44
France n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.85
Italy –0.08 0.14 –0.22 0.61
47 Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, ‘The rise of Europe: Atlantic trade’, 546: “In fact between




1500 – 1700 1700 – 1750 1750 – 1820 1820 – 1870
Spain –0.02 –0.10 0.10 0.27
Sweden 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.65
Poland –0.13 –0.24 0.21 0.59
Russia n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.64
Turkey n.a. 0.16 0.07 0.52
Source: Stephen Broadberry and Kevin H. O’Rourke, ‘Introduction to Volume 1’ in: Ste-
phen Broadberry and Kevin H. O’Rourke, eds. , The Cambridge Economic History of
Modern Europe. Volume I: 1700 – 1870 (Cambridge 2010) 1 – 4, page 2.
The comments just made indicate that it is important to be precise about what
regions actually diverged during the Great Divergence. It is important to realise
that the Great Divergence caused by the emergence of modern economic growth
first and foremost marked a bifurcation in the economic trajectories of differing
parts of the world, to wit Western Europe and its offshoots, and the rest of the
world, apart from, to some extent and only from the end of the nineteenth century
onwards, Japan. It therefore does not make sense to follow Goody’s advice and
“… look not for a European miracle, but rather for a Eurasian miracle.”48 Dif-
ferences in wealth and development between various parts of Eurasia simply
became too big for that. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, overall, Asia
became a very poor continent. There simply was no ‘Eurasian’ miracle then. This
comment also applies to Jared Diamond’s, Guns, germs and steel, a book that is
often referred to in debates on the Great Divergence, but that actually does not
explain the main gap between rich and poor in the world at all, as it focuses
almost entirely on what parts of Eurasia shared as opposed to the rest of the
world, whereas only a very tiny fragment of it deals, very superficially, with what
might have caused the enormous differences in wealth in Eurasia, where some
two-thirds of the world’s population actually lived.
This, however, does not mean that one can treat the West as one un-
differentiated entity. When it comes to discussing and locating the Great Di-
vergence there, one should opt for a mix of an exclusively British and a pan-
(West-) European perspective. Great Britain was the first and for a couple of
decades for all intents and purposes the only major industrial country. Con-
sidering the fact that its economy, or in any case that of England, had been quite
different from that of the rest of Western Europe for already quite some time, this
need not really surprise us.49
48 Goody, Eurasian Miracle, back-flap.
49 For some distinct characteristics of pre-industrial England see Wrigley, ‘Divergence of
England’, and Macfarlane, Invention of the modern world. http://fortnightlyreview.co.uk The
2012 Spring –Summer Serial. In this text I will, as a rule, refer to Great Britain, consisting of
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Table 14: Some indicators of the enormous lead of Great Britain in the middle of the
nineteenth century
Great Britain France Germany
1850 population in millions of people 21 35 33
1850 coal consumption in millions of tons 49 4.4 6.7
1850 iron consumption in tons 1,970,000 600,000 420,000
1850 steam power in HP 1,290,000 370,000 260,000
1850 railroads in kilometres 10,000 6,600 3,200
1840s total cotton consumption in tons 2,300,000 610,000 410,000
1850 – 1860 percentages of global trade 23 11 9
1850 index of industrialisation, UK 1900 is 100 64 20 15
Source: I took these figures from, Joel Mokyr, The Enlightened economy. An economic
history of Britain 1700 – 1850 (New Haven and London 2009) 476. See there for the original
sources.
Table 15: Per capita real income in 1990 international PPP dollars
Year UK France Germany
1820 1,706 1,135 1,077
1870 3,190 1,876 1,839
Source: Angus Maddison, Contours of the world economy, 1 – 2030 AD. Essays in macro-
economic history (Oxford 2007) 382.
As I already indicated, the rise of modern economic growth in Britain – and I
want to really emphasize this – manifested itself not just in industrial pro-
duction, far from it. Even at the time it was the workshop of the world, the
commodity trade balance of Great Britain as a rule was negative. The deficit,
however, was more than compensated by a surplus on the balance of invisible
trade (i. e. business services, shipping and overseas investment income).50 In the
beginning of the twentieth century, half the tonnage of all the fleets in the world
was British. In 1913, some twenty-two per cent of total exports of the United
Kingdom consisted of invisible exports (transport, banking, insurance and fi-
nance). No less than fifty per cent of all foreign direct investment in the world at
that moment came from the United Kingdom alone.51 Great Britain already after
a couple of decades of industrial primacy became the service centre rather than
the workshop of the world.
It is only fair that Britain should hold centre stage in this text. On the other
England, Wales and Scotland, as the entity that will be compared to China and other regions
or nations of the world.
50 See, for the period 1850 – 1911, Cain and Hopkins, British imperialism 1688 – 2000, 158.
51 See fur further comments and references Vries, ‘Europa und die Welt’, pages 411, 414 and 417
See for two quite distinct approaches to show the importance of the service sector, Cain and
Hopkins, British imperialism, and Wrigley, Energy and the English Industrial Revolution,
chapter 5.
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hand a more European perspective is essential as a lot of what happened in
Britain can only be understood against the backdrop of a shared Western Eu-
ropean history, as can be seen – which of course as such is yet another reason not
to focus exclusively on Britain – in the relative ease with which most of Western
Europe caught up. There must have been strong Western European con-
genialities. That does not mean that countries that industrialised after Britain
did so by simply copying the forerunner. There is no such thing as a single model
of nineteenth-century industrialisation.52 There are many different ways to
create an economy with modern economic growth although certain basic in-
gredients over time have proven to be indispensable. I only refer to the following
disparate list of ‘pre-requisites’: massive availability of fossil fuels in the field of
energy (coal, natural gas and oil, nuclear energy or modern wind, water, and
solar energy or a combination of these, to provide heat, power and light); arti-
ficial fertilisers; synthetic fibres and plastics; iron, steel and concrete; chemical
dyestuffs and medicines; continuous technological innovation, which means
institutionalisation of scientific research and technological development, a
permanent improvement of human capital, institutional flexibility and an effi-
cient state infrastructure.
Debates about the Great Divergence tend to focus on the take-off phase of
modern economic growth; that is the moment when this growth began. It, of
course, was Walt Rostow who introduced that concept. Scholarship meanwhile
has completely distanced itself from the exact way in which he implemented the
concept in his stage-theory.53 But I think his imagery is still very helpful, and I
use the concept here in the rather more loose interpretation by Hobsbawm, who
describes the ‘take-off ’ as the process in which “the shackles were taken off the
productive power of human societies, which henceforth became capable of the
constant, rapid and up to the present limitless multiplication of men, goods and
services.”54 In my analysis, the focus will also be on this moment when the
economy, as we can see with the benefit of hindsight, the economy entered a new
phase. All the same, I again want to repeat that the essence of modern growth and
development is their sustained or preferably even self-sustaining character,
which means that in my explanations I will have to refer to not just what lifted
Britain’s economy up but also to what kept it in the air and made it rise ever
higher, to stick to the aircraft metaphor.
52 See e. g. O’Brien, ‘Do we have a typology for the study of European industrialization in the
XIXth century?, and Verley, L’¦chelle du monde, chapter 3.
53 Rostow, Stages of economic growth, 39.
54 Hobsbawm, Age of revolution, 45.
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2. Taking off and falling (further) behind
The focus of my analysis here will be on Great Britain and China. The choice of
Great Britain, the country where the first take-off took place, is quite obvious as
is the choice of the period discussed here, the period from 1688 to 1849, i. e. from
the Glorious Revolution onwards to the formal end of mercantilism, the period
when the actual take-off took place. When it comes to analysing parts of the
world that were left behind economically speaking, selection is unavoidable.
From an analytical point of view, it is not much use, on the contrary, to try to
provide a general overview in which ‘the West’ is simply confronted with an
undifferentiated ‘Rest’. We will not discuss the situation in Central and Eastern
and in Southern Europe here, regions that of course felt the impact of economic
changes in Western Europe quite intensively and to a certain extent saw clear
‘sprouts of industrial development’, but that did not really catch up.55 Japan, of
course, did start to industrialise quite early and provides a much-studied, quite
idiosyncratic case of a non-Western country that already with the beginning of
the First World War was firmly on the road to becoming an industrial nation. Up
until now it nevertheless hardly figures in the debates that explicitly deal with the
Great Divergence. Would it be farfetched to suppose that the California School
tends to ignore it because its favourite coal-and-colonies explanation simply
does not fit a country that had hardly any coal and no colonies and yet it took off
in a situation that looked even more like a Malthusian trap than that of China at
the time? To me the case of industrialising Japan is ideal for illustrating the
extent to which institutions matter in explaining the wealth and poverty of
nations.56 In particular when it comes to manufacturing, India in many respects
55 The amount of literature I could refer to here of course is limitless. For the pre-industrial
period I refer to the literature under note 45 plus Cerman, Villagers and lords in Eastern
Europe, for Eastern and Central Europe, and to Lains and Ferreira da Silva, Histûria eco-
nûmica de Portugal ; Ringrose, Spain, Europe and the Spanish miracle (for a fairly positive
interpretation of the situation since 1700), and Malanima, Fine del primate, for the situation
in Portugal, Spain and Italy. For the situation in the nineteenth century for all these regions a
brief first introduction can be found in Teich and Porter, Industrial revolution in national
context and a state-of-the-art synthesis in Berend, Economic history of nineteenth-century
Europe.
56 For an analysis dealing with the question to what extent the ideas of the California School
might apply to the case of Japan, see Carmen Gruber, ‘At the Edges of the Pacific. What the
California School Means for Japan’, unpublished Master Thesis at the University of Vienna.
The text can be downloaded on request. Please mail peer.vries@univie.ac.at. For some telling
data see Kaoru Sugihara, ‘The state and the industrious revolution in Tokugawa Japan’,
GEHN Working Paper no 2 (London, London School of Economics 2004) figures 1 and 2. For
literature in which directly or indirectly the Japanese case is directly or indirectly brought
into the debate see note (for its standard of living) notes 78 (for the East Asian development
path/ and the industrious revolution) plus Osama Saito, ‘All poor but no paupers: a Japanese
perspective on the Great Divergence, Economic and Social History at Cambridge’, The
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was a highly advanced economy, although no one to my knowledge has ever
claimed it could have become the world first industrial nation. But its case has
only very recently, with the book by Prasannan Parthasarathi, been introduced
with a full-scale monograph into the Great Divergence debate as it is currently
being waged.57 I have never come across an author who claimed that (parts of)
Africa would have been in a position to have an industrial revolution before or at
about the same time as Great Britain. Robert Allen explicitly claims it did not.58
So do Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in their Why nations fail :
Africa was the part of the world with the institutions least able to take advantage of the
opportunities made available by the Industrial Revolution. For at least the last one
thousand years, outside of small pockets and during limited periods of time, Africa has
lagged behind the rest of the world in terms of technology, political development and
prosperity.59
Gareth Austin, without any doubts one of the main experts in the field of African
economic history, apparently agrees and made the following interesting ob-
servation.
… I would not claim that African economies were, on average, on a growth path equal to
those followed in the Lower Yangzi Valley or Western Europe … No such path was
available under the environmental constraints they faced … The economic premise of
the external slave trades was precisely that African labour was more productive, in
market terms, in the continents to which slaves were taken than at home. The im-
plication is that these trades, even the Atlantic one, reinforced rather than originated
Africa’s relatively poor economic position compared to Western Europe (and parts of
Asia).60
I can only agree with these scholars and refer to their work and the literature it is
based on.61 Many parts of the continent were hit by a complex set of vicious
Leverhulme Lectures Podcast. The amount of literature on Japan’s beginning indu-
strialisation after the Meiji Restoration of course is enormous.
57 Parthasarathi, Why Europe grew rich. There of course already existed several relevant articles
dealing with the subject. I only refer here to two very recent ones: Washbrook, ‘India in the
early modern world economy’ and Roy, ‘Knowledge and divergence from the perspective of
Early Modern India’. For several attempts to measure early modern India’s wealth see note
78.
58 Allen, Global economic history, 92. In chapter 7 of this book Allen gives a compact analysis of
Africa’s economic predicaments.
59 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail, 115.
60 Austin, ‘The ‘reversal of fortune’ thesis and the compression of history’, 1019. See also idem,
‘Resources, techniques and strategies south of the Sahara’.
61 For further literature analysing the long-term economic (non-) development of Africa, see
Bertocchi and Canova, ‘Did colonization matter for growth?; Englebert, ‘Pre-colonial in-
stitutions, post-colonial states, and economic development in tropical Africa; James, Fens-
ke,‘The causal history of Africa: a response to Hopkins’, http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/
24458/ posted 16 – 8-2010; Hopkins, ‘The new economic history of Africa’, and finally several
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circles caused by ‘bad geography’, negative effects of slave trade, slavery, colo-
nialism and imperialism, a dangerous specialisation on primary products and
resources with volatile and often declining prices, bad institutions, e. g. weak and
often even ‘failed’ states. We must be very careful though not to simply ignore
differences of time and place or simply write off a continent on which some
countries have surprisingly high growth rates and show more dynamism than
Western Europe’s economies at the moment. But for the early modern period, an
African take-off simply is too unlikely to be explicitly and extensively discussed
here. For the Islamic world too, voices claiming it might have taken of first, are
absent. The rare studies that deal with its economic history in periods that are
relevant to our topic from a comparative perspective, e. g. those by Şevket Pamuk
and recently Timur Kuran basically focus on the question of why capitalism did
not or only slowly and partially emerge in the Ottoman Empire. But they never
suggest that modern economic growth could have emerged there earlier than in
Western Europe.62
The situation is quite different in the case of North America. It looks as if it is
almost taken for granted that it would catch up quickly. Its fast growth at least is
hardly ever really regarded as an issue in general debates on the Great Di-
vergence. At the time of Britain’s industrialisation, it already was a highly de-
veloped part of the West. According to Paul Bairoch (1930 – 1999) real income
per capita of the United States surpassed that of the United Kingdom already in
the 1890s, whereas real wages for industrial labour in several parts of what were
to become the United States already were higher than those even in London in
the eighteenth century.63 Industrial production of the United States surpassed
that of the United Kingdom in the 1880s.64 There of course is a very extensive
literature on the economic history of the United States and Canada, but, and that
is decisive here, developments there have as yet hardly if at all been taken on
board in the Great Divergence debate. Explicit reference to economic develop-
publications by Nathan Nunn. See his website at Harvard University. For literature specifi-
cally dealing with the slave trade and it consequences see pages 253 – 262. For literature that
focuses more on the contemporary situation, be it with historical background information,
see Easterly and Levine, ‘Africa’s growth tragedy’; Keefer and Knack ‘Why don’t poor coun-
tries catch up?’; Mills, Why Africa is poor and what Africans can do about it ; Sachs and.
Warner, ‘Sources of slow growth in African economies’, and Van der Veen, What went wrong
with Africa?
62 For publications by Pamuk see www.ata.boun.edu.tr/sevket.pamuk.htm and for publications
by Kuran see http://econ.duke.edu/people/kuran. Donald Quataert published several in-
teresting texts about Ottoman economic history and in particular about the development of
industry in the Ottoman Empire, but he never used an explicitly comparative approach,
trying to connect his work to the Great-Divergence debate. See for his work http://
www2.binghamton.edu/history/people/faculty/donald.html.
63 See Bairoch, Victoires et d¦boires, Volume II, 252 – 253, and Allen, Global economic history,
69.
64 Di Vittorio, Historia econûmica de Europa, 253.
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ment in Central and South America also is still rather scarce in debates on the
Great Divergence, although comparing what happened there to what happened
in the Northern hemisphere of the American continent has always been quite
popular. Those comparisons definitely throw light on the central question of this
book, so I will repeatedly refer to them.65 What is becoming increasingly
problematic about them is that they up until very recently and almost without
exception started from several assumptions that now are becoming heavily
contested. Basically all the scholars who dominated the debates on why North
America became so rich and Latin America ended up being so poor – we will
encounter several of them further on in this book – took the following claims for
proven facts: (1) Latin America soon after it had been conquered overall became
very poor ;66 (2) it was characterised by extreme inequality of income and wealth
and (3) by coercive and extractive institutions that ensured that this these in-
equalities were perpetuated, and (4) on top of that a substantial part of its wealth
was drained off to Spain and Portugal. For (the north of) what is now called the
United States and Canada, premises for growth were almost the opposite as
incomes and wealth were less unequally spread, the mass of the population had a
relatively high purchasing power, labour predominantly was free and wealth was
not siphoned off. The southern parts of the United States of course had some-
thing of an intermediate status aparte, particularly, but not exclusively, before
the abolition of slavery in the 1860s. All the main explanations of the gap in
wealth in the New World in the nineteenth and twentieth century have basically
shared these premises.
Now, however, several articles have been published on the economic history of
Spanish Latin America that very seriously question those premises and that, to
the extent that their claims are correct, which has already been fiercely con-
tested67, would require a fundamental rethinking of what needs to be explained
and what can be regarded as a valid explanation. The most efficient way to show
what these recent revisionist articles claim is simply to quote them extensively.
This is the abstract of an article by scholars who have the explicit goal of bringing
(Spanish) Latin America into the Great Divergence debate by comparing in-
comes there with incomes in Western Europe, and other parts of the world.
We show that nominal wages and prices were on average much higher than in Western
Europe or in Asia, a reflection of the low value of silver that must have had con-
sequences for the competitiveness of the Latin American economies. Labour scarcity
65 For a recent overview of the positions in this debate see Engerman and Sokoloff Economic
development in the Americas since 1500, in particular chapter 1.
66 How wealthy, and populous, the Americas were ‘before Columbus’ is a matter of debate. For a
very positive overall view of their wealth and development see Mann, 1491.
67 Allen, Murphy and Schneider, ‘Colonial origins of the Divergence in the Americas’.
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was the second salient feature of Spanish Latin America and resulted in real wages
much above subsistence and in some cases (Mexico, Bolivia, Argentina) comparable to
levels in North-western Europe. For Mexico, this was caused by the dramatic decline of
the population after the Conquest. For Bolivia, the driving force was the boom in silver
mining in Potos that created a huge demand for labour. In the case of Argentina, low
population density was a pre-colonial feature. Perhaps due to a different pattern of
depopulation, the real wages of other regions (Peru, Colombia and Chile) were much
lower, and only increased above subsistence during the first half of the 18th century.68
This is the abstract of another revisionist article:
Neither were wages low nor were heights short by the international standards of the
period. Thus, living standards of the Spanish Americans compare favourably with
those of other regions of the world, including Europe. As in many parts of the West, a
trend towards deterioration of real wages is observed in Spanish America at the end of
the period. Our findings suggest that the Great Divergence in living standards between
Spanish America and the developed Western countries might have taken place mainly
after the Independence.69
According to the view that is still current, wages were not only low but basically
also quite exceptional in the sense that free labour would have been the exception
and all sorts of coerced labour the rule. Several authors now claim that the focus
on coerced labour and extractive institutions has been unjustified as their im-
portance became quite small over time.70 The ‘classic story’ of persistent in-
equality in wealth and incomes is also under attack. Jeffrey Williamson, in one of
his many iconoclastic articles, claims that this pessimistic belief would be a
myth. It, so he writes, is in any case not supported by the admittedly small
amount of available evidence. That evidence does not suggest that pre-industrial
Latin America overall – he uses evidence from the period 1790 – 1870 – was
unambiguously more unequal than pre-industrial Northwest Europe – for this
region he uses evidence for England, the Dutch Republic and France for various
moments in the eighteenth century. He, however, adds – which is not in full
concordance with claims by the authors cited above – that Latin America was
poorer than north-western Europe and that poorer societies have smaller sur-
pluses for elites to extract. Therefore its extraction rates, indicating the part of
the actually available societal surplus that is appropriated by the elite, would
have been higher.71
68 Arroyo Abad, Davies, and Van Zanden, ‘Between conquest and independence’.
69 Rafa¦l Dobado-Gonzlez and H¦ctor Garca-Montero, ‘Neither so low nor so short: Wages
and heights in Bourbon Spanish America from an international comparative perspective’,
EHES Working papers in economic history number 14, 2012. http://ehes.org/EHES_No14.
pdf
70 See e. g. Dobado-Gonzlez and Garca-Montero, ‘Neither so low nor so short, 1 – 4.
71 Williamson, Trade and poverty, 154 – 156.
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The idea that the Spanish colonies in Latin America would have been
squeezed by their motherland is also disputed now, in particular in work done by
Regina Grafe and Alejandra Irigoin. This is the abstract of one of their articles:
This article revises the traditional view of Spain as a predatory colonial state that
extracted revenue from natural resources and populations in the Americas while of-
fering little in return. Using eighteenth-century Spanish American treasury accounts,
we show that local elites exerted important control not only over revenue collection, as
previously argued by the authors, but also over expenditure allocation. The Spanish
colonial state developed into a stakeholder model, in which local interests were deeply
invested in the survival and expansion of empire. The means of co-optation were intra-
colonial transfers, as well as credit relations between the state and colonial individuals
and corporations, which guaranteed that much of colonial revenue was immediately
fed back into the local economy, while minimizing enforcements costs.72
Grafe and Irigoin in this article claim that by the late eighteenth century,
transfers in Spanish America to the metropolis made up only just over five per
cent of Spanish American revenue: ninety-five per cent of the taxes raised in the
Spanish Americas were spent in the Spanish Americas. These quite revisionist
views have up until now not really been digested by scholarship so it is not clear
what to think of them. They in any case have not yet had much impact on the way
in which Latin America’s ‘backwardness’ has been discussed. But I guess they
soon will.
3. Two case studies: Great Britain and China in the very long
eighteenth century
The core of the Great Divergence debate as it has been waged over the last fifteen
years or so has undoubtedly been the comparison between early modern Great
Britain and Qing China (1644 – 1911). By far most of the contributions to the
debate have focused on that comparison. It will therefore also be at the heart of
this text. In discussing Britain, I will, where helpful, also refer to other parts of
Western Europe. When it comes to ‘the rest’ the focus will be on China, but there
will also be comments on the rest of Asia, the Americas and Africa. This book
does not aim to provide an overview of concrete developments over time in a
narrative trying to give full coverage of the history of Great Britain and China in
the very long eighteenth century, let alone the history of the world. In that sense it
is not a history book. It discusses central questions and positions with regard to
the origins of modern economic growth in the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
72 This is the abstract from Grafe and Irigoin, ‘A stakeholder empire’. See also their, ‘The
Spanish Empire and its legacy’.
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turies using Great Britain and China as illustrative case studies to support an-
alytical claims.
For China, the focus will be on the period from 1683 to 1842, i. e. from the
beginning of effective Qing rule in the country till the end of the First Opium War
when, after its efflorescence under the Kangxi (1661 – 1722), Yongzheng (1723 –
1735) and Qianlong (1736 – 1795) emperors, it had become clear that China was
no longer a formidable power politically and economically.73 The choice for
China during the period of Qing rule was and is not an obvious one. In all
probability China reached its highest level of development and wealth – that is
before the twentieth century – during the period of the Song Dynasty (907 –
1276). Song China in many respects was more developed and more dynamic than
Qing China. Mark Elvin, in his path-breaking The pattern of the Chinese past,
contrasts the dynamism of China under the Song and partly even under the Yuan
(1215/1276 – 1368) with what he regards as the beginning of technological
stagnation and decreasing dynamism from as early as the fourteenth century
onward.74 Economist and economic historian Eric Jones is even more explicit
and claims that, “China came within a hair’s breath of industrialising in the
fourteenth century.”75 The question why there was no breakthrough under the
Song and why (probably) the Song achievement was never repeated is still open
and, what is more surprising, all but ignored, by the Californians as well. Debates
about the Great Divergence almost exclusively focus on the question why Qing
China did not take off. As I confine myself here to synthesising and evaluating
existing scholarship, my references will also primarily be to the Qing era, al-
though there are very good reasons in future, pending further research to pay far
more attention to the Song period.76
In preceding paragraphs I as a matter of fact already indicated when I think
the great diverging actually took place by comparing the situation in Britain and
China in what one might call the very long eighteenth century. In all Californian
texts, without much further ado and explication, the beginning of the Industrial
Revolution in Britain is regarded as the starting point of the Great Divergence. I
think that in principle is correct, but a couple of comments nevertheless are in
order. As Pomeranz himself now admits, Great Britain in all probability already
73 For the concept ‘efflorescence’ that I will use quite regularly in this text, see Goldstone,
‘Efflorescences and economic growth in world history’.
74 Elvin, Pattern of the Chinese past, chapters 2 and 3, and idem, Another history, chapters 2
and 3.
75 Jones, European Miracle, 160. See also his Growth recurring and ‘The real question about
China’. To my view the real medieval efflorescence of China was already receding in the
fourteenth century.
76 See for a very recent analysis Kent Deng, Demystifying growth and development in North
Song China, 960 – 1127. Working Paper 178 (2013) London School of Economics and Political
Science.
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before industrialisation was wealthier than the wealthiest parts of China.77 Full
well realising how risky it is to make firm statements in this respect, a new
consensus appears to be emerging that the wealthiest parts of China at the end of
the eighteenth century were not as wealthy as Britain (or the Dutch Republic and
the United States) after all – as Californians had enthusiastically been claiming –
but that on the other hand as compared to the gap that emerged over the long
nineteenth century, the differences were still relatively small. According to the
most recent trustworthy estimates, Great Britain and the Dutch Republic at the
eve of the Great Divergence apparently were wealthier than any part of Asia.78
The differences, however, though small compared to what they would later be-
come, were not negligible. At the very low-income levels we are discussing here,
every penny counts and those differences may well have given the wealthier
regions a head start. They in any case show that talk about ‘Europe’s back-
wardness’ at the time is just fashionable ‘Euro-bashing’. Robert Allen produced
the following table comparing the real income of labourers in various parts of the
world via a so-called ‘welfare ratio’. This ratio indicates how many times one
fully employed male adult labourer earned the amount of money needed to
support his four-person family at ‘bare-bones level’, that is calculated by Allen to
be at 365 dollars from 1990.79
77 Pomeranz, ‘Ten years after’, 24.
78 For China the optimism has been toned down in Allen, ‘Wages, prices, and living standards in
China, 1738 – 1925’. See also Allen, Global economic history, 3 – 14. For India it has been done
in Broadberry and Gupta, ‘The early modern great divergence’, iidem, ‘Indian GDP, 1600 –
1871. Some preliminary estimates and a comparison with Britain’, Asian Historical Eco-
nomics Conference Beijing 19 – 21 May 2011, and in Gupta and Ma, ‘Europe in an Asian
Mirror’. Examples of a far more optimist view can be found in Parthasarathi, ‘Rethinking
wages and competitiveness in the eighteenth century ; in idem, ‘Agriculture, labour, and the
standard of living in eighteenth-century India’, and in Sivramkrishna, ‘Ascertaining living
standards in erstwhile Mysore, Southern India, from Francis Buchanan’s journey of 1800 –
1801’. For a quite positive image of the economy of Tokugawa Japan, see Hanley, Everyday
things in premodern Japan. Optimism here is somewhat toned down by Jean-Pascal Bassino
and Debin Ma, ‘Japanese wages and living standards in 1720 – 1913: an international com-
parison’, Paper for the Conference Towards a Global History of Prices and Wages, Utrecht
19 – 21 Augustus 2004; Jan Pascal Bassino and four colleagues, ‘Japan and the Great Diver-
gence 730 – 1872’, Third European Congress on World and Global History, held at LSE, 14 – 17
April 2011, and Osamu Saito, ‘Wages, inequality and pre-modern growth’, Working Paper
Hitotsubashi University Research Unit for Statistical Analysis in Social Sciences. Then finally
there has been research with regard to the Ottoman Empire that is not so much toning down
optimism but showing that in comparison to this region too, north-western Europe in the
eighteenth century was wealthier. I refer to Pamuk and Ozmucur, ‘Real wages and standards
of living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489 – 1914’.
79 Allen, Global economic history, 12. In Maddison The world economy, the real income of
several African countries is estimated to have been much lower than 365 US dollars of 1990.
For Zaire for the year 1998 Maddison even gives a figure as low as 220 of such dollars. See
page 224. That is not credible See for a critique of Maddison’s approach, with reference to
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Table 16: Welfare ratios of ordinary labourers in Europe, America and Asia, indicating the
ratio of income to subsistence
1500 – 49 1550 – 99 1600 – 49 1650 – 99 1700 – 49 1750 – 99 1800 – 49
North
America
Boston 1.44 2.32 3.00 4.17
Philadelphia 4.84 5.40
Maryland 3.67 3.35 4.18
Latin
America
Potos 1.83 1.82 1.75 1.71














2.89 2.21 1.65 2.03 2.79 2.52 3.15
Antwerp 2.88 2.87 2.98 2.48 2.75 2.48 2.32





Valencia 2.46 1.65 1.7 1.87 1.82 1.35
Madrid 1.99 1.77 1.71 1.65 1.39 0.99 0.73
Florence 1.29 1.52 2.35 1.92 1.64 1.82
Milan 3.28 2.07 1.82 1.99 1.77 1.35
Naples 2.46 1.65 1.70 1.87 1.82 1.35
Leipzig 1.99 1.77 1.71 1.65 1.39 0.99 0.73
Vienna 1.29 1.52 2.35 1.92 1.64 1.82
somewhat different data, Morten Jerven, ‘An unlevel playing field: national income estimates
and reciprocal comparison in global economic history’, Journal of Global History 2012 (7)
107 – 128. Compare J. Bradford DeLong, ‘Estimating world GDP, one million B.C. – present’,
on his Website at Berkeley under econ161. I regard his preferred estimates of average global




1500 – 49 1550 – 99 1600 – 49 1650 – 99 1700 – 49 1750 – 99 1800 – 49
Asia
Beijing 1.25 1.04 0.79
Lower
Yangzi
0.78 2.17 1.79 1.15 0.78
Delhi 2.96 2.99 1.30
Bengal 1.39 0.83 0.84
Source: Robert C. Allen, Tommy E. Murphy and Eric B. Schneider, ‘The colonial origins of
the Divergence in the Americas: A labour market approach’, The Journal of Economic
History 72, 4 (2012) 863 – 894, Online Appendix, page 31, Table 4.
They actually leave out some unavoidable costs like those of housing. Allen’s
calculation as such is not unproblematic. A fundamental problem is that
worldwide the bulk of people were not wage-labourers, let alone that they would
work for wages full-time. On the other hand, in families with wageworkers there
very often was more than one income. Over the period from the 1780s to the
1860s, the contribution of other family members to total family income in
Britain, for example, hovered between ten and forty per cent depending on time
and type of occupation.80
Allen and others who are sceptical about several Californian claims, probably,
at least in these calculations, may be somewhat too revisionist. The difference
between Britain and China overall might have been smaller than the figures
presented by them suggest. In Britain wage labour was quite normal and rela-
tively well paid; in China, by contrast, it was very exceptional and relatively badly
paid. So the figures used for that country here in all probability underestimate
incomes. But still, firm doubts that Britain was wealthier no longer exist. What
really matters then is how important that existing difference in wealth on the
level of ordinary incomes might have been for economic development. Allen
himself emphasises the possibility provided by a higher income to enjoy more
and better education, which would create a labour force with more literacy,
numeracy, and other skills. He considers mass education a necessary pre-
condition for economic development.81 One may also assume that higher income
led to improved health and strength for workers. Higher total income also
created extra room for consumption, which is certainly relevant as economic
historians are increasingly becoming aware that changes in consumer behaviour
– not only and not even primarily an increase of total consumption but often just
a shift to certain products – may have played a major role in the process we call
industrialisation. For savings and investment, the amount of ordinary wages, so
80 See for this estimate Humphries, ‘Household economy’, 259.
81 Allen, Global economic history, 26 and 15.
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it seems, was less relevant. As we will discuss later, in all advanced pre-industrial
economies there was in principle sufficient money available to make the still
fairly small investments needed during the very first stages of industrialisation.
4. Continuity and change, inevitability and contingency
When it comes to timing, a second comment is in order : notwithstanding the
often-repeated claim that the actual Great Divergence came quite late and
suddenly, and I would add as something unprecedented, it did a have a pre-
history. Even ‘the new’ somehow has to be borne in the old. It did not come out of
the blue as Pomeranz actually argues against his own intentions by claiming that
Britain’s industrialisation was caused by ‘coal and colonies’ actually. ‘Coal’ and
‘colonies’ both were already quite prominent in Britain’s history decades before
the first sprouts of industrialisation emerged. Coal was not exactly ‘invented’ by
industrialising Britain.82 It, moreover, did not launch industrialisation, at least
not in the cotton industry, but enabled it to continue and turn an economic
‘efflorescence’ into a real breakthrough. It was only in the 1830s that it became a
really important source of power in textile production. Empire-building also was
already going on for decades when industrialisation began and Britain’s most
important colonies, those in what now is the United States, became independent
exactly when its industry is supposed to have taken off.
But it has to be admitted – and in that respect the Californians do have a point
– that the differences between Britain and China before roughly 1700 or 1750 did
not yet make a big difference in terms of wealth. Nor did they point at funda-
mentally different economies in terms of their potential. Britain as well as China
may have been advanced organic economies but they both still were subject to
‘Malthusian constraints’.83 It was only with the process of industrialisation and
the emergence of modern economic growth in Britain that a fast acceleration of
development and a major widening of the gap between both countries set in. It is
essential for my arguments to realise the magnitude and character of what is
discussed here: what we try to explain for Britain and Western Europe is the
take-off into an increase in wealth that between 1820 and 2003 amounted to no
less than 1500 per cent ; that occurred in an almost continuous process over many
decades and that was accompanied by structural changes in Western Europe’s
economy and society. Western European countries on average had a real per
82 Already in 1700, half of the energy consumed in England and Wales came from fossil fuel. See
Warde, Energy consumption in England and Wales, 69.
83 For an explanation of that concept see pages 66 – 79.
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capita income of 1,202 so-called 1990-international dollars in 1820: in 2003 this
was 19,912.84
The Great Divergence, whatever its causes and their longevity, indeed in-
volved a rise of the West. It is important to realise that it was not due to increasing
poverty after 1750 of the countries that were to become the poor ‘Rest’ but to
increasing wealth of the countries that turned out to be rich. The cases of China
and Britain, the countries that will be at the heart of this book, clearly illustrate
this. In China the economic situation over the period 1820 – 1950 often was very
bleak and at times its real GDP per capita even declined somewhat. The emerging
gap between it and Britain, however, was almost entirely caused by the growth of
Britain’s real GDP per capita.85
Graph 3: Real per capita GDP of China and the United Kingdom compared
Source: Angus Maddison, Contours of the world economy, 1 – 2030 AD. Essays in macro-
economic history (Oxford 2007) 158.
Yet another comment that needs to be made, in this case concerning chronology,
deals not with the beginning but with the end of the Great Divergence. It has
become fashionable to claim that the divergence is over. Frank, e. g. claims the
Rise of the West was just, “a mere blip in what was, and is again becoming, an
Asia-centred world.”86 The Great Divergence, however, which only adds to its
importance, is not over yet. It is not even certain that we, as Goody suggests, are
84 Maddison, Contours of the world economy, 382.
85 Maddison, Contours of the world economy, 380.
86 Frank, ReOrient, back-flap.
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experiencing another swing towards the East.87 In a way, Western primacy in-
deed belongs to the past: in terms of purchasing power the combined output of
the developing economies surpassed that of the original members of the OECD
minus Turkey as early as 2008. Emerging economies now in many respects have a
greater bigger share of the global economy than developed ones and their
economies have much higher growth rates.88 In particular, the prospects for
Western Europe, which has become an old, tired, spoiled and indebted region,
are bleak. But in terms of per capita real income – and that is what really counts
when one discusses wealth – there still is a wide gap between the West and most
of the rest of the world. GDP per capita in real terms in Britain in 2010 still was
almost five times as high as in China, far more than at the beginning of the Great
Divergence.89 In 1820, China’s GDP in terms of purchasing power was 32.9 per
cent of the world’s GDP. In 1952 it was only 4.6. Now, in 2012, it will be over 15 per
cent.90 In terms of real income per capita, China is now where Great Britain was
more than 70 years ago. In 1989 it was about as wealthy as Great Britain was in
1830.91
The Great Divergence is definitely not just another phase in a continuing
movement of historical ups and downs that, by the simple fact that the West will
in turn also decline, loses its exceptionality and much of its historical relevance.
To argue this means to completely lose sight of orders of magnitude. It is ahis-
torical and anachronistic to describe it, as Goody does, as “a long-term exchange
of information between East and West, and the dominance of one followed by the
dominance of the other – in other words, alternation rather than dominance.”92
The same applies to his claim: “So when we now see China and India making
such an important contribution to the world economy, this is nothing new, but a
revival of the past, an alternation.”93 What occurred in the nineteenth century
with Western industrialisation and imperialism was not simply a changing of the
guard. What emerged was a gap between rich and poor nations, powerful and
powerless nations that was unprecedented in world history. The emerging gap
was not only far bigger than ever before, it also had much more of a global impact
then ever before because the world had become so much more of a unity in terms
of the intensity, extensity, velocity and impact of intercontinental contacts. Any
87 Goody, Eurasian Miracle, 2. See also the back-flap for a “further alternation in favour of the
East”.
88 The Economist, August 6. 2011, page 59.
89 The Economist Pocket World in Figures 2013 edition (London 2012). All data refer to the year
ending 31 December 2010.
90 Maddison, Contours of the world economy, 381.
91 Allen, Global economic history, 12 and 4 – 5.
92 Goody, Eurasian Miracle, back flap.
93 Goody, Eurasian Miracle, 95.
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analysis ignoring the unprecedented scale and scope of Western global primacy
that emerged with the Great Divergence simply misses the point.
It must be clear beforehand – although apparently for many scholars it is not –
that such an extraordinary growth needs an extraordinary explanation, not just
‘more of the same’. Even if growth like this might in principle be explicable
according to the principle of ‘compound interest’, that would simply miss the
point in two respects: why all of a sudden in global history would growth ‘simply’
continue? If it was basically reducible to such a simple mechanism, then why did
it take so long before it materialised? And secondly : What actually happened in
countries experiencing modern economic growth was not a matter of a little bit
more of the same year after year – and in that sense like ‘compound interest’ – but
of sustained increased efficiency and structural change in every aspect of eco-
nomic life. The coming of modern economic growth was not a natural con-
tinuation of previous economic history, be it on a different scale: it was quite
unnatural. It was not something that was bound to occur if only certain
blockades would disappear. It was really new, as Dengjin Jin puts it, a matter of
“transcending” the old.94 These comments bring us to that perennial bone of
contention in historical debates: the role of continuity and change, inevitability
and contingency.
Looking at the data, one can distil from recent research by economic his-
torians that the Great Divergence appears as the relatively fast emergence of an
increasing and large difference in wealth between countries against the back-
ground of relatively much smaller differences that existed for much longer.
Considering these circumstances I personally am quite reluctant to attach a
major and in particular an independent and determining role in my explanation
to very long-term and constant background factors like geography, the European
state-system, Europe’s culture or religion. I think one should in general be very
wary of giving explanations that focus on the very longue-dur¦e. To my taste such
explanations tend to ‘fix’ history and become fatalistic. Path-dependency exists
and history matters, but things can change or, rather, at times people can change
things.95 I have to admit I get somewhat nervous when I read a claim by Oded
Galor that “pre-historical bio-geographical conditions” had a “persistent direct
effect … on the process of development over the entire course of human history”
i. e. “from the dawn of human civilization to the modern”, I, as a historian, even if
his correlations are statistically sound, cannot help asking: why, for millennia,
did no one do anything about this?96 The same goes for the positive answer that
94 This is the thesis of Dengjian Jin in his forthcoming publication in the Princeton Economic
History of the Western World.
95 See the interesting analysis by Nunn, ‘The importance of history for economic development’.
96 See e. g. Galor, Unified growth theory, chapter 6.4. The quotations are on page 208. For a
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D. Comin, W. Easterly and E. Gong give for their question about whether the
wealth of nations was determined in 1000 BC97 or for the suggestion taken over
by Jones that “… the establishment of a cultural form in remote prehistory” …
would … “ipso facto explain the special behaviour of later European society.”98
Jared Diamond too does not shy away from very long-term determinism: “Of
course, those technological and political differences as of A.D. 1500 were the
immediate cause (sic! PV) of the modern world’s inequality … How, though, did
the world get to be the way it was A.D. 1500?”99 He even goes as far as to write:
“The hand of history’s course at 8000 B.C. lies heavily on us.”100 Robert Allen
apparently thinks one can confidently claim that, “to understand why Africa is
poor today we have to understand why it was poor in 1500.”101 Reading Nathan
Nunn’s analyses of the long-term impact of slavery in the regions where the
slaves came from, one cannot help wondering why those effects continued to
persist.102 If as he claims one of the effects of the slave trade is that it created a
sense of distrust amongst Africans that still persists, then how is it possible that
Germans and French at the moment are such good neighbours?103 Persistence as
well as change, they both have to be explained.
And there have been changes, even clear ‘reversals of fortune’. According to
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, who coined that phrase, the richest regions
that were colonised by Western powers became poor, whereas those that were
not so rich to begin with, fared much better.104 But even with these authors there
is a clear tendency to turn the past into destiny. One cannot help thinking that for
them ‘the critical juncture’ of the establishing of different systems of property
rights shortly after their discovery sealed the fate of the regions they discuss.
Scholars like Daron Acemoglu and colleagues and Stanley Engerman and Ken-
neth Sokoloff (1952 – 2007) also tend to underestimate agency, in their case that
of the people who lived in the regions where Westerners interfered and tried to
enforce their will. The inhabitants of Africa and Latin America in their analyses
seem to be reduced to fairly passive objects in a history that is made by Euro-
similar very-longue dur¦e approach see Olsson and Hibbs Jr. , ‘Biogeography and long-run
economic development’.
97 D. Comin, W. Easterly and E. Gong, ‘Was the Wealth of Nations Determined in 1000 BC?’,
NBER Discussion Paper 12657, 2006.
98 Jones, European Miracle, 13 – 14.
99 Diamond, Guns, germs and steel, 16.
100 Ibid, 417.
101 Allen, Global economic history, 92.
102 See for example his, ‘The long-term effects of Africa’s slave trades’.
103 See his website at Harvard with the article written together with Leonard Wantchekon ‘The
slave trade and the origins of mistrust in Africa’. Why would some societies be “shackled to
the past”, to quote the title of an article by him dealing with the long-term consequences of
slavery?
104 See their ‘Reversal of fortune’.
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peans or certain collaborating elites. That often turns out to be a serious ex-
aggeration of the power of those Europeans and an underestimation of room for
manoeuvring and the self-interests of the inhabitants of those regions. The
tendency amongst economists in particular to ‘compress history’ by comparing
two moments in time with no discussion whatsoever of the period in between
only invigorates this tendency to leave actual agency out. It, moreover, can lead
to somewhat misleading conclusions as the exact choice of the moments in time
that one wants to compare can have major consequences for what must be
explained and what can count as an explanation.
Virtuous and vicious circles, which reinforce each other and are not easy to
escape, do definitely exist. But they can be and sometimes have been broken,
which means that path dependency always has to be explained and not just
assumed.105 Otherwise one turns history, whether it would be determined by
geography or institutions, into fate, depriving it of any consequential human
agency as, for example, Ian Morris explicitly does when he time and again
discusses whether historical actors are ‘“bungling idiots” and claims history is
made by “maps” and not “chaps’.106 That seems quite exaggerated as Acemoglu
and Robinson discuss in their latest book in which they show that people can
actually ‘break the mould’ of such vicious, or virtuous, circles and change their
economic trajectory by changing their institutions. Why should things last for
centuries when it is so obvious that they can change overnight? In 1950, GDP per
capita in the Central African Republic was the equivalent of 772 international
dollars of 1990; in 1998 it amounted to 653 of those dollars. For Haiti, to again
refer to that country, the figures are 1051 dollars and 816 dollars, for South Korea
777 dollars and 12,152 dollars.107 Moreover, even countries with the wrong in-
stitutions can experience periods of growth. Haiti – a country that nowadays is
one of the poorest on the entire globe – may have been the richest part of the
entire Americas and even of the world in 1790, on the eve of its Revolution, when
it was a very extractive slave-plantation colony. The economy of Argentina
during the nineteenth and twentieth century is one of boom and bust.108
Considering its relative fastness after centuries of relative stasis, I also cannot
endorse Julian Simon’s idea that the Great Divergence might have been caused by
105 See for some comments my ‘Does wealth entirely depend on inclusive institutions and
pluralist politics?’
106 See my review in Journal of Global History 7, 1 (2012) 143 – 147. In his Why the West rules he
refers no less than sixteen times to “bungling idiot(s)”.
107 Maddison, World economy, 323, 289 and 304. The dollars here are so-called 1990 inter-
national dollars.
108 For figures about Haiti, see Engerman and Sokoloff, Economic development in the Americas
since 1500, 11. See for those ups and in particular those downs caused by existing extractive
institutions, Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail, under ‘Haiti’ and ‘Argentina’.
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a ‘“cumulatively large random process whose first step may have been a small
“accident”.109 It, moreover, was so incisive and consequential and the gap it
created so difficult to close – that the existence of ‘surprising resemblances’ and
a ‘Eurasian similarity’ is not very likely. I sympathise with John Bryant’s critique
that the recent exclusive focus on resemblances and similarities and its sug-
gestion that Europe’s rise to economic pre-eminence was both “late and lucky”,
removes “all potentially invidious distinctions between West and East”. This
means I also sympathise with his rejection of Jack Goody’s claim that “…the
distinct qualitative difference between East and West came only with in-
dustrialization.” In my view, Bryant is right in writing that “… a world flattened
of determinant social differences makes the local emergence of any historical
novelty structurally inexplicable”, and restricts explanatory options to “the
aleatory or incidental.”110 Landes’s “golden rule of historical analysis” to wit
“…big processes call for big causes” to me seems fairly straightforward to me.111
Considering the nature of the explanandum, in my view explanations focusing
on ‘contingency’, ‘luck’, ‘accident’ fortune’, ‘fortuitous circumstances’ and the
like are simply unconvincing. Even if things may have started with some ‘luck’ it
would be hard to be so permanently lucky as to sustain increased production for
many decades on a row in a region with tens of millions and later on several
hundreds of millions of people. Such explanations nevertheless have become
surprisingly popular. John Hobson, in his The Eastern origins of Western civi-
lisation, claims, that the West was lucky no less than five times.112 Rosaire
Langlois claims that: “Europeans weren’t just lucky ; they were lucky many times
over.”113 In publications by Robert Marks, Peter Perdue, Kenneth Pomeranz,
Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Roy Bin Wong references to ‘contingency’, ‘con-
juncture’, ‘accidents’, and ‘fortuitous circumstances’ abound.114 In a way Andre
Gunder Frank too refuses any agency to the West in his explanation of the Great
Divergence by describing it entirely in terms of anonymous, abstract global
109 Simon, Great Breakthrough and its cause, 174.
110 See for these quotations, Bryant, ‘West and the Rest revisited’, pages 410, 417 and 418. This
text sparked a debate in Canadian Journal of Sociology/ Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie 33,
1 (2008) with contributions by Jack Goldstone, Rosaire Langlois, Joseph M. Bryant and
Mark Elvin. See also Coclanis, ‘Ten Years After : Reflections on Kenneth Pomeranz’s The
Great Divergence’, 12: “At the end of the day, though, Pomeranz’s own argument has too
many “black swan” elements to prove convincing or intellectually satisfying, at least to me.”
For an introduction to the theory of so-called black swan phenomena, see Taleb, Black swan.
111 Landes, ‘What room for accident in history?, 653.
112 Hobson, Eastern origins of Western civilisation, 313 – 316.
113 Rosaire Langlois, ‘Closing of the sociological mind’, 141.
114 Marks, Origins of the modern world. See under ‘conjuncture’ and under ‘contingency’;
Perdue, China marches West, 536 – 539; Pomeranz, Great Divergence, the flap text and pages
12, 16, 68 and 241; Wong, China transformed, 278 – 279; Rosenthal and Wong, Before and
beyond divergence, 127.
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cycles and Kondratieff waves.115 It apparently escapes these anti-Eurocentrists
that it is not exactly a comforting thought for the poor of this world that those
few societies that escaped from poverty would have done so by sheer luck. Would
that not at least suggest that agency, conscious planning and the implementation
of specific policies are fairly irrelevant when it comes to developing modern
economies and promoting modern growth? Moreover, if wealth is simply good
luck, is poverty then simply bad luck? Strikingly enough, Daron Acemoglu and
James Robinson, who never refer to the work of any Californian in their Why
nations fail also repeatedly emphasize the major importance of “small differ-
ences” and “contingency”.116
Of course, in the strict, technical sense of the term, it indeed was a con-
tingency that industrialisation happened in Britain first, or for that matter that it
happened anywhere at all. In logic, the term ‘contingency’ refers to a possible but
not very likely future event or condition. In that sense, Britain’s industrialisation
and the rise of the West clearly were contingent. But that does not mean they were
contingent in the common sense meaning of the word, i. e. purely accidental, a
matter of chance. The undeniable divergence between Britain and the most
advanced regions of China was not a pure historical accident. In my view, the
chances that Qing China would have industrialised first instead of eighteenth-
century Britain are nil. The probability that Britain would industrialise con-
sidering the trajectory it was on definitely was not negligible and in any case
much higher than the probability that any other region outside Western Europe
would and also – but with less distance – higher than the probability that this
would occur in, e. g. the Dutch Republic or France. The huge, enduring and for
many decades steadily growing gap that we call the Great Divergence simply
cannot be the sole consequence of some luck or windfall. Even if one admits – as
one should – that Western industrialisation and imperialism created a new
environment in which catching up was made anything but easy for non-Western
countries, it simply should have been much easier if indeed initial differences
had been as negligible as Californians like to claim. And why would all those
wanting to catch up constantly claim that their societies ought to radically
change, i. e. modernise, if basically they already were like those in the West?
Growth as we have seen in the West since industrialisation cannot be treated as a
(by definition fairly momentary) windfall. It involves a continuing process of
structural and broad innovation in the use of resources, technologies and in-
stitutional arrangements.
115 See e. g. Frank, ReOrient, 248 – 267.
116 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail, 435: “Small differences and contingency are not
just part of our theory ; they are part of the shape of history.” See further under ‘contin-
gencies’ in the Index.
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The fact that I deny that the Great Divergence would be contingent in the sense
of a matter of sheer accident does not mean I would opt for the other extreme and
claim that the emergence of modern economic growth during the Industrial
Revolution was inevitable. Although it is quite common to claim that ‘Euro-
centrists’ – and I guess I will be considered as one – would do that, no serious
scholar actually ever did. John Hobson’s book is full of attacks on Eurocentrists
for thinking that “…Europe autonomously developed through an iron logic of
immanence” and that “… only the West was capable of independently pio-
neering progressive development.”117 According to him they have a “… tri-
umphalist teleology in which all of human history has ineluctably been leading
up to the Western endpoint of capitalist modernity.”118 On more than one oc-
casion he writes that they “… impute an inevitability to the rise of the West and
the stagnation of the East”119 and claim that the rise of the West “can only be
accounted for by factors that are strictly endogenous to Europe.”120 About Max
Weber (1864 – 1920), one of the many bÞtes noires in his text, he writes: “Max
Weber’s whole approach was founded on the most poignant Orientalist ques-
tions: what was it about the West that made its path to modern capitalism
inevitable? And why was the East predestined for economic backwardness?”121
One finds similar accusations, although less repetitious, in Robert Marks’ book
on the origins of the modern world, where he writes, “One very powerful im-
plication of the storyline of the rise of the West, though it is seldom made
explicit, is that the way the world turned out was the only way possible. … this
interpretation implies that the rise of the West was inevitable.”122 In his block-
buster, Ian Morris, too, suggests that there would have existed one school of
‘long-term lock-in theorists’ who claim, “…from time immemorial some critical
factor made East and West massively and unalterably different, and determined
that the industrial revolution would happen in the West.” That it would happen
there and not some place else would have been inevitable according to these
theorists. That is, if we are to believe Morris, which we should not.123 Pankaj
Mishra, in a review of Ferguson’s Civilization, writes, “To ask, as Ferguson does,
why the West broke through to capitalist modernity and became the originator
of globalisation is to assume that this was inevitable, and that it resulted basically
from the wonderfulness of the West, not to mention the hopelessness of the
117 Hobson, Eastern origins of Western civilisation, 2 and 9.
118 Hobson, Eastern origins of Western civilisation, 10.
119 Hobson, Eastern origins of Western civilisation, for example, 18, 295 and 312.
120 Hobson, Eastern origins of Western civilisation, 306.
121 Hobson, Eastern origins of Western civilisation, 14 – 15.
122 Marks, Origins of the modern world, 10. (Italics in the original PV).
123 Morris, Why the West rules, e. g., 13 and 14. The quote is on page 13.
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East.”124 Even nuanced scholars succumb to attacking determinist straw men.
Prasannan Parthasarathi dedicates of couple of pages to such attacks in the
beginning of his recent book.125 In the discussion on Pomeranz’s work in His-
torically Speaking Hoffman thinks it is necessary to point out that, “…the British
Industrial Revolution was not at all foreordained”126, whereas Pomeranz himself
writes, “Yet a deeply rooted divergence is not the same as a divergence that was
locked in and bound to happen as soon as the first step of those slowly maturing
advantages appeared” and “Even once some new machines appeared, it was not
inevitable that this would lead to a sustained and growing divergence.”127 I can
only agree, but who would not?
This claim that Eurocentrists would postulate the inevitability of the rise of
the West is completely unfounded. Just look at the work of scholars like, in
alphabetical order, Paul Bairoch (1930 – 1990)128, Ernest Gellner (1925 – 1995)129,
John Hall130, Eric Jones131, Alan Macfarlane132, Michael Mann133, Joel Mokyr134,
124 See Pankaj Mishra in London Review of Books 33, no 21, 3 November 2011.
125 Parthasarathi, Why Europe grew rich, 8 – 14.
126 Hoffman, ‘Comment on Ken Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence’, 17.
127 Pomeranz, ‘Ten years after’, 24.
128 Bairoch, Victoires et d¦boires,Volume I, 267 – 269, where Bairoch explicitly says that the
occurrence of the Industrial Revolution in Britain was not inevitable and not even very
probable.
129 See, for example, Gellner, Plough, sword and book, 199: “We have striven to explain how one
society, and only one, had by a series of near-miraculous coincidences, attained this kind of
world.” (i. e. the modern industrial world, PV) For a similar statement see page 204. For
further analysis of Gellner’s position, and information on that of Macfarlane himself, see
Macfarlane, ‘Ernest Gellner and the escape to modernity’.
130 Hall, Powers and liberties, 111, where he describes the rise of Christian Europe as “a curious
concatenation of circumstances” and as “miraculous”; page 142, where he writes about this
same phenomenon: “We can rationally reconstruct how this occurred, but it is all too easy
to imagine things happening otherwise. It was the European miracle”, and page 249, where
again the word “miraculous” is used.
131 Jones, European miracle, 238: “Europe’s very long-term development appears miraculous.
Comparable development in Asia would have been super-miraculous.”
132 Macfarlane, Riddle of the modern world. See, for example, chapter 14: ‘The riddle resolved’,
where he explicitly objects to thinking in terms of inevitability e. g. on page 289. See also his
Invention of the modern world, chapter I.
133 Mann, Sources of social power. Volume I, 505 – 506: “… it is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that the origins (Italics in the original, PV) of the European miracle were a gigantic series of
coincidences. Many causal paths, some long-term and steady, others recent and sudden,
others old but with a discontinuous historical growth (like literacy), emanating from all
over the European, Near Eastern and even Central Asian civilisations, came together at a
particular time and place to create something unusual.”
134 For two quotations see Mokyr, Enlightened economy, 12 and 487: “…it is important not to
succumb to “hindsight bias.” By this I mean that when we know that a certain event
occurred, we tend to view it as more or less inevitable and reinterpret all prior conditions as
facilitating the outcome” and: “…one of the irrepressible sentiments of the economic
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and even David Landes.135 If they are not Eurocentrists, who is? Yet none of them
ever writes in terms of ‘inevitability’. To claim as Hobson does that Max Weber
would regard ‘the rise of the West’ as ‘inevitable’ and the economic backward-
ness of the East as “predestined” is ridiculous.136 Wallerstein, who is also often
accused of Eurocentrism, explicitly writes that the emergence of the European,
capitalist world-system was due to “… a fortuitous simultaneity of events.” He
refers to “the implausible contemporaneity of four collapses – those of the
seigniors, the state, the Church and the Mongols.” According to him “Europe is
historically aberrant.” He adds: “In some ways this was a historical accident, not
entirely Europe’s fault.”137 Fernand Braudel, another famous ‘Eurocentric’, never
talked in terms of inevitability and had no problem in admitting that Western
Europe was not richer than India or China around 1800.138 When it comes to
‘inevitability’, one might refer to a couple of economists and other scholars who
claim that some kind of industrial revolution in the end was inevitable someplace,
because the increase of collective knowledge over which mankind can dispose
and the competitive pressure to use it as efficiently as possible make economic
progress the normal outcome of a Darwinian process of natural selection. But
historian studying the Industrial Revolution is a sense of amazement that it occurred at all.”
(Italics in original PV).
135 Landes makes it quite clear that he does not like the debunking of the rise of the West into a
matter of sheer contingency. But nowhere does he claim that it would have been inevitable.
See, for example, his Wealth and poverty of nations, 29, where he starts the chapter on
European exceptionalism with the comment “Europe was lucky…” and then claims that the
probability of European global dominance around the year 1000 A.D. was “somewhere
around zero”.
136 See, for example, Käsler, Einführung in das Studium Max Webers, 172: “To consider it a
“theory of evolution” in which the history of the world would be depicted as a steady rise to
the perfection of a rational dominance of the world, would be a grotesque misunder-
standing (Italics in the original, PV) of Weber’s work. It was exactly the incredible, ‘con-
tingent’ aspect of the process that he called ‘rationalization’ and its permanent interruption
by ‘non-rational’ developments that Weber was fascinated with during his entire life time
and that led him to keep asking his central question for new subjects.” The translation is
mine. In German the quotation reads: “Eine “Evolutionstheorie”, nach der die Welt-
geschichte sich als steter Aufstieg zur Vollkommenheit rationaler Weltbeherrschung dar-
stellen wurde, wäre ein groteskes Missverständnis des Weberschen Werkes. Gerade das
unglaubliche, “zufällige” an jenem Prozess den er Rationalisierung nannte, und zugleich
dessen konstante Unterbrechung durch “nicht-rationale” Entwicklungen war es, was Weber
zeit seines Lebens faszinierte und ihn die Fragestellung auf immer neue Gebiete anwenden
ließ.” See further Kalberg, Max Weber’s comparative-historical sociology, passim, for
example, pages 145 – 146.
137 Wallerstein, ‘World system versus world-systems’. The quotations are on pages 295, 293 and
295. For an explanation of how Europe emerged as an aberration out of its late-medieval
crises, see his ‘The West, capitalism, and the modern world–system’.
138 Braudel, Civilization and capitalism, 15th-18th century. Volume III, 533 – 535. See also his
Civilization and capitalism, 15th-18th century. Volume II, 134: “… the gap between the West
and the other continents appeared late in time”. (Italics in the original).
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even if one would be willing to endorse this line of reasoning, which, I, following
Dengjian Jin, would hesitate to do, that of course is a far cry from claiming that
the Industrial Revolution as it actually occurred in Great Britain was bound to
occur.139
No one in Britain had a presentiment that so many fundamental technological
breakthroughs were in the air, even as late as the 1750s. The brightest economist
in the realm in the eighteenth century, Adam Smith, argued that sustained
economic growth was impossible and he could not imagine a non-Malthusian
economy. The idea that Britain would within a couple of decades be the biggest
power on the globe would also have struck almost everyone in the country as
very odd, even as late as the 1780s. The Industrial Revolution and modern
economic growth were neither foreseen, nor predicted or planned. It would be a
major error to look at pre-Great Divergence history as a race between countries,
which one would industrialise first140, although one in particular for European
countries already in the early modern era should certainly not underestimate the
importance of international economic competition and ‘emulation’: that was
enormous and to my view one of the main if not the main driving force behind
economic development. Interstate competition and ‘emulation’ certainly were
the essence of mercantilism.141 Things of course became quite different when
people noticed that the changes that we associate with the emergence of modern
economic growth brought wealth and power to those who initiated them. Eco-
nomic development and industrialisation then very quickly became ‘a national
project’, something rulers and their subjects wanted – and actually considering
international competition needed – for themselves and their countries. They
became fixed ingredients of all plans to modernise as was clear to economists
otherwise as different as Walt Rostow (1916 – 2003), Alexander Gerschenkron
(1904 – 1978), and Simon Kuznets (1901 – 1985).142 Let me just give one quotation
by Gerschenkron:
139 For Dengjian Jin see note 94. For the thesis that an industrial revolution was bound to occur
sometime someplace see e. g. in alphabetical order : Christian, Maps of time ; Galor, Unified
growth theory and ‘Towards a unified theory of economic growth’; Jones ‘Was an Industrial
Revolution inevitable?’; Kremer, ‘Population growth and technological change’; Ridley,
Rational optimist (I will refer to the paperback edition that came out in 2011 in London);
Simon, Great Breakthrough, and Wright, Nonzero. Gregory Clark too, is beginning to think
in such terms. See e. g. his Fare well to alms, 8 – 12. For the fairly senseless contrast that is
often made between the contingency and the inevitability of modern economic growth and
a suggested compromise see also White, Understanding economic development, chapter 14.
140 Parthasarathi, in his Why Europe grew rich writes as if Eurocentrists would endorse all these
erroneous assumptions. See e. g. pages 7 – 14.
141 See e. g. Hont, Jealousy of trade ; Reinert, How rich countries got rich…and why poor
countries stay poor and Sophus Reinert, Translating empire.
142 See e. g. Rostow, Stages of economic growth, chapter 3; Gerschenkron, Economic back-
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To break through the barriers of stagnation in a backward country, to ignite the
imaginations of men, and to place their energies in the service of economic develop-
ment, a stronger medicine is needed than the promise of better allocation of resources
or even of the lower price of bread. Under such conditions even the businessmen, even
the classical daring and innovating entrepreneur, needs a more powerful stimulus than
the prospect of high profits. What is needed to remove the mountains of routine and
prejudice is faith…143
Plans to modernise their economies were easier to realise to the extent that states
embarking upon them knew social cohesion and political consensus. In that
sense some sort of nationalism often played a very prominent and positive role in
economic development and in creating and sustaining growth.144 In the long run,
the chances of sustaining growth by means of brute force are quite slim. In that
respect David Landes clearly has a point when he emphasizes that Britain as first
industrialiser “had the early advantage of being a nation.”145
Neither does looking for the causes of the Great Divergence imply that one
would think that Europe would have been fundamentally different and superior
from time immemorial as e. g. James Blaut (1927 – 2000) claims in his anti-
Eurocentric attack on ‘the colonizer’s model of the world’.
The purpose of this book is to undermine one of the most powerful beliefs of our time
concerning world history and world geography. This belief is the notion that European
civilization – “The West” – has had some unique historical advantage, some special
quality of race or culture or environment or mind or spirit, which gives this human
community a permanent superiority over all other communities, at all times in history
[italics mine] and down to the present.146
When Goody claims that we should “… abandon the notion of perpetual su-
premacy of one or the other” and “the common, western, idea of the permanent,
or even long-term, dominance or superiority of Europe in its trajectory to
modernization or capitalism,” I can only wonder who ever endorsed such a
notion.147 Which serious historian can he have in mind when he writes, “History
wardness in historical perspective, 22 – 26, and Simon Kuznets, www.nap.edu/html/bio
mems/skuznets.pdf
143 Gerschenkron, Economic backwardness in historical perspective, 24.
144 See e. g. Greenfeld, Spirit of capitalism ; Magnusson, Nation, state and the Industrial Re-
volution ; Moe, Governance, growth and leadership and Sen, Military origins of indu-
strialisation and international trade rivalry. For a more detailed comparative empirical
study see David, Nationalisme ¦conomique et industrialisation. Rostow, by the way, in his
Stages of economic growth already strongly emphasized the importance of nationalism for
countries wanting to catch up. See the references to ‘nationalism’ in the index of his book.
145 Landes, Wealth and poverty of nations, 219. See for the emergence of British nationalism
Colley, Britons. Forging the nation, 1707 – 1837 and Greenfeld, Nationalism. Five roads to
modernity.
146 Blaut, Coloniser’s model of the world, 1.
147 Goody, Eurasian Miracle, 105 and 106.
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did and does not move in the straight lines the essentialist accounts assume.”148
His recent books bristle with references to Eurocentrists assuming a perennial or
at least age-old advantage that the West possesses, a built-in Western supremacy,
a Western essence versus an Eastern one, and attacks on Max Weber for claiming
the West had always had an advantage. We have already noticed that Morris too
departs from the notion there are people thinking in such terms.149 But is there
really anyone who for example has seriously suggested that Western Europe
around 1000 A.D. was more advanced than Song China or various parts of the
Islamic world?
Finally, the fact that developments in the West are compared to those in other
parts of the world in an analysis like mine of course does not imply that I would
want to deny the existence of all sorts of exchange over time between the regions
involved. In this context too, Goody – but not only he – is fond of fighting straw-
men in his recent publications with his attacks on scholars who neglect “the
contributions of other societies to the achievements of the Industrial Revolution
and, in particular overlooked … the contributions of the east to ‘modernization’,
mechanization and industrialization.”150 Again, I do not know any serious
scholar at the moment that would want to deny such contributions.
In my view, the Great Divergence is neither something pre-ordained from
time immemorial, based on fundamental and perennial differences, nor “a late,
rapid, unexpected outcome of a fortuitous combination of circumstances in the
late eighteenth century” as Perdue and many Californians want us to believe.151
An explanation of the Great Divergence should not start from a ‘long-term lock-
in perspective’, in which the West has been ‘exceptional’ from time immemorial
and in which industrialization could only – and would inevitably – happen there,
nor should it depart form a ‘short-term accident perspective’ and regard it as
“just a recent, freakish accident.”152 The emergence of modern economic growth
and industry in the Western world were not inevitable whatever that exactly may
mean – but they did have a relevant pre-history that certainly stretched further
back in time than the late eighteenth century. They were path-dependent out-
comes of a specific trajectory that made their occurrence in Britain (and Western
Europe) in the eighteenth century much less unlikely than they would have been
in Qing China (and any other part of the non-Western world) at the time.
Historical developments and outcomes can only be explained and compared in
terms of probabilities. The phenomena we are dealing with here are so important
that it is perfectly legitimate and highly relevant to design research that ex-
148 Goody, Eurasian Miracle, 105.
149 See note 123.
150 Goody, Eurasian Miracle, 2.
151 See note 121.
152 For these terms see Morris, Why the West rules, 13 – 15 and 21.
Continuity and change, inevitability and contingency 57
clusively focuses on their preconditions although we of course have to be careful
not to turn all previous history into either their prehistory, or regard it, when it
did not lead to modern economic growth, as therefore irrelevant, or a failure, as
Parthasarathi and Pomeranz rightly, although in my view somewhat super-
fluously, remind us.153
I hope the extended comments made so far show that it is of the utmost
importance to be as explicit as possible, and to refer as much as possible to
concrete links and concrete mechanisms that can be shown to indeed connect the
explanandum (the situation to be explained) and the explanantia (the factors
adduced to explain that situation). What we want to explain is the emergence of
long-during, sustained, substantial growth in one part of the world and its non-
emergence at the time in the rest of the world, focusing on the very beginning of
the process of breaking the strangleholds of the old economy.
5. Old clichés about Asia’s economic past that are no longer
tenable
The main direct reasons that the debate on the emergence of big differences in
the wealth and poverty of nations has flared up again so much of late must be
sought in the emergence of a new economic order, of which ‘the rise of the East’ is
the most prominent feature, and in the major revisions that have occurred in the
historiography dealing with the economic history of early modern Asia, and in
particular early modern China. The current decline of the West and rise of the
East provide ample reason to rethink the phenomena of development and
growth. Apparently the ‘East’ need not be stuck in a ‘histoire immobile154 and
many historians now find out it did not do so in the past either. Not many
scholars would still want to defend the classic bleak image of early modern Asia
as, economically speaking, almost the perfect anti-Europe. For the West most of
the classic stories of its rise were too rectilinear, too self-assured, too ex-
ceptionalist. For ‘the Rest’, a weird category anyhow, they as a rule were too
bleak, ‘timeless’ and undifferentiated. ‘Non-Western’ history is now much more
153 Pomeranz, ‘Ten years after’, 22: “… we can’t just look aback from what eventually happened
and say “Europe was, by definition, on the road, to where Europe wound up, and China
wasn’t: therefore China wasn’t on the road to anything significant.” He adds “and doesn’t
seem to have been addressing problems raised by increased resource demands in any
constructive way.” Here I have my doubts: to be honest, I think the Chinese did not solve
their problems and from the 1750s onward did not show much inventiveness in trying to
tackle them.
154 A pun on Peyrefitte, L’empire immobile ou le choc du monde, a book on eighteenth-century
China.
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seen in its own right and in the light of the times, not in a Western light and with
the very dubious benefit (?) of hindsight that ‘knows’ what region will ‘succeed’
and which ones will ‘fail’. Of course, not everyone has given up on all clich¦s, and
not all clich¦s are wrong. To give a couple of fairly recent examples of how one
should not discuss the rise of the West, let me briefly quote Eric Jones, David
Landes, and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, who all have written on the
subject and received an enormous response. I will confine myself to what they
write about ‘Asia’.
In his book on the European miracle, Jones time and again pointed out that
Asian empires were extremely crowded. In his view pre-colonial Asia was “…
heading into a demographic cul-de-sac”. In China and India, so he writes,
“Seemingly, copulation was preferred above commodities” with people given to
a “mere insensate multiplication of the common life.” In contrast, the population
pressure in Europe was held in check thanks to its specific (Western) European
marriage pattern.155 Landes in his Wealth and poverty of nations actually is quite
silent on demography. This is what Jones, still in 1981, in the time-honoured
tradition of ‘oriental despotism’, wrote about property rights in early modern
Asia: “The Asian condition was summed up by Reade … as property is insecure.
In this one phrase the whole history of Asia is contained.”156 On page 229 of his
The European Miracle it reads: “The Ottoman, Mughal and Manchu systems
were all alien, imposed military despotisms: revenue pumps. They were pri-
marily responsible for the blighted developmental prospects of their subjects.”
Landes in 1998 still describes Qing China as “despotic” or even “totalitarian”,
and as an empire of “stasis and retreat”, whereas he discusses the history of the
Islamic nations in a chapter with the title: ‘History gone wrong?’157 In Jones’s
words, Europe in contrast to Asia’s empires avoided “the plunder machine”.
Government there, even so-called absolute rule, was always checked. It was
seldom as “insecure as Moreland’s India” and witnessed a “withering away of
arbitrariness, violence, custom and old social controls.”158 In Western Europe in
particular, the state provided some security, order and services. Acemoglu and
Robinson who in their work almost exclusively focus on institutions reproduce
all the standard clich¦s when it comes to Asian institutions. They hardly refer to
India and what they say about the Ottoman Empire and Qing China is in the best
tradition of oriental despotism: they are ‘absolutely’ ruled by extractive gov-
ernments that respect no property rights, systematically oppose any innovation
155 The quotations are on pages 231, 15 and 3 of his European Miracle. For references to a
European marriage pattern see, for example, pages 14 – 16 and 19 – 21 of that book.
156 Jones, European Miracle, 165. Jones here refers to a book by Winwood Reade published in
1925. Italics in the original.
157 Landes, Wealth and poverty of nations, 56 – 57, chapters 21 and 24.
158 Jones, European Miracle, 233, 232 and 235.
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and keep the population poor.159 The interested reader can look for many more
examples of ‘Eurocentrism’ in the compilations by James Blaut, that in all their
one-sidedness and propensity to blatant exaggeration do come up with quite a
few authentic examples of silly views on ‘the Rest’ that no serious scholar should
ever have defended, or in some of the more extreme parts of Ferguson’s Civi-
lization.160 On the basis of much recent research one can only agree with Peter
Coclanis: … it is no longer possible today for any serious student of pre-modern
history to overlook – or even understate – the size, sophistication and wealth of
the major economic centres in Asia.”161 Not only were those centres sophisticated
and wealthy ; they were also far less extractive than claimed, often even much less
extractive than Western states.162 There indeed existed far fewer checks and
balances for rulers in the big Asian empires than in Western European states, but
terms like ‘totalitarian’, ‘despotic’ and ‘absolute’ clearly exaggerate the level of
un-freedom and constraint in Asia, while exaggerating that of freedom and
liberty in the West.
We will discuss the old negative stereotypes of Qing China in more detail in
the text and see that amongst experts they have almost all been discussed and
rejected or at least corrected.163 Such revision was long overdue. Qing China
during its ‘efflorescence’, from roughly 1700 to 1780, in many respects was a
highly developed country. The majority of knowledgeable Europeans at the time
did not regard it as ‘underdeveloped’ or ‘poor’, nor did they describe it in
categories of ‘oriental despotism’ and ‘corruption’. They rather (optimistically, I
would say!) looked at it as a benignly and well-ruled country that even practised
a kind of laissez-faire. Nor was it regarded at the time as an overpopulated land of
famines or a military weakling. Halfway into the eighteenth century, it was not at
all obvious that the future would belong to the West. The Ottoman and Mughal
Empires clearly had known better days and in India, with the Battle of Plassey in
1757, the British had acquired a substantial foothold. But considering the way
they were treated in China, Japan or Korea, Westerners certainly were not ‘calling
the shots’ in Asia. On the contrary. During the two last decades of the eighteenth
century, the Chinese, too, were confronted with problems that were still over-
whelmingly of their own making. But no one would have been able to actually
159 See in their Why nations fail under ‘Ottoman Empire’ and ‘China’.
160 Blaut, Eight Eurocentric historians.
161 Coclanis, ‘Ten Years After : Reflections on Kenneth Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence’, 11.
For a good survey of the changes for the case of early modern China, see Deng, ‘A critical
survey of recent research in Chinese economic history’.
162 See for example my ‘Governing growth’ and Yun-Casalilla and O’Brien, Rise of fiscal states.
163 See for brief overviews of the way China was represented in the West, Blue, ‘China and
Western social thought in the modern period’ and Ho-fung Hung, ‘Orientalist knowledge
and social theories’.
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predict that these problems would be the beginning of some 150 years of major
trouble. There may have been differences in wealth and development between
West and East but they definitely were not always to the disadvantage of the East.
To ask why China wasn’t the first country with modern economic growth is not
as a-priori senseless as it would be if the old clich¦s were even only partially true.
6. Income, growth and wealth: problems of measurement
To discuss modern economic growth and its emergence, one must be able to
measure it. Economists currently as a rule do that by measuring the increase of
real GDP per capita over time. In my analysis and data, references to GDP in all
its varieties also are frequent and they play an important role in my arguments.
As such, GDP is of course not an unproblematic concept, neither in theory nor in
practice. Using it becomes even more problematic when one applies it to a
period that to a large extent was pre-statistical and in which many, if not most,
prices were set by tradition or authority or at least heavily influenced by all sorts
of manipulation rather than reflecting relative scarcity. Many goods and services
did not receive a price at all. Comparing real incomes between places over time is
anything but unproblematic,164 particularly in periods of fast economic change –
and we are discussing such a period here – when not just more but in particular
more new things are produced. Their value often cannot (easily) be determined
in terms of what was already known and as a rule is under-estimated. Many of the
products that exist at the moment simply did not exist when Britain took off. In
that respect, growth as the increasing potential to satisfy needs certainly was
much greater than our GDP figures indicate. Existing price indices by their very
nature tend to ignore the most important technological revolutions.
Even if new products or services catered to old needs, they still made an
enormous qualitative difference and completely changed the way in which they
satisfied wants, often by basically creating new ones. The revolution in light to
which Nordhaus (graph 4) refers, for example, was not a matter of simply adding
millions of candles. Light became an entirely new product whose costs in terms
of work dwindled since the revolutionary changes in lighting that set in with gas
lighting. Undoubtedly, one can tell a similar story as Nordhaus does for lighting
for transportation, heating and many other forms of consumption. Their labour
prices have changed beyond recognition. An automobile with ten HP is not
identical to ten horses. This is a fact of major importance.
164 For an analysis of a just a couple of the problems involved, that has special relevance for
debates in global economic history, see Jerven, ‘Unlevel playing field’.
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Graph 4: The labour price of light 1800 – 2000: hours work per Kilo Lumen Hour. The price
(top line) of lighting in terms of actual labour hours as compared to its price (bottom line)
as measured in consumer price indices
Source: William Nordhaus, ‘Do real wage and output series capture reality? The history of
lighting suggests not’ in: Timothy Bresnahan and Robert Gordon, eds., The economics of
new goods (Chicago 1997) 54.
The amount of new products that came on the market in ‘modernising’
economies was enormous. Retailers have a measure, known as Stock Keeping
Unit, to count the number of types of products sold in their stores. In New York at
the beginning of the twenty-first century, that number has been estimated at
some ten billion; in primitive hunter-gatherer economies it was several thousand
at best.165 Not surprisingly, definitions of wealth and poverty changed over time:
Today, of Americans officially designated as ‘poor’, 99 per cent have electricity, running
water, flush toilets, and a refrigerator ; 95 per cent have a television, 88 per cent a
telephone; 71 per cent a car and 70 per cent air conditioning. Cornelius Vanderbilt (the
richest man in the world in the mid 1800s) had none of these.166
On the other hand, there are good reasons to be quite sceptical when it comes to
the question whether the increases in expenditure for government services – i. e.
what governments actually do apart from redistributing –, health care and ed-
ucation, mirror increased production rather than increased payments.167 Are we
165 Beinhocker, The origin of wealth, 9.
166 Ridley, Rational optimist, 17.
167 See for some interesting and not very comforting comments Cowen, The Great Stagnation,
chapter 2.
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really so much better ruled, is our health so much better taken care of and are we
really so much better educated as exploding costs over the last century and a half
suggest?
GDP as Gross Domestic Product refers to income, not to wealth, i. e. to what a
country earns in a year at home, not to what it has. The focus in my analysis will
be on growth in terms of increased earnings, but that of course can be misleading
when this growth is unsustainable, i. e. when it is produced at the expense of
existing stocks of wealth. How and with what a country earns its income and
what that means for its earning potential in future certainly is not irrelevant.
Measuring the wealth of nations is even more complicated than measuring their
income. Unsurprisingly up until now, not many efforts have been undertaken to
systematically do so. In a recent study national wealth of some twenty countries
has been, I think very sensibly, measured by estimating three kinds of ‘assets’ of
their economies: ‘manufactured’ or ‘physical’ capital (machinery, buildings,
infrastructure and so on); human capital (the population’s education and skills)
and natural capital (land, forests, fossil fuels and minerals). For all countries in
the world apart from Nigeria, Russia and Saudi Arabia, the biggest asset turned
out to consist in its people. For the United States, they amount to seventy-five per
cent of its national wealth, for Great Britain to eighty-eight per cent. The value of
that human capital is measured in years of schooling of the labour force, the
wages the workers can command, and the number of years they can expect to
work before they retire or die.168 To put the figures about GDP into perspective,
they in the following table and figure are also compared to figures expressing
‘human development’ that measure and combine Gross National Income per
capita in real terms, average real or expected years of schooling and life ex-
pectancy in an index going from 0 to 100 and, in figure 3, to estimates of national
wealth.
Table 17: A comparison of the ranking of nations according to their GDP per capita in real
terms and their Human Development Index
GDP 2010 HDI 2011
Norway 126. 7 94.3
United States 100 91
Canada 84.3 90.8
Australia 83.7 92.3
United Kingdom 76.5 86.3
168 See http://www.ihdp.unu.edu/article/iwr. This volume can be cited as: UNU-IHDP and
UNEP (2012). Inclusive Wealth Report 2012. Measuring progress toward sustainability.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. UNU stands for United Nations University, IHDP
for International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change, and
UNED for United Nations Environment Programme.





Saudi Arabia 51.8 77
Venezuela 27.7 73.5
Source: The Economist. Pocket World in figures, 2013 Edition (London 2012) 25, the figures
in that text are for the year ending 31 – 12 – 2010.
Figure 3: A comparison of the ranking of nations according to their wealth per person in
2008 in constant dollars of 2008, average annual rate: in thousands of dollars
Source: The Economist, June 30th 2012, page 75.
One last but very important comment: I will explicitly focus here on Gross
Domestic Product. From a social perspective the question of distribution is
enormously important, but what interests me here is (the increase in) pro-
duction and productivity and in particular the question of why some societies
could get so much more done than others. Who profited from that increase is an
extremely important but different question.
7. Industrial Revolution and Great Divergence
The Great Divergence began when Britain went through its Industrial Revolu-
tion, a time that in most books is, too hastily, fully identified with it. In dis-
cussions about the Great Divergence amongst more global historians, that
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revolution tends to be described as an event of world-historical importance, a
turning point in the economic history of the globe. Amongst economic histor-
ians whose focus is more confined to Britain, strikingly enough, a long and fierce
debate has been waged about whether Britain’s industrialisation actually
amounted to a revolution. The ideas about what actually happened in Britain
during the very long eighteenth century have changed substantially. Sceptics
have noticed that during the period from 1750 to 1850 growth in Britain was far
too slow and hesitant to warrant the label ‘revolution’. Overall, growth indeed
was slow and hesitant. That is not surprising though: it was a period, lasting until
1815, of several considerable wars. The Napoleonic Wars, in which Britain was
directly and indirectly involved, were global conflicts that cost enormous
amounts of effort, people, money and resources. Agricultural production was
intermittently hit by bad weather and bad harvests. Probably most important of
all, Britain’s population tripled between 1750 and 1850. Without the emergence
of new ways of producing, the situation in all probability would have been
catastrophic. Sceptics also point at the fact that structural change actually was
fairly slow and not yet clearly visible in many macro-economic data. They again
are right, but that too need not surprise us. Even if some ‘new’ sectors of the
economy grew fast, which they did, it obviously took time to fundamentally
transform and lift the entire British economy. In many sectors, moreover, change
was less fast and sweeping. Innovations will initially have caused problems of
adaptation and stagnation and sometimes even decreasing productivity. The
expansion of new sectors caused several old sectors to expand too, and so on and
so forth.169 This claim by Nicolas Crafts and Knick Harley very probably syn-
thesizes the new communis opinio: “Growth had probably begun to accelerate by
the early eighteenth century but modern economic growth only became fully
established in Britain by the railway age.”170 Pioneers tend to have lower growth
rates than those who successfully catch up. All these decelerations notwith-
standing: what was going on in Britain’s economy definitely was revolutionary if
not in speed then in impact. The many innovations were a harbinger of a new era
in economic history and opened completely new windows of opportunity. An
entirely transformed economy was set to emerge.171 The period we focus upon in
this text was the period in which Britain’s economy took off.
169 One must not underestimate the effect of even low growth: 2.5 per cent growth per year
already leads to a doubling of GDP in 29 years.
170 Crafts and Harley, ‘Output growth and the Industrial Revolution’, 705.
171 For a view that I endorse, see Griffin, Short history of the British Industrial Revolution, in
particular chapters 1 and 2, and Joel Mokyr, ‘Accounting for the Industrial Revolution’ in:
Floud and Johnson, Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, 1 – 27.
Industrial Revolution and Great Divergence 65
Table 18: Output of various sectors of the British economy, 1750 – 1900 (indexed to 1750 or
1800 = 1) plus Britain’s population
Year Cotton Coal Pig Iron Steam-
ships




1750 1.0 1.0 1.0 – – 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
1800 24 2.1 6.7 1.0 1.0 7.0 1.71 1.4 3.0 1.5
1850 267 10.6 83.3 56.0 62.4 114.8 2.79 2.2 7.3 3.1
1900 788 53.2 337.2 2,402.7 191.6 1,931.8 2.54 7.2 5.4 5.6
Source: Jack Goldstone, Why Europe? The rise of the West in world history, 1500 – 1800
(New York 2008) 127.
Table 19: Composition of GDP and of active population per sector in Great Britain
GDP (%) Active population (%)
Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary
1788 40.0 21.0 39.0 – – –
1841 22.0 35.0 43.0 22.3 44.3 33.4
1871 15.0 40.0 45.0 15.3 47.1 37.6
Source: Antonio di Vittorio, ed., Historia econûmica de Europa. Siglos XV – XXX (Barce-
lona 2003) 190. The table is taken from the contribution by Giovanni Luigi Fontana on the
nineteenth century.
8. Malthusian constraints, premodern growth and modern
growth
We study the origin of modern economic growth because of its societal rele-
vance. It has created a global gap in wealth with major implications for all
societies involved. But there is also a more strictly scholarly motive: although we
may have come to regard growth as quite normal, it actually is extremely ab-
normal and ‘miraculous’. The most efficient and salient way to understand what
modern economic growth actually is and means probably is to compare our
current Western world, in which it is prevalent, with the pre-industrial world
where poverty, stasis and stagnation were the rule or as some would even claim, I
think correctly, ‘inevitable’.172
172 See e. g. Wrigley, Poverty, progress, and population, chapter 7: ‘Why poverty was inevitable
in traditional societies’. For a brief overview of the changing ideas about the poor and about
poverty over the last three centuries see Martin Ravallion, The idea of anti-poverty Policy
NEBRWorking Paper no 19210 July 2013, in synthesis available at http://www.aae.wisc.edu/
mwiedc/papers/2013/Ravallion_Keynote.pdf
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These are some indicators for the (relative) lack of growth, wealth and de-
velopment in Western Europe at the end of the eighteenth century :
Table 20: The European population 1300 – 1870 (x1000)
1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1750 1800 1870
Scandinavia 2,500 1,400 1,500 2,400 2,900 2,600 5,250 9,550
England
(+Wales)
4,500 2,700 3,500 4,450 5,450 6,300 9,250 23,000
Scotland 1,000 700 800 1,000 1,200 1,260 1,630 3,420
Ireland 1,400 700 800 1,000 1,900 3,120 5,200 5,800
Netherlands 800 600 950 1,500 1,950 1,950 2,100 3,650
Belgium 1,400 1,200 1,300 1,300 1,900 2,300 2,900 4,900
France 16,000 12,000 15,000 18,500 21,500 24,600 29,000 38,000
Italy 12,500 8,000 9,000 13,300 13,500 15,500 18,100 28,000
Spain 5,500 4,500 5,000 6,800 7,400 9,300 10,500 16,200
Portugal 1,300 1,050 1,200 1,300 2,000 2,600 2,900 4,300
Switzerland 800 500 800 1,000 1,200 1,300 1,700 2,700
Austria* 10,000 9,000 11,500 12,800 15,500 18,300 24,300 35,700
Germany 13,000 8,000 11,000 16,200 14,100 17,500 24,500 41,000
Poland 2,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 2,800 3,700 4,300 7,400
Balkans 6,000 5,000 5,500 7,000 8,550 9,900 12,000 23,700
Russia
(European)
15,000 11,000 15,000 16,000 13,000 22,000 35,000 63,000




78,700 56,850 69,850 91,050 101,850 121,230 153,630 247,320
*Austria here includes Hungary, Bohemia, Croatia, Slavonia and Transylvania.
Source: Paolo Malanima, Pre-modern European Economy. One thousand years (10th-19th
centuries), Leiden and Boston, 9.
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Graph 5: GDP in Europe 1000 – 1900, in international 1990 PPP dollars
Source: Paolo Malanima, Pre-modern European Economy. One thousand years (10th-19th
centuries), Leiden and Boston, 287.
Graph 6: Per capita GDP in Europe 1000 – 1900, in international 1990 PPP dollars
Source: Paolo Malanima, Pre-modern European Economy. One thousand years (10th-19th
centuries), Leiden and Boston, 287.
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Table 21: Life expectancy in Europe and East Asia up to the 19th century
Life expectancy at birth
Western Europe
Germany before 1800 35
England 1550 – 1599 38
England 1650 – 1699 35
France before 1750 25
France 1750 – 1799 28 – 30
England 1750 – 1799 38
London 1750 – 1799 23
East Asia
China (Anhui) 1300 – 1880 28
China (Beijing) 1644 – 1739 26
China (Liaoning) 1793 – 1867 26 – 35
Japan, countryside 1776 – 1815 33
In the period from roughly 1750 to 1800, of all 1000 children born in France only 491
survived to become 15. For England that number was 736, for Sweden 612 and for Den-
mark 641.
Sources: Gregory Clark, A Farewell to alms. A brief economic history of the world
(Princeton and Oxford 2007) 94; Massimo Livi-Bacci, Population of Europe (Oxford 2000,
originally 1998) 113 and 135, and Roy Bin Wong, China transformed. Historical change and
the limits of European experience (Ithaca and London 1997) 28.
Under-nourishment and famine were still facts of life, even in quite developed
parts of Western Europe. Robert Fogel estimates that twenty per cent of the
adults in eighteenth-century France were too ill nourished to do more than three
hours of light work a day.173 The following facts refer to the life of a normal,
‘average’ French father at the end of the seventeenth century, the era of Louis XIV,
when France was regarded as a rich country :
He was born in a family with five children of whom only half reached the age of fifteen.
He in turn would also have five children, of whom only two or three would still be alive
when he died. On average he would become 52 years. During his life he would witness
two or three famines, two or three periods of scarcity and two or three epidemics.174
Why were poverty and stagnation so normal? That can best be explained by
following the line of reasoning of Reverend Thomas Malthus (1766 – 1834) whose
basic ideas have had a tremendous influence in economic history and lie at the
basis of a point of view that in the rest of this book will be referred to as
173 Fogel, ‘The conquest of high mortality and hunger in Europe and America’, 47.
174 Fourasti¦, ‘De la vie traditionnelle  la vie tertiaire’.
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‘Malthusian’.175 Malthus, however, with his pessimism was not an exception
amongst economists in his time. His friend David Ricardo (1772 – 1823) thought
in principle that with an increasing population wages would always end up at or
very near subsistence level defined as the level that allows the wage-earner to buy
the ‘necessaries’176, whereas at the same time increasing food prices would lead
to lowering profits, as they made labour more expensive. Under such circum-
stances, only members of the landlord class might profit as rents increased. Marx
later took Ricardo’s ‘iron law of wages’ for granted. Even Adam Smith in the end
tended to pessimism: he never gave any sign that he thought what we now call
‘modern economic growth’ was possible.177 Not by accident many people in the
nineteenth century considered economics a ‘dismal science’.178 For all so-called
classical economists, the limited availability of resources set limits to growth, in
particular when population increased. Most of them had a tendency to think in
terms of decreasing returns and an inevitable slowing down of growth. Smith in
this respect was not very consistent. He assumed increasing returns as a result of
further division of labour but nevertheless did not expect the emergence of big
monopolies because, in his view, the existing competition and growing scale of
production would constantly tend to push profits down to an ‘average’ or ‘nat-
ural’ level. He, moreover, thought that there were practical limits to how far
labour can be divided and how far markets can be extended. Transport and
communication were so slow and expensive that, in his view for most goods,
markets could not be very extensive. So in the end he thought there was a limit to
growth in which economies reach their ‘stationary state’.179
As such it of course is very significant that in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, so many knowledgeable economists in Britain, the wealthiest country
in the world and its first industrial nation, were so pessimistic. This appears to be
quite a telling indication of how abnormal growth apparently was and how
normal it had always been to think of the bulk of the population, the working
175 For a succinct explanation see Wrigley, Poverty, progress, and population, Part I, in parti-
cular chapter 6. See my comments on the way in which I use the world ‘Malthusian’ under
note 25.
176 It is clear that in any case Smith, Ricardo and Marx meant ‘social subsistence’ not bare
‘biological’ subsistence when they talked about ‘natural wages’. See Schlefer, Assumptions
economists make, 39 – 41.
177 See for some further explanation why pages pages 79 and 426 of this book.
178 See, for some introductory information with regard to lives and ideas of these scholars,
Heilbroner, Worldly philosophers ; Milgate and Stimson, After Adam Smith and particularly
relevant for the question at hand, Wrigley, ‘The classical economists and the industrial
revolution’.
179 See e. g. Smith, Inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, 99 and 111. For
the natural tendency of profits to diminish see e. g. pages 108, 111 and 113.
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people, as poor.180 Karl Marx, with his focus on technology, innovation and on
increasing returns here clearly was an exception. He, in principle, was very
optimistic about possible ways to increase productivity but obviously not about
the future of the capitalist system that had created them.
Malthus, to return to him, departed from the fundamental problem, which, in
his opinion, stated that the satisfaction of the main human needs depended very
strongly on the (limited) availability of (good) land. Before the emergence of
modern economic growth, the satisfaction of those wants was either entirely – in
the case of food, clothing and shelter – or predominantly – in the case of energy
where one might also use wind and water power and in some regions coal and/ or
peat – dependent on the quantity and quality of available land. The same actually
applies for all the materials used for fertilising, for lighting and dyeing, for
making drugs and so on. In ‘organic’ economies, it was all but impossible to
increase wealth substantially and over a longer period of time, in particular
when the population increased simultaneously.181 That would simply lead to too
many competing claims on a fairly stable amount of land. Such economies were
subject to what we call ‘Malthusian constraints’ and knew their ‘Malthusian
ceiling’ and might even be caught in a ‘Malthusian trap’.182 Britain during in-
dustrialisation was the first economy in the world where resources no longer
were overwhelmingly organic.183 The enormous growth in the use of coal as fuel
and, even more consequentially, as source of power, was essential. This is how
Fernand Braudel put it : “Until the Industrial Revolution, every burst of growth
came up against … the limits of the possible”, a ceiling imposed by agricultural
input, by the available means of transport, sources of power or market demand.
Modern growth begins when that ceiling or limit recedes indefinitely into the
distance – which is not to say of course that some kind of ceiling may not be
reached in the future.”184
Malthusian stories about dependence on nature normally focus on ‘avail-
ability’ and on ‘overall quantities’. Those, of course, are extremely important.
Actually, however, they certainly were not the only constraints on development
and growth, particularly but not exclusively when it comes to energy. As Douglas
Allen in a fascinating book rightly remarks, before the steam revolution, “…
180 For the ideas about the obvious presence of those ‘labouring poor’ see Lis and Soly, Worthy
efforts, chapter 7, 478 – 494.
181 See for the concepts ‘organic economy’, ‘advanced organic economy’ and their ‘contrast’ the
‘mineral-based energy economy’, Wrigley, Continuity, chance and change.
182 All these concepts point at the fundamental limits to growth in Malthusian thinking.
183 Although one has to realise that a) already in 1700 half of the energy used in that country
came from fossil fuel (See note 82) and b) the increased use of ghost acreage that was so
important in Britain’s escape from land scarcity was not a ‘real’ escape but a matter of
‘evading’ problems via the use of land somewhere else.
184 Braudel, Civilization & capitalism, 15th -18th century, III, 592.
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power was not only limited and low, but intermittent and unreliable. … Steam
power introduced an era of reliable power.”185 Some of the ‘old-regime’ power
variation was seasonal, much of it however quite random. That is obvious in the
case of wind and water as power sources. Windmills and watermills were very
unreliable machines. The lack of reliability of wind and water also had major
consequences for transport. Sailing ships depended on the wind and were se-
verely curtailed in their movements at sea by currents and changing tides.
Transport on rivers and canals could be seriously hindered by water levels that
were either too high or too low. “‘The British navy”, as Douglas Allen comments,
“by this time (the eighteenth century PV), was perhaps the largest firm in the
world, and yet, all of its capabilities were at the mercy of wind and sea.”186
Changes in food supply and diseases – often caused by natural condition – had
an enormous impact on the quantity and quality of available labour power of
people and animals, and in the case of animals also on the supply of fertiliser.
Agriculture and transportation were heavily dependent on the weather.
This means that in the pre-industrial world, to again quote Douglas Allen,
“variance” was “everywhere”.187 That made economic activities very hard to
plan, opaque, risky and thus costly. The introduction of steam power was an
essential part of a wide-ranging process of eliminating this variance, a process
that very positively impinged on productivity. Steam power was reliable in the
sense of being independent of the whims of nature and in principle in con-
tinuous supply. It could also be standardised and made measurable – a man is
not a man and a horse is not a horse, but one horsepower is one horsepower –
and in that way helped to standardise and measure production and productivity.
It, moreover, created unheard-of possibilities to accumulate and concentrate
power.188 Machines driven by reliable and continuous energy in turn stand-
ardised production: they reproduced identical products in identical ways. They
were not the only force behind standardisation but they were very important.
The hold of nature and its variance were also diminished, for example, because
methods of measurement and measures themselves were standardised and
turned into abstract, formal and science-based concepts. Measures of time,
distance, temperature and so on and so forth were made independently of
context (i. e. nature) and determined mechanically. Gas lighting, to just point at
yet another important innovation, made the difference between day and night
almost irrelevant to production. Life in general became more predictable; more
predictability meant better, more ‘realistic’ planning and decreasing trans-
185 Douglas W. Allen, Institutional revolution, 26. The Italics are in the original.
186 Allen, Institutional revolution, 25.
187 Allen, Institutional revolution, chapter 2: ‘Variance everywhere’.
188 For concentration and accumulation of power see Goldstone, ‘Efflorescences and economic
growth in world history’, 359 – 366.
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actions costs. Diminished interruption and disturbance, thanks to ‘modern’
sources of energy, meant that far less time was lost or wasted. Making large-scale
investments and specialising in specific products thereby became less risky ; the
fact that modern sources of energy lowered the prices of fixed capital goods like
iron, steel, glass, or buildings, made it cheaper. The essence of modern economic
growth is steadily increasing productivity. That requires reliability, continuity
and predictability, not only to obtain it but also to be able to measure it at all. In
the pre-industrial setting of omnipresent variance, it was almost impossible to
determine how efficient production actually was, which will have been yet an-
other impediment for those who wanted to increase it.
Malthusians present a correct description of the ultimate, long run logic of
pre-industrial economies. Growth was exceptional, often extensive at best,
fragile and intermittent, with a tendency to peter out. The clear emphasis in the
theory and explanation of Malthus and those inspired by him as a rule is on the
limited availability and specific characteristics of resources. But their actual
‘scarcity’ and ‘limitations’ to a very large extent were a function of the absence of
technological innovation (caused by constraints in the field of knowledge, as
practical know-how was insufficiently or not at all embedded in theoretical
knowledge), which in turn was closely linked to institutional and cultural con-
straints, in particular widespread rent seeking and opposition to innovation.
Those technological, institutional and cultural constraints apparently were and
in the case of Malthusianist scholars very often still are more or less taken for
granted or regarded as of limited relevance.189 That means that many cases of
Malthusian ‘overpopulation’ may also, or even just as well, be blamed on tech-
nological or institutional ‘deficiencies’. Actually Malthus considered the possi-
bility of technological innovation, but he simply thought that could never be as
effective as his ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ checks. Sustained growth is only possible
in a setting of continuing ‘improvement’ in all three of these contexts (resources,
institutions, and technology). Growth in a setting of technological change but
inflexible institutions will peter out, and, as more and more economists are
realising, even in a setting of permanent technological and institutional in-
novation growth is not guaranteed when in the end resources become scarce. In
every day practice, most people, including most economists, ever since the first
industrial revolution behaved and argued as if the problems Malthus had been
brooding about had been solved. One, of course, knew that resources in prin-
ciple are not limitless, but did not really bother about that for the time being,
apart from the economist William Stanley Jevons (1835 – 1882), who already in
1865 wrote about the dangers of a gradual exhaustion of the UK’s coal sup-
189 See for an insightful and enlightening analysis Mokyr, ‘Why was the Industrial Revolution a
European phenomenon?’.
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plies.190 Many resources like coal actually became cheaper during take-off. But
now in the twenty-first century with so many more consumers and so much
more consumption and aspiration to consume, the idea that there might be
limits to growth because of resource scarcity has again become a major issue in
debates amongst economists. An economy can only experience modern eco-
nomic growth when the limitations in terms of resources, technology and in-
stitutions all are continuously pushed aside in a process of permanent in-
novation. Explaining the Great Divergence ultimately means explaining how
societies could emerge in which innovations in the use of resources, in the
application of technology and in the existing institutional set-up became normal
and self-sustaining.
Those Malthusian constraints and the ceilings they implied were structural
and global phenomena. They were omnipresent in the entire pre-industrial
period in the entire world even if many regions never became so ‘overpopulated’
that they actually hit a Malthusian ceiling. In the West, for example, differences
in the level of wealth and development between the Roman Empire at its height
and Britain on the eve of its industrialisation were rather small. As for the Roman
Empire, Robert Allen claims: “The real wage evidence supports a guardedly
optimistic view of Roman living standards. Certainly, the Roman worker in
Diocletian’s time was doing about as well as most workers in eighteenth-century
Europe or Asia.”191 Both the Roman and the British Empire – at least up until
industrialisation started – did not know modern economic growth. Differences
in wealth and development between various societies at the same moment in
time before modern growth emerged also were small. Between the richest and
the poorest society, they would have been in an order of magnitude of maybe five
to one at the eve of Britain’s industrialisation as compared to some hundred to
one now. Between the wealthiest parts of Western Europe and the wealthiest
parts of China at the eve of Britain’s industrialisation, they would have been in an
order of magnitude of at best two, maybe three to one. Real incomes in north-
western Europe (Great Britain and the Dutch Republic) were substantially higher
than in the rest of Europe.
190 For Jevons’ worries see his Coal question.
191 Robert C Allen, How prosperous were the Romans? Evidence from Diocletian’s price edict
A.D. 301 http://economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/12121/1/paper363.pdf. See also Manning and
Morris, Ancient economy and Temin, ‘Economy of the early Roman Empire’.
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Table 22: Estimated Gross Domestic Income per capita in 1990 international dollars at PPP
Roman Empire year 14 844
England and Wales year 1688, social tables 1,418
Holland, province of the Dutch Republic year 1732, tax census 2,035
England and Wales year 1801 – 1803, social tables 2,006
China year 1880, social tables 540
Source: Branko Milanovic, Peter H. Lindert and Jeffrey G. Williamson, ‘Measuring ancient
inequality’, The World Bank, Policy Research Papers WPS 4412. 2007 – 11/1.
The tension between population and wealth existed even in the economically
most advanced countries. Even in Britain during the early modern era, a sus-
tained increase of population normally led to higher food prices and put pres-
sure on real incomes.192 Over time the relation between population and wealth
tended to be inverse.
Graph 7: The tension between real incomes (of unskilled building workers) and po-




























Source: Paolo Malanima, Pre-modern European economy, One thousand years (10th-19th
centuries), (Leiden and Boston) 275.
I already pointed out how pessimistic many economists in the eighteenth and
nineteenth century were, including in Britain, when it came to the possibility of
sustaining growth with an increasing population. Fairly substantial differences,
however, exist between scholars when it comes to the extent to which they think
that pre-industrial economies showed at least some growth and some develop-
ment, even if a Malthusian logic in the end would prevail. Those differences of
course have implications for the way in which the Great Divergence is in-
terpreted and explained. Strict Malthusianists like Gregory Clark and Oded
Galor claim that there was no real growth whatsoever. They only see ups and
downs of incomes that on average always hovered near the level of subsistence.
192 See e. g. Wrigley, Continuity, chance and change, 60 – 67.
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Clark, in his A farewell to alms, is very outspoken. He opens his book by
claiming, “…short term gains in income through technological advances were
inevitably (sic! PV) lost through population growth” and “…the average person
in the world of 1800 was no better off than the average person of 100,000 BC.” In
his view the situation was even worse: in 1800 so he claims, “the bulk of the
world’s population was poorer than their remote ancestors. The lucky denizens
of wealthy societies such as eighteenth-century England or the Netherlands
managed a material lifestyle equivalent to that of the Stone Age.” “In the pre-
industrial world” so he writes on page 32, “sporadic technological advance
produced people, not wealth.” On page 166 it then reads: “The Malthusian era
was one of astonishing stasis, in terms of living standards and of the rate of
technological change.”193 It would seem that Clark would endorse the first part of
this claim by Beinhocker : “To summarize 2.5 million years of economic history
in brief ; for a very, very long time not much happened; then all of sudden, (with
industrialisation PV) all hell broke loose.”194 In the literature dealing with the
history of Europe there exists a venerable line of ‘Malthusians’, e. g. historians
from the Annales-School like Fernand Braudel or Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie,
who even wrote about l’histoire immobile, and others like Wilhelm Abel (1904 –
1985) or Michael Postan (1899 – 1981). The Italian historian Paolo Malanima
would be an excellent recent example.195
Scholars who are less strict claim that Malthusian economies were not entirely
immobile and could go through periods of some growth and development. Their
thesis is the more convincing one. So-called ‘advanced organic economies’ like
those of North-western Europe, of Qing China (1644 – 1911), Mughal India
(1526 – 1858) and Tokugawa Japan (1601 – 1868) had their phases of ‘ef-
florescences’ before the economy in Britain took off. For north-western Europe,
for example, that would be during the High Middle Ages, for the Dutch Republic
during its Golden Age, and for Britain during the period of growth of the
eighteenth century before it would usher in the Industrial Revolution when
steam power became a major source of power. As indicated, the highest level of
development and wealth in China was in all probability reached during the
period of the Song Dynasty, but the period of the high Qing up until the last
decades of the eighteenth century is also widely regarded as one of ‘ef-
florescence’.
Economic growth was certainly not completely unknown in the pre-industrial
world. Direct proof in terms of unequivocal statistics will always be lacking but
193 Clark, Farewell to alms, 1 and 166. The fierce critiques the book received did not make him
change his mind. See his, ‘In defence of the Malthusian interpretation of history’.
194 Beinhocker, Origin of wealth, 11.
195 See e. g. his Pre-modern European economy.
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there is clear circumstantial evidence. In most parts of the world, apart from the
Americas with their disastrous mortality rates as a consequence of the in-
troduction of Eurasian diseases, population was higher than ever before at the
eve of the First Industrial Revolution in Britain. That indicates at least a certain
extensive growth. For the sake of convenience, I will confine myself in my further
examples to the situation in Western Europe. Population growth over time was
such that one may wonder when exactly, if ever, diminishing returns set in.
Apparently ‘Malthusian limits’ were fairly flexible there between 1000 and 1800.
Urbanisation also increased. In the wealthier regions of Western Europe, which
were as a rule also the ones that were more densely populated, many people,
moreover, clearly and permanently lived above subsistence. In Britain and the
Dutch Republic in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries even the working
poor had an income above bare subsistence. They had some room to spare in
their budgets to buy, for example, new products like tea, sugar, coffee or tobacco,
and alcoholic beverages.196 But one has to realise these were the wealthiest
countries in Europe at the time. Mortality indeed was at times high, but deaths
often were the result of diseases that were only indirectly or hardly at all related
to famine or food scarcity. The famines and food scarcity that did occur, in turn,
were often caused by problems of distribution or had political causes like war.
The link between fertility and the availability of resources also often was much
weaker than strict Malthusianism would suggest. Apparently there was some
room to increase the amount and quality of arable land, technology was not
completely stable and institutional change was not entirely lacking.197 If one
realises how rich – or rather poor – and developed – or rather underdeveloped –
even the richest and most developed societies still were in the second half of the
eighteenth century just before industrialisation began in Britain, it is clear,
however, that the history of the pre-industrial world could never have been one
of substantial and sustained growth and of major development.
What brought about the little pre-modern growth there was? Very important
was rent seeking, a common denominator for all sorts of surplus extraction that
are not so much a matter of creating and profiting from overall growth as of
appropriating as much as possible of an already existing ‘pie’ via force or, in any
case, power.198 Think of war, plunder, extortion, coercion, manipulation or
196 That has been shown in many publications. I here just refer to Voth’s review of Clark’s book
in European Review of Economic History 12 (2008) 152 – 153.
197 See e. g. the critical comments on Clark’s book by Hans-Joachim Voth, George Grantham
and Karl Gunnar Persson in European Review of Economic History 12, 2 (2008) 149 – 173;
Karl Gunnar Persson, ‘The end of the Malthusian stagnation thesis’, http://www.econ.ku.
dk/europe/early-growth.htm and Allen, ‘Review of Gregory Clark’s A farewell to alms’, a
very systematic and I think absolutely devastating critique.
198 This is the simple definition of Wikipedia of rent seeking or rent-seeking: spending res-
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monopoly. The wealth of a nation was then as a rule regarded as something that
could best be promoted on the backs of other nations, which would imply that
until the Industrial Revolution, “the limits to economic growth were set by
geopolitics.”199 Then there was the strategy of making more intensive use of the
resources, in particular land, that one already had and – very important –
extending the ‘resource-pool’ by incorporating more and more frontier re-
sources, in Europe first200, and with the passing of time increasingly also in other
continents. Another way to increase production and preferably productivity has
always been to increase the stock of capital goods. We see many examples of that
in the pre-industrial world: an increasing use of animals and implements; the
building of extra windmills, watermills and ‘machinery’; the construction of
manufactories and ports, et cetera. In a Malthusian context, though, this strategy
is not unproblematic. It implies increasing claims on the land, to feed animals,
for example, or to grow trees to produce wood that can be used in building or for
making implements or can serve as fuel to produce capital goods of iron or stone.
Many ‘fixed’ capital goods, moreover, were so vulnerable to wear and tear that
they were hardly distinguishable from fluid capital. Then there is improvement
of capital, whether physical, human or social. Technological innovation was not
absent: there were some important innovations and many small adaptations. But
one has to concede to the Malthusians that no real breakthroughs occurred since
there was no scientific underpinning of technology. Innovation was ad hoc,
intermittent and not interconnected. When it comes to human capital, progress
over the long run in literacy and numeracy was definitely made, but its impact
on production is hard to measure. People started to work harder and longer and
the percentage of working people on the whole of population increased. There
very probably was an (worldwide) increase in industriousness. That had its
limits of course, especially since poverty, illness and under-nourishment in-
capacitated many people and prevented them from working for long stretches of
time and from working hard. One may wonder whether all this extra toil really
brought growth in terms of an rise of productivity or rather, much more likely,
only a meagre extra compensation for much extra work. Social capital may have
ources in order to gain by increasing one’s share of existing wealth, instead of trying to
create wealth. The net effect of rent seeking is to reduce total social wealth, because res-
ources are spent and no new wealth is created. In a theoretical context, it is important to
distinguish rent seeking from profit seeking. Profit seeking in this sense is the creation of
wealth, while rent seeking is the use of social institutions such as the power of government
to redistribute wealth among different groups without creating new wealth. Rent seeking
implies extraction of uncompensated value from others without making any contribution to
productivity. See Wikipedia under rent-seeking.
199 I here quote from Mokyr, Enlightened economy, 156. Mokyr himself does not endorse this
mercantilist view. He refers to David Ormrod who according to him does. See Ormrod, Rise
of commercial empires.
200 See Bartlett, Making of Europe.
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improved as trust either deepened or more people worked in bigger entities
where it could – and should – become more formalised.201
Then there was ‘Smithian’ growth via specialisation, i. e. the division of la-
bour, in particular when it occurred in a setting of free and fair competition. But,
as indicated, even Adam Smith himself, who gave so much thought to this source
of ‘the wealth of nations’, thought this strategy was not sustainable and would
reach its limits, its ‘stationary state’ as he called it, quite soon.202 Even in free
markets, the costs of exchange over long distances soon became prohibitive.
Many markets, moreover, were not free and much competition not fair. Many
people wanted to keep it that way. As long as many people were so poor that they
could not buy something coming from a faraway place, substantial extension of
the market was quite illusionary anyway. Be it as it may : in the pre-industrial
world, none of these ‘strategies’ brought a breakthrough, nowhere on the globe.
Constraints in terms of resources, knowledge, and institutions made that im-
possible. Then where did this modern economic growth come from? What more
obvious way to find out is there than to ask economists?
201 See for this topic: A note on social capital, Tine de Moor, ERC Starting Grant Project,
‘United we stand’. The dynamics and consequences of institutions for collective action in
preindustrial Europe http://vkc.library.uu.nl/vkc/seh/research/Lists/Projects/DispFor-
m.aspx?ID=19
202 For the modern concept of ‘Smithian’ growth see Kelly, ‘The dynamics of Smithian growth’.
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Part one: Economists and theories of economic growth
1. Introduction
Economics as a serious intellectual discipline came into being at about the same
time as modern economic growth. That growth is or at least ought to be one of its
central topics. It would therefore be strange not to take a brief look at what this
science has to say about growth in general and modern growth in particular. I
will muster what I think are the main explanations of growth that economists
have come up with over time in terms of proximate as well as ultimate causes203
and then in the rest of the book compare them with the explanations that have
been presented by scholars discussing the Great Divergence and present and
argue my personal points of view along the way. My analysis will therefore not be
structured according to different schools or approaches in global economic
history, nor will it follow chronology, presenting explanations as they have been
put forward over time. I must immediately add, that taking stock of the main
explanations that have been suggested by economists for (modern) economic
growth as point of departure for my own analysis sounds far simpler than it is.
Actually the practitioners of ‘the queen of the social sciences’ hardly agree on
anything substantial and for any economist making a claim, one can find an-
other one claiming exactly the opposite, which, in a way, is comforting, as it
allows me to be unashamedly selective. Is it clear that economics has not yet
answered its major question, or to put it in the words of the author of a lucid
overview of the debates, Elhanan Helpman:
For centuries economists have been preoccupied with the growth of nations, and they
have studied this subject continually since the days of Adam Smith. This effort has
produced a better understanding of the sources of economic growth. But the subject
has proved elusive, and many mysteries remain.204
203 For a further explanation of these two concepts see White, Understanding economic de-
velopment under ‘causation’, ‘proximate’ and ‘ultimate’.
204 Helpman, Mystery of economic growth, Preface IX.
Colin White seems to agree in his recent book on understanding economic
development:
Despite an explosion in relevant publications on economic growth, there is still no good
explanation of why modern economic development has occurred where and when it
has. It is disappointing that there is such a marked disproportion between the effort
expended and its return.205
Gregory Clark is even more outspoken, and quite negative:
…since the Industrial Revolution we have entered a strange new world in which the
rococo embellishments of economic theory help little in understanding the pressing
questions that the ordinary person asks of economics: Why are some rich and some
poor? In the future will we all be among the lucky?
He refers to a “deluge” of publications by economists that “serves more to
obscure than to illuminate” and claims that:
History shows … that the West has no model of economic development to offer the still-
poor countries of the world. There is no simple economic medicine that will guarantee
growth.206
But there are many positive signs and it would of course be extremely inefficient
and arrogant to simply ignore the points of view of economists, many of whom
admit that they have no simple recipe. Dani Rodrik correctly writes that econ-
omists could do with a lot more modesty and should be much more aware of
their shortcomings. Without giving up the principles of neo-classical analysis,
he holds a paean for economics as a discipline that stresses the importance of
careful reading of empirical evidence, admits the possibility that governments
change economies for the better, and is always attentive to context and to local
realities with their specific sets of constraints and possibilities, a paean that to
me almost sounds like a plea to transform economics into a kind of historical
economics in which economists can learn as much from historians as historians
from economists.207
In that respect however, it is striking and somewhat disturbing that historians
discussing the Great Divergence have taken on board so little of the economists’
theorising. Many if not most historians seem to harbour serious doubts whether
economics as a way of thinking can be of any use to them. And to be honest, most
economists discussing growth as a rule continue to hover at such an abstract and
in particular general level that it remains rather unclear how exactly they would
explain a concrete historical phenomenon like the Great Divergence. They are
205 White, Understanding economic development, Preface VII.
206 Clark, Farewell to alms, 372 and 373.
207 Rodrik, One economics, many recipes, 3 – 6.
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not really interested in the in-depth analysis of unique phenomena in the past,
whatever their importance. But in the end no one gains from mutual ignoring.
This ‘essay’, as the French would call it, aims on the one hand to discuss in a fairly
idiosyncratic, personal and definitely not exhaustive way, whether and how
economics might be of any help in answering one of the greatest, if not the
greatest question in economic history, and on the other hand what (global)
economic historians might teach economists. What struck me in my reading of
the fairly extensive amount of literature that is at the basis of this book are the
enormous differences in approach and more surprisingly in emphasis between
what economists say about (the origins of) modern economic growth and what
most global (economic) historians say about it. They often seem to live in two
different universes, assuming things the other party would never assume and
often knowing things ‘the counterpart’ simply does not know. This book will not
try to provide a ‘thesis’ of its own in the form of a ‘definitive’ mono-causal
explanation or a small selection of key variables. I do not believe such a thing is
possible. Even if universally valid theories would exist, they would never be fully
applicable to specific cases in the sense that they can never fully cover them. That
means that even if universally valid theories of economic growth existed, they
would not be able to fully explain the Great Divergence as it actually occurred.
Historical explanation always is a matter of logic in context, i. e. applying the-
ories in specific configurations and then assessing their validity for that context.
The same logic may very well entail different outcomes in differing contexts, as
Rodrik correctly points out. A good historical explanation is one that fits the case
well, but always in comparison to other explanations. A good social scientific
theory is one that formally is impeccable and in practice covers as many ide-
alized cases as possible. I hope this confrontation between what is going on in
two lively fields of scholarship will prove fertile for both these fields.
Probably the most obvious way to discuss the views of economists on the
causes of economic growth would be to start with having a look at what they are
saying about the contributions to growth of the classical factors of production:
land, labour and capital. That clearly does not suffice: a simple adding up of
inputs in whatever combination in the end will lead to diminishing returns.
Sustained growth requires changes in the production process that make it more
productive. One way to increase productivity, long known to economists and
central in the work of Adam Smith, consists in the dividing of production
processes in more parts (specialisation) while at the same time extending the
market. Nowadays changes in production are often more or less identified with
‘technological changes’ or more broadly with the concept of ‘innovation’. In-
novation and even change can only become structural features of an economy
and a society if that economy and society in turn have certain institutional
features. Those very probably will be strongly influenced by the dominant
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culture in a certain society. We will therefore briefly muster what economists
have said about the contribution of the different factors of production, in-
novation, institutions and culture to modern economic growth, and then have a
look how scholars studying the Great Divergence appraise their role in the
explanations they come up with.
2. Land, resources, geography
Let us begin our overview with what in classical economics used to be referred to
as ‘land’, basically shorthand for what nature has to offer : natural resources,
location, climate and disease. In this text I will refer to it as ‘geography’ in the
widest meaning of the word. Its importance looks quite obvious. In practice,
however, the connection between geography and wealth appears to be anything
but clear. Amongst economists – and surprisingly enough also amongst geog-
raphers – it is not very popular to refer to ‘geography’ in debates about economic
development out of fear to be accused of geographical determinism. Which, to
be honest, indeed has produced quite a few too simple explanations. Economist
Daron Acemoglu and political scientist James Robinson, for example, recently
quite explicitly rejected geographical explanations of the Great Divergence.208
But paying attention to geographical factors need not lead to geographical de-
terminism and simply ignoring them would be unwise, as, by the way, Acemoglu
and Robinson and their colleague Simon Johnson in practice clearly admit. One
can only agree with Clint Ballinger that geographic factors are necessary in
development studies.209 Geography – amongst other things – deals with the
question why something happens at a certain place, which is highly relevant as
for example shows in world-systems theory that focuses entirely on the working
of its ‘system’ but actually as such cannot explain why the core and periphery
emerged where they emerged. Geographical circumstances can trigger certain
developments, amplify or (re)enforce them, create path-dependency, throw light
on processes of concentration and agglomeration and their effects. Actually,
these topics are the subject of lively debates, in particular in the so-called ‘new
economic geography’.210
When references to geography pop up in general debates on economic de-
velopment, they mostly tend to be negative, i. e. they provide explanations of why
growth did not occur. One can find quite a few references to ‘bad’ geography in
208 See their Why nations fail, chapter 2, pages 48 – 56.
209 Clint Ballinger, Why geographic factors are necessary in development studies http://phi
losophyofscience.webstarts.com/working_papers.html
210 The book by Braun and Schulz, Wirtschaftsgeographie provides a very helpful general
introduction. See further under note 211.
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the sense of e. g. bad soil, location (being landlocked or suffering from the
tyranny of distance), climate, natural disasters or diseases that all hamper
economic development and act as barriers to growth.211 Such ‘geographical’
conditions can indeed often (help to) explain why some nations are poor. Jeffrey
Sachs, for example, one of the most important economists of our time, in an
article written with colleagues, points at the fact that the great majority of the
poorest countries lie in the geographical tropics, the area between the Tropic of
Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn. Most of the richest countries, in contrast, lie
in the temperate zones. A more precise picture of this geographical divide can be
obtained by defining tropical regions by climate rather than by latitude. They
then conclude that geography is important because of geographically de-
termined transport costs, the prevalence of disease and its impact on agricul-
tural productivity. That all sounds quite convincing.212 But one must be wary not
to become too deterministic. One can easily find counterexamples. The Dutch
Republic during its ‘golden’ seventeenth century in many respects was not ex-
actly blessed by nature. Other examples that come to mind would be Japan or
Switzerland, countries that became very wealthy but where, in any case, prima
facie nature was a challenge rather than an asset and both of which were regarded
as poor and having bleak prospects at the moment Great Britain took off. For
Japan, this overall was the case at least up until the Meiji Restoration. As late as
1815, Patrick Colquhoun (1745 – 1820), a Scottish merchant, statistician and
magistrate, described (landlocked, mountainous and split-up!) Switzerland –
that soon was to become one of the richest countries in the world – as a place
…where the density of the population, the insufficiency of food, and the paucity of
resources for profitable employment, produce much misery : and where no relief can be
found but emigration to countries, where for want of colonies the labour of the people is
lost to the Parent State.213
It would seem quite obvious that being blessed by nature has a positive impact
on the wealth of a nation. In stories about industrialisation reference to the
fundamental importance of the availability of coal and iron ore, for example, can
hardly be overlooked. That availability undoubtedly determined the location of
211 See in particular publications by Jeffrey Sachs, Andrew D. Mellinger, John L. Gallup and
Paul Krugman. For ample references to their work and that of many others that is relevant to
this topic, I refer to Ballinger, ‘Why geographic factors are necessary in development
studies’; White, Understanding economic development, chapters 5 and 6, and to the websites
of the four scholars mentioned.
212 See Sachs, Mellinger and Gallup, ‘Geography of poverty’. The title is very apt. The text tells
us a lot about geography and poverty but nothing much about geography and growth.
213 Colquhoun, Treatise on the wealth, power and resources of the British Empire, 4. For the
country’s wealth see Maddison, World economy, 264.
Land, resources, geography 85
many of the first industrial sites in Europe.214 More generally, it would seem
obvious that when a country has many resources in the form of raw materials, it
can use that windfall and the comparative advantage it creates by exporting them
and so earn money that it can use to finance development. This is exactly what
Harold Innis (1894 – 1952) claimed in his ‘staples thesis’ when he, building on the
case of Canada, postulated that exporting raw materials can trigger sustainable
economic growth.215 Most mainstream economists have long considered it a
good strategy for countries that have a lot of resources to put them to good use
and export them. That would mean they use their comparative advantage in
trade, which is supposed to ensure a win-win situation for all parties involved
and provide the exporting countries with the money necessary for investment.
In the ‘staples thesis’ and similar approaches, producing and exporting primary
goods is regarded as a sensible option that can act as a stepping-stone to wealth
and growth, in particular when the resource-rich country that opts for it has an
ample supply of labour that keeps wages down and invests in capital goods216,
and, many economists would add, does not use too much of the money that is
earned by exporting to pay for imported consumer goods but rather focuses on
strengthening and broadening the domestic growth potential of the country.
Counter-intuitive as that may seem, being blessed by nature does not guar-
antee wealth, far from it. Actually, the ample availability of resources for various
reasons often is not a good predictor of wealth. In the words of historian Gavin
Wright, “there is no iron law associating natural resource abundance with na-
tional industrial strength.”217 For the period since roughly World War II, it has
been statistically shown that low- and middle-income economies are more re-
source-dependent than wealthy economies.218 For previous periods, including
the period when the Great Divergence took place, for which we of course have
fewer data, this generalisation seems generally valid as well.219 So many of the
poor and underdeveloped countries in the world are countries whose exports
214 See e. g. Pollard, Peaceful conquest, maps 1 and 2, pages XIVand XV, and of course, as will be
discussed later on, Pomeranz, Great Divergence.
215 See for Innis’s ideas http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harold_Innis, consulted 15 – 12 – 2011.
216 See for this thesis for example Findlay and O’Rourke, Power and plenty, chapter 7, where
they build on the ideas of W. Arthur Lewis (See note 251), and Barbier, Scarcity and frontiers
under ‘resource-based development’ and ‘resource-dependent development’. Investment in
capital goods in poor countries that only have relatively small stocks of them is considered
to add more value than it does in rich countries that already have a lot of them, and is
therefore considered to facilitate catching-up.
217 Wright, ‘The origins of American industrial success’, 666.
218 Resource dependence refers to the ratio of primary products to total merchandise exports.
For the claim made in the text see Barbier, Scarcity and frontiers, 583 – 585. See for further
information his chapter 9, and in particular Box 9.1. For the definition of resource de-
pendence see ibidem, 583.
219 See Williamson, Trade and poverty.
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mainly consist of raw materials, that to simply trust that such exports in the end
will lead to wealth in any case is rather optimistic, to put it very mildly. There is a
substantial amount of economic literature devoted to the so-called ‘curse of
natural resources’ – with the so-called ‘Dutch disease’ as a special case – in which
the frequent existence of a negative connection between the ample availability of
(certain) natural resources and growth is postulated and analysed.220 This effect
can also occur when one imports resources from elsewhere. A quite peculiar case
would be that of early modern Spain and Portugal, which imported huge
amounts of cheap bullion from the Americas; this did not trigger substantial
economic growth but rather became a hindrance to economic development,
amongst other things because of the inflation they produced. The Iberians fo-
cused their attention and their extractive activities on the (bullion-)‘rich’ regions
of the Americas exactly because they yielded easy income. These extractive
activities and the general exploitation that in the end did not make the Iberians
rich would have impoverished those resource-rich regions where they ruled. The
West Indies were exploited by West European plantation-owners because they
too offered the opportunity to earn huge amounts of money. In these examples,
the resource-wealth of regions turned out to be a curse that may have con-
tributed substantially to their own under-development. ‘Poorer’ parts of the
Americas, in contrast, had the fortune to attract less unwelcome attention.221 In a
similar vein, parts of Africa may have profited from their inhospitable or rugged
environment because it kept out slave hunters and conquerors.222
The ‘curse of natural resources’-effect has always played an important role in
what has become known as ‘dependency-theory’ and later also in so-called
‘world-systems analysis’, a body of thought that claims that countries whose
220 See e. g. Jeffry Sachs and Andrew Warner, ‘Natural resource abundance and economic
growth’, Harvard Institute for International Development. Discussion paper 517a (October
1995); iidem, ‘The curse of natural resources’ and Wick and Bulte, ‘Curse of natural res-
ources’. For further references see Williamson, Trade and poverty, 183 – 184. The expression
‘resource curse’ very probably originates with Auty, Sustaining development in mineral
economies. In economics, the Dutch disease is a concept that explains the apparent rela-
tionship between the increase in exploitation of natural resources and a decline in the
manufacturing sector. The mechanism is that an increase in revenues from natural res-
ources (or inflows of foreign aid) will make a given nation’s currency stronger compared to
that of other nations (manifest in an exchange rate), resulting in that nation’s other exports
becoming more expensive for other countries to buy, which in turn makes the manufac-
turing sector less competitive. The Economist coined the term in 1977. See for this definition
and further explanation http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dutch_disease, consulted 15 – 12 –
2011.
221 This is a ‘reversal of fortune-thesis’, that is defended by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson
and James Robertson as well as Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff. See pages 162 –
174.
222 Nunn and Puga, ‘Ruggedness’.
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economies heavily rely on exporting raw materials tend to end up being poor
and stuck in a development-trap. The explanation of that trap in this perspective
is directly connected to the existence of a global division of labour, in which rich
countries are more likely to import raw materials than to export them, and to
specific power relations, both in countries that themselves export primary
products and internationally.223 Dependency theorists and kindred spirits claim
that counties specialising in the export of raw materials tend to develop a dual
economy in which the export-sector is isolated from the rest of the economy and
lacks positive backward or forward linkages. Such countries, still in their view,
do not develop an integrated economy and continue to be dependent on foreign
markets to sell their goods, for finance and knowledge. Their export sector is in
the hands of a small and wealthy elite that pays its labour low wages, which is an
impediment to the emergence of a domestic mass market and technological
development. Such elites collect huge rents and oppose social change and in-
novation. The rising demand for resources in particular when they are in the
hands of small elites often e. g. in case of minerals – that do not provide much
work and whose production is easily isolated from the rest of the economy –
provides them with very high incomes or, rather, rents. Those rents can enable
ruling elites to further strengthen their position and create an extraction-in-
tensive economy with a vicious circle of “circular cumulative causation” which
does not lead to equilibrium as is always implied in neo-classical economics but
rather to increasing inequality and poverty.224
Overall income for countries specialising in the production of primary re-
sources lagged far behind, still according to adherents of this perspective, be-
cause the terms of trade for primary goods are assumed to be structurally
deteriorating. In this respect, the work of the economists Raffll Prebisch (1901 –
1986) and Hans Wolfgang Singer (1910 – 2006) was extremely influential.225
Their empirical research focused on the period 1870 – 1940, for which they
claimed the existence of those structural deteriorating terms of trade. The
findings of their work for that specific period, however, tended to be presented as
an illustration of a general universal mechanism hitting all countries whose
exports mainly consisted of primary goods. In ‘dependency-theory’ focusing on
223 See for a first introduction and several references http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Depen
dency_theory, consulted 15 – 12 – 2011. For the rise and many would claim the decline of
dependency theory I refer to Bernecker and Fischer, ‘Rise and decline of Latin American
dependency theories’.
224 The concept ‘circular cumulative causation’ was coined by the Swedish economist Karl
Gunnar Myrdal (1898 – 1987). Acemoglu’s and Robinson’s vicious (and virtuous) circles
remind strongly of this way of reasoning. See pages e. g. page 126.
225 See for their life and work http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singer%E2 %80 %93Prebisch_thesis.
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the production and export of primary goods therefore is regarded as a dead-end
street that brings underdevelopment.
Proponents of both theses – i. e. the staples thesis and dependency theory –
can refer to examples that ‘prove’ their position. Britain, the first industrial
nation, had long been an exporter of wool and until as late as the 1770s it
exported wheat. The United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand and, with
at times quite different histories, Argentina and Uruguay, are examples of
countries that clearly profited from exporting staples. These settler colonies all
went through a ‘Golden Age’ in the period from 1815 to 1914 when their exports
boomed. The United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, overall, became
economically very successful and were amongst the richest and most highly
developed countries in the world even though they, in particular in the case of
Australia and New Zealand, to a large extent continued to be major exporters of
primary goods often including minerals. From a global perspective even Ar-
gentina and Uruguay, whose economic trajectories were much more ‘bumpy’
and volatile, continued to be quite wealthy.226 The differences in development
and wealth that emerged between former ‘British’ and former ‘Spanish’ colonies,
were not unrelated to their differing institutional set-up and policies and the
extent to which those enabled them to avoid a simple “staples trap”. The British
settler colonies in particular followed a very specific and exceptional trajectory
that as such would have been very hard to copy by other countries and that
cannot be used as basis for broader generalizations. I will therefore not sepa-
rately discuss the growth paths of these settler economies and not further refer to
them in my analysis, apart from my comments in this chapter on the ideas of
Engerman and Sokoloff and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson.227
In Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia many countries with large exports
of primary products in the end continued to be poor and underdeveloped.
Whatever its exact tenability, the dependency-approach in any case forced
mainstream economists and others to think about the striking phenomenon that
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries an overall increase in economic di-
vergence emerged in the global economy accompanied by an overall increase in
trade contacts. According to mainstream economics, convergence should have
226 See for their real GDP per capita Maddison, Contours of the world economy, 382, under USA
and other Western offshoots, and, for Argentina and Uruguay, Maddison, World economy,
195.
227 For a very interesting general analysis of their economic histories, see Lloyd, Metzer and
Sutch, Settler economies in world history. For the “staples trap” see, MacAloon, ‘State and
economic policy’. In Europe, Denmark would be an example of a country that successfully
escaped it. For a comparison of two settler economies and their trajectories (a Spanish one
and a British one: Uruguay and New Zealand) see Schlüter, Institutions and small settler
economies.
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been the outcome. Mainstream economics predicts that growth rates would tend
to slow down in developed countries as they already have very high capital inputs
and will therefore be confronted with decreasing returns, whereas they would be
quite high in poorer countries that could directly use the latest state-of-the-art
capital goods and add them to their still small stock, using investment capital
that would go from rich to poor countries in search of high yields. The idea that
poor countries, provided they acquire enough capital and meet some other
requirements, would have high growth rates and potential to catch up has long
been and basically still is widespread amongst economists and sounds quite
‘logical’. The problem is that fighting poverty apparently requires more than just
investment.228
The question of why so many resource-dependent countries continued to be
so poor and underdeveloped and how this could be related to the nature of the
goods they exported never lost its urgency. The matter is still discussed amongst
economists. In current debates on the resource curse and the related question
with regard to pros and cons of specialisation according to comparative ad-
vantage, one can discern two positions. There is hardly any economist left who
would want to defend the extended Prebisch-Singer thesis that terms of trade of
all primary products would structurally deteriorate. What empirical research
has found are big differences over time and place and per product.229 Most of the
‘de-industrialisation’ of what was now becoming a poor periphery (later the
Third World) occurred before 1870, in a period when its terms of trade in-
creased, with 1.4 per cent per year over the period from 1800 – 1860. For the
period 1870 – 1939, the period that Prebisch and Singer investigated and used as
basis for their thesis, the much-lamented connection between primary pro-
duction and deteriorating terms of trade seems spurious. In any case, it seems
too rash to speak of a secular deterioration of the terms of trade of the Third
World. There was some industrial ‘lift-off ’ in Latin America before 1913, espe-
cially in Mexico and Brazil. Not all commodity prices were deteriorating then.
What became increasing problematic, though, was their high volatility. There
was much more volatility in the export baskets of peripheral than of core
countries. The extreme specialisation of many peripheral economies of course
made them very vulnerable for such volatility. The situation, however, changed
over time. Since the Korean War (1950 – 1953), the terms of trade of primary
228 See my comments with regard to ‘capital fundamentalism’ – and an explanation of that
concept – on pages 234 – 244.
229 The information in the rest of this paragraph is taken from Williamson, Trade and poverty,
52, 191 and 196 ff. For further information indicating that the terms of trade for countries
producing primary products did not structurally deteriorate see Allen, Global economic
history, 127 – 128; Bairoch, Economics and world history, chapter 10, and Findlay and
O’Rourke, Power and plenty, 424 – 425.
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products has shown no clear trend at all. After 1970, the Third World no longer
was just a primary producing region. In 1970, seventeen per cent of total exports
of the Third World countries consisted of manufacturing. In 1998, that was sixty-
four per cent, and now in 2012 it is even higher.230 Many Third World countries
have recently gone through a labour-intensive industrialisation. The contrast
between resource-abundance and labour-abundance lost much of its meaning
and the contrast in the global division of labour – developed countries export
manufactured goods and under-developed or developing ones primary goods –
much of its poignancy. We will come back to the importance of terms of trade
and discussions about it later on.
These findings have of course eliminated a very important building block of
dependency theory and similar approaches. That does, however, not mean that
the goods that are produced in an economy would be irrelevant to economic
development, which brings us to the second position of the two we want to
distinguish: an increasing number of economists claim that the specific nature
of the goods that many poor countries produce plays a fundamental part in
causing their poverty not so much because of their unfavourable terms of trade
but because their prices are so volatile231 and, in particular, because producing
them has few ‘growth-enhancing’ effects. An increasing number of scholars,
moreover, now reject the so-called ‘equality assumption’ that all economic ac-
tivities are qualitatively alike and claim that what is produced is not irrelevant to
economic development and growth: development and growth are activity-spe-
cific. Not every specialisation has the same potential.232 As economic historian
David Landes puts it : “… some activities are more lucrative and productive than
others. (A dollar is not a dollar is not a dollar.) They require and yield greater
gains in knowledge and know-how, within and without.”233 Economist Erik
Reinert created the following hierarchy to show what is meant here:
230 For these figures for 1970 and 1998 see Martin, ‘Developing countries’ changing partici-
pation in world trade’, and idem, ‘Outgrowing resource dependence’.
231 For this extreme volatility and its possible consequences see e. g. Williamson, Trade and
poverty, chapter 10.
232 The expression ‘equality assumption’ is coined by Buchanan in his What should economists
do? 231 ff. See for an extensive explanation Reinert, ‘The other canon and uneven growth’
and in his How rich countries got rich, for example, chapter four. See also Landes, Wealth
and poverty, the Index, under ‘comparative advantage’.
233 Landes, Wealth and poverty, 522.
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Figure 5: The quality index of economic activities
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imperfect information
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high wage level
possibilities for important economies of scale
and scope
high industry concentration
high stakes: high barriers to entry and exit
branded product
produce linkages and synergies
product innovations
standard neo-classical assumptions irrelevant
Characteristics of low-quality activities
old knowledge with low market value
flat learning curves
low growth in output
little technological progress
low R& D content
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perfect information
divisible investment (tools for a baseball factory)
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low wage level
little or no economics of scale/risk of
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produce few linkages and synergies
process innovations, if any
neo-classical assumptions are reasonable
proxy
Source: Erik S. Reinert, How rich countries got rich … and why poor countries stay poor
(New York 2007) 317.
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Certain (industrial-urban and modern service) activities as a rule have more
cost-reducing and productivity-enhancing potential than other (traditional
agricultural and service) activities. Industry and modern services overall appear
to have higher returns to scale than traditional sectors and as a rule profit more
from all sorts of agglomeration effects. In particular, industry will therefore
clearly function as the carrier of growth, in particular when concentrated in
urban clusters that foster agglomeration effects and demand for and accumu-
lation of skills, have more efficient markets, and facilitate the creation and
transfer of knowledge. Urban environments, to somewhat broaden this com-
ment and its implications tend to be more innovative than the countryside.
There apparently is, in several respects, an ‘urban bias’ in development.234 In-
habitants being close to each other and directly connected apparently increases
productivity to such an extent that it more than compensates for the fact that
cities are more expensive to live in. Especially cities that are more complex and
diverse can become and remain economic centres.235 Countries without a strong
and developing industry will tend to fall behind. In this respect, Wallerstein
clearly has a point:
Since a capitalist world-economy essentially rewards accumulated capital, including
human capital, at a higher rate than ‘raw’ labour power, the geographical mal-dis-
tribution of these occupational skills involves a strong trend towards self-maintenance.
The forces of the marketplace reinforce them rather than undermine them.236
Later in this text in the explanation of why the Third World fell behind the causes
and effects of specialisation in the production and export of primary products
will be more extensively discussed and analysed when it comes to their im-
portance for the Great Divergence.237 Again a reference to the work by Erik
Reinert can explain what is meant here.
234 Michael Lipton refers to fifteen countries that were already wealthy at the time of the Meiji
Restoration. Their populations, when faster growth and industrialisation took off, were
thirty-five to seventy percent urban. See his, Why poor people stay poor, 35.
235 See for this thesis Glaeser, Triumph of the city ; Hall, Cities in civilization ; Jacobs, The
economy of cities ; idem, Cities and the wealth of nations, Lipton, Why poor people stay poor
–that also criticizes it–, and PolÀse, The wealth & poverty of regions. In this book on pages
33 – 49 there is a brief discussion of several ‘agglomeration effects’. And then of course there
is the famous thesis of Saskia Sassen about the fundamental importance for economic
development of what she calls ‘global cities’. See her Global city. For some interesting
general comments see Warsh, Knowledge and the wealth of nations, 245 – 247, 306 – 308, and
318 – 321.
236 Wallerstein, Modern world-system. Volume I, 350.
237 See pages 272 – 290.
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Figure 6: Good and bad export activities
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Based on: Erik S. Reinert, How rich countries got rich … and why poor countries stay poor
(New York 2007) 151.
Many economists at the moment are convinced that the kind of goods one
exports as such clearly can have major effects on the developmental potential of
an economy, but most of them would discuss their impact looking at the total
context in which that export takes place and at what happens in the rest of the
economy. They would, in any case, advise not continuing to specialise according
to static ‘comparative advantages’ based on factor endowments, but to try to
actively create dynamic ‘competitive advantages’, as Michael E. Porter defines
them.238 Geography, as a rule, is not regarded as fate. Institutions and other
variables also matter a lot as in more sophisticated varieties of dependency-
theory.
A specific way to point at the importance of geography that has always been
stock in trade amongst historians dealing with the pre-industrial world, but that
had gone out of fashion amongst economists only to come back now with a
vengeance, so it seems, can probably be best characterised as Neo-Malthusian.
An increasing number of economists have begun to wonder whether, consid-
ering the enormous worldwide increase of consumption, finite resources could
not again, as in Malthus’ view, become a constraint to growth. Very wide-ranging
and acrimonious debates on the limits to growth and on sustainability have
flared up. Not by accident, Jared Diamond’s highly acclaimed Guns, germs and
steel, basically dealing with growth and development, was succeeded by his
Collapse, about squandering resources and damaging if not completely ex-
hausting the environment.239 Those debates and the insights they have brought
238 See e. g. his, Competitive advantage of nations.
239 Diamond, Guns, germs and steel, and idem, Collapse.
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about possible limits to growth, as we know it, could also be relevant to those
studying the emergence of that growth. The same goes for neo-Ricardian
analyses of rent seeking by owners of resources.
The connection between resources and economic growth in general appa-
rently is not as straightforward as one might think. That, by the way, is not a
recent discovery. In the early modern world, at least in Europe amongst authors
we would now call ‘mercantilists’ – and who to my view are uniquely European –
the idea that resources could easily turn into a curse actually was already
widespread. In their eyes, according to Erik Reinert, “The wealth of a nation
appeared, somewhat paradoxically, to be inversely related to its natural wealth.”
He indicates that, “The realization spread through Europe that the real gold
mines of the world were not the physical gold mines, but manufacturing in-
dustry.”240 One can find several quotes referring to the poverty of Spain and the
wealth of countries or cities that did not have gold and silver mines at their
disposal. The idea that exploiting some natural resources like coal might be just
as important if not more important than simply amassing bullion even occurred
to an English poet as early as 1651: “England’s a perfect world, has Indies too/
Correct your maps, Newcastle is Peru.”241
What we are discussing in this book, however, is the emergence not of eco-
nomic growth as such but of modern economic growth. That is quite con-
sequential for our analyses. Even though, ever since the emergence of modern
economic growth, technology has always managed to beat nature and to come up
with solutions for scarcity and even though, according to a ‘rational optimist’
such as Matt Ridley, it probably will continue to do so in the future242, it is
nevertheless clear that geography in the widest sense of the word might set limits
to any kind of growth and in that way is a necessary precondition for modern
economic growth. It definitely can facilitate, enable or even elicit such growth.
But it is hard to see how it could be a sufficient condition. A country undoubtedly
can benefit from its geographic windfalls, but geography per se is static or almost
static, whereas modern growth is sustained and very strongly thrives on change
and innovation.
240 The quotations are taken from Reinert, How rich countries got rich, 77 and 86. See for a
general discussion chapter 3.
241 Cleveland, Poems, 10.
242 Ridley, Rational optimist, in particular chapters 9 – 11.
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3. Labour: the effect of quantities
The second factor of production that might act as an engine of growth would be
labour. The role of labour in growth is an issue over which, not unsurprisingly,
economists have strongly disagreed. Let us enter their debates by tackling the
question in rather blunt and simply quantitative terms: is an ample and in-
creasing supply of labour better for growth than a small and decreasing one? For
the sake of convenience, I will distinguish between two extreme positions. The
first one will be called ‘Boserupian’, after the Danish economist Ester Boserup
(1910 – 1999), the other one ‘Malthusian’, after the British cleric and economist
Thomas Malthus, whose ideas we already discussed briefly. Ester Boserup
tended to focus on the positive incentives and effects of population increase. In
her view, such an increase also increases the pressure to innovate.243 Although in
her work she focused on agricultural development and never claimed that
population growth would actually cause overall economic growth, she was
convinced that ‘necessity is the mother of invention’. It was her great belief that
humanity would always find a way and she was quoted in saying, “The power of
ingenuity would always outmatch that of demand.”244 An increasing population
can have positive effects on innovation via several supply-side mechanisms:
more people means more brains, a higher intensity and ease of communication
and exchange, plus the possibility of a more extended division of labour. Positive
effects may also set in via incentives in the demand-side, as an increasing
population as a rule means higher prices for products, larger markets for selling
them, and the ability to use scale effects in production.245 All these effects tend to
be even more prominent in an urban environment. Many ‘new growth-econo-
mists’ who believe in endogenous growth have elaborated upon various possible
connections between population growth and density and economic growth. As
such they are not new. William Petty (1623 – 1687), by many regarded as the
founder of political economy, already wrote: “It is more likely that one ingenious
curious man may be found among four million persons than among 400 per-
sons.”246 Amongst modern economists, I here only mention Oded Galor, Charles
243 Her best-known book is Boserup, Conditions of agricultural growth. See also her Population
and technological change.
244 See for this quote the article on her on Wikipedia in English, consulted on 12 – 11 – 2011.
245 When I refer to scale effects in this text I mean ‘economies of scale’ and ‘returns to scale’.
Where economies of scale refer to the positive relationship between the size of a firm and its
costs, i. e. a lowering of average costs with increasing size, returns to scale describe the
relationship between inputs and outputs. Returns to scale are constant if increasing all
inputs by some proportion results in output increasing by that same proportion. Returns
are decreasing if, say, doubling inputs results in less than double the output, and increasing
if more than double the output
246 Warsh, Knowledge and the wealth of nations, 309.
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I. Jones, Michael Kremer, Matt Ridley and Julian Lincoln Simon. Economist-
historian Gregory Clark would also be an example.247 These economists also
point out that, in principle, a larger population permits increased specialisation
and economies of scale in the production and exchange of ideas, which would
lead to synergy, or, as Matt Ridley calls it, “ideas having sex.”248
Many economists and historians would not endorse the ‘Boserupian’ ap-
proach and rather defend the Malthusian thesis that after some initial increasing
returns, population growth as a rule leads to ‘overpopulation’, which means
scarcity of resources and problems. In their approach, the potentially positive
effects of population pressure receive far less attention than its problematic side.
When it comes to the power of ingenuity, ‘Malthusianists’ claim that a large
supply of labour makes it so cheap that the need to think about new technologies
and the willingness to invest in them decreases rather than increases. They
associate an abundant supply of labour with scarcity of resources and low wages
and those in turn with ‘constraints’ and ‘ceilings’ causing ‘involution’ and several
kinds of ‘traps’.249
Economics, however, would not be economics if other economists did not
claim the opposite and defend the thesis that an abundant supply of labour might
very well be good for development, not so much because it necessitates and
facilitates innovation but because – to put it in the terms of Nobel-Prize winner
W. Arthur Lewis (1915 – 1991) – “unlimited supplies of labour” and low wages
may attract investment.250 In his story, a ‘capitalist’ sector develops by taking
labour from a non-capitalist backward ‘subsistence’ sector. At an early stage of
development, the capitalist sector, because of its huge reservoir of labour, can
expand without the need to raise wages. This leads to higher returns to capital,
which are then reinvested in further capital accumulation, drawing further la-
bour from the subsistence sector. If profits are reinvested and capital accumu-
lation does not substitute for skilled labour in production, the process becomes
self-sustaining and leads to modernisation and economic development. As soon
as the excess labour in the subsistence sector is fully absorbed into the modern
sector, further capital accumulation begins to increase wages, which then creates
an entirely different situation.251 If profits are not re-invested, there is a serious
247 Galor, Unified growth theory, passim; Charles I. Jones, ‘Population and ideas. A theory of
endogenous growth’, NBER Working Paper no 6285, 1997; Kremer, ‘Population growth and
technological change’; Simon, Economics of population growth ; idem Great Breakthrough.
For Clark see his Farewell to alms, 8 – 14 and chapters 10, 11 and 12.
248 Ridley, Rational optimist, chapter 1.
249 We will discuss those later on in this text. See the Register, ‘Involution’ and ‘High-level
equilibrium trap’.
250 Lewis, ‘Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour’.
251 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_Lewis_(economist)
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risk that a ‘dual economy’ will emerge in which the underdeveloped part will not
catch up but rather become a poor ‘appendix’, a scenario that many scholars who
think along the lines of dependency-theory and world systems-theory consider
the more likely one.
Lewis’s theses primarily refer to the situation in poor countries trying to
catch up, but the thesis that low wages allow for higher profits and thus enable
more investments that in turn enhance productivity can of course easily – and
that has often been done – be turned in a general one with universal applicability.
Joel Mokyr in any case thinks it is valid for industrialisation as it occurred in
Europe.252 But here too the opposite claim can be defended and might indeed
depending on the circumstances be correct: not only can economists argue that
an abundant supply of (cheap) labour takes away incentives to develop labour-
saving innovations, or that low wages help to finance them, they can also argue
that labour-scarcity and high wages are an incentive to look for production
methods that save labour. Many scholars have indeed done so. As we will see later
on Robert Allen is convinced that the emergence of modern economic growth in
Britain during the industrial revolution has to be attributed to high wages. Here
too, I guess, context matters: high wages may just as well be an incentive to not
invest and set up production someplace else where labour is cheaper, as many
high-wage economies have noticed of late. Basically we are confronted here with
two lines of reasoning, one thinking in terms of wage-led economies where high
wages make high consumption possible, which as long as there is not too much
leakage via imports creates possibilities for domestic growth, and one in which
low wages make high profits and thus large investments possible, in particular
when there is a big foreign market.
In the context of discussing factor endowments, Swedish economists Eli
Heckscher (1879 – 1952) and Bertil Ohlin (1899 – 1979), building on Ricardo’s
theory of comparative advantage, predicted that countries with relatively few
people and many resources will focus on exporting resources, whereas countries
with relatively many, ‘cheap’ people and few resources would focus on labour-
intensive production. We will discuss this option, which in principle would be
quite suitable for countries like China and Japan, later on in our analysis of the
East Asian path of industrialisation. The complexity and context-dependency of
causality in this context can be nicely illustrated by the fact that, to already
anticipate the content of chapters 2.6 and 2.7, for both the countries that are
central in our analysis, completely opposite theses have been suggested when it
comes to the role of their labour supply and their wage level as explanation for
their economic trajectory. In the case of Britain, there are quite respected
scholars who claim it industrialised thanks to its high wages just as there are
252 See Mokyr, ‘Dear labor, cheap labor’.
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scholars who claim it industrialised because of its low wages. Both of these, of
course, cannot be true. For China, scholars have defended the thesis that it did
not industrialise in the nineteenth century because of its low wages, whereas the
fact that it industrialised later on in the last quarter of the twentieth century has
also been explained by reference to its low wages. Both of these can be true.
A specific connection between population size and economic growth that will
not be discussed in this text but that must at least to be mentioned is the so-called
demographic dividend theory which claims that economies can profit from a
specific composition of their total population. Proponents of this theory then as
a rule refer to a situation in which total population increases, there still are a large
number of young people available and the participation rate is high, but in which
at the same time the number of children decreases. The low dependency rate that
characterises such a situation then leaves more room for investment in human
capital.253
The questions addressed in the previous paragraphs also were already dis-
cussed in the early modern era. Overall, in pre-industrial societies, the idea that
having a big and increasing population was something positive prevailed. It, in
any case, meant many subjects, soldiers and taxpayers for the rulers. I will
confine myself in my examples to Europe. Mercantilist thinkers there overall
were convinced that a large and increasing population not only was good for the
strength of a state but also a beacon of prosperity.254 But also someone like David
Hume (1711 – 1776), who was not a mercantilist, in one of his many publications
still suggested that, “the happiness of any society and its populousness are
necessary attendants.”255 From the point of view of mercantilist authors a large
population in particular had positive effects on the economic strength of the
nation when it was poor! Two reasons were normally given for this ‘utility of
poverty’. The first one is that if labour earns ‘too much’ it becomes lazy. In-
numerable quotes could illustrate this. Let me confine myself to examples from
Britain. Thomas Mun (1571 – 1641) wrote: “… penury and want do make a
people wise and industrious.”256 William Temple (1628 – 1699) was more ex-
plicit : “The only way to make the poor industrious is to lay them under the
necessity of labouring all the time they can spare from meals and sleep in order
to procure the common necessities of life.”257 Bernard Mandeville (1670 – 1733)
claimed in 1714 that, “in order that society might be happy … it is a requisite that
253 See, for a first introduction, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographic_dividend
254 See Stangeland, Pre-Malthusian doctrines of population. More specific for the case of Britain
see Bonar, Theories of population and Glass, Numbering the people.
255 I found this quotation in Milgate and Stimson, After Adam Smith, 121.
256 Mun, England’s treasure by forraign trade, 73. The book was published after Mun died.
257 I took this quote from Ashworth, Customs and excise, page 60, where one also can find the
original references.
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great numbers of them [i.e. the labouring classes, PV] be poor.” According to
Arthur Young (1741 – 1820) in 1771 “everyone but an idiot knows that the lower
classes must be kept poor or they will never be industrious.”258 The other reason,
that we also find quite explicit in, for example, the work of Thomas Mun, was that
high wages might tempt labour to buy luxury goods from abroad. That was
regarded as bad for the national economy.259 In such a context – and that applies
world-wide – the emergence of modern economic growth that only in very
exceptional cases can thrive without an expanding domestic market for mass
products, is not very likely. During the eighteenth century, we see a gradual
change in this respect as more people started thinking about wages in terms of
‘the carrot of incentives’ instead of ‘the stick of necessities’ and began to see
positive effects of increasing incomes for the mass of the population and of a
growing (mass) consumption. Adam Smith for example wrote: “No society can
surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are
poor and miserable” and repeatedly discussed the advantages of a “liberal re-
ward of labour”.260 That, however, continued to be a contested minority view.
Discussions about ‘idleness’ and ‘luxury’ did not abate.261
Malthus is known to have been a clear exponent of a different view on in-
creasing population. From the end of the eighteenth century onwards that often
came to be regarded as a major potential and often even acute problem. During
his lifetime – and thus during Britain’s take-off – most economists agreed that
the ‘natural price’ of labour would be a subsistence wage and that increasing
population would not have positive effects on that wage. The importance of
ordinary labour in sustaining mass-consumption was not regarded as a major
issue. Questions of cheap supply prevailed over questions of massive demand. It
is not by accident that in the work of Marx, who focused so much on labour,
‘overproduction’ appears as the main threat to the sustainability of industrial
capitalism. Schumpeter, though not exactly a friend of Keynes, was well aware of
the importance of mass consumption: “The capitalist engine is first and last an
258 See for these last two quotations, Furniss, The position of the laborer in a system of na-
tionalism, chapter VI, ‘The doctrine of the utility (sic! PV) of poverty’, page 118. For many
similar claims, see Lis and Soly, Worthy efforts, chapter 7, e. g. 478 – 494.
259 Mun, England’s treasure by forraign trade, 60.
260 See Smith, Inquiry into the nature and causes, 96 for the quote, and chapter I, VIII for the
“liberal reward of labour.”
261 See e. g. Coats, ‘Economic thought and Poor Law policy in the eighteenth century’; idem,
‘Changing attitudes towards labour in the mid-eighteenth century’; Lis and Soly, Worthy
efforts, chapter 7, e. g. 478 – 494; De Vries, ‘Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Re-
volution’, and Wiles, ‘Theory of wages in later English mercantilism’.
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engine of mass production which unavoidably means also production for the
masses.”262 Nobody in his view ever got rich producing for the rich.
4. Labour quality: human capital
In the previous paragraphs, the emphasis was on the quantity of labour, in the
widest sense of the word, including those who ‘co-ordinate’ and manage the
work of other people as ‘entrepreneurs’. It is evident that economic development
and modern economic growth cannot just be a matter of the quantity of labour
input but must also involve qualitative changes in it. In recent debates the role of
human capital in this respect has even been given pride of place as the most
important factor in enabling growth. In rich countries, people on average are
much better educated than in poor countries, the well-educated on average have
higher incomes and more wealth than the less well-educated. The correlation is
statistically quite clear and the thesis that educating people will increase wealth
is immensely popular. When Richard Easterlin, in 1981 asked himself the
question ‘Why isn’t the whole world developed?’ he was convinced education
made the difference.263 Robert Allen describes promoting mass education as one
of the four standard development strategies for catching up in early in-
dustrialisation.264 That human capital has a central role to play in economic
development has become a truism in all new growth theories.265 Alice Amsden
goes as far as to give the following definition of economic development: “Eco-
nomic development is a process of moving from a set of assets based on primary
products, exploited by unskilled labour to a set of assets based on knowledge,
exploited by skilled labour.”266 Human capital embodies the real treasure of an
economy as may be deduced from many miraculous recoveries from physical
destructions after wars. Knowledge of how to build replacements is far more
important than the physical things in which that knowledge is embodied at a
given moment. As long as human capital is not destroyed, physical destruction
262 Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism and democracy. I quote from the fifth edition, published
in London in 1976. The quotation is on page 67.
263 Easterlin, ‘Why isn’t the whole world developed?’.
264 Allen, Global economic history, 41 – 42. The other strategies are to unify the internal market,
to protect it against competition from abroad and to create of a well-functioning banking
sector.
265 See e. g. the introduction of Lucas, Lectures on economic growth. The amount of literature on
human capital is staggering. I just refer to two publications I found helpful: Becker, Human
capital and Hartog and Maassen van den Brink, Human capital. For a brief introduction, see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_capital.
266 Amsden, Rise of “the Rest”, 2.
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can, in principle, always be repaired or replaced. The same applies to the
knowledge of institutions.267
But as always, here, too, actual causality appears to be not that simple. In
many cases it could also have been the other way around: an increase in wealth
leading to an increase in education. Besides, as Jack Goldstone warns the readers
of his book on the rise of the West that not just any kind of (college) education
might do. In his view, millions of dollars have been wasted by countries trying to
catch up with the West in “training college graduates in the traditional skills of
law, administration, social sciences, arts, humanities, medicine, accounting,
even theology – without also nurturing the engineering and entrepreneurial
talents that would create a modern economy capable of employing legions of
humanists and professionals.”268 As Ha-joon Chang writes “More education in
itself is not going to make a country richer.”269 Many modern societies indeed
may have become over-educated. Thomas Sowell, of course, is correct in
claiming: “Human capital must not be confused with formal education, which is
just one facet of it, and still less with the growth of the intelligentsia, which may
be either a positive or a negative influence on economic development and po-
litical stability….”270 In his view, the so-called intelligentsia often contribute
little to growth; with their prevailing anti-business mentality, they often even
hamper it. He is following in the footsteps of Schumpeter who emphasized that
intellectuals as a rule tend to not be very fond of capitalism and innovation.271
There still is abundant evidence about wage gains from schooling for individuals
but the impact of all that schooling on GDP has become much less evident, so one
may well ask along with Lant Pritchett in his famous article: “Where has all the
education gone?”272 Maybe Tyler Cowen has a point when he writes there is no
more “low-hanging educational fruit of uneducated kids.”273 Whatever the exact
connection may be between (certain types of) schooling and education, in a
wider sense of the word and economic growth in the beginning of the twenty-
first century, studying the Great Divergence without paying serious attention to
them would be negligent.
Talking about labour in the context of economic growth sooner or later in-
volves talking about work ethic, discipline, and industriousness. The idea that
the rich inhabitants of the world in this respect would be different from the poor
267 I took this comment from Sowell, Conquests and cultures, 336.
268 Goldstone, Why Europe, 173 – 174.
269 Ha-joon Chang, 23 things they don’t tell you about capitalism, chapter 17.
270 Sowell, Conquests and cultures, 349.
271 See page 117.
272 Pritchett, ‘Where has all the education gone?’ Several versions exist. See under Google, Lant
Pritchett, Where has all the education gone.
273 Cowen, Great Stagnation, chapter one.
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ones and that wealth is somehow a reward for more efficient and effective be-
haviour, and hard work, has always been quite popular, in particular amongst the
rich. I only have to refer to the famous Weber-thesis that time and again is
rejected by some, only to be endorsed by others but, and that of course is what
matters here, shows no signs of simply being out-dated. To be sure, the same
applies to the idea that economic growth exists thanks to the activities of en-
trepreneurs who by their specific role in economic life create the permanent gale
of creative destruction that is at the heart of modern growth. To claim that
societies that produce many of such entrepreneurs and give them leeway would
become rich is then an obvious next step. Capitalism, until now the system most
successful in creating economic growth, is a system in which “innovation could
triumph habit”, to paraphrase Joyce Appleby, with a central role for innovators.
She claims that the riddle of capitalism’s ascendancy isn’t just economic but
political and moral as well : “How did entrepreneurs get out of the straightjacket
of custom and acquire the force and respect that enabled them to transform,
rather than conform, to the dictates of their society.”274 Deirdre McCloskey with
her heavy emphasis on the acceptance of ‘bourgeois dignity’ as a precondition
for the emergence of modern economic growth clearly thinks along similar
lines.275 In their work matters of human capital become tightly interconnected
with matters of culture and institutions that will be discussed separately in this
book.
5. Consumption
Traditionally, production and supply have always been at the heart of most
explanations of growth, which, in a way, is evident as sustained growth would be
unthinkable without increasing productivity. That meant a focus on capital
goods, on machines, factories and infrastructure, on education and research.
Those all have to be paid for. That can only be done by not consuming what one
has accumulated or by borrowing, which of course has its costs. Growth eco-
nomics has always had a strong tendency to focus on the supply-side, on capital
and capital goods. In recent research dealing with growth, consumption and the
consumer figure much more prominently. That is not simply an effect of
Keynes’s ‘discovery’ that Say’s Law stating that aggregate supply creates its own
aggregate demand, which would mean that a general glut is impossible, does not
necessarily hold. Actually, not every offer begets its demand and, in any case, for
individual producers producing only makes sense if enough people buy or at
274 Appleby, Relentless revolution, 7.
275 See her Bourgeois virtues and her Bourgeois dignity.
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least in principle can buy their produce.276 The approach of John Maynard
Keynes (1883 – 1946) presented a switch in perception, according to which
saving is not primarily perceived as reserving money for a potential investment
but also as not-consuming, borrowing not only as making debts, but also as
enabling extra consumption or investment, and in which government inter-
vention to prime the pump is no longer necessarily taboo. With increasing
wealth it, moreover, becomes less and less obvious that extra produce will indeed
be bought, so the question of what drives and determines consumption becomes
ever more pressing. Even more so as one of the striking characteristics of
modern economic growth consist in the fact that an ever-growing number of
new products are entering the market literally in search for consumers. As
Michael Piore aptly put it : “The central growth problem in a capitalist economy
becomes that of how to organize demand so that the required expansion is
assured.”277 Contemporary Western society is not by accident often described as
a ‘consumer society’, a label that suits an increasing number of non-Western
societies too. Considering this essential role of consumption in contemporary
society, it was more or less unavoidable, that the role of demand as compared to
that of supply in the emergence of the modern economy would also begin to
attract more attention in modern economics. An increasing number of scholars
are now convinced that changes in demand played a role in steering production
(the key word is here ‘consumer revolution’) and the supply of labour (the key
word is here ‘industrious revolution’) just before and during take-off.278 It is no
use to enter here into a chicken or egg debate: The importance of consumption
for growth and innovation is obvious. But here too, on must be aware of the
limits of a strategy : as many people and countries are finding out for themselves
now, there is a limit to the extent to which one can build an edifice of growth on
the basement of consuming and borrowing.
6. Capital and capital accumulation
Producing means combining land, labour and capital goods. Amongst econo-
mists who theorise about growth and want to model it, capital has always re-
ceived privileged attention. Full well aware of other ways to generate growth, e. g.
via specialisation, most of them have long been convinced that the most effective
276 For this law named after the French economist Jean-Baptiste Say (1767 – 1832), although he
did not really invent it, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean-Baptiste_Say.
277 Michael J. Piore, The theory of macro-economic regulation and the current crisis in the
United States, MIT Working Paper Cambridge Mass. 1981, page 20. I found this quote in
Schlefer, Assumptions economists make, 229.
278 See for these concepts the Register.
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way to create and sustain growth would be via investment in extra capital goods
so that per unit of labour more capital goods become available. Those capital
goods of course have to be paid for out of money one does not use for con-
sumption. It is not by accident that classical growth theories that put such an
emphasis on investment emphasised the importance of accumulation and sav-
ing. We all know the story of the fisherman saving some of his earnings to then
buy a new net and catch more fish.
In the so-called Harrod-Domar growth model named after the economists
Henry Roy Forbes Harrod (1900 – 1978) and Evsey Domar (1914 – 1997), a direct
link between an increasing input of factors of production and increasing output
was postulated. In this model, the rate of growth of national income is de-
termined by the capital-output ratio, which in turn is determined by the savings
ratio. Growth in that way becomes a function of capital formation. What is
striking and not without consequences, considering the enormous importance
of that sector, is that in many input-output models based on this model, the
service sector (public as well as private) is simply not taken into account. In
classical growth theories, there can only be diminishing returns to capital; that
means that the returns of simply adding extra inputs decrease. If adding extra
inputs is all one does, the economy will be heading for a ‘steady state’. This
tendency for growth to decrease as the capital stock increases implies that ceteris
paribus countries with a small capital stock (i. e. poorer countries) can expect
higher growth rates when they invest than countries that already have a large
capital stock (i. e. richer countries). That being the case global economic con-
vergence would be much more likely than global economic divergence. In reality
however, catching up is not at all easy and is the exception rather than the rule
because, as so many economists claim, of the existence of increasing returns in
many sectors of production, among other reasons.
The fact that according to neo-classical standard theory there, in principle,
are limits to promoting growth by simply increasing investment has not pre-
vented many people, in particular economists working outside Academia, pol-
iticians, but also economic historians, to act like ‘capital-fundamentalists’, even
though their position has in theory been rejected. According to capital funda-
mentalism, which is a practical attitude and assumption rather then an explicit
theory, capital is the key to development, which makes differences in national
stocks of capital the primary determinants of differences in levels of national
product.279 A famous example of a rejection of capital fundamentalism that is
quite interesting for our analysis and might with time provide a good macro-
economic test of it, are Krugman’s comments from 1994 on the impressive
279 See for a first introduction the many references to capital fundamentalism on Wikipedia,
the English version.
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growth of Asia’s new industrialising countries at the time. Krugman claimed that
this growth to a very large extent was a matter of simply increasing inputs, i. e.
capital and labour. In his view it therefore was primarily a matter of “perspi-
ration, not inspiration” and would therefore ceteris paribus, as in the Soviet
Union during its industrialisation, simply peter out.280
A sustained pilling up of capital goods simply cannot be the main explanation
for growth as we have seen it in the West over the last two centuries. One simply
cannot explain all the growth that has taken place in wealthy countries since the
first Industrial Revolution and the gap this caused between rich and poor by
referring to extra capital investment. That would leave a lot of increased output
simply unaccounted for. Empirical research has shown that increases in so-
called total-factor productivity in developed countries contain an enormous
residual of growth that cannot be explained by increases in input: a ‘residual’
that economist Moses Abramovitz (1912 – 2000), correctly characterised as ‘a
measure of our ignorance’ and that of course continued to be a major irritant to
all scholars who really wanted to understand growth.281 All this is common
knowledge amongst economists but one of course has to realise that even if in the
long run piling up capital stocks is a dead-end street, it may very well in the short
and medium term have positive effects. All countries that industrialised in any
case went through a substantial increase in total capital investment during the
first stages of their industrialisation. Capital accumulation certainly is not the
key to all growth and it certainly was not, like capital fundamentalism wants us to
believe, the major problem for developing countries. But adding extra capital
certainly played a role when countries took off. How much is an empirical
matter. There are good reasons, and data, to expect that sheer accumulation will
have been rather small but more important in the beginning of the process of
taking-off than in economies that have already entered the post-industrial stage
of their development.
Notwithstanding all these qualifications of the importance of added capital
input for growth, in thinking about industrialisation and modernization and
even more in efforts to actually promote them, the role of capital accumulation
has always been very prominent up until fairly recently. Marx, who more than
most economists of his age was aware of the fundamental importance of tech-
nology and technological innovation for (capitalist) development was not only
280 Krugman, ‘The myth of Asia’s miracle’, page 66. For other critiques, see e. g. Easterly,
Elusive quest for growth, chapter 3, and McCloskey, Bourgeois dignity, chapter 15. For
similar comments see Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail, 124 – 132, where they
write that growth in the former Soviet Union was not caused by innovation but by larger
inputs and moving production into more productive sectors.
281 See e. g. his Resource and output trends in the United States since 1870, 10 and his ‘Search for
the sources of growth’.
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convinced that the emergence of capitalist production presupposed “the pre-
existence of considerable masses of capital.”282 He also claimed that accumu-
lation would be its very essence: ‘Accumulate! Accumulate! That is Moses and
the Prophets!’283 In his view, it got a kind of kick-start with ‘primitive accu-
mulation’ or ‘original accumulation’, which means ‘accumulation by dis-
possession’. This is what he writes about the process in Great Britain:
The spoliation of the Church’s property, the fraudulent alienation of the state domains,
the theft of the common lands, the usurpation of feudal and clan property and its
transformation into modern private property under circumstances of ruthless ter-
rorism, all these things were just so many idyllic methods of primitive accumulation.284
Primitive ‘accumulation’ of Western capitalism, however, never was just a do-
mestic process. This is how Marx describes its global dimensions:
The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and en-
tombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the beginnings of
the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the
commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things which characterize the dawn of the era
of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive
accumulation.285
For both quotes, but that of course is an aside, one may wonder how exactly the
facts described can be sensibly connected to Britain’s take-off in the late 1700’s.
Notwithstanding its repeated references to ‘imperialist’ exploitation, in classical
Marxism capitalism is assumed basically and primarily to feed on its internal
logic of exploiting free labour with a structurally weak position on the labour
market. Over time, however, the importance of colonialism, imperialism and
unequal exchange has come more to the fore in Marxist or ‘Marxisant’ thinking.
In dependency theory and world-systems analysis, it has even become funda-
mental. In these approaches capitalism is an economic system that by definition
is not confined to specific states but a ‘world-system’ in which the focus is so
much on exchange that some classic Marxists worry that Marx’s emphasis on
modes of production gets neglected.286 In theories on imperialism and advanced
capitalism, in dependency-theories, theories about unequal exchange, modern
world-systems theory, and the like, one encounters a similar line of reasoning
time and again: The development of the West has been paid for by the Rest. That
claim clearly starts from the assumption that amassing sufficient capital is the
282 MEW, 23, page 741.
283 MEW, 23, page 621.
284 MEW, 23, pages 760 – 761.
285 MEW, 23, page 779.
286 See notes 1042 and 1045.
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main bottleneck of development and that when this problem is solved, economic
modernisation will more or less take care of itself.
Quite surprisingly to many readers, I guess, is the fact that Keynes too, in a
comment that was very much an aside, thought it all began with ‘primitive
accumulation’:
The modern age opened, I think, with the accumulation of capital, which began in the
sixteenth century. I believe – for reasons with which I must not encumber the present
argument – that this was initially due to the rise of prices, and the profits to which that
led, which resulted from the treasure of gold and silver which Spain brought from the
New World into the Old. From that time until today, the power of accumulation by
compound interest, which seems to have been sleeping for many generations, was re-
born and renewed its strength. And the power of compound interest over two hundred
years is such as to stagger the imagination. … Thus, every £1 which Drake brought
home in 1580 has now become £100,000. Such is the power of compound interest!287
So in a way did Walt Rostow. He may have set out to write a non-communist
manifesto, but in his book dealing with the stages of economic growth he too
nevertheless considered accumulation as fundamental. The quintessence of the
take-off into self-sustained growth in his view would consist in a sharp increase
in the savings and investment rate. W.A. Lewis thought the central problem of
taking-off was where to find the huge extra savings to pay for it.288 Alexander
Gerschenkron in his equally influential analyses of catching-up always focused
on capital goods, heavy industry producing capital goods, forced savings, the
role of banks, in brief, on investment.289 The overriding problem to be solved for
industrializing nations was presented as that of saving and investing so much
that one could make a ‘great spurt’, preferably by massive investment in heavy
industry. The conviction that industrialisation equals investment in capital
goods, that big is beautiful and that history shows no pity for those who are slow
was at the core of most communist, fascist and authoritarian schemes and ‘plans’
to industrialise. The idea that poverty is basically the main problem of under-
developed countries and that providing them with money thus is basic solution
to their predicament their development continued to be the motivation behind
much of Western ‘development aid’ for decades. It still is prominent in the
thinking of, for example, Jeffrey Sachs in his The end of poverty.290
I already pointed out that, in classic Marxism, primitive accumulation at
home and abroad but also more regular exploitation via colonialism and im-
287 Keynes, ‘Economic possibilities for our grandchildren’, 359 – 360. What holds for every £1
that Drake brought home, of course also holds for any pound from 1580 earned in, let us say,
milking cows. Why Drake’s pounds would be unique escapes me.
288 See for a fine quote, McCloskey, Bourgeois dignity, 136.
289 See e. g. his Economic backwardness in historical perspective.
290 Sachs, End of poverty, in particular chapters 13 and 15.
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perialism certainly played a role in the development of capitalist economies, but
that systematic exploitation of labour at home long figured as its essence and
driving force. In the classic Marxist model, accumulation primarily occurs on
the labour market where ‘free’ labour has a weak position and capitalists can –
and have to – accumulate profits, invest and innovate to not be wiped out by
competitors. In this perspective, the path to capitalist development is through
changes in production instigated by producers. I, however, also pointed out that
in a flood of ‘neo-Marxist’ studies, discussing imperialism and later dependency
and the logic of world-systems, accumulation via international exchange became
so prominent and the rise of the West so much connected to exploitation abroad
and the negative effects for underdeveloped countries of (unequal) exchange
that several classical Marxists who, in line with the original Marx interpretation,
like to focus on production (and innovation!), began to look at it as ‘neo-
Smithian’ rather than Marxist291, this notwithstanding the fact that those ap-
proaches were clearly conceived from a left-wing perspective and elaborated on
elements present in Marx’s work. In the bulk of that work, however, capitalist
accumulation and innovation are considered essential for understanding de-
velopment and growth in terms of increased total production. The classic
Smithian growth model is based on different assumptions and focuses primarily
on (positive effects of) exchange and only in the second instance on modes of
production and their effects in terms of accumulation and innovation. It is time
to briefly introduce the very influential growth models that base themselves on
the main ideas of Adam Smith.
7. Specialisation and exchange
In Adam Smith’s original model, growth basically was a consequence of an
increasing division of labour and specialisation, ideally occurring in a context of
free and fair, or as it is called in economists’ jargon, ‘perfect competition’.292 He
illustrated the effect of specialisation on production in his rather fanciful ex-
ample of the famous pin factory, where, according to him, the same number of
workers made 240 or maybe even 4800 (!) times as many pins as they had been
producing before the introduction of labour division.293 Smith of course did not
deny the fundamental importance of accumulation to the division of labour – in
his words it was “previously necessary”294 – in the sense that the money invested
291 See Brenner, ‘Origins of capitalist development’.
292 For an explanation of this term see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Perfect_competition.
293 Smith, Inquiry into the nature and causes, 14 – 15.
294 Smith, Inquiry into the nature and causes, 277.
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in productive entities like pin factories, had to come from somewhere. But where
it actually came from is not discussed as a really major problem, presumably as
Smith still primarily thought in terms of rather small ‘pre-industrial’ private
enterprises that could be paid out of what entrepreneurs had saved or borrowed
from family, banks and current profits. Those profits generated in exchange, still
in Smith’s view, would always tend to an ‘average’ or ‘natural’ level because of the
fierce open competition that he considered essential for a well-functioning
economy. This of course also implies that growth actually would not need
enormous investments. Smith never really focused on technological innovation
in production processes and was unaware of any industrial revolution take-off
during his own lifetime. Nor did he apparently expect the enormous increases in
scale and investment costs that would characterise progressing industrialisa-
tion. The increases in productivity he referred to in his example are quite im-
pressive – and not very probable – but in his perception there were fairly tight
limits to growth because even in a context of free and fair competition, trans-
portation and information costs set fairly tight limits to the division of labour
and the extent of the market, and because it would be ‘eaten up’ by increasing
population. In brief, one might say that for Smith, division of labour and the
working and extension of the market were more fundamental sources of growth
than accumulation, investment and innovation: the latter, in as far as they de-
veloped to a higher level, were driven by exchange and competition.
For his neo-classical successors, the fundamental importance of techno-
logical innovation including those technological breakthroughs in trans-
portation and communication that made the emergence of a really global mass
market possible, was obvious and undeniable. That, however, did not mean their
approach changed fundamentally. The market mechanism continued to be
fundamental for them. In their view, innovation would be the ‘logical’ outcome
of open i. e. free and fair competition. In such a situation, the alternative is
basically to innovate or to perish. William Baumol, for example, describes
capitalism as “the free-market innovation machine” that generates “a flow of
innovation” and “the consequent rise of productivity and per capita gross do-
mestic product”.295 Innovation seems guaranteed even if it is a kind of ‘manna
from heaven’ whose exact provenance is not fully understood. Exchange rela-
tions in terms of open competition – domestically and internationally – so
provide the main key to the ‘riddle of growth’.
Smith wrote his magnum opus as an attack on the mercantile system because
he thought that restrictions on fair and free trade in whatever form would be bad
for the wealth of the nation, i. e. for the consumer and therefore needed to be
abolished. Domestically his focus lay on all sorts of monopolies and rents, but
295 Baumol, Free-market innovation machine, 2.
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not surprisingly international trade, the favourite subject of so much mercan-
tilist writing, also attracted his attention. Here, too, he plead for the abolishment
not only of monopolies, but also tariffs, banns, subsidies and other interferences
in free trade, although not, surprisingly enough, of the Navigations Acts as
such.296 It was David Ricardo who would become known as the real theorist of
free international trade. According to most mainstream economists, his ex-
planation of the ‘law’ of comparative advantage would for once and for all have
proved that free trade has a positive effect on all parties involved. According to
him, international trade should not be seen as a zero-sum game where one
party’s gain is another party’s loss but – at least when the exchange is free and
fair – one in which all parties can profit. The best policy therefore would be to put
as few obstacles in the way of international exchange as possible. Free trade via
efficient specialisation increases “the general mass of productions” and thus
creates, as we would now say, greater wealth in the trading countries.297 Ricardo’s
logic became extremely influential and for most mainstream economists a kind
or article of faith but also Paul Krugman describes it as “truly, madly, deeply
difficult. But … also utterly true, immensely sophisticated – and extremely
relevant to the modern world.”298 It provided an enormously influential per-
spective on growth also in the context of global economic history.299 The wealth
and poverty of nations like those of individual people in the end are supposed to
depend on the right specialisation and competitiveness.
Ricardo’s law, however, never got generally accepted as a basis for actual trade
policies and is not unproblematic as an explanation or predictor of develop-
ments in the real world where increasing returns are quite common, as Krugman
is fully aware.300 It, in any case, is ominous that Ricardo’s own example to
illustrate his law, the trade between Great Britain and Portugal, does not seem to
really confirm it. One cannot help to get the firm impression that the Portuguese
for whatever reason profited less from their trade with the British than the
British did from their trade with the Portuguese. As Adam Smith already pointed
out, the British managed to collect several tens of thousands of pounds worth of
gold weekly in their exchanges with the Portuguese, which they then sent back to
London by packet boat.301 In circles of economists the ‘theoretical’ debate about
the value of openness versus protectionism never ceased. Friedrich List (1789 –
1846) is just one, albeit a fairly early one, example of the many scholars who also
296 See note 1165.
297 See Ricardo, On the principles of political economy, and taxation, 152.
298 Paul Krugman http://www.pkarchive.org/trade/ricardo.html the last sentence.
299 See for a historical implementation of these ideas e. g. Bernstein, Splendid exchange.
300 See his text on increasing returns in a comparative advantage world http://www.prince-
ton.edu/~pkrugman/deardorff.pdf
301 Smith, Inquiry into the nature and causes, 546 – 548.
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saw clear disadvantages in free trade and favoured protectionism, in any case of
‘infant industries’.302 Many others economists, some of them forgotten now but
very influential in their times, had major problems with free trade. The debate
never stopped even though in mainstream economics the conviction that freeing
trade in principle was a good policy always tended to prevail.303 What is more
important for actual economic development, which is what really interests us
here, of course is what happened in practice. There, protectionism was rule
rather than the exception and strikingly enough very often that apparently did
not hurt development and growth.304 Economists and economic historians are
still fiercely discussing the advantages and disadvantages of free and fair trade
for development and growth and still disagree about whether the West rose
because of free and fair trade or not – to my view a not very helpful, because
completely ‘decontextualising’ way of looking at the matter.
Our brief explanation of the (neo)classical thinking about the growth-en-
hancing effects of exchange focused on exchange as a means of increasing
production – and thus the possibility of accumulation – via reallocation. But
trade can, of course, also have effects on productivity and accumulation as it
stimulates or even necessitates innovation, as the quote by Baumol suggests.
That is yet another reason to now start discussing innovation, according to most
modern economists the most important motor of modern economic growth.
8. Innovation
For scholars who looked at growth from a more theoretical angle, it has always
been obvious that in the long run ‘capital fundamentalism’ could not work and
that growth could only be sustained when it was propelled by innovation. As far
as I can see, innovation has universally come to be regarded as the essence of
modern economic growth and Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1883 – 1950), as its
prophet.305 In his broad – and also somewhat vague – definition, innovation is
the impulse that comes from “the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of
production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial
organization” or as he puts it one page later, “the new commodity, the new
technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization”.306 Devel-
oping economies do not so much grow: they evolve in the sense that they do not
302 For an introduction into List’s ideas see Bachinger and Matis, Entwicklungsdimensionen des
Kapitalismus, chapter 3.1
303 For the many intellectual debates about it, see Irwin, Against the tide.
304 Ha-joon Chang, Kicking away the ladder.
305 For the expression ‘prophet of innovation’, see McCraw, Prophet of innovation.
306 Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism and democracy, 83 and 84.
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produce more of the same but more and in particular more new things. Capi-
talism in his famous words is a “perennial gale of creative destruction.”307 In that
process saving certainly is important but its importance is completely over-
shadowed by the fact that development consists primarily in employing existing
resources in a different way.308
What drives modern economies is not so much competition over who is most
efficient in producing what is already known but over who is most effective in
producing something new. Only by such permanent innovation can one escape
the decreasing returns that in the end set in when one simply combines more of
the existing factors of production in a similar way. This, of course, does not
contradict the fact that for individual enterprises, being good at copying is at
least as important as being innovative.309 It is not by accident that in many
publications modern economic growth is referred to as ‘Schumpeterian’ or more
figuratively ‘Promethean’ as opposed to Solovian growth – created by increasing
input and named after Robert Solow – and Smithian growth – created by ex-
tending markets and maximizing specialisation and of course named after Adam
Smith. As a matter of fact, capital accumulation in the fiercely competitive
setting that characterises modern, developed economies actually implies in-
novation as Solow already pointed out in his neoclassical growth model.310 To
maintain profitability, entrepreneurs will in any case buy capital goods that,
compared to the old ones, produce more per unit of time. Otherwise, they would
end up with just more of the same old product at, sooner or later, lower prices
and lower profits for each additional unit. They will preferably make ‘new’
products, though, because in that way they have better chances to ‘monopolise’ a
market for some time and make higher profits. That is actually the central point
in Schumpeter’s analysis of capitalism. According to him, the real entrepreneur,
the driving force behind development, does not try to make the best of the
existing situation but wants to change it and create new markets rather than
adapting to old ones. That, however, as Schumpeter adamantly insists, means
that the dynamism of capitalism implies the existence of “monopolistic prac-
tices”311. In his words: “The introduction of new methods of production and new
commodities is hardly conceivable with perfect – and perfectly prompt –
competition form the start. And this means that the bulk of what we call eco-
nomic progress is incompatible with it.”312 This is an extremely important
307 Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism and democracy, 84.
308 Schumpeter, Theory of economic development, 68.
309 The Economist May 12, 2012, page 60.
310 Actually, the Australian economist Trevor Swan (1918 – 1989) came up with a quite similar
model at about the same time.
311 Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism and democracy, chapter 8.
312 Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism and democracy, 105.
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conclusion considering the free market-fetishism of many economists, but of
course also one that many more mainstream economists, however much they are
convinced of the importance of innovation, do not (wholeheartedly) support.
The impact of innovations and inventions that create those new markets can
be very different. It has become common practice to distinguish between macro-
inventions (that provide new paradigms, entirely new ways of thinking about
production in the form of workable and improvable techniques) and micro-
inventions (incremental extensions of knowledge in a field that is basically
known). Such macro-inventions can be at the basis of macro-innovations, so-
called general-purpose technologies; completely new general ways of carrying
out production with effects that spread over on an entire economy. Examples
would be the steam engine, the railway, electricity, the automobile, the computer
or the internet. Such macro-innovations, in turn, entail lots of micro-in-
novations, i. e. incremental improvements. Without innovation the growth that
occurred in the wealthiest parts of the world over roughly the last two centuries
would simply be inexplicable as Deirdre McCloskey very convincingly shows.
The developed parts of the world in her words have entered the ‘age of innovism’
or the ‘age of innovation’.313
Obviously, giving a different definition of the Great Divergence in terms of its
proximate causes – by characterising it, for example, as the beginning of per-
manent innovation instead of the beginning of a phase of higher investment –
has major implications for determining its ultimate causes. Explanations are
always explanations in terms of descriptions, i. e. one explains what one thinks is
actually going on. Many discussions about explanations in history in fact are
discussions about interpretations. Gregory Clark succinctly and effectively il-
lustrates this fundamental point that is also ignored far too often in debates on
the Great Divergence. In his Farewell to alms, in a paragraph under the headline
“Innovation explains all modern growth”, he explicitly claims: “…the efficiency
growth from innovation is actually the true source of all growth, and it also
explains growth of physical capital. The apparently independent contribution of
physical capital to modern growth is illusory.”314 Investment in capital goods, as
a rule, will be investment in the best available capital goods. If that indeed is the
case – which I think it is – that of course has its consequences for what can count
as an explanation of the Great Divergence. Clark would certainly agree: “All we
need explain [sic] is why in the millennia before 1800 there was in all societies –
warlike, peaceful, monotheist, polytheist – such limited investment in the ex-
313 See, for that argumentation, McCloskey, Bourgeois dignity, and for that claim ibidem, 76.
314 Clark, Farewell to alms, 204.
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pansion of useful knowledge, and why this circumstance changed for the first
time in Britain some time around 1800.”315
Clark’s claim may be rather extreme. But most economists do realise that
growth, as we know it since industrialisation, has primarily become a matter of
innovation as described by Schumpeter. They acknowledge that in trying to
explain the increase of total production via the increase in input, one is left with
that famous and enormous ‘residual’ that at least to a very substantial extent
must be due to innovation, in particular new technologies. In the nineteenth
century, growth may still have had a physical-capital using bias, but in the
twentieth century the importance of human capital and of knowledge increased
beyond recognition. The question, however, of what brings about all those new
technologies has long been considered as ‘exogenous’ to economics, i. e. not
something for the economist to explain or even not something the economist as
economist can explain, indeed ‘manna from heaven’ as the expression went. The
best one could do was to, for example, measure investment in research and
development and use that as a kind of proxy for innovation and more or less take
innovation for granted. That, of course, was and is a rather unsatisfactory ap-
proach for a social science not exactly known for its modesty. Unsurprisingly
economists tried to remedy the situation and to ‘endogenise’ innovation as the
application of (new) knowledge in their thinking about growth. That is how ‘new
growth theory’ or ‘endogenous growth theory’ emerged in which the central role
of knowledge is acknowledged and economists try to figure out were it comes
from and how it can be ‘produced’ and ‘applied’.316 The focus on knowledge is
not confined to new growth theory. People who are not considered new-growth
economists such as Douglass North also recognize its fundamental role in
modern economic growth as shows in the following quotations: “… the driving
force in the modern world is the growth in the stock of knowledge” and, “The rise
of the Western world was ultimately a consequence of the kinds of skills and
knowledge … that were deemed valuable to the political and economic organ-
ization of the medieval [sic!] Western world.”317
If the essence of growth and of the ‘new economy’ is (applied) knowledge, so
much so that many people all it ‘the knowledge economy’, then the kind of
product that knowledge actually is becomes a paramount question. It turns out
to be something special. To begin with, it is a non-rival good. It consists of ideas,
not things. It therefore has increasing returns, which means sinking costs per
315 Clark, Farewell to alms, 207.
316 Texts that explained new growth theory to me were Cortright, ‘New growth theory, tech-
nology and learning; Helpman, Mystery of economic growth and in particular Warsh,
Knowledge and the wealth of nations. I also profited from reading Beinhocker, Origin of
wealth, although that author has a somewhat different approach and terminology.
317 North, Understanding the process of economic change, 44 and 63.
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entity produced with it. An idea can be used simultaneously by a number of
people without any diminution of its usefulness, and normally without much or
even any compensation. The cost of inventing a new technology is independent
of the number of people who will later use it. The increasing returns to knowl-
edge contrast with the decreasing returns associated with land, labour and
capital. The fact that knowledge is so fundamental for modern growth has at
least two major consequences: if knowledge is or has indeed become the prime
motor of growth, and if it indeed has increasing returns, economics would no
longer have to be the ‘dismal science’ obsessed with scarcity. Accumulating more
of it would mean faster growth, in particular when technological progress no
longer, as in a Malthusian world, leads to increased population. And it then of
course becomes essential to know how one can increase the amount of available
and useful knowledge and turn innovation into something endogenous and
‘normal’.
In that context, one has to consider another characteristic that makes
knowledge special: much of it in principle can be fairly easily and cheaply
copied. It has a tendency to spill over. It is partly excludable, which means that
access to it can to some extent be controlled i. e. monopolized, at least in prin-
ciple with intellectual property rights, and in practice in the form of ‘tacit
knowledge’ or ‘trade secrets’. But still, one can actually easily lose it. The public
benefits of research and development tend to be fundamentally higher than the
private benefits they generate: new inventions diffuse so that copycats and
competitors can benefit. This ‘non-appropriability’ can easily make investors
hesitant to invest in it because, as with investments in infrastructure, they will
not be able to capture the return on their investment. Fixed costs of new tech-
nology, moreover, can be very high for private investors. This suggests that there
is an important role to play for government in any case in education and ac-
cording to many new growth theorists also in research and development, al-
though in that respect opinions are divided. On the one hand, there are scholars
such as David Warsh who point out that Western governments understood that it
was in their interest to subsidise the production and diffusion of knowledge,
endorsing Bacon’s motto that knowledge is power. In his view, the nations that
did best were those that did something fundamental about education. Because of
the public character of knowledge, so he claims, public policies are necessary to
support the production and diffusion of ideas. Human and technological re-
sources require a degree of active management by the state.318 Tyler Cowen, who
is afraid innovation will peter out, also thinks governments should help and
318 Warsh, Knowledge and the wealth of nations, ‘Conclusion’. I paraphrase comments on pages
405 – 409.
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hopes they could do so by raising the social status of scientists.319 As compared to
their enormous importance for the modern economy and for most people’s
wealth, their status and remuneration are indeed striking, that is, strikingly low.
Other scholars are far less convinced, to put it mildly, that governments in
particular when it comes to research and development can play an important
positive role in promoting knowledge. For Ridley, development is a bottom-up
process, technology-driven by competition and not a top-down, collective and
planned process, propelled by scientific research. All research for him is a matter
of openness, exchange, competition and synergy. Innovation and growth are
normal in an open, competitive context. With the extension of the market for
ideas, fertile specialisation can emerge and ‘the collective brain’ will grow ac-
cordingly.320 The historian of science Terence Kealey is convinced that the free
market has proved by far the most successful institution in promoting science,
innovation, wealth and happiness. State-funded research in his view has always
been a waste of money, energy and resources.321 For him, government by nature
is a monopoly and “Humanity’s great battle over the last 10,000 years has been
the battle against monopoly.” Matt Ridley agrees.322 Robert Wright, to give one
final example, never refers to government and only to competition and synergy
in his book about the ‘non zero-sumness’ of the development of knowledge. All
these ideas – and that of course is the reason to refer to them – might be helpful in
focusing attention to the role of knowledge in the Great Divergence and to figure
out whether Great Britain had an advantage in this respect. What is striking is
how much we hear about competition as a motor for innovation and how little
about co-operation, which, as it seems to me, is fundamental when it comes to
creating synergy and innovation.323
That, of course, is also the case with ideas that economists have developed
regarding what could make innovation stop or under what conditions it would
not even emerge to begin with. Schumpeter himself foresaw an end to capitalist
innovation because of what he described as the obsolescence of the en-
trepreneurial function and the destruction of capitalism’s protective strata and
institutional framework. In his view, capitalism is confronted with an increas-
ingly hostile environment for capitalists.324 It in this context, is interesting that,
according to William Baumol, large firms basically take care of the improvement
of already existing technology, whereas it is small entrepreneurs who currently
319 Cowen, Great Stagnation, 83 – 86.
320 Ridley, Rational optimist, chapter 8, in particular pages 275 – 277.
321 Kealey, Economic laws of scientific research and Wright, Nonzero.
322 The quote is from Kealey, Sex, science and profits. Matt Ridley cites him approvingly in his
Rational optimist, 396. For his economic laws of scientific research, see the previous note.
323 See the comments Dudley as I synthesize them on pages 225 – 226.
324 Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism and democracy, chapters XII and XIII.
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produce most of the ‘real’ innovations. Large corporations are not likely to take
risk and they tend to be run by managers, not entrepreneurs. Although there are
always exceptions, the degree of the division between those two approaches in
his view is striking. It would then be the combination of corporate R& D and
entrepreneurial activity by more or less independent individuals that keeps the
economy going ahead.325 Economists may well be fond of innovation in their
theories, but many people definitely are not in practice. What about opposition
to innovation? Acemoglu and Robinson are quite adamant about the importance
of that opposition: “The fear of creative destruction is the main reason why there
was no sustained increase in living standards between the Neolithic and In-
dustrial revolutions.”326 They turn this fear into a major theme in their highly
acclaimed latest book and focus on opposition to innovation by elites, but as a
matter of fact such opposition is far more widespread.327 The very pertinent,
more analytical approach of Joel Mokyr in this respect would deserve more
attention and follow-up.328
What about the possibility that innovation per se stops or in any case no
longer brings about higher productivity? In his fiercely debated The Great
Stagnation, which appeared in print as a book in 2011, Tyler Cowen claimed that
the United States at the time was running out of innovations and low-hanging
fruits and that the latest and most sensational innovations brought only very
slight benefits in terms of increasing productivity. Relative to national income or
expenditures on education, there is now less innovation in the United States than
there was in the nineteenth century. It was easier for the average person to
produce an important innovation in the nineteenth than in the twentieth cen-
tury. According to him, the rate of innovation in terms of economic impact has
been slowing down.329 The most advanced economies in the world have over-
whelmingly become service economies and in his view it is anything but obvious
that productivity increases in the service sector are comparable to those in other
sectors. Is the ‘growth’ we see in sectors such as telecom, internet and finance
really growth, i. e. increasing production or only a matter of higher wages?330 His
325 William Baumol, Education for innovation: entrepreneurial breakthroughs vs. corporate
incremental improvements. National Bureau of Economic Research. Working Paper 8651.
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10578. (June 2004).
326 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail, 183.
327 See the comments in my review in Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis and
on, http://technologygovernance.eu/eng/the_core_faculty/working_papers/
328 Mokyr, ‘Innovation and its enemies’, 61 – 91.
329 Cowen, Great Stagnation. The claims I make here are quite explicitly made in the text there
on pages 18 – 20. See also The Economist January 12th -18th 2013: The great innovation
debate, page 9 and pages 19 – 22.
330 In the Netherlands, my home country, between 2000 and 2010 somewhat over half a million
new jobs were created, 385,000 of them in the health sector. In 2010 there were 1.4 million
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comments remind of ‘Baumol’s cost disease’ named after William Baumol, who,
together with William Bowen, discussed the causes and consequences of the
phenomenon that in response to rising salaries in jobs that did experience labour
productivity growth, salaries of jobs that did not experience such a productivity
growth nevertheless also rise. In that context, particular reference is made to the
situation in (public) services in which labour productivity hardly grows, if at all,
as they are very labour-intensive and provide little opportunity for technological
innovation but nevertheless have to pay competitive salaries. With the increasing
relative importance of the service sector for modern economies, this can clearly
have a dampening effect on overall growth and lead to steadily increasing tax-
ation to find the money to pay all those working in the service sector.331 In any
case, Cowen’s comments stimulate discussion on whether innovation actually
will always continue and, more importantly, whether it will always be really
productive. What innovations matter? How can innovation stop or peter out?
And, what I believe is very important for debates on the Great Divergence: what
is the economic importance of innovations in services and how do we measure
productivity there?
My comments in the previous paragraph focused on innovation but similar
questions of course might be asked with regard to inventions. There are several
well-known examples of societies that were very inventive but where for one
reason or another that inventive fervour disappeared or at least sharply di-
minished; think e. g. of China after the Song, of the Arabic-Islamic world after
the twelfth century, of Italy after the Renaissance, or of the Dutch Republic after
its Golden Age. There is even a law (or rather an empirical generalization)
referring to this phenomenon, to wit Cardwell’s Law, named after the historian
of technology Donald Cardwell : “No nation has been (technologically) very
creative for more than a historically short period.”332 What causes such ef-
florescences of creativity and, consequently, their withering away? Why do there
tend to be shifts in the places that are most inventive? Is it in this respect an
advantage to be an empire, with all the advantages of economies of size, scale and
scope or rather to be part of a state-system, with all the advantages of difference,
diversity and competition?
Such questions bring us to the way in which economies and the societies of
full-time jobs in that sector, 38 per cent more than 10 years ago. In trade there were 1.5
million jobs in 2010. Government employed about 1.1 million people in 2010, some 100,000
more than it did in 2000. That increase took place in particular in education, but also in
bureaucracy. The increase in the number of jobs in the private sector over the period was
negligible. In the 1990s, the private sector had still been the main job creator in the Dutch
economy with 1.3 million new jobs. In the first ten years of this century that number
amounted to only 30,000.
331 For Baumol’s cost disease see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baumol%27 s_cost_disease
332 Cardwell, Turning points in Western technology, 210.
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which they are part are structured. To organise economic life as efficiently as
possible and to turn innovation into something permanent and normal or at
least something that is not random and ad hoc, certain societal arrangements,
i. e. certain institutions are required. Without the ‘right’ institutional setting, the
‘right’ allocation, combination and development of factors will not be possible or
at least easily be endangered. If land, labour, capital and knowledge are the
proximate causes of growth, institutions must be amongst its ultimate causes.
9. Institutions: property rights, markets and states
It has become very fashionable for economists to refer to ‘institutions’, although
it is not entirely clear what the term means – indeed, this ambiguity may in part
explain why it is so fashionable. Many of them, for example Douglass North and
Daron Acemoglu (and their co-authors) or Avner Greif and Dani Rodrik, who are
amongst the most influential economists at the moment, explicitly regard them
as a or even the fundamental cause of long-run economic growth.333 There are
many, differing definitions. Avner Greif describes an institution as “a system of
rules, beliefs, norms, and organizations that together generate a regularity of
(social) behaviour”.334 In all likelihood, the definition that is used most –
probably because it was provided by a Nobel-Prize winning institutional
economist, Douglass North – is this one: “Institutions are the rules of the game
in a society, or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape
human interaction. … In consequence they structure incentives in human ex-
change, whether political, social or economic.”335 Geoffrey Hodgson describes
333 The most influential institutionalist economist /economic historian at the moment might
well be Douglass North. It is not much use to list his entire oeuvre here, so I only refer to his
latest book at the moment, written with his colleagues Wallis and Weingast, Violence and
social orders. I further refer to: Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, ‘Institutions as a fun-
damental cause of long-run growth’; ibidem, ‘Colonial origins of comparative develop-
ment’; iidem, ‘Reversal of fortune’ and iidem, ‘Rise of Europe’; Acemoglu and Robinson,
Why nations fail a recent monograph in which the authors time and again refer to the
decisive importance of institutions for growth; Greif, Institutions and the path to the
modern economy, to only refer to his latest major publication; Hall and Jones, ‘Why do some
countries produce so much more output per worker than others?’; Helpman, Mystery of
economic growth ; Helpman, Institutions and economic performance: Olson, ‘Big bills left on
the sidewalk’; Rodrik, One economics, many recipes ; Rodrik, Subramanian, Trebbi, ‘In-
stitutions rule’, originally published as NBER Working Paper Series 9305, 2002.
334 Greif, Institutions and the path to the modern economy, 30.
335 North, Institutions, institutional change and economic performance, 3. As indicated in the
introduction, this text is not an encyclopedic historical overview and it has no intention to
show the entire intellectual itinerary of scholars it refers to. In this case though it has to be
pointed out that North’s points of view have gone through quite radical changes. In his first
major book, The rise of the Western world, that he wrote with Robert Thomas, his approach
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institutions as follows: “Institutions are durable systems of established and
embedded social rules that structure social interactions.”336 He emphasizes that
‘structuring’ in this context means ‘constraining’ as well as ‘enabling’, which to
my mind implies a fundamental and necessary broadening of the concept. In-
stitutions predispose people to do behave in a certain way in certain circum-
stances. When I use the term in this text I will, unless otherwise indicated, do so
in his sense. North’s conceptualization is too one-sidedly focused on the con-
straining element of institutions and neglects their enabling function, which in
my view is at least as important when it comes to explaining actual growth.
Property rights, for example, on the one hand indeed constrain other people
from taking what belongs to an owner but on the other hand they enable that
owner to do what he wants to do with what is his. Greif ’s phrase ‘regularity of
behaviour’ in principle can include structural constraints as well as well as
structured agency, just as it in principle might include both formal and informal
aspects, which North explicitly distinguishes, referring, which I think is quite
helpful, to two kinds of constraints, those in terms of formal rules (laws, con-
stitutions, rules) and informal constraints (conventions, codes of conduct,
norms of behaviour) and the effectiveness of their enforcement. Enforcement of
the rules is carried out either by third parties (law enforcement, social ostra-
cism), second parties (retaliation) or the first party (self-imposed codes of
conduct).337 North distinguishes institutions, the rules of the game, from or-
ganisations, the players, although in his view organisations also are institutions,
be it of a specific kind. Those organisations “consist of specific groups of in-
dividuals pursuing a mix of common and individual goals through partially
coordinated behaviour.”338 Whatever exact definition one starts from, it is only
basically still was neoclassical. In Institutions, institutional change and economic perfor-
mance, he put more emphasis on persistent inefficiency, uncertainty, bounded rationality,
social norms, and institutional change. Then his focus increasingly turned to ‘real’ in-
stitutionalist topics like the role of transactions cost and formal institutions. Next there was
a phase in his career when he very much emphasized the role of culture and ‘mental models’
as the ultimate basis of economic order, for example in his Understanding the process of
economic growth. In his latest publications e. g. Violence and social orders, formal in-
stitutions like the state, law and rulings, and violence hold center stage. One now no longer
finds explicit references to transactions costs whereas the role of culture and mental models
has become far less prominent. For North’s intellectual itinerary and his major and changes
of opinion, see Brownlow, ‘Structure and change’; M¦nard and Shirley, ‘The contribution of
Douglass North to new institutional economics’ to be published in: Galiani and Sened,
Economic institutions, rights, growth, and sustainability but already in draft available at
http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/62/42/97/PDF/2011–Men
ard_Shirley_North_and_NIE–CUP.pdf, and Milionakis and Fine, ‘Douglass North’s re-
making of economic history’.
336 Hodgson, ‘Institutions and economic development’, 86.
337 North, ‘Prologue’, in particular page 6.
338 North, Wallis and Weingast, Violence and social orders, 15.
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logical to regard the state as an institution or rather as the super-institution that,
even in “minimalistic” interpretations of its tasks, functions as an/the arena of
collective action, with government providing infrastructure, formulating the
rules and acting as referee when it comes to applying them. Greif, North and
Hodgson all consider institutions as a kind of outgrowth or ‘coagulation’ of the
dominant culture, which means that the rules of the game in the last instance
depend on the values and interpretations of the players. I, personally, endorse the
following claims by Claudia Williamson that argue against a strict distinction
between formal and informal institutions (and thus between institutions and
culture) and that emphasize the importance of culture:
The findings suggest that the presence of informal institutions is a strong determinant
of development. In contrast, formal institutions are only successful when embedded in
informal constraints, and codifying informal rules can lead to negative unintended
consequences. This suggests that institutions cannot be easily transplanted in order to
spur economic development. … My findings suggest that the success of formal in-
stitutions depends on the ability to map onto informal rules.339
But, and here I would agree with Hodgson, here too agency and structure are
interacting:
… institutions are simultaneously both objective structures ‘out there’ and subjective
springs of human agency ‘in the human head’. Actor and structure, although distinct,
are connected in a circle of mutual interaction and interdependence. However, the
relationship is not symmetrical: structures and institutions typically precede in-
dividuals. … We are all born into a world of pre-existing institutions, bestowed by
history.340
When it comes to this (inter-)relation between agency and structure, culture and
institutions, however, not all institutionalists agree.341
That institutions matter is, to me at least, is quite obvious. How could the
“durable systems of established and embedded social rules that structure social
interactions” not have a fundamental impact on the economy? Unsurprisingly
though, opinions here are also divided in sense that there are several quite
different views when it comes to their relative importance and their relative
‘autonomy’. Several economists, the best-known amongst them Jeffrey Sachs, do
not so much want to claim that institutions are unimportant as to demonstrate
that at times other factors, such as ‘geography’ in their case, might predominate.
We will see that several social scientists such as Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson
and James Robinson as well as economic historians such as Stanley Engerman
339 Williamson, ‘Dignity and development’. The quotations are from the Abstract and the
Conclusion.
340 Hodgson, ‘Institutions and economic development’, 92.
341 For further information see pages 141 ff.
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and Ken Sokoloff with different points of emphasis want to accentuate the
connections and interactions that might exist between institutions and geog-
raphy, even though for them too, in the end, institutions rule. Others would claim
that in the end culture or knowledge would be fundamental. We will encounter
examples of this line of thinking later on in the book.342 The popularity of
institutionalist approaches clearly does not mean that all economists have made
an ‘institutionalist turn’. Many of them take the existence of markets and supply
and demand mechanisms for granted and focus on proximate causes in their
explanations. Jeffrey Williamson, for example, to whom we already referred,
tries to provide an explanation of the Great Divergence in which he only refers to
proximate causes.343 Andre Gunder Frank seems to think likewise and as usual is
quite outspoken. This is what he wrote in his ReOrient: “… a major thesis of this
book is precisely that institutions are not so much determinant of, as they are
derivative from, the economic process and its exigencies, which are only in-
stitutionally instrumentalized rather than determined.”344 He too and all those
who think likewise, apparently assume the existence of markets and supply and
demand ‘mechanisms’ as fairly natural. But as Hodgson rightly emphasises, the
market is not a ‘spontaneous’, ‘natural’ order, but a social institution that is
created and has to be maintained. It cannot work without certain institutional
(pre-)arrangements. Any attempt to remove all constraints and regulations from
a market system would be dysfunctional.345
‘Classic’ Marxists would defend the thesis that institutions in the end depend
on technology. That, for example, is the case in William Shaw’s book on Marx’s
theory of history in which he claims that, according to Marx, the ‘productive
forces’ determine the ‘relations of production’, and, again basing himself on his
interpretation of Marx’s oeuvre, defends a certain technological determinism.346
Douglas Allen, in his book on the institutional revolution, thinks along similar
lines, claiming that technological change was the motor of industrialisation in
Britain and that institutions had to adapt. That took time and explains why that
‘revolution’ actually progressed so slowly and took so long. He refers to “…the
342 From the perspective of a global historian it is striking that institutionalists tend to almost
exclusively focus on situation in states, in the sense of their internal institutions and
organization. There is hardly any attention to international contexts and how those impinge
on domestic affairs. The recent books by Acemoglu and Robinson and by North and his co-
authors are clear examples of that exclusive focus.
343 See his Trade and poverty.
344 Frank, ReOrient, 206. Much, of course, depends on what he means by the expression “the
economic process and its exigencies”. I guess he means that economic developments can be
explained entirely according to the logic of economic variables and their proximate cau-
sation.
345 Hodgson, ‘Institutions and economic development’, 89 – 91.
346 Shaw, Marx’s theory of history.
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time it takes institutions to catch up to technological advances and the sub-
sequent spill-overs that result from institutional change” and to a mismatch
between technological breakthroughs and the existing institutional framework
that acted “as a brake” on economic growth.347 Andre Gunder Frank, as indicated
earlier on, thinks likewise. But that of course in the end does not rob institutions
of their major importance. If they do not ‘adapt’, technological innovation
cannot have its optimal effect. New growth theory as preached by Oded Galor
does not consider institutions to be really independent variables either.348 Julian
Simon, who thinks they in the very long run are not very important, has a similar
view.349 Erik Reinert, to give one last example, is fairly reticent about giving
institutions too much ‘independence’ for similar reasons: “…institutions are
moulded and determined by the mode of production more than the other way
around, and it is not really constructive to attempt to reverse the arrows of
causality.”350
The really interesting question of course is: how exactly do what institutions
matter and, most important of all for the topic discussed in this book: what are
good institutions, i. e. institutions promoting or at least facilitating modern
economic growth? Surprisingly enough, even amongst self-professed in-
stitutionalist economists, explicit statements in this respect are not easy to find.
North, Wallis and Weingast do explicitly deal with the question of good in-
stitutions in their Violence and social orders of 2009. In their view, modern
economic growth can only prevail in an institutional setting that they charac-
terise as an ‘open access order’ and that has the following specific character-
istics:
A widely held set of beliefs about the inclusion of and equality for all citizens
Entry into economic, political, religious and educational activities without restraint
Support for organizational forms in each activity that is open to all (for example,
contract enforcement)
Rule of law enforced impartially for all citizens.
Impersonal exchange351
347 These quotations are from Allen, Institutional revolution, 221 – 222.
348 See the interview with him by Brian Snowdon, ‘Towards a unified theory of economic
growth’.
349 Simon, Great Breakthrough, chapter 4.
350 Reinert, How rich countries got rich, 223.
351 North, Wallis and Weingast, Violence and social orders, 114. The term ‘‘open access order’-
societies’ in my view is just an abstract term to refer to modern Western capitalist demo-
cracies, or rather even more narrowly, capitalist democracies of the – idealized! – Anglo-
Saxon variety. Societies of the open-access-order type are characterized as developed de-
mocracies, with perpetually lived organizations including the state, diverse elite groups,
impersonal interaction, a homogenous belief system, equal property rights, an encom-
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For a society to enter that stage of impersonal and standardised treatment and
leave that of a ‘natural state’ of differences and privileges for the elites behind,
three ‘doorstep conditions’ must be met:
A rule of law for elites must be introduced
There must exist perpetual forms of organization in public and private spheres
There must exist consolidated political control of the military.352
In his previous work North had always put a heavy and explicit emphasis on
property rights. He still does, but his approach seems to have clearly broadened.
We also find that emphasis on property rights in Hernando De Soto’s bestseller
of 2000, The mystery of capital, a book that in particular focused on the in-
sufficient definition of property rights in non-capitalist countries.353
In the many extremely influential co-authored publications of Daron Ace-
moglu, Simon Johnson and James Robinson, property rights, markets and
growth, always go together. When property rights are well defined and protected,
some kind of representation exists for the propertied groups, markets are
functioning, and the state promotes their functioning, economic growth will
take care of itself ; this seems to, in a nutshell, be their credo. They permanently
insist that institutions are a fundamental cause of long-run growth but sur-
prisingly enough as yet never got very concrete when it comes to what in-
stitutions and what policies they exactly they were talking about: “… we think of
good economic institutions as those that provide security of property rights and
relatively equal access to economic resources to a broad cross-section of soci-
ety.”354 In their Why nations fail, however, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson
have become far more explicit though not much more concrete. It is fairly
obvious what they consider not the way to become rich for a country. In their
view, the main cause for the poverty of so many countries is that they are badly
governed by rent-seeking elites that back up extractive institutions.355 The point
of departure in their analysis is the distinction between political and economic
institutions that are inclusive and political and economic institutions that are
extractive, concepts they already used in earlier publications but that in this
book have been made the very cornerstones of their analysis. The former, so they
repeat over and over again, create prosperity. Without inclusive institutions that
can only emerge in a centralised state that provides order and enforces rules and
passing rule of law, high and enduring provision of public goods, a very high quantity and
complexity of organizations, high wealth, and a low level of violence.
352 North, Wallis and Weingast, Violence and social orders, chapter 5. The chances that these
conditions would be met in Qing China clearly were extremely slight.
353 De Soto, Mystery of capital.
354 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, ‘Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run
growth’, 395.
355 See e. g. their Why nations fail.
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that first evolved in the West, sustainable growth is impossible. Extractive in-
stitutions – though they do not make all growth impossible – in the long run are
incompatible with modern economic growth because such growth implies
permanent innovation, something elites in extractive societies fear and will try
to obstruct. The absence of growth also clearly is a matter of (having the wrong)
institutions.
So one would expect ample attention to the question what exactly inclusive or
extractive institutions are and how they can be defined in a way that lends itself
to solid empirical research. Surprisingly enough, however, their description is
quite open and general. They never give an explicit, operational, definition.
Several elements, though, clearly are essential: the enforcement of property
rights and the existence of representative institutions that treat all people equally
enable as many of them as possible to participate on their own terms in economic
and political life and share power and wealth amongst wide segments of society ;
and, finally, policies that combat rent seeking. In societies with inclusive in-
stitutions, power and wealth are less concentrated than in societies with ex-
clusive institutions where the political system is such that it tries to keep the rich
and extracting elites in power. Inclusive institutions tend to lead to virtuous
circles of increasing inclusiveness and rising wealth as they create a level playing
field and so enable a society to mobilise all its talents. Extractive institutions
tend to lead to vicious circles, as they tend to enrich small elites who can then
shore up their extractive power, which exacerbates political strife over the spoils
of extraction. Extractive economies can succeed for a time, but their growth will
not sustain as too many people are shut out and as there will not be enough
innovation. Sustained economic growth requires innovation, which implies
creative destruction. Those who profit from the existing extractive system will as
a rule not allow changes that might jeopardize their position.356 Acemoglu and
Robinson clearly assume that inequality is bad for growth and development, a
claim that is less obvious and more contested amongst economists than they
suggest. We will briefly comment on the connections between inequality and the
Great Divergence later on.
What is striking in the work of North and co-authors as well as that of
Acemoglu and co-authors is that they start from the unspoken and never-dis-
cussed assumption that the market-mechanism assures economic growth. They
therefore must assume that good institutions are those that allow the market to
function optimally or if need be make it work optimally. In the modern world
that means, first and foremost, a specific kind of state with specific state policies.
Sustained growth in the view of North, Wallis and Weingast as presented in their
common book is only possible in a society with private property and capitalist
356 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail.
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decentralized assignment of production factors. Their ‘metanarrative’, just like
the one presented in Acemoglu’s and Robinson’s Why nations fail, is a stylized
generalization of a very specific, positive interpretation of the modern history of
Great Britain and the USA. Other routes to development are never discussed in
depth or even suggested, even though many societies that have crossed the
20,000 dollars real income per capita threshold – in their view an indication that
a county has entered the open-access stage – have very different histories and
structures.357
Although Acemoglu and Robinson in particular are convinced that politics is
extremely important, they actually have a quite restrictive view on it. They do
not believe that the state should do that much to actively promote growth. It
suffices when government policies support and uphold the market, which as
indicated in their view implies that they involve as many citizens as possible as
active participants in public and economic life, give them a fair share of what is
produced and provide them with the right incentives. They clearly do not mean
that the state itself should act as an active party on that market, regulate it or even
actively implement developmental policies of its own.
Dani Rodrik dedicates an entire chapter of his One economics, many recipes to
institutions for high-quality growth which he all characterises as “market sup-
porting institutions.”358 He refers to property rights, not so much in terms of
actual ownership but control ; to regulatory institutions (that redress or prevent
market failures), institutions for macroeconomic stabilisation (that implement
Keynesian anti-cyclical policies), institutions for social insurance, and in-
stitutions for conflict management. Adding all this up, one gets a fairly extensive
package of government tasks, none of which, however, seems to imply an active
and direct policy of growth. What institutions would be best suited to implement
such policies remains rather open. Elsewhere in his book he points out that there
is “no unique correspondence between the functions that good institutions
perform and the form that such institutions take.”359 Colin White, in his Un-
derstanding economic performance, dedicates an entire chapter (chapter 8) to
the institutional setting of growth, focusing on the role of government, market
and civil society. On page 159 he suggests that the relationship between in-
stitutions and economic performance may well be “kaleidoscopic” and does not
exclude the possibility that Rick Szostak was right in claiming that the key
difference in terms of the prospects for economic growth is between “countries
that can manage / enforce any institutions well, and countries that can manage
357 For those countries see Violence and social orders, 4.
358 Rodrik, One economics, many recipes, chapter five. For the expression “market-supporting
institutions”, see page 156. In my view, only very rich and developed states can afford the
policies and institutions Rodrik recommends. See also chapter 6 of his book.
359 Rodrik, One economics, many recipes, 15. It is all, in his terms “context specific”!
Institutions: property rights, markets and states 127
/enforce no economic institutions well”.360 Sokoloff and Engerman, in their
Economic development in the Americas since 1500, devote an entire chapter
(chapter 10: ‘Institutional and non-institutional explanations of economic de-
velopment’) and the ‘Epilogue: ‘Institutions in political and economic devel-
opment’, to the question of what good institutions would look like. Their main
thesis is:
Institutions matter, but our thinking of how they matter recognizes that they are
profoundly influenced by the political and economic environment, and that if any
aspect of institutions is crucial for growth, it may be that institutions will change over
time as circumstances change.361
In their view, “no single institutional solution is crucial”. Societies with good
institutions for growth are those with “greater institutional flexibility”, where
institutions “make it easier for private or public agents to take advantage of new
opportunities” and have a “capability for adaptation”362 Joel Mokyr, to give one
last example, in an entirely different context comes to a similar conclusion. What
one needs, is “institutional agility”.363 Britain had quite informal – and flexible –
institutions that were very adequate and helpful during its first industrialisation
but were far less suited to enable it to hold primacy during the so-called ‘second
industrial revolution’. The idea of ‘creative destruction’ should be extended to
the realm of institutions. Those too have to be innovated permanently.
There are numerous institutions that might, one way or another, have an
impact on economic development and that might have played a role in the
emergence of the Great Divergence. There have been numerous debates in this
respect. Debates for example on what kind of organisation of economic life
would be preferable in terms of efficiency : a formal one or an informal one? In
classic stories about modernisation, the emphasis has always been on the ad-
vantages of formal structures. For Max Weber and many other theorists, ra-
tionalisation, which implies formalisation, was at the very heart of economic
modernisation. We have seen that formalisation also figures quite prominently
in the definition that North, Wallis and Weingast give of open-access societies.
They clearly consider impersonal and rational institutions, organisations and
procedures as positive for development and growth. Wong and Rosenthal in
360 White, Understanding economic development, 159. He quotes Rick Szostak from an un-
published paper from 2006 called ‘A growth agenda for economic history’.
361 See for this quotation page 318 of that book.
362 See for these quotations, Engerman and Sokoloff, Economic development in the Americas
since 1500, 326 – 327, 340, 325 and 326.
363 Mokyr, Enlightened economy, 486.
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contrast are not so sure that formal institutions would be more efficient than
informal ones.364
Many studies have pointed at the positive impact of having a highly developed
civil society for economic development. The existence of such a civil society has
often been presented as ‘typically Western’ and as an important explanation of
its economic success. The widely acclaimed study by Robert Putnam, with
Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Nanetti, Making democracy work, in which they
compare the flourishing civil society of Northern Italy and its wealth with the
lack of ‘civility’ of Southern Italy and its relative poverty, is regarded by many as a
clear proof – in the words of Aaron Wildavski – that it is the “capacity for self-
organization that makes a people richer and freer, and their governments more
effective”.365 A flourishing civil society is an indicator of the existence of trust as
a form of social capital, which tends to be regarded as positive for economic
development, amongst other reasons because it lowers transactions costs.366
Acemoglu and Robinson, with their emphasis on inclusive institutions and
broad participation, clearly think along the same lines. But here too, it all de-
pends on the context. Mancur Olson (1932 – 1998), a very influential political
scientist, amongst other things, has become famous for his thesis about ‘in-
stitutional sclerosis’ that suggests, that societies with greater numbers of interest
groups (And how many collectives do not sooner or later turn into interest
groups?) grow more slowly, accumulate less capital, and experience reduced
productivity growth relative to others.367 The idea that a well developed ‘civil
society would be a necessary condition for economic development sounds quite
plausible and has found ample support from scholars who think that in this
respect the West had an advantage and therefore developed much faster.
Considering these assumptions it need not come as a surprise that it has
become almost a truism amongst mainstream economists and in particular
amongst institutionalists that ‘despotism’ is incompatible with ‘development’
and that representation, the sharing of power (and wealth!), and the inclusion of
as many citizens as possible, amounting to, in the end, democracy, are good for
development. Rodrik calls democracy “a metainstitution for building good in-
stitutions”.368 In practice, however, the connection between democracy and
growth is fairly complex. Counties that were democracies during take-off in any
364 See the introduction and chapter 3 of their Before and beyond divergence.
365 Putnam, Making democracy work. The claim by Wildavski is on the flap of this book.
366 For a couple of well-known publications dealing with the subject of trust, see note 1250.
367 See for that thesis e. g. his Rise and decline of nations. North, Wallis and Weingast do not
endorse Olson’s view when it comes to institutional sclerosis. They think that in open-
access-order societies as they define them, rent-seeking interest groups cannot play their
pernicious games. See the references to Olson in their Violence and social orders.
368 Rodrik, One economics, many recipes, 8.
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case are extremely rare. There certainly is no empirical backing for the thesis
that a country has to be democratic to be able to take off, rather the contrary.369
Nor is being democratic a guarantee of sustained growth once countries have
taken off. Let me just quote the abstract of an article by Robert Barro, the major
expert in the field, on the connection between democracy and growth:
Growth and democracy (subjective indexes of political freedom) are analysed for a
panel of about 100 countries from 1960 to 1990. The favourable effects on growth
include maintenance of the rule of law, free markets, small government consumption,
and high human capital. Once these kinds of variables and the initial level of real per
capita GDP are held constant, the overall effect of democracy on growth is weakly
negative. There is a suggestion of a nonlinear relationship in which more democracy
enhances growth at low levels of political freedom but depresses growth when a
moderate level has already been attained. Improvements in the standard of living –
measured by GDP, health status, and education – substantially raise the probability that
political freedoms will grow. These results allow predictions about which countries will
become more or less democratic over time.370
Sustained growth means innovation and there will always be those who, rightly
or wrongly, fear that they personally will experience the destructive rather than
the creative side of innovation. It definitely is not the case that only ruling,
extractive elites would prefer to perpetuate the status quo as Acemoglu and
Robinson reiterate time and again in their Why nations fail. You do not even need
quite outspoken and obstructive interest groups to block change as Olson
suggests. It is not at all hard to imagine that an obstructive majority of sorts can
be found in a democratic or, as Acemoglu and Robinson would call it ‘an in-
clusive society’, even if that might be economically irrational. Western Europe at
the moment would provide several perfect examples. If industrialisation had
been made subject of a nationwide general referendum in industrialising Britain,
it in all probability would have been voted down, as it would have been in many if
not most industrialising countries. It is easy to argue (and find examples!) that
democratic institutions in specific circumstances can be bad for growth whereas
authoritarian institutions in specific circumstances might be good for it. When it
comes to the debate whether democracy causes growth or the other way around,
North, Wallis and Weingast hold the view that the two are mutually reinforcing.
They do not think in terms of a one-way causality. They may not be very concrete
about the actual emergence of the Great Divergence but clearly think, like
369 Ha-joon Chang, Kicking away the ladder, 71 – 76.
370 Barrow, ‘Democracy and growth’. Compare, however, Rodrik, Globalization paradox, 311 –
312, note 3 of chapter 11, where reference is made to literature that is somewhat more
positive about the relationship between democracy and growth.
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Acemoglu and Robinson that sustained growth is only possible in a democratic
setting.371 This at the moment seems to be the majority-view.
Many other institutions and their potential impact on growth might be and
have been discussed. There is the debate instigated by the Hungarian-British
scholar John Hajnal (1926 – 2008), that a specific Western European marriage
pattern existed – actually confined to parts of Western Europe to the West of a
virtual Trieste-Saint Petersburg line with specific implications not just for
household economics but also for the economy as a whole.372 There are the
influential ideas of Emmanuel Todd about the connection between family
structures, ideology and development.373 There are numerous references to
Western individualism.374 There is, of course, law.375 A specific debate about
whether civil law would be more rational and general and therefore better for
economic growth than common law that is more case-based and leaves more
room for interpretation has emerged.376 Here we see a strong focus on property
and property rights. The amount of literature on these topics is staggering. In
institutionalist literature with a historical bend, property rights undoubtedly are
the main issue as institutional economists and all those inspired by them regard
the existence of well-described and well-secured property rights as a necessary if
not sufficient condition for economic growth. We will discuss them – and the
specific variety of property right that often gets specific attention, to wit in-
tellectual property rights as described in patents – briefly later on. Considering
their importance and the big differences in this respect between early modern
Britain and China, rules governing inheritance, for example whether primoge-
niture or partible inheritance prevails and whether entail or all sorts of condi-
tional sales exist, would also deserve more attention than they can be given here.
Amongst historians, an interesting debate has flared up about whether guilds
and the guilds-system would have had a positive or a negative effect on economic
development in pre-industrial Europe.377
371 See North, Wallis and Weingast, Violence and social orders under ‘democracy’.
372 I just refer to two relevant publications: Engelen and Wolf, Marriage and the family in
Eurasia and De Moor and Van Zanden, ‘Girl power’.
373 See for a selection of his publications http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emmanuel_Todd
374 See e. g. in particular for the English case Macfarlane, Origins of English individualism and
idem, Invention of the modern world, in particular chapter 8.
375 For connections between law and economic growth in general see Cooter and Schäfer,
Solomon’s knot. For a focus on the role of law in the Great Divergence see Debin Ma and Van
Zanden, Law and long-term economic change. For the situation in Britain see Macfarlane,
Invention of the modern world, chapter 11.
376 Helpman, Mystery of economic growth, 119 – 122.
377 See for the most recent texts Epstein, ‘Craft guilds in the premodern economy’; Epstein and
Prak, Guilds, innovation and the European economy, and Ogilvie, Institutions and European
trade. In my view, their overall impact was negative, which means I would side with Ogilvie.
See for some very recent comments that would endorse Ogilvie’s views, Dudley, Mothers of
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It would simply lead too far afield to discuss all these and related topics so I
will focus on those institutions that receive most attention in debates amongst
economists about growth and that I consider the most relevant ones for the
debates on the Great Divergence. That means I will focus on the role of the
market and of the state. They will be discussed together, since in reality as well as
in those scholarly debates, they are so entangled that it is not helpful to discuss
them separately. It, again, is striking and for the unsuspecting outsider probably
even shocking how widely opinions amongst economists differ even when it
comes to the not exactly irrelevant question of what a growth-promoting system
of allocation and a growth-promoting polity would look like. Every position
imaginable, from perfect competition to monopoly and from total laissez-faire to
complete central planning, – and everything in between – has enthusiastically
been defended by some economist. Everyone seems to agree – and rightly so – on
the importance of the rule of law, the monopolisation of violence and some
centralisation of public power – but apart from that disagreement is rife.
Mainstream, i. e. classical and many neo-classical economists, still claim that
the market mechanism, i. e. free and fair competition, is a necessary and many
would even say sufficient condition for growth. Adam Smith already formulated
quite explicitly what is still their dogma, even though what we call ‘modern
economic growth’ in his eyes was impossible: “Little else is required to carry a
state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace,
easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought
about by the natural course of things.”378 Explaining modern economic growth
as a rule is not regarded as fundamentally distinct from explaining growth in
general. Or as Sir John Hicks (1904 – 1989) put it : “Industrialization … is a
continuation of the process of mercantile development.”379 For him, the essence
of the history of economic development would be the rise of the market as a
formal institution. Many economists would agree. Monetarist economists  la
the late Milton Friedman (1912 – 2006), as far as they still exist, also emphasise
“the power of the market”, fiercely oppose “the tyranny of controls”, and think
that “interventionist governments, no matter how well-intentioned, have almost
innovation, passim, e. g. 128 – 129 and 191. When it comes to training and quality control,
their role was, in my view, positive.
378 This is claimed by Adam Smith’s friend Dugald Stewart. See Hall, ‘States and economic
development’, 154. Neo-classical and institutionalist economists have become much more
optimistic when it comes to the possibility of sustained and substantial economic growth
than Smith was.
379 Hicks, Theory of economic history, 143 and 145. To be fair, Hicks also explicitly points at the
fact that without science growth as we know it since the Industrial Revolution would have
been impossible.
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invariably done more harm than good”.380 In their eyes, the sole interventionist
policy that is allowed government would be to take care of the money supply. The
heydays of the so-called Washington Consensus, especially when it, in my view
incorrectly, is interpreted as a kind of neo-liberal fundamentalism, are over.381
But most mainstream economists still simply cannot imagine economics to be a
serious ‘scientific’ endeavour if it does not take the market mechanism as its
point of departure, which in practice often leads to a situation in which they
continue to work with assumptions they know to be unrealistic and with pos-
tulates they can never prove. Institutionalist economists, in particular those who
are referred to in debates on the Great Divergence or actually themselves par-
ticipate in them, basically still are all neo-classical economists even though, for
example, Douglass North, to refer to the most well known of them, later in his
career explicitly pointed at weaknesses and blind spots in (neo)classical
thinking.382 Institutionalists’ analyses of markets, their functions, preconditions
and embedding have become very sophisticated and they have become very
influential in particular in development economics.383 But in the end they too
consider the market as the essence of a well-functioning economy and the motor
of growth. The state should be no less and no more than an efficient provider of
public goods. ‘Good institutions’ are market-supportive institutions and ‘good
governance’ in essence is market-supportive governance.
For champions of the market, monopoly and government – insofar as gov-
ernment is not regarded as just another form of monopoly – primarily are
threats to growth. They mistrust them as a matter of principle and their entire
theoretical scaffolding is built on clear dichotomies: rents versus profits, mo-
nopoly versus competition, and bureaucrats versus entrepreneurs. In the 1980s,
political scientist Margaret Levi formulated the ‘postulate’ that states are pred-
atory and will always try to maximise revenue extraction.384 For political sci-
entist Mancur Olson too, unless ‘tamed’, the state would be predatory, or as he
describes it, act as a ‘stationary bandit’, with a natural tendency to maximise
revenue and expenditure and to interfere with property rights.385 Douglass North
380 See e. g. Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to choose. See for the quotations the titles of its first
two chapters and the back-flap of the book.
381 See for an introduction http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Consensus
382 See e. g. North, Understanding the process of economic change, 84 – 85.
383 For the institutionalists who are particularly relevant in the context of this book see under
note 333. For a general introduction into institutionalist economics see – amongst tens of
introductions – e.g. van den Berg, Spithoven and Groenewegen, Institutional economics ;
Brousseau and Glachant, New institutional economics: a guidebook and M¦nard and
Shirley, Handbook of new institutional economics.
384 Levi, ‘Predatory theory of rule’.
385 See e. g. his ‘Dictatorship, democracy, and development’ in: Olson and Kähkönen, A not-so-
dismal science, 119 – 137.
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basically holds the same view. In his Understanding the process of economic
change he writes: “The government is not a disinterested party in the economy.
… In rare cases [it (PV, Italics mine)] designs and enforces a set of rules of the
game that encourage productive activity.”386 The so-called ‘natural state’, that
according to him and his colleagues Wallis and Weingast for most of the last ten
thousand years has virtually been the only form of society larger than a few
hundred people and that only in very specific conditions in a small part of the
world has been succeeded by an open access order, is depicted by them as a rent-
seeking, predatory state with a privileged elite monopolising power and
creaming off wealth.387 In institutional and mainstream economics, such as-
sumptions have become all but undisputed.388 For Daron Acemoglu and James
Robinson, as already indicated, extractive government clearly has been the main
impediment to growth in world history. They are convinced of the fundamental
importance of political transformations to do something about poverty and
claim that their book Why nations fail is about “the politics of poverty and
prosperity” and that “… politics determines what institutions a nation has.”389
They, like many other institutionalists, are willing to consider the existence of
market failures and to admit that government intervention can have positive
effectives. But, in the end, for them, the best the state can do is to support the
market and to ‘get the prices right’ as the expression goes – which is complicated
and rare enough.390 They are very explicit : “…prosperity and poverty are de-
termined by the incentives created by institutions.”391 References to “shaping the
incentives”, creating “incentive structures” abound. There are no less than
eighty references to incentives in the text. The message is clear : When the right
incentives are in place, the economy can and should take care of itself : “You can’t
engineer prosperity.”392 This is the way in which the World Bank in 1991 sum-
marized its ‘market friendly’ view: “The appropriate role of government in a
market-friendly strategy is to ensure adequate investments in people, provision
of a competitive climate for enterprise, openness to international trade, and
stable macroeconomic management. But beyond these roles, governments are
386 North, Understanding the process of economic change, 67.
387 See e. g. their Violence and social orders, chapter 2.
388 For an analysis of Douglass North’s ideas when it comes to economics and economic
history and their reception see note 335. For those of Mancur Olson, see e. g. his ‘Dicta-
torship, democracy, and development’, and Power and prosperity.
389 For the quotations see Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail, 44, and the title of
chapter 3.
390 The expression ‘getting the prices right’ refers to a policy in which governments do less in
those areas where markets work or can be made to work reasonably well, to do more in those
areas where markets cannot be relied upon.
391 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail, the title of chapter 3.
392 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail, 446 and 67.
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likely to do more harm than good.”393 Most of these famous economists would
overall tend to agree with the not-so-famous economist Ronald Reagan when he
said “(In this present crisis) … government is not the solution to our problem;
government is the problem.”394 The Economist suggests one can look at eco-
nomic development in terms of “markets versus misery.”395 It would be hard to
put it more succinctly than William Easterly did: “The poor have bureaucrats,
the rich have markets.”396
For mainstream economists the state basically has to see to it that markets can
function optimally and to redress the situation when they ‘fail’. For many non-
mainstream economists that is not enough, but one should not forget that for
many states even implementing this ‘minimum’ programme is too much. Many
polities lack even those minimal requirements under which they could support
the market, as they have no rule of law and no functioning system of infra-
structure or education. The fact that such states are not developing would not
surprise any economist. But their frequent failures point at the fact that it ap-
parently is far from easy to create and maintain functioning states, let alone
states with ‘good’ governance. There are and always have been many ‘failed
states’, that is, states perceived as having failed at some of the basic conditions
and responsibilities of a sovereign government that has centralised power and
rule.397 Before a state can implement all sorts of policies, it first has to be in good
shape. Westerners living in countries where the process of state building took
several centuries may have a tendency to underestimate its complexity and
exceptionality.
What we, for the sake of convenience, call ‘mainstream’ has never had a
monopoly in economics. For a couple of decades after World War Two, Keynes’
ideas about the role of state were quite popular and actually many of his ideas
became part of a neo-classical-Keynesian mainstream synthesis, for example, in
the extremely influential work of Paul Samuelson (1915 – 2009).398 Keynes ba-
sically accepted the market mechanism and considered it too efficient to be
rejected on principle. He clearly did not reject ‘capitalism’, but acknowledged
that markets are not always self-adjusting and self-correcting and that structural
crises are very well possible. He therefore pleaded for specific forms of state
393 World Bank: World Development Report. The Challenge of Development (New York 1991)
84.
394 He said so in his inaugural address of 20 – 1-1984. See http://www.reaganfoundation.org/
pdf/Inaugural_Address_012081.pdf. Consulted 21 – 7-2013.
395 The Economist June 1st 2013, page 11
396 Easterly, White man’s burden, 165.
397 See, for a more theoretical overview dealing with the contemporary situation, Fukuyama,
State building and idem, Origins of political order for a historical overview.
398 For the ideas and influence of this economist see e. g. Nasar, Grand pursuit under ‘Paul
Samuelson’ in the Index.
Institutions: property rights, markets and states 135
intervention to directly or indirectly, over savings and investments, act upon
consumption and suggested to build mechanisms into the economy that might
dampen its undulations. In the 1960’s his ideas were so popular that arch-
monetarist Milton Friedman in 1965 claimed that in a sense “we are all
Keynesians now.”399 They have never completely lost their appeal, for example to
John Kenneth Galbraith (1908 – 2006) and Nobel-Prize winning economist Paul
Krugman, and they are even experiencing a revival of sorts lately.400 What is
more relevant, of course, is the fact that the actual presence of the state in
Western economies as it can, for example, be measured in terms of government
income, expenditure and debt as a percentage of GDP, is still enormous and that
governments are often expected to, at least in times of crisis, engage in Keynesian
deficit spending. What Robert Solow said about computers: “You can see the
computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics” basically also goes
for neo-liberalism: “You can see neo-liberalism everywhere but in the statistics
of public revenue and spending.”401
Table 23: Government* spending, % of GDP 1870 – 2009
1870 1913 1920 1937 1960 1980 1990 2000 2005 2009
Austria 10.5 17.0 14.7 20.6 35.7 48.1 38.6 52.1 50.2 52.3
Belgium n.a. 13.8 22.1 21.8 30.3 58.6 54.8 49.1 52.0 54.0
Britain 9.4 12.7 26.2 30.0 32.2 43.0 39.9 36.6 40.6 47.2
Canada n.a. n.a. 16.7 25.0 28.6 38.8 46.0 40.6 39.2 43.8
France 12.6 17.0 27.6 29.0 34.6 46.1 49.8 51.6 53.4 56.0
Germany 10.0 14.8 25.0 34.1 32.4 47.9 45.1 45.1 46.8 47.6
Italy 13.7 17.1 30.1 31.1 30.1 42.1 53.4 46.2 48.2 51.9
Japan 8.8 8.3 14.8 25.4 17.5 32.0 31.3 37.3 34.2 39.7
Netherlands 9.1 9.0 13.5 19.0 33.7 55.8 54.1 44.2 44.8 50.0
Spain n.a. 11.0 8.3 13.2 18.8 32.2 42.0 39.1 38.4 45.8
Sweden 5.7 10.4 10.9 16.5 31.0 60.1 59.1 52.7 51.8 52.7
Switzerland 16.5 14.0 17.0 24.1 17.2 32.8 33.5 33.7 37.3 36.7
United States 7.3 7.5 12.1 19.7 27.0 31.4 33.3 32.8 36.1 42.2
Average 10.4 12.7 18.4 23.8 28.4 43.8 44.7 43.2 44.1 47.7
*1870 – 1937 central government; 1960 – 2009 general government
Source: The Economist, March 19th 2011, Taming Leviathan. A special report on the future
of the state, 4.
399 See for this claim and President’s Nixon’s claim from 1971: “I am a Keynesian now in
economics”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/We_are_all_Keynesians_now
400 For further information let me only refer to Skidelsky, Keynes. Return of the master.
401 See for that quotation, Robert Solow, ‘We’d better watch out’, New York Times Book Review,
July 12 (1987) 36.
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In practice, of course, the economy has always been and will always be too
important to leave it to itself. Governments have always intervened in markets,
whatever ideology they officially may have endorsed. Anyone with only the
slightest knowledge of history can refer to innumerable examples of intervening,
pro-active, ‘pushing’ governments that did not simply respond to crises or
market-failures but as a matter of structural policy tried to set the economy on a
certain course and, what is fundamental, pursued policies that were not bad for
growth. I could of course give hundreds of references here to history books that
would show that government policies to promote growth were not always fail-
ures, let alone always doomed to fail. According to Joe Studwell, founding editor
of the China Economic Quarterly and a knowledgeable free-lance journalist, this
fact would to most economists still be an “unspeakable reality”, whereas eco-
nomic historians consider it as fairly uncontroversial. When it comes to ex-
plaining how the developed countries in the world actually took-off, main-
stream, neo-classical economics in his view is all but irrelevant.402 A position I
would fully endorse. The interesting thing is that an increasing number of
professional academic economists have started to reflect on this fact.403 Let me,
to show how far opinions are apart, quote one of them: Erik Reinert, who pleads
for “governing the market”, “getting the prices wrong” and claims: “Perfect
markets are for the poor”.404 Studwell in his analysis of development and non-
development of Asian economies claims “… there is no significant economy that
has developed successfully through policies of free trade and deregulation from
the get-go. What has always been required are pro-active interventions …”405
Recent developments in the global economy of course play their part in the
emergence of more dissenting views on the role of government in promoting
economic growth. The rise of Japan and later the Newly Industrialized Countries
led several economists to coin and debate the concept of the ‘developmental
state’, referring to a coordinating, pro-active state that does not eliminate the
market but tries to steer and develop the economy and in order to do so does not
refrain from price-manipulation, raising tariffs, infant industry protection and
support for import substitution. In such a state, government takes on devel-
402 See Studwell, How Asia works, Part Two, ‘Manufacturing: The victory of the historians’, and
‘Epilogue: Learning to lie’. For the expression “unspeakable reality” see pages 64 – 66 of that
book.
403 Two economists are very important in this respect and are becoming increasingly in-
fluential. One is Ha-joon Chang, whose most interesting study in the context of this book is
his Kicking away the ladder. See further his personal website and his Cambridge University
website. The other one is Erik Reinert, whose How rich countries got rich, gives a good
overview of his ideas. For more, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erik_S._Reinert.
404 Reinert, How rich countries got rich, 18. See there for further references for the first two of
these quotations.
405 Studwell, How Asia works, 226. The author means interventions by the government.
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opmental functions.406 Then there was the more recent, sensational rise of several
other countries, in particular the co-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India
and China), most of them not exactly shining examples of laissez-faire econo-
mies. There is apparently not only quite a lot of successful government inter-
ventionism: so many huge firms at the moment actually are state enterprises that
one may well talk of a revival of a form of state capitalism.407 But growth rates in
many states with interventionist governments are so high and also so sustained
that even the staunchest defender of laissez-faire has to one way or another deal
with this stubborn ‘anomaly’. Centrally planned economies as ‘real existing
socialism’ knew them, apart from some not exactly inspiring and successful
remnants like North Korea, Cuba or Myanmar, have all but disappeared. But, as
many economists love to forget, the idea that central planning would work was
not without its supporters, also in the West. Many Western ‘experts’ there, up
until at least the end of the sixties, believed that the Soviet Union would very soon
catch-up with the United States, if it had not already done so.408 Up to a certain
point and in certain respects many planned economies indeed were successful.
All in all it would be hard to find a thesis about the role of the state in
economic development that has not been wholeheartedly supported by some
economist. Amongst the leading economists at the moment the night-watchman
state and the ideas of the Washington Consensus are basically dead but of course
top economists are not necessarily those who influence public opinion let alone
economic policies. The idea that markets can fail has been widely accepted, as
has the idea that there might be inefficient equilibriums and path-dependencies.
A well-known economist like Paul Romer attributes a large role to the state in
matters of research and development, although still not a single new growth
theory model in his Advanced Macroeconomics textbook of 2006 makes any
reference to industrial policies as a means of promoting development, invest-
ment and growth.409 His colleague Paul Krugman admits that in international
trade, state intervention might be needed and helpful. Dani Rodrik regards
406 See for information in alphabetical order : Amsden, Rise of “the Rest”; Ha-joon Chang, see
note 403; Johnson, Japan. Who governs?; Erik Reinert http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erik_S.
_Reinert; Wade, Governing the market ; Weiss and Hobson, States and economic develop-
ment and Woo-Cumings, The developmental state. For a general, first introduction see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Developmental_state. Consulted 17 – 2-2012.
407 See for example on this subject Bremmer, End of the free market and The Economist, 21 – 27
January 2012, ‘Special Report: State capitalism. The visible hand.’
408 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail, 124 – 132, and Spufford, Red plenty. For fasci-
nating examples of how Soviet growth and development were over-estimated, see Levy and
Peart, ‘Soviet growth and American textbooks’. Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1517983. Consulted 28 – 3-2012.
409 Romer, Advanced macroeconomics. I found this comment in Schlefer, Assumptions eco-
nomists make, 186.
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himself as basically neo-classical but actually is convinced that the state has
quite a broad range of tasks, including forms of industrial policy. What really
matters of course is that is that, whatever economists may suggests, the actual
role of the state in economic life of the wealthiest countries of the world simply is
enormous and has already been enormous for many decades whatever way one
might want to measure it.
When it comes to monopolies and oligopolies, there has also been a certain
change of perspective. Their potentially positive effects are now taken more into
consideration and it is also more recognised that it is almost impossible to fully
do without them. Adam Smith was fiercely against monopolies for reasons one
from the perspective of the consumer can easily reconstruct and understand,
although his plea for maximising the division of labour because that would
increase efficiency can only mean that bigger productive entities are more ef-
ficient. This of course means that the ones with the optimal size can wipe out all
competitors and become monopolists. It is not only increasing returns that can
make big beautiful. To cover the enormous fixed costs for many modern firms,
they to some extent simply have to be price-makers, i. e. monopolists with super-
normal profits for at least some time. As Schumpeter explained so forcefully and
convincingly in his theories, the essence of capitalist development is not free
competition but as it is now often called with an oxymoron ‘monopolistic
competition’.410
Historians wanting to explain the Great Divergence with reference to the role
of the state and the market thus have a confusingly wide range of theories at their
disposal that they can choose from. Actually the bulk of them do not really
choose. The majority of those who do prefer the current amended classical
approach that is predominant under institutionalist economists or, and that is a
growing group, a kind of neo-mercantilist approach in which Britain’s status as a
mercantilist fiscal-military state – like most Western European states – is not
seen as something by definition negative for development and growth, but as at
least as a necessary precondition for take-off. The problem of that last approach
up until now is how to exactly show the positive connections between growth
and mercantilism.
410 See for this concept http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monopolistic_competition.
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10. Culture and economic growth
Institutions do not emerge out of the blue and their existence and permanence
are not simple facts of life. In my view, they can only emerge, persist and dis-
appear when a sufficiently large number of people with political clout wants
them to. That means they need to find sufficient backing in the dominant culture
of society, which in turn means that culture could also be an ultimate if not an
even more ultimate cause of economic growth. The problem here resides in the
fact that the concept is so notoriously hard to define. My point of departure is
this definition by Eric Jones: “Culture is the pattern of beliefs, habits, and ex-
pectations, of values, ideals, and preferences, shared by groups of people, large
and small.”411 Jones himself immediately adds an element that is fundamental:
those beliefs et cetera are learned. Mokyr’s definition also explicitly refers to the
role of learning in this context: “Culture is a set of beliefs, values, and prefer-
ences, capable of affecting behaviour, that are socially (not genetically) trans-
mitted and that are shared by some subset of society. It seems best to define
culture as something entirely of the mind, which can differ from individual to
individual and is, to some extent, a matter of individual choice.”412 In a previous
publication, I myself used the following definition: Culture refers to “the socially
acquired set of dispositions of a group of people with regard to describing,
interpreting and valuing the social and natural world.”413 In the end, this means I
endorse the view of Geert Hofstede who describes culture as “the collective
programming of the mind”.414 Whatever exact definition one wants to endorse: it
would to my view be impossible to a) deny any connection between the in-
stitutions of a society as ‘the rules of the game in a society’ and its culture as
defined in the above terms, and to b) deny culture any importance in economic
life, even though that is exactly what many economists and global historians
would want to do. Most economists since at least the 1960s or 1970s ignored
culture.415 These are the opening words of Eric Jones’s book Cultures merging
from 2006: “Economists agree about many things – contrary to popular opinion
– but the majority agree about culture only in the sense that they no longer give it
much thought.” He quotes the economist Mark Casson saying “…the pro-
fessional culture [sic!] of economists prevents most of them from seeing that
411 Jones, Cultures merging, IX.
412 This is a view defended by Joel Mokyr in his, ‘Culture, institutions, and modern growth’,
prepared for the Conference: Understanding institutions and development economics: the
legacy and work of Douglass C. North, St. Louis, November 4 – 6, 2010, http://cniss.wustl.
edu/files/cniss/mokyrpaper.pdf, page 3.
413 See my ‘Role of culture and institutions in economic history’.
414 Hofstede, Culture and organizations, 150.
415 There of course were exceptions.
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culture matters at all.” They tend to adopt the position of “cultural nullity”.
These quotes, however, are from a chapter called ‘Revival of cultural explanation’
in a book devoted to the relation between culture and the economy.416
Apparently, things are changing. According to Deepak Lal “‘culture’ is in the
air” and becoming rather popular as an ultimate cause of economic growth.417
Peter Temin is right on target when he claims that in economics it has become
kosher again to talk about culture.418 Robert Lucas, Nobel-Prize winning econ-
omist, claims that modern economic growth requires what he refers to as “a
million mutinies”. Societies and their citizens must be open to the new possi-
bilities that development creates as the key to economic development consists in
the invention of new ways of doing things.419 An increasing number of pub-
lications, some of which I just referred to, is being devoted to the role of culture
in economics, although I guess not many people would want to go as far as the
American scholar Lawrence Harrison who simply states: “Underdevelopment is
a state of mind.”420 Actually, the ever increasing group of economists who think
economic growth is a matter of innovation and consider innovation in the last
instance as a matter of knowledge and institutions, whether they explicitly admit
it or not – most would not as they don’t like to talk about culture – do give an
essential role to culture.
The role of culture here is discussed separately from that of institutions.
Scholars have somewhat differing opinions when it comes to how distinct they
actually are. Can institutions function as ultimate causes in economic analysis or
must one take that analysis to a ‘deeper’ level and indicate what in turn causes
them? The relations between institutions and culture and between institutions
and factor endowments have been widely and fiercely debated. The second
connection has already been discussed extensively, so let us now briefly com-
ment on the first. Several influential scholars think it does not make much sense
to sharply distinguish between culture and institutions in the sense that in-
stitutions are somehow epiphenomena of culture. Douglass North in most of his
416 Jones, Cultures merging, chapter 1. The quotations are on pages 3 and 5. For the expression
‘cultural nullity’ that is coined by Jones, see the Index.
417 Lal, Unintended consequences, 2.
418 Temin, ‘Is it kosher to talk about culture?’
419 Lucas, Lectures on economic growth, ‘Introduction’. The expression ‘a million mutinies’ is
from V.S. Naipaul’s book India, a million mutinies now.
420 See for this revival of cultural explanations in economics the many references in Harrison
and Huntington, Culture matters ; Jones, Cultures merging ; Nunn, ‘Culture and the hi-
storical process’. The text is also on Nunn’s website; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, ‘Does
culture affect economic outcomes?’ and inmy ‘Role of culture and institutions in economic
history.’ For Harrison’s quotation, see Harrison, Underdevelopment is a state of mind.
Recent and interesting publications in German are Abelshauser, Gilgen and Leutzsch,
Kulturen der Weltwirtschaft, and Berghoff and Vogel, Wirtschaftsgeschichte als Kulturge-
schichte.
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work gives ample attention to culture in wide sense of the word referring to belief
systems, cognition, consciousness and human intentionality.421 He does so be-
cause he thinks its role in development is fundamental. In his words, human
evolution is guided by the perceptions of the players, and those perceptions
come from beliefs about the consequences of human actions, typically blended
with preferences.422 The following statement makes his position clear :
Culture not only determines societal performance at a moment of time, but through the
way, in which its scaffolding constrains the players, contributes to the process of change
through time. The focus of out attention [In a book about understanding the process of
economic change PV] therefore must be on human learning – on what is learned and
how it is shared amongst members of a society and on the incremental process by which
beliefs and preference change, and on the way in which they shape the performance of
economies through time.423
As indicated, North has changed his mind several times in his career, but even
in the book he wrote with Wallis and Weingast, in which culture as such is
hardly discussed, causality in processes of macro change runs like this beliefs
=> institutions => organizations => policies => outcomes.424 Avner Greif
holds a similar position and puts “beliefs and norms at the centre of the analysis
of institutions” and regards “motivation provided by believes and norms … [as]
the[ir] linchpin”.425 Geoffrey Hodgson thinks institutions only work because the
rules involved are embedded in shared habits of thought and behaviour. In his
view they are conditioned by and dependent upon individuals and their habits,
though not reducible to them.426 David Landes, as expected, thinks culture forms
the determinant of institutions and regards them “as expressions of the values
and needs of a given population, more derivatives and consequences than as
drivers and determinants.” They in his view matter, but he thinks that, “over
time, with adjustment and adaptation, people have got the institutions they need
and deserve.”427 I could give more examples, such as that of Masahiko Aoki who
describes an institution as “… a self-sustaining system of shared beliefs about a
salient way in which the game is repeatedly played”.428 Just to show how broad
the range of opinion is amongst economists also in this respect, I can refer to
421 See e. g. North, Understanding the process of economic change, chapters 3 and 4.
422 North, Understanding the process of economic change, VIII.
423 North, Understanding the process of economic change, VIII. See also, written together with
Wallis and Weingast, Violence and social orders, 27 – 29, where he indicates that culture is
very important for, but to a large extent exogenous to economics.
424 This claim is central in North’s Understanding the process of economic change and still
endorsed in Violence and social orders. See e. g. page 28.
425 Greif, Institutions and the path to the modern economy, 39 and 45.
426 Hodgson, ‘Institutions and economic development’, 91 – 94.
427 See Landes in his reply to Om Prakash and me on page 8.
428 Aoki, Toward a comparative institutional analysis, 10.
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Acemoglu and Robinson two institutionalists who explicitly reject cultural ex-
planations of major economic developments.429 They regard cultural differences
as “consequences of … different institutions and institutional histories” and on
that basis claim – not entirely convincing in my view – that culture is mostly
irrelevant to explaining the wealth and poverty of nations. Cultural differences at
best are effects rather than causes. In their view ‘culture’ clearly cannot explain
the Great Divergence or in their words “how we got here and why the inequalities
in the world persist.”430
Whatever the exact relation may be between the dominant culture in a society
and its institutions, if it at all makes sense to try and determine their exact
relationship, it will in any case be a fairly close one. Institutions without any
cultural underpinning in my view are bound to lose relevance, but on the other
hand there are plenty of examples that show that when you introduce different
institutions in countries with fairly similar cultures you get very different out-
comes. Just think of the examples of East and West Germany, North and South
Korea and Mainland China and Taiwan.431 It is not at all probable that in China
with Deng’s reforms in 1978, the beliefs, habits, expectations, values, ideals and
preferences of the Chinese suddenly changed. What did change was the structure
of incentives and sanctions they were confronted with. Different ‘carrots and
sticks’, i. e. different institutions can ceteris paribus lead to quite different out-
comes.
But for analytical reasons, I agree with Jones when he claims that the “con-
flation of culture and institutions is a ready source of confusion”. He describes
institutions as “political and power-based choices” whereas culture consists
“mainly of rules and practices learned fairly informally…” Institutions tend to
be “conscious, even political constructs … organized networks of formal, em-
bodied rules. Culture, though often able to bind, is relatively intangibly ; in-
stitutions have a more rule-bond existence.” And, so he adds, “…institutions are
in principle always open to being renegotiated.”432 He is not the only one to make
this distinction. Mokyr describes institutions as socially determined conditional
incentives and consequences to actions. They are a given to every individual and
therefore create the structure of incentives in society. Institutions as rules specify
certain behaviour to be proper and legal, but also specify the penalties for
429 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail, chapter 2, 56 – 63.
430 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail, 63 and 57.
431 These three cases are referred to in Niall Ferguson, Civilization, 11. See for a similar line of
reasoning Acemoglu, a.o., ‘Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth’, 404 –
420, where they point at the enormous impact of introducing differing institutions in North
and South Korea in the 1950s, and Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail, 56 – 63.
432 The quotations are all from Jones, Cultures merging, 259, 17 – 18, 109 and 110.
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breaking them and the rewards for meeting them.433 For him institutions are
more formal and in that respect more binding. The same goes for Niall Ferguson,
who regards them as in some sense formalised products of culture.434 My view
would be that institutions are hardly ever a direct and unequivocal reflection of
culture. As a rule they and the cultural setting in which they exist are so strongly
intertwined that it is extremely difficult, as well as not very enlightening, to try
and completely disentangle them. Institutions do have dynamics and logic of
their own that cannot directly be reduced to the culture of the individual par-
ticipants involved. But on the other hand, they simply cannot be understood nor
explained without reference to that culture. It would be best to regard culture as
the software of institutional arrangements that, in turn, play a big part in de-
termining culture. Institutions as structures and culture as their software in the
end are two sides to the same coin.
But let us return to culture: what about its actual impact on economic de-
velopment? Jones with whose definition we started our brief discussion on the
role of culture in economics himself endorses an approach in which culture and
economy continually react on one another, not one of “cultural nullity”, where
culture is largely irrelevant nor one of “cultural fixity”, where culture is all-
inclusive and static. He harbours no doubt that culture in the form of preferences
and behavioural routines can hold implications for the economy. For economic
development, it may act as a brake or filter but it in his view is seldom likely to be
the original source of change. One should therefore only treat it as the active
ingredient with caution.435 I think this is a sensible position and would suggest
prudence in using the concept because it is very hard to turn it into a useful
operational category in social scientific research and because just about ev-
erything one would want to claim about values, believes et cetera and their
impact, can be said without introducing a mega, all-encompassing concept of
culture.
What, of course, is striking about economics that often likes to pass as a hard-
nosed science, especially in the eyes of economists themselves, is that it actually
is full of all sorts of ‘cultural’ assumptions when it comes to how economies
function and develop. Mainstream economics is built around the concept of the
homo economicus – of unspecified gender – who is supposed to be rational,
calculating in terms of pleasure and pain, benefits and costs. He is supposed to
act on his own as an individual whose nature it is in Adam Smith’s famous words
433 Mokyr, ‘Culture, institutions, and modern growth’.
434 Ferguson, Civilization, 11: “Institutions are, of course, in some sense the products of
culture. But, because they formalize a set of norms, institutions are often the things that
keep a culture honest, determining how far it is conducive to good behaviour rather than
bad.”
435 See for these claims e. g. Jones, Cultures merging, 212, 259 and 270.
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“to truck, barter and exchange one thing for another”.436 As economic agent he is
supposed to have no family and separate his household from his firm to be able
to be as rational and efficient as possible on an ‘anonymous’ market. Firms, in
this perception, are no more than a collection of individuals who are connected
to each other via formal contracts. Neither does our homo economicus belong in
any consequential sense to a class, social group or nation. If he wants to be
successful he is hardworking, thrifty and innovative. He is disciplined and en-
gaged in non-violent competition via supply and demand, not using any extra-
economic pressure. Very important, of course, is the fact that ever since the so-
called subjective or marginal revolution in economics, the core concept of the
entire discipline of economics, i. e. value, as a rule is defined as something
subjective, that is a matter of value judgements. What matters is what something
is worth to someone, not some ‘intrinsic’ objective value per se. The primum
movens in economics, the reason people want to acquire goods or produce them
in the first place, is outside economics. The much-discussed rationality of the
homo economicus, and of the economist, normally only considers the ordering of
the means, not of the ends. We will not, however, further discuss the implications
of that fact.437
It is already quite intriguing per se that such a broad range of ‘cultural pre-
suppositions’ is so important in a supposedly ‘hard’ social science. It, in practice,
also turns out to be quite problematic. It does not take an awful lot of imagi-
nation or technical economic schooling to think of situations in which one or
more of the character traits mentioned above indeed foster economic growth.
But, and that is the problem, it does not take much imagination either to think of
circumstances in which they don’t. Many of them tend to be regarded as positive
because they are considered good from a moral point of view – somehow we like
people to work hard, to save, to be individualistic, et cetera – and we tend to think
that behaviour of that kind ought to be rewarded. But that does not necessarily
mean that these private, moral virtues would be public, economic virtues too. It,
moreover, is far from obvious how the cultural traits that are supposed to have
set the West on its specific trajectory can be combined into one consistent
storyline.
Again it is fundamental to realise what it is we want to explain here: modern
economic growth. In that growth, the role of innovation is fundamental. Actually
no economist would deny that, but innovation is not a matter of rationality and
calculation, and not an individual affair either. The homo economicus of classical
economics is prudent: calculating how to make the best of what is. In the end he
436 Smith, Inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, 25.
437 For a very brief comment on the marginal or subjective revolution in economics see http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neoclassical_economics#The_Marginal_Revolution.
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is adaptive.438 That certainly may yield some growth, some progress, some
profits, via specialisation and being more efficient in what is known. But it does
not carry sustained and substantial growth. It is not by accident that Adam Smith
did not think in terms of such growth. The actual driving force of capitalism, the
economic system that up until now has been most successful in producing
modern-growth, however, the real entrepreneur, is creative and changes his
environment. That requires a completely different mind-set. Innovation means
risk-taking and uncertainty, not prudence and calculation. It requires creative
people, not bookkeepers. It by definition cannot be rational – apart from the fact
that it can be considered rational in the sense of ‘necessary’ because one oth-
erwise is driven off the market – because the impact of doing something new
cannot be calculated and predicted. The prudent, saving bourgeois is not exactly
the most likely source of the gale of perennial creative destruction that
Schumpeter regards as the essence of capitalism. Ideally, one can insure oneself
to make risk less risky, but one cannot insure oneself against uncertainty, and
innovating is by definition uncertain.439 As he wrote in Capitalism, socialism and
democracy :
Any existing structures and all the conditions of doing business are always in a process
of change. Every situation is being upset before it has had time to work itself out.
Economic progress, in a capitalist society, means turmoil.440
James Watt (1736 – 1819) spent ten years and all his wealth, and became very
heavily indebted, in order to invent the steam engine. It took him two part-
nerships to finally sell his first steam engine. He wrote to a friend: “Of all things
in life there is nothing more foolish than inventing and probably the majority of
inventors have been led to the same opinion by their own experiences”441 Many
inventors and innovators during the first industrial revolution in Britain were
not very successful and did not really profit from their efforts.442 For me this
would be yet another reason to be very reticent when it comes to explaining
438 For the ideas of Adam Smith in this respect see, e. g. the brief comments in Milgate and
Stimson, After Adam Smith, 83 – 84. Smith’s rational homo oeconomicus is supposed to be
calm, calculating, self-conscious and the like: in brief he is prudent. The essence of his
rationality is the systematic adjustment of means to ends.
439 For the ‘irrationality’ of risk taking and especially of acting in a context of uncertainty see
Brenner, History. The human gamble and Goldstone, ‘Cultural orthodoxy, risk, and in-
novation’. For the classic suggestion by the economist Frank Knight (1885 – 1972) that the
word ‘risk’ should only be used to refer to measurable uncertainty with known probabilities
whereas the word ‘uncertainty’ should only be used to refer to non-measurable, qualitative
uncertainty with unknown probabilities, see Knight, Risk, uncertainty, and profit.
440 Schumpeter, Capitalism, socialism and democracy, 31 – 32.
441 See for this quotation http://inventors.about.com/od/wstartinventors/a/james_watt_4.htm
442 See for some striking examples of famous innovators who did not exactly profit from their
work Clark, Farewell to alms, 235 – 237
Part one: Economists and theories of economic growth146
innovations in terms of ‘challenges and responses’. Uncertainty not only con-
fronts the innovator : Every economic agent has to deal with it. Actually the entire
economy is fundamentally unpredictable as it depends on the interplay of in-
terpretations, expectations and actions by so many people and on so many
occurrences, that no one can really know what the outcome will be. Macro-
economics is at best informed guessing. In daily life the concept ‘rational ex-
pectations’ so dear to many economists, means nothing as already shows in the
fact that economists themselves hold so many different ‘rational’ expectations
about the future. The future is unknown and unpredictable. Most economic
decisions as Keynes puts it probably are the result of “animal spirits – of a
spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction.” If, for example, investments
were based on “cold calculation” there would not be much of it. Much of what is
going on in economic life is an effect of the “temptation to take a chance.”443
When it comes to the ‘rationality’ of individuals, it is anything but certain that
this will lead to macro-economic growth. Individuals usually work for personal
net income, however defined, not for gross national product and that is what we
are discussing. Activities that are economically rational from a personal point of
view and increase or even maximise a private person’s income can be socially
inefficient. Smith’s optimistic interpretation of the working of the invisible hand
is over-optimistic, even in the best of all markets. It is very rational and from an
individualistic perspective perfectly rational to be a free rider and not pay for
public goods but widespread free riding can easily lead to situations that hamper
development. Institutional economists have not by accident begun to focus on
the question how co-operation of economic actors can be accomplished where it
might, at least in the short run, often be more rational to be a free rider. In-
dividual competitiveness, mobility and dynamism, all rational, are not always
easy to combine with confidence, trust and stability, which in many contexts are
(regarded as) fundamental ingredients of development.
Besides, all the focusing on rational individuals notwithstanding, the main
players in economic life are not individuals but firms that simply cannot be fully
identified with collectives of individuals connected only via a formal contract.
What does it tell us about economics as a social science that it was not until 1937
that an economist seriously wondered why firms exist?444 Economists may have
‘proven’ that the family firm is inefficient and doomed, but millions of such
firms still exist and many of them are very successful. Capital and labour are
supposed to have no nation, which of course in reality they do. The history of
Western economic development simply cannot be written without ample ref-
443 I took these quotations from Keynes from Schlefer, Assumptions economists make, 150 and
159. See there for the original sources.
444 Coase, ‘Nature of the firm’.
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erence to nations and states. Their mutual competition and emulation was the
very essence of mercantilism but did certainly not disappear when mercantilism
officially was no longer en vogue. In my view – and not only in my view –
competition between states still is one of the main driving forces of economic
development whatever Paul Krugman, who considers the idea nonsense that
states could actually compete economically, might say about it.445 All the talking
about individual rational choice notwithstanding, public debate dealing with
economics tends to be about national or domestic income and product, national
debt, national unemployment and inflation rates, and so on and so forth.
Whereas classical economists tended to think in terms of classes and groups,
neo-classical mainstream economics simply abolished ‘society’ in its analyses
and began to only refer to individuals and firms.
Economic life in reality is very much about collectives. In real life, such
collectives often are in open conflict. Mainstream economics assumes economic
agents to be competitors engaged in free and fair competition on open markets
abstaining from all sorts of extra-economic pressure and violence. That of
course is quite optimistic, if not plainly silly. For the period we are discussing
here it is utterly un-realistic as the recent book by Ronald Findlay and Kevin
O’Rourke on trade, war, and the world economy in the second millennium, that
is not accidentally titled Power and plenty, conclusively shows: “…no history of
international trade can ignore the causes or the implications of military ex-
ploits.”446 The greatest expansions of world trade, so they write, have tended “to
come …from the barrel of a Maxim gun, the edge of a scimitar, or the ferocity of
nomadic horsemen”, adding that “For much of our period the pattern of trade
can only [italics in original] be understood as being the outcome of some
military or political equilibrium between contending powers.”447 Actually, es-
pecially on open seas outside Europe, the role of violence was so fundamental
that the distinction between peaceful, consensual trade and simple piracy was
often very thin if not simply non-existent. Let me again just give a couple of
examples. For ‘the East’ Jan Pieterszoon Coen, one of the founders of Dutch
power in what we nowadays call Indonesia and a person who can be assumed to
have known what he was talking about, claimed “… trade cannot be maintained
without war, nor war without trade”. He wrote these words in 1614 but they
445 I refer to the literature under note 144 and to Max Weber’s quotation on pages 337 – 338. For
Krugman’s claim, that states do not and cannot compete like firms, that competitiveness is a
meaningless word when applied to national economies and that the obsession with com-
petitiveness is both wrong and dangerous, see e. g. his ‘The illusion of conflict in inter-
national trade’, chapter 5 in his Pop internationalism.&
446 Findlay and O’Rourke, Power and plenty, XIX.
447 Findlay and O’Rourke, Power and plenty, XVIII and XIX.
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continued to be valid during the entire early modern period.448 In the Caribbean
things were not really different according to John Elliott: “Trade and piracy were
liable to be synonymous in this lawless Caribbean world of the later seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries.”449 For the Dutch West Indies Company in the
1620s and 1630s, the costs and income from war and privateering far exceeded
those of actual trade.450 To just give another example from a different context:
The total amount of prize money taken by the British at sea during the Napo-
leonic Wars has been estimated at thirty million pounds sterling. That is more
than the yearly national income of the Dutch Republic at the time.451 The dis-
tinction between trade and robbery was often as unclear as that between public
and private as of course perfectly shows in the activities and structure of the
existing chartered companies that traded as well as (in some cases increasingly)
ruled. In various places in their book, Findlay and O’Rourke actually come quite
close to Rapp’s thesis that “… the state, not the individual firm was the relevant
unit of competition in early modern international competition.”452 Again,
context and intensity matter : as we will see, one of the main debates when it
comes to the role of the state in economic development is whether, when, and
how that development and growth were promoted by economic nationalism and
protectionism. Their disadvantages may be obvious, but no one would want to
claim that countries that economically succeeded refrained from them.
In those debates about the role of state and nation in economic development,
the thesis that cultural-ethnic homogeneity would be better for economic de-
velopment than cultural-ethnic diversity because such diversity can easily lead
to divisions, tensions and misunderstandings that increase transactions costs
has emerged. That sounds quite convincing and would mean that culture does
matter.453 So too, however, does Amy Chua’s thesis that may not be claiming the
exact opposite but does start from quite differing assumptions. According to her,
each of the hyper-powers in world history (defined as those “remarkably few
societies … that amassed such extraordinary military and economic might that
they essentially dominated the world.”) was “… at least by the standards of its
time, extraordinarily pluralistic and tolerant.” Each of them, so she claims “…
448 I found this quotation, which pops up in almost every publication on the topic, in Parker,
Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare in the introduction on page 9.
449 Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic world, 224.
450 See for figures Brandon, Masters of War, table 2.5 page 110.
451 Allen, Institutional revolution, 121.
452 Rapp, ‘Unmaking of the Mediterranean trade hegemony’, 515.
453 For an overview of a huge amount of literature, see Alesina, with Eliana La Ferrara, ‘Ethnic
diversity and economic performance’. Douglass North e. g. is quite convinced of the ad-
vantages of cultural homogeneity in the sense of shared beliefs. See the references to beliefs
and belief formation in North, Wallis and Weingast, Violence and social orders. The po-
tential disadvantages of such uniformity apparently are considered less relevant.
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succeeded by harnessing the skills and energies of individuals from very dif-
ferent backgrounds, and by attracting and exploiting highly talented groups that
were excluded in other societies”.454 The father of modern world history William
McNeill agrees and claims that: “… the principal factor promoting historically
significant social change is contact with strangers possessing new and un-
familiar skills”.455 So would, in principle, proponents of new growth theory who
focus on the role of knowledge and information in societal development and
emphasize the advantages in this respect of ‘open’ societies over ‘closed’ ones.
The broad historical overviews of Matt Ridley and Robert Wright and that of
Leonard Dudley, who focuses on Britain, France and the United States, bear clear
testimony to that.456 But – and that is the point I want to make here – collectives
whether based on kinship, interests, identities or a combination of them and
force and violence clearly matter in economic life and they can do so in quite
different ways and to quite differing effects.
The connection between working hard and getting rich that one comes across
so often in cultural explanations of differences in wealth looks so self-evident
that it usually is not even put up for debate. It should, however. One might think
of situations where working hard can delay mechanisation and economic in-
novation. It can become irrational, as Weber already knew. It is not very rational,
economically speaking, for people who have accumulated more than they can
ever spend, to continue working or for (would be) inventors and entrepreneurs
to keep on working without any assurance that their efforts will pay. But more
importantly ; can differences in ‘working hard’ – if for simplicity’s sake we
assume that it can be determined what working hard actually means and be
measured in such a way that a ranking of industriousness would be possible –
really explain differences in wealth between countries with modern economic
growth and countries without such growth? At the moment Austrians per capita
are some twenty-five times as wealthy as the inhabitants of Kenya.457 I guess no
one would want to impute that entire difference to differences in industrious-
ness. But then how important are they? Few if any people worldwide could claim
to work as hard as rural African women. It has not exactly made them rich.458
When hard work is praised, references to thrift as a rule follow suit. It seems
quite obvious that thrift is good for growth. But is it really? What we praise as
454 See, for these quotations, page XXI and the flap-text of Chua, Day of empire. For a more
extensive definition of the concept of hyperpower, see pages XXI – XXII.
455 William McNeill, Rise of the West, XVI.
456 See Ridley, Rational optimist ; Wright, Nonzero, e. g. 163 – 167 and Dudley, Mothers of in-
novation.
457 The Economist. Pocket World in Figures 2013 Edition, 116 and 172.
458 I found this claim in Mills, Why Africa is poor, 11.
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thrift today we may deplore as under-consumption tomorrow. And can one
really save oneself into modern economic growth? The answer must be no.
As I hope to have shown in my critical comments in the previous paragraphs,
the role of culture simply must be very important for economic growth, however
much mainstream economists have tended to ignore, simplify or misrepresent it.
How could it be otherwise? The economy is about making choices and those
choices in the end are always influenced by one’s interpretations and values. My
position would be that those interpretations and values have their major and
structural effect when they actually ‘solidify’ in institutions with their enabling
and enforcing mechanisms. As long as they are only in the realm of ideas they
definitely still have an impact, but that impact will be less and in any case less
easy to ‘measure’. But even if problems of measurement and operationalisation
would be much less daunting, that still would not lead to a generally accepted and
convincing theory about relations between culture and modern economic
growth. Even if one could imagine many of the traits referred to above as good
for (some) growth, what about modern economic growth with its enormous
scale, scope and permanence and its relatively sudden emergence and what
about the fact that cultures normally show a combination of the various traits
referred to earlier on?
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Part two: Actual explanations of the Great Divergence
1. The Great Divergence and geography
Amongst global historians and all those writing about the Great Divergence,
references to geography in the widest sense of the word not only are extremely
popular, which would surprise most economists, they also set quite different
accents than economists would.459 Not surprisingly, there is a lot of negative
‘Malthusian’ reasoning in which poverty in particular in the pre-industrial world
is blamed on limited resources. According to this perspective, which has always
been extremely influential amongst historians who study the pre-industrial
world, ‘geography’ primarily refers to constraints. In his highly influential
trilogy on the global history of material civilization and capitalism in the early
modern era, Fernand Braudel brilliantly illustrated “the limits of the possible”
that determine what he calls “the structures of everyday life”.460 The emphasis in
his oeuvre usually lay on the constraints to which human agency was subjected
and he has, correctly, mainly become known to hold views that come close to
geographical determinism. At times, though, he also pointed at ways in which
nature enabled agency. To some extent, so he claimed, Europe’s dynamism can be
traced back to its geography. Europeans in a sense were almost forced to go out to
the sea if they wanted to develop their economies. According to him, they turned
this necessity into a challenge to which they responded very successfully : Europe’s
global dominance began at sea.461 In that respect too, Immanuel Wallerstein fol-
lowed in the footsteps of France’s most influential historian and gave Europe’s
expansion a specific geographical twist. Let me just give a couple of quotes:
“Europe needed to expand geographically more than did China.”462 Portugal,
459 For this popularity, see Bentley, ‘Web browsing’.
460 Braudel, Civilization and capitalism, 15th-18th century, I.
461 Braudel, History of Civilizations ; idem in: Braudel, L’Europe.
462 Wallerstein, Modern world-system. Capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European
world-economy in the sixteenth century, 63. From now on referred to as Modern world-
system I.
Europe’s first intercontinental overseas coloniser, according to him had to ex-
pand overseas as it “… because of its geography, had no choice.”463 He also
provides a more concrete reason: “Europe’s ‘internal Americas’ in the fifteenth
century were quickly exhausted, given an agronomy that depended on more
space.”464
The claim that Western Europe in one way or another was blessed by nature
was pushed more emphatically by Eric Jones in his book on the European
miracle, originally published in 1981, that not by accident referred to environ-
ment in its subtitle and had a major impact on ensuing debates.465 Jones de-
scribed Europe as a continent with a dispersed resource portfolio that was very
varied geologically, geographically, and in terms of climate. He then claims:
“Fruitful political variety, capital accumulation, and trade all seem partly ex-
plicable as adjustments to Europe’s particular site and endowments.”466 It had a
good location from which it was relatively easy to discover and exploit the New
World with its huge ‘ghost acreage’.467 Disasters hit capital relatively less hard
than people, which gave the continent a bias in favour of capital accumulation
already before industrialization. The fact that Europe was never absorbed in one
empire, a characteristic that is referred to in almost every text on the rise of the
West as a major explanation, according to Jones also, at least partly, was due to
geography. Its larger core areas were, as he calls it, ‘much of a muchness’ and the
occupants of any one of them found it hard to dominate the others. On top of
that, distance offered some protection against Asian invasions, as did the for-
ested landscape unsuited to cavalry warfare.468 On page 226 of the book it reads:
The topographical structure of the continent, its mountain chains, coast and major
marshes, formed boundaries at which states expanding from the core-areas could meet
and pause. These natural barriers helped to hold the ring between the varied ethnic and
linguistic groups making up the European peoples. They helped to define the nation-
states which filled up the matrix so formed and because they were expensive to cross
they helped a little in reducing conflict between neighbouring states.
Another point that Jones wants to bring home is that “What happened to dis-
tinguish Europe was the swollen emergence of bulk trade over quite long dis-
tances, multilaterally, in everyday commodities, and not simply in the luxuries
463 Wallerstein, Modern world-system I, 47.
464 Wallerstein, Modern world-system I, 57. This suggests a quite peculiar interpretation of the
history of Western Europe’s population. The fifteenth century was not exactly a period
when Western Europe was suffering from ‘over-population’.
465 Jones, European Miracle. There exist various editions. I quote from the second edition,
Cambridge 1987.
466 Jones, European Miracle, 226.
467 For that term see 290 – 298.
468 Jones, European Miracle, XXV and XXVII.
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that had always dominated long-distance trade.”469 Britain as an island in this
context was particularly fortunate. It was even more protected against diseases
and enemies. It was amply provided with water for agriculture and waterpower,
and for domestic and overseas transport. Its location, moreover, was favourable
as to other continents in particular the New World. Whereas it was relatively
close to the enormous ghost acreages of that New World, it was quite a long
journey from the Central Asian steppes with its conquering nomads.
Probably the most influential example of a global economic analysis in which
geography holds the key is the book by Jared Diamond, Guns, germs and steel.
Diamond is quite explicit : “History followed different courses for different
peoples because of differences among peoples’ environments, not because of
biological differences among peoples themselves.”470 The book overwhelmingly
– a fact that many people tend to overlook – is about Eurasia versus ‘the Rest’.
The contrast between Western Europe and China that up until now is at the core
of the Great Divergence-debate actually is only discussed on some five pages.
Diamond focuses on refuting the assumption that Eurasian hegemony is due to
any form of Eurasian intellectual, moral or inherent genetic superiority and
argues that the gaps in power and technology between human societies originate
in environmental differences. When cultural or genetic differences have fav-
oured Eurasians (for example, written language or the development among
Eurasians of resistance to endemic diseases), he asserts that these advantages
occurred because of the influence of geography on societies and cultures, and
were not inherent in the Eurasian genome.471 Specifically for Europe, he, like
Jones, thinks that its geography favoured balkanization into smaller, closer,
nation-states, as its many natural barriers (mountains and rivers) provide de-
fensible borders. As a result, governments that suppressed economic and
technological progress soon corrected their mistakes or were out-competed
relatively quickly.472 The advantages that Eurasians had in development were
primarily due to a fortuitous mixture of climate, crops, and animals. They had a
favourable environmental endowment and location in which geography
trumped culture.
Ian Morris may not yet be as famous as Jared Diamond, but he, if possible, is
469 Jones, European Miracle, XIV. This fact too, so he suggests, was connected to its specific
geographical diversity.
470 Diamond, Guns, germs and steel, 25.
471 I refer the reader to the excellent synthesis and analysis of the book by McNeill, ‘The world
according to Jared Diamond’, The History Teacher 34, 2 (2001) 21 pars. 7 Aug. 2011<http://
www.historycooperative.org/journals/ht/34.2/mcneill.html>. My words paraphrase his
text.
472 Diamond, Guns, germs and steel, ‘Epilogue’.
The Great Divergence and geography 155
even more outspoken when it comes to the role of geography in answering the
question why the West rules. He summarizes his findings as follows:
The West rules because of geography. Biology tells us why humans push social de-
velopment upward; sociology tells us how they do this (except when they don’t); and
geography tells us why the West, rather than some other region, has for the last two
hundred years dominated the globe. Biology and sociology provide universal laws,
applying to all humans in all times and places; geography explains differences.473
This boils down to the thesis that, in his words, “maps” make history and not
“chaps”. Let me again give some quotations. In a paragraph in the introduction,
entitled: “Location, location, location”, it reads: “Once we recognize that chaps
… are all much the same … all that is left is maps.”474 In his view “latitudes”
explain history and not “attitudes.”475
Robert Marks summarizes his explanation of Britain’s industrialisation in
terms of the ‘contingent’ availability for Britain of colonies and coal.476 Basically
what Marks presents in his book on the origins of the modern world is a (over-
simplified) synthesis of Pomeranz’s Great Divergence. But although the author of
that book argues with more sophistication than Marks suggests, he too likes to
refer to “fortunate location of coal”, “geographic good luck”, “fortunate geo-
graphic accidents”, “crucial accidents of geography” and “massive windfalls of
fuel, fibre and perhaps even food” and does attach great importance to them.477
Deepak Lal is much more nuanced than Diamond and Morris but he too claims
that geographical endowments built the foundation for the rise of the West. In
his view, Western material culture had its basis in relative factor endowments
and its institutional set-up was “ecologically determined.” Like Jones, he claims
that because of ecological constraints, European states could not be as predatory
as the imperial states of Eurasia.478
I could refer to several other examples. Michael Mann in the first volume of
his books on the sources of social power – that primarily deals with the sources of
Europe’s unique dynamism – also accords a big role to ecology, at times in ways
quite similar to Jones. He describes the modern West as heir to a civilization that
473 Morris, Why the West rules, 557. See also, for example, page 30.
474 Morris, Why the West rules, 29. See also pages 331, 427 and 430.
475 Morris, ‘Latitudes not attitudes’, also on http://www.historytoday.com/ian-morris/lati
tudes-not-attitudes-how-geography-explains-history
476 Marks, Origins of the modern world, 118, where he writes “…British manufacturers and
inventors rose to the challenges they faced, especially with regard to coal mining and the
development of the steam engine. But there is no reason to think that the Chinese or Indians
(or other people with advanced old regime economies, like the Japanese, for instance)
would not also have been able to solve those problems in similar ways. They simply didn’t
have colonies or coal.”
477 Pomeranz, Great Divergence, flap text, pages 12, 16, 68 and 241.
478 Lal, Unintended consequences, 70 – 71 and 79.
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was “geopolitically multi-centred, cosmopolitan and non-hegemonic”. It had
“three ecological roots: irrigated river valleys and confined plowlands, the core
of the land empires of the Near East; more open, extended plowlands in Europe;
and the inland seas that connected them. The juxtaposition of such ecologies was
unique in the world; therefore, in world-historical terms, so was the civilization
to which it gave rise.”479 Its population density was less than in the Far East
because its agriculture was less productive. It had rain-watered agriculture, not
one based on irrigation. It therefore, according to Mann, gave rise to less cen-
tralised, despotic states, more autonomous but cooperating individual peasant-
households and a very energy-intensive mode of production. All this strength-
ened local and medium-distance trade in ordinary goods.480
In books by David Cosandey and Hubert Kiesewetter, geography, too, plays a
pivotal role in explaining Western Europe’s peculiar path.481 David Landes fo-
cuses on culture, but his magnum opus also contains a chapter on geography, in
particular dealing with the negative effects of bad geography.482 Bairoch in his
economic and social history of the world from the sixteenth century onwards
points at the fact that the agricultural revolution that took place in the West could
not easily be transferred to much of ‘the Rest’ and claims that factors like climate,
soil type and population density go a long way in explaining that fact.483 We
already pointed out the huge implications of the dependency on nature as
Douglas Allen highlights them in his book on the institutional revolution. But at
least overall that dependency and the ensuing variance and unpredictability
were facts of life for all those living before the Industrial Revolution. It might, of
course, be the case that some were hit harder than others, as is often suggested.
But I have never come across an analysis in which that was actually and con-
vincingly shown.
It is quite obvious that nature can make a difference. Who would deny that, for
example, location (or for that matter climate, soil and so on) is important and
can have negative but also quite positive effects? We already referred to Jones,
Diamond and Morris who all make claims in this respect and will later on briefly
discuss Pomeranz’s comments on the different location of British and Chinese
coalfields. Before the existence of modern means of transportation in particular,
landlocked countries indeed had a real disadvantage, although that has not
prevented landlocked Switzerland and Austria to in the end become quite
wealthy. South America was further from Europe than the Northern half of the
New World, which certainly had effects on its development. Just like the fact that
479 Mann, Sources of social power, I, 189.
480 Mann, Sources of social power, I, pages 184 – 189 and 399 – 409.
481 See Cosandey, Le secret de l’Occident and Kiesewetter, Das einzigartige Europa.
482 Landes, Wealth and poverty of nations, chapters 1 and 2.
483 Bairoch, Victoires et d¦boires, II, 648 – 661.
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it was internally less well connected via rivers and canals than, for example,
Western Europe was. Roman Studer has convincingly shown the importance of
geography as an explanation for differences in market integration between parts
of Europe and the advantages of Europe’s low lands in this respect as compared
to parts of the continent with fewer waterways and more relief.484 High trans-
portation costs in Africa, worsened by low population density, had an impact on
economic potential. Something as prosaic as the direction of winds could have
major effects. This is what Felipe Fernndez-Armesto writes about the Indian
Ocean: “The frustration of the Indian Ocean and the fulfilment of global am-
bitions in the Atlantic have to be explained in part with reference to the in-
escapable facts of geographical determinism: the tyranny of the winds.”485 Ob-
viously natural endowment in terms of the fertility of land, the availability of
certain natural resources, flora, fauna, diseases and changes in them mattered. In
regard to these changes, there is the enormous global impact of the ‘Columbian
Exchange’ and of ‘European ecological imperialism.’486
Very important factors that to a certain extent can be regarded as geo-
graphical and that in my view have not been sufficiently taken on board in the
Great-Divergence debate are size and population density in connection to ad-
ministrative unities or polities and their implications for effective rule. Let me
only point at one quite recent and very interesting effort to figure out its possible
implications: the book by David Stasavage, States of credit. Size, power and the
development of European polities. In this book Stasavage, to quote from the flap
text “…shows that active representative assemblies were more likely to be
sustained in geographically small polities. These assemblies dominated by
mercantile groups that lent to governments, were in turn more likely to preserve
access to credit.”487 That, in turn, to pursue the line of reasoning further than
Stasavage does, at least explicitly, made those states stronger in terms of infra-
structural power.488 States that are infrastructurally weak in my view, will never
be able to industrialise and experience modern economic growth. In the pre-
industrial world, effective and efficient rule, whether it was tried via bureauc-
racy, patronage or the selling of offices, in the end was only possible when an
effective and efficient system of monitoring could be put in place. That, at the
484 Studer, Does trade explain Europe’s rise? http://www2.lse.ac.uk/economicHistory/pdf/
WP129.pdf.
485 Fernndez-Armesto, Civilizations, 483.
486 See Crosby, Columbian exchange ; idem, Ecological imperialism; Nunn and Qian, ‘Co-
lumbian Exchange’ and iidem, ‘Potato’s contribution to population and urbanization’;
Mann, 1491, and idem, 1493. For the role of disease in economic development see, as an
introduction, McGuire and Coelho, Parasites, pathogens and progress.
487 Stasavage, States of credit. This comment is on the inner flap of the book.
488 For that concept see pages 378 – 379.
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time, was only possible over a certain area given the limitations of transport and
communication. Britain, which also happened to be an island with very good
internal communications, a set of circumstances it used very effectively, here had
a huge advantage over China.489 I would consider the disadvantage with respect
to China as compared to Britain as of fundamental importance in any ex-
planation of why China did not industrialise. More generally, it cannot be purely
accidental that in the nineteenth century as a rule it was not small city-states or
huge empires that modernised their economies most successfully, but medium-
sized, territorial nation-states. Those apparently had an optimal size to ration-
alise and modernise their economies and state-apparatuses.
In my view, giving a central role to geography in explaining the Great Di-
vergence by claiming it ‘favoured’ the West is not very helpful and in the end
rather misleading. Not because I would principally want to deny that some
things in history are more important than others. I consider as exaggerated the
following claim by Felipe Fernndez-Armesto in a book in which he presents a
comparative history of civilizations “arranged environment by environment”:
“… I am not aware of any evidence that any of the human experience we lump
together under the heading of ‘history’ is determined by anything.”490 My cri-
tique is twofold: part of it is fundamental and concerns the general relevance of
geography to the question at hand; part of it is specific and concerns certain
concrete geographical explanations. Let me start with some comments on spe-
cific explanations and begin with Jones’s claims. Studying the maps of Europe
and China and judging by my extended travelling in both parts of the world, I am
not convinced that Europe’s geography would indeed encourage and support
greater fragmentation than China’s. Without the Grand Canal, for example, the
digging and maintaining of which cost an enormous amount of effort, the
connection between Southern and Northern China would have been quite ten-
uous. In my view, one could come up with many more examples that China
actually was only loosely integrated by nature.491 The claim that Europe’s trade in
bulky goods was unique also is hard to defend in any case in regard to quantities.
Long-distance grain trade in eighteenth-century China dwarfed that over the
489 See e. g. Guldi, Roads to power. For a very interesting text connecting much of the wea-
knesses and problems of the state in Qing China to its size that made it all but impossible to
really monitor officials, see Tuan-Hwee Sng, ‘Size and dynastic decline. The principal-agent
problem in late imperial China, 1700 – 1850’, http://apebhconference.files.wordpress.com/
2009/08/sng.pdf, November 10, 2010.
490 Fernndez-Armesto, Civilizations, VIII and XI. Compare his comments on page 158.
491 See, for example, also McNeill, ‘China’s environmental history in world perspective’, 35:
“…China was probably the most ecologically diverse polity in the history of the world
before Britain assembled its far-flung overseas empire … it remained for more than eleven
centuries (from about A.D. 650 to 1800, PV) the state with the greatest ecological com-
plementarity.”
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Baltic, the biggest example of such trade in Europe.492 When it comes to the
variety of ordinary goods that were traded, my hunch is that Jones is correct.
There are also good reasons to doubt whether diversity and the fact that there
were so many core areas actually was favourable to Europe’s growth. It in any
case is far from obvious. Jones’s comments on potentially positive peculiarities
of Europe’s climate are too vague to be really put to the test and looking at
agricultural yields in regions with other climates, for example Central and
Southern China, does not exactly suggest Europe had an advantage here. His
comments on disasters that in Europe would have the specific effect of making
labour more expensive which would advance innovation and along with it
growth seem fairly farfetched, the more so as wages in Europe varied strongly
according to time and place, and he does not come up with clear significant
relations between disasters, labour supply and innovation.
Jared Diamond’s comments on the geographical differences between Eurasia
and other parts of the world certainly are very relevant and may indeed go a long
way in explaining their differing development, but when it comes to explaining
the Great Divergence, they are irrelevant. The characteristics of Eurasia in its
entirety of course cannot explain why modern economic growth would emerge
in a specific part of it.493 The book tells us next to nothing about why Western
Europe grew rich and China or India didn’t. He simply repeats the often heard
argument that Europe was privileged because it had more and better access to
water transport and because it – thanks to its geography – consisted of a large
number of competing entities, but that cannot ‘geographically’ explain sustained
growth. I have already extensively published my critique on Morris elsewhere.494
So there is no use to repeat myself here. The ideas of Pomeranz will be dealt with
quite extensively at various occasions in this book. For critique on Mann’s
geographical approach, I can for example refer to an analysis by James Blaut.495
It would not be very useful, and it is in any case is not my intention, to deal
here with each and every claim and each and every comment. I want to focus on
the one fundamental critique that applies to all geographical explanations of
growth, in particular modern growth. What we want to explain in our analysis is
not just some growth and some difference in wealth but (the emergence of)
modern economic growth, i. e. substantial growth over consecutive decades and
(the emergence of) an enormous gap between those whose economies grow and
those whose economies do not. Considering this specific explanandum, which is
492 See for some examples Pomeranz, Great Divergence, 34 – 35. For comments on European
and Chinese market integration see Shiue and Keller, ‘Markets in China and Europe’.
493 Comments can be found, for example, in Blaut, Eight Eurocentric historians, chapter 8, and
in Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail, chapter 2.
494 See Journal of Global History 7, 1 (2012) 143 – 147.
495 Blaut, Eight Eurocentric historians, chapter 6.
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characterised by continuous change and continuous increases in production and
productivity, we simply cannot not expect very much from references to geo-
graphical conditions that by definition are rather static. Their direct relevance in
explaining the Great Divergence, a relatively sudden and quick process, is
anything but obvious. One may well doubt whether one can explain a temporary
phenomenon, such as the economic primacy of Western Europe during certain
centuries (or of China in earlier ones) by referring to virtually permanent
conditions, such as the topography of Europe and China. The following quotes
by none other than Eric Jones indicate why references to geography can certainly
be useful in explaining (modern) economic growth as long as one realizes their
limitations: “…resource endowment is not very helpful in explaining change.
Resources are a function of the available technology and have no economic
meaning until a technology has been invented to employ them.”496 According to
Jones, “By itself geography explains nothing. … Yet geography may not be
altogether dismissed. The layout of the world does affect the relative costs of
economic activity under any one technology.”497 He defines the role of envi-
ronmental factors as “to sketch out least-cost paths of human action Ceteris
paribus we should expect them to have been followed.”498 He then for the case of
Europe adds: “An environment of relatively cheap capital may well have influ-
enced the rate of innovation.”499 One must, moreover, realise that even if all the
geographical conditions referred to had played an important role in the eco-
nomic history of Western Europe and provided certain benefits and advantages,
they apparently up until the eighteenth century did not create a significant gap in
wealth, growth and development between (Western) Europe and the most ad-
vanced other economies of the world. So one may well ask why they would do so
from then onwards. In that respect, it is not very helpful that most references to
geography, just like those to ‘culture’ are so broad and under-specified. A nice
example of how to try to make connections that are more concrete and direct
would be Terje Tvedt’s systematic comparative analysis of water systems in
Britain, China and India, in which he analyses how differences in those systems
might in concrete terms explain that Britain industrialized and China and India
did not.500
496 Jones, European Miracle, XXVI. Referring to Pomeranz’s work and his explanation of
Britain’s take-off via coal and colonies, he writes in his Cultures merging on pages 115 – 116:
“Resources do not guarantee their own development.” One has to deal with them “pro-
ductively and accumulatively.”
497 Jones, European Miracle, XXVII.
498 Jones, European Miracle, 228.
499 Jones, European Miracle, 228.
500 Tvedt, ‘Why England and not China and India?’.
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2. Geography, factor endowments and institutions
My previous comments, of course, do not exclude the possibility that natural
conditions set societies on a certain path, or as Jones put it, sketch out least-cost
paths of human action, which then do or do not lead to economic development
and growth. That means one might look at geography as setting limits and
providing challenges. To argue in terms of geographical challenges or possi-
bilities and ensuing responses has become quite popular, particularly with
scholars who discuss the connection between geography and institutions.
Probably the connection that is most frequently assumed in global economic
history is the one that leads from geography to ‘dispersion’ to (political) com-
petition and from there to wealth. Despite its popularity, this argumentation is
not very convincing. Apart from the fact that it is not at all evident that geog-
raphy indeed led to political fragmentation, the connection between competi-
tion amongst polities and economic growth that one comes across in almost all
publications on the rise of the West is far less clear and unequivocal than is
usually assumed. Even when it comes to determining the exact advantages of
competition – and the best type of competition – between economic actors,
economists are not exactly of one mind. When it comes to the quite different
logic and structure of competition between political actors, opinions are even
more divided. My hunch would be that most economists at least are rather
negative about the economic impact of the way in which polities in Europe – and
elsewhere – competed with each other before the Great Divergence. In Europe,
that competition normally was played out according to mercantilist rules and
amongst the majority of economists mercantilism still has a very bad name. We
will return to that topic later on in this text.
Let us elaborate some more on the challenge-response line of reasoning. Jared
Diamond, to whom we have already repeatedly referred, claims: “All human
societies contain inventive people. It’s just that some environments provide
more starting materials, and more favourable conditions for utilizing in-
ventions, than do other environments.”501 Morris’s perspective is quite similar.
He departs from what he calls ‘the Morris theorem’. That reads: “Change is
caused by lazy, greedy, frightened people looking for easier, more profitable, and
safer ways to do things”502 and thinks geography sets the stage for human activity
providing people with challenges, to which they (have to) respond. This
‘adaptive’ view transpires in his favourite quote: “Each age gets the thought it
501 Diamond, Guns, germs and steel, 408.
502 Morris, Why the West rules, 28. Strikingly enough, this mega-generalization is presented
without any empirical underpinning or reference to empirical studies by others.
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needs.”503 If other people would have been located and challenged like the in-
habitants of Western Europe, they would have developed and thought like
them.504 For him history is a “single grand and relentless process of adaptations
to the world that always generate new problems that call for further adapta-
tions”.505 Geography functions as the necessity that is to become the mother of
invention. Confronted with similar situations, people will respond in similar
ways. He comes up with an explanation of the Great Divergence of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries  la Pomeranz, claiming that it resides in the Atlantic
economy and its ghost acreage in combination with coal and steam, and then
quite consistently claims that if Asia had had an Atlantic economy and coal, it
would also have had an industrial revolution.506 That Western Europe became the
centre of the Atlantic economy, again, at least according to Morris, is due to
geography. It was simply a matter of location: it was relatively easy for Europeans
to discover and exploit America.507 He does acknowledge the importance of
science and technology in economic development but interprets their devel-
opment in the West too as a simple consequence of the ways in which Western
scholars were challenged to tackle particular problems, in particular practical
concerns raised by the emergence of the Atlantic economy. In his view that
economy generated “new challenges, stimulating the whole package of scientific
thought, mechanical tinkering, and cheap power”.508 Prasannan Parthasarathi
also thinks in terms of challenges and responses. According to him, India, to only
focus on the Asian country that is central to his analysis, did not industrialise
because it was not challenged as Britain was by foreign competition as textiles
producer nor, what is relevant here in our discussion of geography, by scarcity of
wood. Let me just give two quotations: “Europe followed an exceptional path
because it faced a set of pressures which were absent in India and only partly
found in China. Therefore, India and China had no need to forge the economic
and technological responses that emerged in Europe”;509 and “What was ex-
ceptional about Europe was not its economic and political institutions or cul-
tural makeup but the pressures that it faced, which were different from those in
India and China.”510 In industrialising Britain, solutions were concocted for
503 See e. g. Morris, Why the West rules, 423, 476, 481, 506 and 568.
504 Morris, Why the West rules, 565 and 500.
505 Morris, Why the West rules, 560.
506 Morris, Why the West rules, 502 and 573.
507 Morris, Why the West rules, e. g. 421. See for a similar line of reasoning Blaut, Colonizer’s
model of the world, 181: “If the Western Hemisphere had been more accessible, say, to South
Indian centers than to European centers, then very likely India would have become the
home of capitalism, the site of the bourgeois revolution, and the ruler of the world.”
508 The quotation is from Morris, Why the West rules, 502. See further ibidem, 500 and 570.
509 Parthasarathi, Why Europe grew rich, 10.
510 Parthasarathi, Why Europe grew rich, 12.
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problems that simply did not exist in India and to a much lesser extent in China.
Let me just give one final example, a quotation by Wallerstein referring to the
invention of the steam engine in Britain: “A new technology was needed that
would change a high-cost industry [iron making that was expensive because of
an existing lack of wood according to Wallerstein] into a low-cost one. The
efficient use of coal, along with the steam engine to convert the energy, was the
solution.” This is just about all he has to say about innovation.511
To be honest, I am quite surprised at the extremely straightforward way in
which these renowned scholars – and others – jump from challenges to re-
sponses. Morris’s claims about geography’s challenging role in explaining the
Great Divergence are far too mechanistic. When it comes to Europe’s advantage
in terms of location – as highlighted by him – one can only be brief. Leaving aside
the question whether, as he suggests, ‘the Americas’ explain Western Europe’s
take-off: is not Western Africa even closer to the Americas? To pretend like he
does, for example, that maintaining and exploiting the Atlantic economy would
have provided Europe with the fundamental challenges for science and tech-
nology is very far-fetched and as a general statement simply untenable. The
often-repeated claim that every time gets the thought it deserves, sounds hollow
and quite meaningless upon closer inspection.
The thesis that the exploration and exploitation of the Atlantic would have
been a challenge, as Morris implies – apart of course from the fact that as he
himself indicates, Columbus never meant to discover America and never knew
he did – is rather exaggerated and in any case one-sided. Adam Smith already
wrote: “The establishment of the European colonies in America and the West
Indies came from no necessity.”512 This line of reasoning would, moreover, at
least suggest that for a country like China, challenges to explore and colonize
would have been lacking. That thesis has for example been defended in many
stories about the ending of Zheng He’s voyages in fifteenth century (1368 – 1644).
China would simply lack economic reasons for exploring the world. This would
also apply to Qing China. Did not the Qianlong Emperor in his famous letter to
George III King of England in 1793 write the following?
As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects
strange or ingenious, and have no use for your country’s manufactures. … our Celestial
Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its own
borders. There was therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians
in exchange for our own produce.513
511 Wallerstein, Modern World-System III, 26.
512 Smith, Inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, II, page 558.
513 http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/core9/phalsall/texts/qianlong.html Emperor Qian-
long: Letter to George III, 1793. One can easily find many other similar quotations.
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That emperor may have fought many wars, like his father and grandfather, but
those in the end were only to secure borders, not to extract resources from
colonies. Very recently, Pomeranz again and succinctly made this point: “…
there was no mercantilist colonialism there (i. e. in Qing China PV) … because
such activities quite reasonably did not seem worth it.”514 Actually there were
more than enough good reasons for the Qing rulers in the very long eighteenth
century to more intensely exploit China’s peripheral regions such as the border
regions in the Southwest, Tibet, Xinjiang, Mongolia, or Manchuria. No pre-
industrial society was so wealthy that its rulers could really afford to be com-
placent and not try and increase available resources. China’s rulers were not
‘colonialists’ like their counterparts in Western Europe for a mixture of reasons:
lack of strength or resources, lack of motivation, and, at times, because they
explicitly did not want to, as can be seen in the particular case of Manchuria. That
region, about twice the size of France, could have provided far larger amounts of
bean cake, grains, and wood than it did and also huge amounts of coal, and it
could have accepted far more immigrants. All that would have been good for
China’s economy. The country’s rulers simply were not interested and had other
priorities.515 Their country, from the last decades of the eighteenth century on-
wards, was not exactly lacking challenges of all sorts but hardly any of them
received an adequate response.516 As general statements, claims about challenges
and responses do not explain anything at all.
Geography, moreover, and therefore its challenges and possible responses, in
many respects does not need to be stable. I already referred to the Columbian
Exchange and to Western ecological imperialism. But there are other relevant
examples. Britain in the High Middle Ages was an outlier : the heart of Europe’s
economy was still in the Mediterranean that, however, with the ‘rise of the
Atlantic’ became much more peripheral. With the ‘opening’ of China, its coastal
regions became more important, whereas several core regions of the country
turned into hinterlands.517 Politics of course can also determine geography.
Peking and Madrid, for example, were capitals and therefore economically very
important although, geographically speaking, their location was anything but
ideal. But the rulers of China and Spain simply wanted it that way. What is more,
neither ‘challenges’ nor ‘responses’ – geographical or otherwise – are actually
‘objective facts’. Problems, to a large extent, are in the eye of the beholder. Up
until the 1830s, for example, the Chinese basically ignored the presence of the
British at their doorstep. They did not see a problem. When it comes to solutions,
514 Pomeranz, ‘Ten years after’, 20.
515 Yong Xue, ‘A “fertiliser revolution”?
516 See for an overview Rowe, China’s last empire.
517 Pomeranz, Making of a hinterland.
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these are not ‘objective’, unequivocal either, with each problem having ‘its’
solution. In the eighteenth century, the increasing scarcity of wood was dealt
with differently in China, Japan and Britain. Such scarcity itself, moreover, is
never simply a matter of geography. It depends on supply and demand. In
Britain, e. g. it to a large extent was a consequence of huge demand by the navy
and the iron industry.518 In brief, geography, the assumed ‘ultimate explanation’,
is not itself a hard ‘fact’.
Let us expand a little on ‘the challenge’ of wood scarcity and ‘the response’ of
coal that figures so prominently in the analyses of Pomeranz and Parthasarathi,
among others, and that holds centre stage in so many debates on the Great
Divergence. Like Britain, China faced wood shortages. But hardly anything was
done to substantially increase coal production, either by private entrepreneurs
or by government. Pomeranz’s Great Divergence argues that the biggest coal
deposits in China lay in the Northwest, too far away from the fuel users in the
economic heart of the country.519 Several scholars rightly claim that the problems
involved in transporting coal from there to places where it was neeeded could
have been solved. The weakness of the Chinese state and the fact that it had other
priorities are important reasons why they weren’t.520 Moreover, even if the
Northwestern province of Shanxi had been the only place with large known coal
fields, this province happened to be home to the famous Shanxi bankers and for
many decades into the nineteenth century actually was a fairly wealthy and
capital-rich region, not a backwater, as Pomeranz wants to suggest. As a matter
of fact there was coal, and there were coal mines in several other parts of the
country.521 It apparently has been claimed that “…coal had been much more
used than wood as energy resource by the Chinese since the end of the Ming
Dynasty”.522 To make things even worse for the Californian position, Loren
518 For demand by the Navy, see Patrick Melby, ‘Insatiable shipyards: The impact of the Royal
Navy on the world’s forests, 1200 – 1850’, http://www.wou.edu/las/socsci/history/Se-
nior%20Seminar%20Thesis%20Papers%20HST%20499/2012/Melby,%20Patrick.pdf
519 Pomeranz, Great Divergence, 64 – 67.
520 See e. g. Li Bozhong, Development of agriculture and industry in Jiangnan, 59 and Perdue,
China marches West, 539 – 542.
521 See for some examples Parthasarathi, Why Europe grew rich, in the Index under ‘Coal, in
China’ and for a contemporaneous comment Abel, Narrative of a journey in the interior of
China, 194: “The missionaries inform us that coal mines are so abundant in every province
of China that there is, perhaps, no country in the world in which they are so common.” Abel
refers to a publication by Jean-Baptiste Grosier, 1743 – 1823, a French abbot, who in 1788
published his General Description of China. He refers to Volume One of this book.
522 Xiang CHI, master candidate at the Department of History of Tsinghua University Beijing,
referred me to an article by Professor Zhonglin Qiu, ‘Population growth, deforestation and
the living fuels transition of Ming Beijing’, The Journal of the Historical Language Institute
of Academia Sinica Volume 74, 2003 in which this claim is made. I could not consult the
article myself.
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Brandt, Debin Ma and Thomas G. Rawski have come up with data that throw very
serious doubts on the Californian claim that China lacked cheap coal.523 The
reason Pomeranz gives for explaining why China did not develop steam pumps
and steam engines is questionable too. In Britain, those pumps were first de-
veloped and used to drain mines. According to Pomeranz, Chinese coal mines
had much less of a water problem.524 That is not true: the Chinese encountered
serious problems of drainage in their mines too.525 Such problems also existed in
many copper mines that were of enormous importance for China’s economy and
China’s state, since they provided the country with its daily money.526 But it looks
as if “the Chinese avoided mines with the underground flooding problem al-
together.”527 Steam engines could have been put to good use in Chinese mines for
ventilation or fire prevention.528 There would, moreover, have been plenty of
room for inventions in early modern China to save labour or resources outside
the mining sector, for example in irrigated agriculture. As long as humans’
material desires are not satiated, there always is a potential demand for new,
better, and more cost-effective technologies. Yet for half a millennium almost
nothing was done to improve on the methods inherited from the past.529 In brief,
there existed several very good reasons to invent pumps and steam engines in
China. The challenge was not taken up. China’s mining technology when it came
to mining coal, gold or silver was and continued to be very primitive as com-
523 See Loren Brandt, Debin Ma and Thomas G. Rawski, China’s long-term economic growth:
retrospect and prospect. Paper prepared for the Asia Historical Economics Conference
Tsinghua University Beijing 19 – 21 May 2010 http://ahes.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/ahec_beijing/pa
pers/may21_no26.pdf. Consulted 14 – 9-2012.
524 Pomeranz, Great Divergence, 64 – 67. Acually, James Watt primarily worked on his steam
engines to solve drainage problems in tin mines in Cornwall, where labour was cheap and
coal expensive.
525 See e. g. Golas, Science and civilisation in China, 186; Xu Dixin and Wu Chengming, Chinese
capitalism, 1522 – 1840, 5, 13, 93, 266 – 267, 277, 280, 287, 289 – 291, 296 – 297 and Mark
Elvin, ‘Skills and resources in late traditional China’ in: Elvin, Another history, 64 – 100,
pages 90 – 93. Japanese mines, by the way, also suffered from serious drainage problems and
there too no innovative response was found to this challenge.
526 For copper mining see Tsu-yu Chen, ‘China’s copper production in Yunnan province 1700 –
1800’, the conclusion on page 117: “In the beginning of the nineteenth century, because of
the perilous mineshafts that went deeper and deeper, the less rich copper lodes that had
been exhausted, the serious flooding of mines, and the fuel shortages for smelting, copper
mining became more expensive. To produce 100 catties of copper, 1,400 to 1,500 catties of
charcoal was required and soon deforestation occurred in the areas of copper mining, so
people must transport charcoal from afar. Copper production in Yunnan declined on
account of failure to break through the bottleneck of mining techniques.”
527 Deng, ‘Why the Chinese failed to develop a steam engine’, page 168. Compare Elvin, ‘Skills
and resources’, pages 92 – 93, and Harrison, Man awakened from dreams, 114 – 115 and
132 – 133.
528 Deng, ‘Why the Chinese failed to develop a steam engine’, 168.
529 Elvin, ‘Skills and resources’, 90.
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pared to Europe’s in the early modern era.530 In this context it, of course, is also
striking that already the Frenchman Denis Papin (1647 – 1712) was ex-
perimenting with a rude kind of steam engine, i. e. at a time when problems of
fuel scarcity were far less pinching than in Britain or China one century later.
Apart from Britain, he also worked in France and Germany where conditions
were quite different. Besides, the problems encountered in China’s mines were
not only technical. Mines often closed during parts of the year when peasants
who worked in them had to tend their land.531 Low wages made big investements
risky as larger mines that might consider them had to compete with small
operations where both investments and wages were very low.532 Here, too, the
challenge-and-response and necessity-is-the-mother-of-invention theories
many scholars are so fond of actually often explain hardly anything.
The importance of geography is also emphasised in literature dealing with
economic growth in the way in which certain environments would ‘predispose’
certain societies to develop certain social relations and certain modes of pro-
duction with huge implications for their further economic development.
Douglas Allen emphasizes that institutions in a pre-industrial societies could
not ignore nature: “The institutions societies use depend on the role of nature,
its variability and (the) ability to measure and separate out natural from human
inputs in any activity.”533 That, of course, is a statement that is quite true but also
so general as to be almost without substance: up until the end of the eighteenth
century all societies in the world were pre-industrial and very dependent on
nature’s whims. The ways they dealt with that fact and more in general with
factor endowments institutionally varied enormously. Let me refer to a couple of
‘institutional responses’ that are highly relevant in the context of this book.
A first example of a debate in which the role of institutions and their de-
pendency on factor-endowments holds centre stage is the extensive and in-
tensive discussion on the differences in economic development between Latin
America and the Caribbean on the one hand and the United States and Canada
530 This was shown beyond any reasonable doubt in a presentation by Professor Hans Ulrich
Vogel from Tübingen University, with the title ‘Books on Mining and Salt Production:
Useful Knowledge in Late Imperial China’ given at a Conference of the British Academy in
London on 14 and 15 February 2013, called The Production and Circulation of Printed
Books in the Occident and Orient, from the Accession of the Tang Dynasty (c. 618) to the
First Industrial Revolution. The lecture will be published in a volume dedicated to the
conference and its topic. For further publications, I refer to his website at Tübingen Uni-
versity.
531 Harrison, Man awakened from dreams, 114 – 115.
532 Harrison, Man awakened from dreams, 132 – 133. A fine example to show that economic
historians are well-advised not to ignore labour-relations.
533 Allen, Institutional revolution, 219. See also ibidem, 227: “…institutions [in pre-industrial
England] turn out to be ingenious solutions to the measurement problems of the day.”
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on the other, in which the first two are described in terms of ‘failure’ and the last
two in terms of ‘success’. This specific Great Divergence is at the heart of some
very interesting analyses in particular by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson and
by Engerman and Sokoloff. Their analyses have had a huge impact and are very
interesting in terms of their methodological reflections on how to do long-term
comparative research. As indicated, they start from certain increasingly dis-
puted assumptions about the existence of huge differences between countries in
terms of national wealth; their inequality of incomes and wealth; their colonial
and postcolonial settlement patterns and labour systems, and the extent to which
there was a drain of money and resources from colony to motherland.534 If those
views, now supposed to be true, turn out to be unacceptable, that would of course
have major implications for the explanations that build on them. But that would
still not detract from the value of learning about the positions in the debate as
they exist now and how they are constructed and defended. I want to present an
overview of where the debate is and where it might be going, not to predict it. The
debate about connections between factor endowment and institutions is also
waged for the case of Africa but up until now that has been done less explicitly
and extensively. For the period that is discussed here, labour is regarded as
relatively scarce for most of Africa – but also as relatively unproductive in
agriculture – and land as relatively abundant. This would have created certain
challenges and blockades that scholars are now beginning to analyse.535
But let us here focus on the American case to try and illustrate possible
mechanisms behind growth and stagnation. As a rule, three blocks are dis-
tinguished in the New World: the North (Canada and the territories of the USA,
with of course some major differences between North and South), the Caribbean
and Latin America (for centuries almost entirely under Spanish and Portuguese
rule). Let us begin by briefly discussing the famous efforts by Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson to see a close connection between the environmental conditions
and the emergence of a certain kind of economic institutions in regions
534 Actually two further comments are in order here: It is only for the nineteenth century that
historians have fairly ‘solid’ data. Much of what is claimed for the colonial era can very well
have been tainted in a kind of backward projection by what is known about the situation in
the first century after independence. On top of that there is the real danger of turning in
particular Latin America into much more of a ‘failure’ than it actually was. As compared to
the United States and Canada, its economies indeed fared badly during the nineteenth
century. But as compared to those two exceptionally dynamic and growing economies, just
about every region in the world ‘failed’. From a global perspective what happened in
Northern America was very exceptional whereas what happened in Southern America was
fairly normal. See e. g. Prados de la Escosura, ‘Lost decades’.
535 See e. g. the publications under notes 60, 61 and 597.
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colonized by Europeans.536 They make a fairly direct connection between factor
endowments, institutions and then growth and regard the presence or absence of
high mortality and diseases and the availability of specific resources as a kind of
trigger for developments in which institutions then become crucial. Regions
with high mortality because of diseases were not very attractive for Westerners
who basically only went there to extract as much resources as possible but not to
really settle. The wealthier those inhospitable regions were, the more they be-
came characterised by extractive institutions with coercive labour relations.
Regions with a less inhospitable environment – and less windfall profits from
resources – attracted settlers who wanted to make a living there and who created
their own favourable institutional environment with well-described and well-
protected property rights and representational government, in brief a set of
inclusive institutions, that according to Acemoglu and his colleagues make de-
velopment and growth all but normal. When in place, those inclusive or ex-
tractive institutions tended to perpetuate themselves via virtuous or vicious
circles.537
Engerman and Sokoloff in their many analyses of the divergent economic
development of various regions of the New World pursue a similar strategy but
pay far more attention to how path-dependency in this context actually worked
and how resource-endowments exactly impacted economic development.538
They emphasise, without in any way becoming mono-causal, the fundamental
role of resource endowments in a broad sense of the word. For them, they cover
quantity and quality of land, climate, the kind of crops that can be grown and the
most profitable way to grow them considering the circumstances, and density of
(the native) population. They claim that differences in these endowments pre-
disposed different parts of the New World to focus on growing different crops or
specialising in specific activities which then had major, long-lasting implications
for the societies involved by setting them on certain trajectories. Those natural
factor-endowments had a very strong impact on emerging institutions, which in
turn could influence them. They do not claim the existence of some sort of ‘crop
determinism’ but think in terms of path-dependencies. Their position comes
close to the one Gareth Austin developed considering economic development in
Africa when he pleads for a position that he refers to as ‘sophisticated geography’
536 See Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, ‘Colonial origins of comparative development’ and
iidem, ‘Reversal of fortune’.
537 See page 125 ff.
538 See for a synthesis of their ideas, Engerman and Sokoloff, Economic development in the
Americas since 1500. See also Nathan Nunn, ‘Slavery, inequality and economic development
in the Americas’.
Part two: Actual explanations of the Great Divergence170
and that claims that: “…institutions are very important for economic growth,
but are themselves partly responses to specific environmental conditions.”539
The resource-endowment approach of Engerman and Sokoloff is primarily
meant as an alternative to the approach of scholars who focus on explaining
those differing developmental routes in terms of the cultural or institutional
background of the settlers.540 What mattered according to them is not so much
whether, as has often been emphasised, settlers came from an Anglo-Saxon or at
least North-western European background or from Iberia, but where and under
what conditions they settled. They too, point at a ‘reversal of fortune’. For the
first 200 to 250 years of settlement of the New World, the regions that in the end
would become by far the wealthiest, the United States and Canada, were the
poorest and did not attract many settlers. The Spanish settlements of Mexico and
Peru with their still substantial native population, their large estates and their
enormous supply of bullion, and even more the Caribbean, with its booming
plantation economy over that period of time were far wealthier, looked more
promising, and attracted more settlers. The West Indies were the region that
attracted most immigrants from Europe from 1650s onwards till the beginning of
the nineteenth century, many more white people went to the mainland of South
America and the Caribbean than to Northern British colonies.541 By 1790, on a
per capita basis Haiti may have been the richest society in the world. In 1800 real
income per capita in Barbados and Cuba was still somewhat higher than in the
United States, where it was about equal to that in Argentina. In 1700, incomes in
Barbados and Cuba had been 50 and 67 per cent higher than in the British
colonies that would become the United States.542 After the war of 1756 – 1763, the
victorious British had a lively public debate over which territory should be taken
539 Austin, ‘The ‘reversal of fortune’ thesis’, 1021. For the concept ‘sophisticated geography’,
that was originally coined by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, see their ‘Reversal of
fortune’, paragraph 4.2.
540 See e. g. Douglass North, who claims that the different fates of the lands North and South of
the Rio Grande were a matter of ‘Iberian’ versus ‘Anglo-Saxon’ institutional and cultural
legacies in North, ‘Institutions’, 97 – 112, and more extensively in North, Summerhill and
Weingast, ‘Order, disorder and economic change: Latin America versus North America.’ He
thinks in terms of path dependency which here implies that you cannot simply transplant
institutions to different settings or get rid of one’s own institutional background. Compare
Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail, chapter I, ‘So close and yet so different’, where
they juxtapose Nogales in Arizona in the United States and neighbouring Nogales in Sonora
Mexico, show the big differences in wealth and development between these two towns and
attribute them to institutions.
541 Engerman and Sokoloff, Economic development, 42 – 43. This seems to contradict the thesis
by Acemoglu and colleagues who claim that in unhealthy regions Europeans could and
would not settle. See Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, ‘Colonial origins’, Abstract. That
many sugar barons in the Caribbean were absentees or returned home as soon as possible is
another matter.
542 Engerman and Sokoloff, Economic development, 10 – 11.
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from the French as reparations, the Caribbean Island of Guadeloupe, measuring
1705 km2, or Canada! The high GDP per capita of the slave societies referred to
here, can be explained by the fact that a higher percentage of their population
worked than was the case in ‘normal’ societies and that their production was
highly capital intensive and commercialised and thus quite efficient. But appa-
rently the long-run growth potential of the Northern part of the continent was
higher than that of its Central and Southern parts.
The thirteen British colonies that were to become the United States after their
revolution and ‘Canada’ only became attractive for settlers quite late. For many
decades they attracted fewer migrants than the rest of America. As compared to
that rest they in any case looked less promising for people who wanted to get rich
quickly. The bulk of their immigrants came from Britain, France, and the
Netherlands. The places where they settled were relatively empty – or emptied –
and well suited for growing wheat and keeping livestock. As regions with a
natural comparative advantage in factor endowment for pastoral agriculture
they later on in the eighteenth and nineteenth century attracted Europeans who
were interested in settling and taking up that agriculture. As a rule, they were
more skilled than their Iberian counterparts.543 Almost without exception, their
mixed-husbandry farms tended to be relatively small. Experiments with large
landholdings worked by wage labour and with tenancy invariably failed and, as a
matter of fact, were rather half-hearted. Family farms owned by those who
worked them came to be the norm. Around 1900, three quarters of the people in
the United States owned land, in Canada that was even more. At times Engerman
and Sokoloff suggest – quite consistently considering their focus on endowments
– a fairly strict crop-determinist explanation for this state of affairs by claiming
that in growing wheat or other grains possibilities to create increasing returns to
scale were very limited if not entirely absent.544 As a general statement, that claim
is at the very least not very convincing, as the huge and profitable wheat farms in
Britain at the time show. What could have been the rationale behind all the
enclosing and consolidating of farms in Britain, if large grain-farms make no
sense? If, in the United States and Canada in the pre-machine age, wheat farming
had no increasing returns to or economies of scale, this must have been because
of some local idiosyncrasies. What is also striking is that those regions of mixed
husbandry knew no slavery or other forms of coerced labour. Considering their
resource endowments, that is not at all obvious.545 On the contrary, if we were to
believe scholars like Nieboer and Domar, the existing situation of land abun-
543 Fielding and Torres, ‘Cows and conquistadors’.
544 See e. g. Engerman and Sokoloff, Economic development, page 42, note 14 and page 53.
545 We must, however, not forget that at least one third of the new settlers during the colonial
period came as indentured labourers, and that the British banished many convicts to their
North American colonies.
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dance and shortage of people would – in the ‘right’ political context – have been
almost ‘ideal’ for the emergence of some kind of coerced labour.546 According to
Engerman and Sokoloff, however, wheat productivity at the time was such that
slaves, for whom there existed high demand on the world market, simply were
too expensive.547 The predominance of family farms thus actually was due to a
mixture of factors. It was very easy to set up independent farms, even for people
of small means. There was abundant free land and keeping people tied as wage
labourers or tenants simply would have been all but impossible. In any case, this
was not actually attempted.
To a very large extent, allowing free men to capture the economic surplus of
free land was a political decision. Labour was scarce on the frontier. Authorities
were very keen on attracting settlers who would develop the country and in-
crease its wealth, realising and accepting that letting them go ever deeper into the
country, made labour scarcer near the coast and drove up wages there – which
would, like in Britain, act as a stimulus to develop labour-saving techniques.
Governments actually supported the emergence of a very broad class of me-
dium- and small-size landowners. Up until into the twentieth century, they
overall allowed millions of immigrants to enter the country without, however,
allowing the country to become ethnically ‘too’ diverse. In the United States
around 1800, some eighty per cent of the population still was ‘white’, some
twenty per cent ‘non-white’, mostly black slaves and a small number of Native
Americans. Those black slaves were concentrated in the Southern part of the
United States that resembled the slave societies of the Caribbean far more than
the rest of the country. Slavery there in the end was abolished in the 1860s and the
economy became more integrated with that of the rest of the country, which led
to structural change, without, however, obliterating its legacy. At first with the
official abolition of slavery in 1865, when slave owners did not receive any
compensation, large plantation-like landholdings disappeared. For those
products for which it made economic sense, they tended to re-appear using
other cheap, often only semi-free labour.
So apart from the South, in the United States and in Canada a society emerged
where the majority of people owned land and where inequality of income and
wealth was relatively low. Moreover, an increasing number of the population,
546 See page 190.
547 See Engerman and Sokoloff, Economic development in the Americas, 42 – 53. Robert Allen
holds a similar view. According to him there was no slavery in the Northern parts of the USA
because slaves would not have generated enough income to cover their costs. See Allen,
Global economic history, 72. Compare, however, page 173 of this text and Moulier-Boutang,
De l’esclavage au salariat, 209, where the author refers to the use of slaves on farms
producing wheat and vegetables in the Northeast of (what were to become) the United
States.
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beginning of course with those owning land, acquired the right to vote. With the
passing of time, wealth-based restrictions on franchise were weakened or even
removed entirely. Voters voted for fairly progressive tax systems in which the
bulk of the – already low – taxation was on property.548 They also voted for a very
broad and open system of education. The white population of the United States
in 1800 were the most literate people of the world. Apart from the South of the
United States, both the United States and Canada were characterised by high
economic participation and activity, and by a substantial mass-market, which
facilitated economic development and the emergence of modern economic
growth that to such a large extent depends on the ability to sell standardised
mass products. The United States already started to industrialise quite early but
did not do so via what has long been the considered the ‘classic’ route i. e. via one
or more leading sectors, massive use of new technologies and new power
sources, and a substantial increase of capital-intensity. Scale effects were im-
portant but, as indicated, more in broadening and deepening the market, i. e.
more via demand than supply. Development and growth occurred over a broad
range of economic activities, often via incremental improvements in organ-
isation, methods of producing and marketing. Less capital-intensive industries
generated just as much growth as more capital-intensive ones. In the first dec-
ades of the nineteenth century, the United States and Canada clearly became the
wealthiest regions of the Americas.
Resource endowments and trajectories of the Caribbean region, to a lesser
extent Brazil and, as indicated to a lesser extent also the Southern parts of the
United States, were quite different. Those regions were quite empty when settlers
arrived. Their native population was small and declining as in the North. But in
terms of soil and climate they were perfectly suited to grow cash crops like
tobacco, coffee, cotton, sugar and rice, that in this region was not a local staple.
The most cost-effective way to grow those products at the time – considering the
enormous and growing global demand for them – was on large units. As not
enough native labour was available for working on large farms and white settlers
were simply unwilling to become wage labourers, another solution was looked
for. The option chosen was to make slaves do the work. A plantation economy
emerged specialising in cash crops and with slaves as the main labour force. The
region may have been quite unhealthy for settlers from Europe but they could
earn such huge incomes as planters that many people nevertheless left Europe to
try their luck. No part of the Americas received more European immigrants
before 1800 than the West Indies.
The societies that emerged here became characterised by the enormous
548 In all these respects, strikingly enough, the United States in the first half of the nineteenth
century were the exact opposite of industrialising Britain!
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differences between the wealthy and ruling elite and the bulk of the population
that consisted of poor slaves. In the West Indies, more than three quarter of the
population consisted of imported slaves. The planters came to get rich, that is if
they were not simply absentee landlords, spent and invested the bulk of their
money abroad and as a rule went home when they had made their fortune.
Amongst the imported slaves, mortality was very high so the slave population
had to be constantly supplemented with new ‘imports’. Inequality in terms of
income and wealth was enormous. Many people were excluded from active
economic life and no mass market for consumer goods existed. The small ruling
elite used its economic and political power to try to perpetuate the status quo.
Franchise remained very restricted and expenditure for mass education was tiny.
Literacy and numeracy were low. The economies of the region would always be
very vulnerable in their one-sided export-orientation and lack of general de-
velopment. When their cash crops were hit by crisis, so were their entire
economies. In the nineteenth century they all were poorer than the United States
and Canada and had far less potential for development.
Mexico and Peru were the regions that first attracted larger group of immi-
grants, in this case Spaniards. The situation there, still according to Engerman
and Sokoloff, can be described in the following terms. Notwithstanding the
enormous mortality under native inhabitants as a consequence of diseases the
Europeans brought with them to the New World, the number of original in-
habitants surviving there still was substantial and it grew enough to provide
labour force for incoming settlers. The happy few amongst the immigrants from
Spain often received large tracts of land and the necessary labour force that goes
with it. In agriculture, they more or less continued the old tribute system, now
running their large estates, so-called encomiendas, with coerced labour. Apart
from on large estates, labour was also coerced to work in gold and silver mines,
which provided a source of easy money i. e. very high incomes for a privileged
elite, without providing many workers with a – very poorly paid and very un-
healthy – job. By and large, mining hardly had any backward and forward
linkages for the rest of the economy apart from pushing up prices. It provided a
textbook example of ‘the curse of resources’. A very substantial part of the
bullion of the colonies of Spain – and for that matter Portugal – was siphoned off
as taxation to the mother country or redistributed between parts of the empire
but here too local elites managed to use their leverage to pay little and receive a
lot.549 There was no need to allow many immigrants to enter. Immigration was
actually opposed and restricted in an effort to not have to share the spoils and
intermarriage between settlers and natives was not prohibited, which of course
proves once again that one never can ignore the role of politics. In the Spanish
549 See for this redistribution Grafe and Irigoin, ‘Spanish Empire and its legacy’.
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colonies in the Americas around 1800, less than twenty per cent of population
could be considered white, in Brazil at the time that was some twenty-five per
cent. In the end a situation emerged that in essence was not unlike that in the
Caribbean with a very high inequality of income and wealth, elites that kept
franchise restricted and did not bother with mass education, low economic
participation or much mass consumption: in brief, here, too, a set of conditions
emerged that were not exactly supportive for economic growth.
The reasons whether crops were grown on plantations or not, and whether
this led to slavery or not, as Engerman and Sokoloff themselves show, actually
were never simply geographical, far from it. They, with good reason, do not want
to preach a kind of ‘crop determinism’. The first crop that comes to mind when
we think of plantations probably is sugar, a crop that in the eyes of Sidney Mintz
almost automatically becomes associated with large-scale production by
slaves.550 That association is also often fairly automatically made with cotton and
to a lesser extent tobacco, especially of course because of what happened in the
Americas. But in China these crops almost without exception were grown on
family plots, very tiny ones at that. Talking about China, there of course also is
the example of tea; a plant that by most people is associated with plantations like
those in India and Ceylon but that in China, the country that originally mo-
nopolized its export, was grown on family plots. That also goes for rice, which as
a rule is typically regarded as a crop to grow on small plots, as indeed was the
case in entire East Asia. There are even theories, e. g. by Francesca Bray, ex-
plaining why before the so-called Green Revolution this had to be the case.551
That seems exaggerated as the availability of labour and its characteristics
definitely also play their part. In what is now the United States, where land was
relatively abundant and labour relatively scarce and expensive, rice was actually
already grown on plantations from the eighteenth century onwards. In South
Carolina, it was introduced on farms in the second half of that century. Many of
those farms, e. g. those near Charlestown and Georgetown, used slave labour. In
some rice-producing areas, slaves outnumbered whites by as much as eight to
one.552 In 1787, a farmer named Jonathan Lucas began to use a rice-mill powered
by water, and in 1792 one driven by tides. Till 1850 some 150 large rice plan-
tations were set up in the region. After 1805, rice also started to be grown in the
South of the United States. In Louisiana and Texas machines were used for
mowing and binding.553 To come back to cotton, it was grown by slaves in the
550 See e. g. Mintz, Sweetness and power and Williams, Capitalism & slavery.
551 See e. g. Bray, Rice economies and Kang Chao, Man and land in Chinese history.
552 See e. g. Blackburn, Making of New world slavery, 476 – 477.
553 Already in 1869 the Southern States of the United States regained their pre-Civil War
production-level of cotton. Over the years 1870 – 1879, they surpassed it by forty-two per
cent. I found these data in McCloskey, Bourgeois dignity, 223. She refers to a study by Stanley
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Southern half of what now is the United States. A ‘crop-deterministic’ ex-
planation would be that slaves in cotton-growing regions could be employed
usefully over the entire year. The reason why there were no plantations with
slaves in the North would then be that this wasn’t the case in wheat-growing
regions.554 This variety of crop-determinism is quite dubious too. After the
official end of slavery, cotton was grown on small farms, without any negative
effect on total production.555 Slaves could have been useful all year round in the
North of the United States.556 In the South, moreover, they had always done many
other things apart from growing cotton for their boss.
3. Geography and institutions: Britain and China, wheat versus
rice
In brief, geography did not per se determine crops and those did not per se
determine and ‘fix’ institutions, as in nave conclusions such as ‘sugar gives you
the plantation’ or ‘rice gives you the peasant plot’ and all that goes with it
through all eternity. One always has to consider factor endowment in its entirety,
the relative prices of factors of production that entails plus the institutional
arrangements that prevail in a certain region.557 In my view, referring to geog-
raphy, apart from obvious, i. e. very extreme, examples can never provide a
sufficient explanation for long run economic growth or its absence. It can never
be the sole or even the main explanation of the Great Divergence. This of course
does not exclude the possibility and sometimes even the probability – to pursue
that example further – that a combination of certain crops and certain in-
stitutions becomes ‘fixed’ and sets an economy on a trajectory that turns out to
be a vicious or – much less often – virtuous cycle or at least a challenge to
innovate. The analyses of Engerman and Sokoloff in particular for the Americas
in my view clearly point that out, as does the following story about China’s rice
Lebergott. Interestingly enough Adam Smith thought the use of slaves in sugar and tobacco
growing was only profitable in the British colonies because trade in those products was
monopolised and protected. See Smith, Inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of
nations, 388.
554 See e. g. Blackburn, Making of new world slavery, 476 – 477.
555 Already in 1869 the Southern States of the United States regained their pre-Civil War
production-level of cotton. Over the years 1870 – 1879, they surpassed it by forty-two per
cent. I found these data in McCloskey, Bourgeois dignity, 223. She refers to a study by Stanley
Lebergott.
556 See e. g. Woodman, Slavery and the Southern economy, 7; Blackburn, Making of New World
slavery, 476 – 479 and under note 547.
557 See for some comments Studwell, How Asia works, Part I. Land: The triumph of gardening,
in particular pages 54 – 55.
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economy and Britain’s wheat-livestock economy, that brings us back to the heart
of our analysis, the Great Divergence between Britain and China.
Britain’s agriculture predominantly was a mixed agriculture with grains such
as wheat, rye, oats and barley – for beer – as staple foods, whereas in those
regions of China that were most advanced and where the majority of the Chinese
lived, a type of agriculture predominated where rice was the staple food. For the
sake of convenience, I will use the expression ‘wheat agriculture’ to refer to the
kind of mixed husbandry we find in Britain and Western Europe. Following
Francesca Bray I will use the term ‘rice agriculture’ for the agricultural system we
find in those regions of China where rice was the staple food.558 One then should
think primarily of the economic and demographic heart of China in the South. I
will here first introduce the way in which Francesca Bray contrasts these two
types of agriculture and the implications of that contrast. After having done that,
I will also point at some assumptions in her work that might be problematic.
What are the main characteristics of pre-industrial rice agriculture compared
to pre-industrial wheat agriculture, and what do they imply for the economy?559
Let us begin with rice agriculture. That has a very high yield per unit of land, far
higher than wheat, with the extra advantage that in growing rice there is no need
to let land lie fallow. On top of that, at least in the right climate, several varieties of
rice can be inserted in all kinds of systems of multi-cropping and inter-cropping.
One can have two or even more harvests per year of rice or, normally, of rice and
some other crop. Yields react very positively to irrigation and fertiliser. The extra
labour required for constructing, maintaining and using irrigation systems and
collecting, preparing and spreading all kinds of fertiliser, pays off. Even tiny
tracts of land can suffice to feed a family.
It is tempting to think that a type of cultivation that is as land-intensive as
growing rice must also be labour-intensive. Preparing, manuring, irrigating and
draining the fields, planting, transplanting, weeding, harvesting, husking and
milling the rice, to mention the most obvious activities involved, involve a lot of
hard work. But the labour-intensity of the crop must not be exaggerated.560 An
558 Bray, Rice-economies. For interesting comments on the specific requirements and cha-
racteristics of Western Europe ‘grain-economies’, that according to the author would have
set Europe on a special path already in the Middle Ages, see Michael Mitterauer, Why
Europe?
559 See for background information Bozhong Li, Agricultural development in Jiangnan,
‘Conclusion’; Bray, Rice economies ; Grigg, Agricultural systems of the world ; Hayami and
Tsubouchi, Economic and demographic development in rice producing societies, 6 – 20;
King, Farmers of forty centuries and Oshima, Economic growth in Monsoon Asia. Some
interesting comments can be found in Sigaut, ‘La Chine, L’Europe et les techniques agri-
coles’.
560 If we compare the total amount of work that is required to provide subsistence in producing
rice with the total amount of work that is required to provide subsistence in producing
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average family, double-cropping, growing rice and wheat, on an average-sized
farm in the Lower Yangzi, still only could be efficiently employed for about four
months per year. In those months, they had to work very hard and often were
short of labour. But during the rest of the year it was underemployed or even
unemployed, if it did not take up other activities.561 This is what most families
did. In Southern China growing rice could easily be combined with growing and
processing other crops like cotton, silk, sugar, tea or tobacco that can bring in
extra money. Handicraft became an integral and fundamental part of almost
every household-economy. Men tended to ‘specialise’ in agriculture, whereas for
their wives handicraft often turned into practically a full-time job. One could
also grow fruits and vegetables, keep livestock and fowl, and work as agricultural
labourer. All these extra activities could become so important that labour was in
short supply and not, as is often thought, abundant.562
In the pre-industrial context we are discussing here, there was comparatively
little scope for labour-saving strategies in this kind of agriculture.563 Although
oxen and buffalo were employed, the ratio of men to draught animals was much
lower in rice-growing regions than in regions where wheat was grown. There was
not much employment for big draught animals, especially in paddy fields. They
were too expensive. Considering the high yields of arable land, it was not
profitable to reserve land for them and better to use human labour instead.
There was no need to buy big expensive ploughs. Whenever possible, land was
used for cultivation. Besides, growing rice was a matter of meticulous cultivation
that requires constant attention of skilled human labour and not brute, repeti-
tive, mechanical force. Using large implements and big draught animals in
working the fields probably would have done more harm than good. Milling was
normally done by hand and not in big mills, as was the case in Western Europe.
When milled, rice could not be kept from decay for long, so it was only milled in
small quantities. Increasing returns to scale or economies of scale were almost
absent in growing rice in China, so it did not make sense to try and work large
farms with large amounts of wage labour. It was more rational as a large land-
owner to rent out your land in many small parcels than to try to exploit it as a
manager in the form of big farms. In case you needed labour for special occa-
sions, it normally was available. Members of the household could also do a lot of
other things besides working their land and were willing to make sacrifices for
wheat, which I think is the best way to compare labour-intensity, the differences between
both kinds of cultivation are minimal.
561 See Bozhong Li, Agricultural development in Jiangnan, 151 – 155. This book contains an
extensive analysis of the labour requirements of various agricultural tasks.
562 See for example Bozhong Li, Agricultural development in Jiangnan, 24 – 25, and Perkins,
Agricultural development in China, 45 – 46 and 58 – 60.
563 In that sense rice economies indeed are labour-intensive as compared to the agricultural
systems of Western Europe.
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the sake of their co-workers. It therefore was not much use to try to kick them off
the farm, even if from a strictly economic perspective their productivity was not
optimal. As indicated, Bray’s model starts from certain assumptions that need
not be universally valid. She writes as if in rice agriculture before the ‘green
revolution’ that set in after the Second World War, family-household production
on small farms was the norm and increasing returns to scale or economies of
scale were non-existent. The example of rice growing in certain parts of the
United States shows this need not necessarily be the case.
The logic of wheat-cultivation according to Bray was almost the opposite.
Yields per unit of land were relatively low. Methods to increase them by in-
tensifying cultivation were not lacking. Land-use in early modern Britain be-
came much more intensive with the reduction of fallow land, the introduction of
all kinds of crop rotations and the extension of the arable land. But rice regions
definitely have a wider range of possibilities. In wheat-agriculture, it took a
relatively large plot of land to assure subsistence, according to various estimates
at least five hectares for a normal five-person family. Without animals one could
not mobilise the large amount of labour power that is needed in, for example,
ploughing. As the yields of land were relatively low, it was relatively cheap to keep
big draught animals on meadows or pasture lands. It was not only because of
their power as draught animals that one must use livestock. They also were
indispensable in transport and especially as providers of manure, without which
one could not even maintain let alone increase the fertility of the soil.564 On top of
that, in wheat agriculture with its simple, repetitive activities, their labour force
could be profitably combined with various implements. In contrast to growing
rice, there were very substantial increasing returns and economies of scale.
These, of course, were not restricted to the use of animals but also had their
impact on labour productivity. That was systematically higher on bigger farms
than on smaller ones. Large capital-intensive farms would be the most rational
and productive ones. This model of wheat agriculture indeed gives a good
stylised description of the situation in Britain, but here, too, I want to add that
the model is not necessarily applicable to all wheat growing regions. Bray’s
contrast between a Western model of grain farming that would be large-scale and
capital-intensive and an Asian model of rice-growing that would be more small-
scale and labour-intensive is far too determinist and dichotomous.565 For ‘the
564 The use of human night soil as fertiliser was almost unknown in Britain. But even if it would
have been systematically collected and spread over the fields, as was the case in China and
Japan, its impact would have been relatively small. As compared to those countries Britain
simply had too much arable land per inhabitant. The fact that it had relatively few draught
animals does not imply that in Qing China animal manure played no role of any impor-
tance. The many millions of pigs must have produced an immense amount of it.
565 See for a brief description Bray, Rice economies, Appendixes A and B.
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West’ it basically extrapolates from the actually quite exceptional case of Britain.
Actually, in many regions where wheat or rye was the staple food, production
also was mainly in the hands of peasant households working on small plots. In
eighteenth-century France, for example, wheat and rye were staple crops, but by
far the majority of the farms consisted of tiny, labour-intensive and capital-
extensive peasant plots. In Southern Spain in the nineteenth century, huge wheat
farms predominated, but they, in contrast to their British counterparts, almost
exclusively used human labour and hardly profited from any increasing returns
or economies of scale. There in all probability were even more landless labourers
here than in England but we find no comparable capitalist dynamics.566
In China, the main consequence was that in this way millions of peasants
became ‘locked’ into a labour-intensive production process. They stuck to their
land. The point is that in a rice economy it is easier to survive on a tiny plot as
well as less easy to survive without one. If one mobilised the working power of
every member of the household and took up the various possibilities to earn
extra income that China’s rice agriculture presented, a piece of land that in the
West would be considered as not much more than a garden, could suffice as a
basis for subsistence. Furthermore, there normally were good reasons not to
completely leave agriculture. For many people, wages were but an ‘extra’ to the
income they were supposed to get from a tract of land of their own. This means
wages as such did not normally suffice to provide for subsistence for a family for
the entire year. So to be on the safe side, one needed land. The fact that wages
could be high in periods of labour shortage normally did not compensate for the
fact that during large parts of the year demand for wage labour was rather
limited. Most of the land was tilled by peasants. They would only hire labour as a
last resort and for as little time as possible. In case of need, they preferred to pool
their labour and animals. Demand for wage labour in Britain came from the
tenants of the big landlords who had done their best to create huge farms, often
at the expense of small peasants. In China’s rice agriculture during the Qing, we
see no comparable urge to deprive small peasants of their land and no com-
parable demand for wage labour to work the land that previously had been
owned by peasants.567 This meant a declining rate of urbanisation and thus a
566 When I refer to scale effects in this text, I mean ‘economies of scale’ and/or ‘returns to scale’.
Where economies of scale refer to the positive relationship between the size of a firm and its
costs, i. e. a lowering of average costs with increasing size, returns to scale describe the
relationship between inputs and outputs. Returns to scale are constant if increasing all
inputs by some proportion results in output increasing by that same proportion. Returns
are decreasing if, say, doubling inputs results in less than double the output, and increasing
if more than double the output.
567 This also was the case, as we have indicated, in regions where rice was not the main staple.
Here of course other reasons must be adduced than the ones that apply to rice-cultivation.
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decreasing importance of urban ‘middle classes’, plus a very low wage level, as
those who worked for wages often still had some means of subsistence of their
own.
Millions of peasants had to combine agriculture with other activities to be
able to earn a decent living. But if they were to give up agriculture completely,
that would have a negative effect on total agricultural production, as it became
increasingly hard to find ways to further increase labour productivity in agri-
culture. In that sense, from a macro-economic perspective, they had to stick to
their land. Finally, there is what Elvin has called ‘an ecological lock-in’.568 A huge
infrastructure of paddies, ponds, dikes, et cetera, had been created to maintain
wet-rice production. If someone decided no longer to do his share, for example,
in maintaining dikes or irrigating fields, somebody else had to. One could not
simply take a link out of the chain. Moreover the sunk-cost of such a system and
the costs of its maintenance are immense. The role of the state in creating and
maintaining major irrigation works at times was quite essential and the effects of
the difficulty that government from the end of the eighteenth century onwards
had in mobilising sufficient resources for their maintenance were certainly
widely felt. But the idea that in China the necessities of irrigation, or more in
general ‘water-management’, would have necessitated a ‘hydraulic state’ and
therefore ‘oriental despotism’ is yet another example of indefensible geo-
graphical determinism.569
For all these various reasons, labour was massively absorbed in the coun-
tryside in household production and kept tied to the land. At the level of the
individual farm, it implied that the productivity of land and labour could in the
course of time only be raised marginally or not at all. The only realistic option for
a peasant family to increase production was to intensify the use of labour, land
and resources even further. In a setting such as this, there is an inherent tendency
towards ‘involution’. Following Huang, I define involution as the situation in
which, with increasing labour, input total output expands but at the cost of
diminished marginal returns per workday.570 Whether it had already set in in
568 For an interesting analysis of the concept of ‘ecological lock-in’, with special attention to the
role of the state in ecological matters, see Elvin, ‘Three thousand years of unsustainable
growth’ 7 – 46, and idem, ‘The unavoidable environment: reflections on pre-modern eco-
nomic growth in China.’ Paper presented at the conference On the origins of the modern
world. Comparative perspectives from the edge of the Millennium. All-U.C. Group in
Economic History Conference University of California, Davis 15 – 17 October 1999.
569 This of course is the thesis of Wittfogel, Oriental despotism. As a Dutchman, I cannot help
being struck by the fact that collectively taking care of water-management in my home
country is always regarded as the cradle of our democracy.
570 For this definition see Huang, Peasant family and rural development in the Yangzi Delta, 11.
It plays a major role in the debate between Huang and Pomeranz in The Journal of Asian
Studies 61, 2 (May 2002). A large part of that entire issue is devoted to Pomeranz’s, Great
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China and, if so, when, may be a matter of debate, but as such, without some
major technological change or massive input from outside the system, in tra-
ditional rice agriculture returns are bound to decrease with increasing pop-
ulation.
In Britain, too, efforts were undertaken to increase production, partly in ways
quite similar to what happened in China, for example by intensifying the use of
land. What for the most part differentiated British mixed agriculture from
China’s rice agriculture with regard to increasing labour productivity was the use
of animals and the way in which scale effects were exploited.571 Animals have to
be fed from the land. Increasing their number increases the pressure on the land.
Sooner or later, this, too, is no longer a viable option. Broadly and comparatively
speaking, China’s pre-industrial agriculture in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries can be characterised as land-, labour-, and resource-intensive and
Britain’s agriculture as land-extensive, energy-intensive and resource-extensive.
China’s agriculture was characterised by a household mode of production. As
indicated, people owning large tracts of land did not exploit them themselves as
managers but rented them out in small plots and became a kind of rentiers. There
were hardly any full proletarians. Peasants had tiny plots of land, did not invest
much in capital goods like implements and animals, and relatively speaking did
not buy much from outside their farm. By and large, China’s agricultural sector,
highly efficient as it was in terms of land-productivity, indeed was on an in-
volutionary path of ever increasing labour inputs. Agriculture in pre-industrial
Britain did try and use scale effects. As compared to China, average farms were
huge and getting bigger, even for European wheat agriculture, the number of
animals used in it was very high, as was the use of implements. It was quite
capital-intensive, wage labour played a prominent role in it, and the majority of
wages labourers were proletarians in the Marxian sense of the word. Efforts to
save labour in such a context make sense and are to be expected, which of course
does not mean that breakthroughs in doing so would be inevitable.
None of all the above makes it inevitable or even predictable that Britain
would ‘escape from Malthus’ but it does make it more probable that it would than
that China would. The more so because – as we will see later on – all these
qualifications can to a very great extent be applied to the economies of Britain
Divergence. Particularly interesting for the debate on the Chinese household mode of
production and the way in which Chinese peasant households integrated in the market is
the article, ‘England’s divergence from China’s Yangzi Delta’ by Brenner and Isett, in that
same issue. Isett later further developed his ideas in this respect in his State, peasant, and
merchant.
571 I do not think that overall the use of implements before industrialisation made a substantial
difference. As long as they were mainly made of organic material and their use depended on
organic sources of energy, the difference in their impact between both countries cannot
have been very substantial.
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and China in their entirety. Geography and the characteristics of their staple
crops definitely played a prominent role in the two very different trajectories of
both countries’ agriculture, but again we must be wary not to succumb to a
simple geographical determinism. We see quite a similar household mode of
production in Qing China with quite similar characteristics in regions where rice
was not the staple and we see many peasant farms in wheat-agriculture regions
where large farms and wage labour would have been more efficient. Cultural
differences regarding the function and status of family and household and dif-
ferent political agendas of the ruling elites also played their role. In Qing China,
the state actively saw to it that peasants did not lose their hold over the land they
farmed or it in any case made sure that those peasants could subsist by taxing
them lightly, and at times offering them tax holidays, free land, or cheap or gratis
food.572 But nature definitely also did count for much.
4. Geography: town versus countryside, urbanising Great
Britain and rural China
A quite specific variety of the thesis that geography – in this case in terms of
location – would be of fundamental importance in explaining differences in
growth and more specifically the Great Divergence, has been proposed by Roy
Bin Wong and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal.573 In their view, industrialisation in
Western Europe, i. e. the rise of mass production with machines in factories574,
was a consequence of the high labour costs in manufacturing, which in turn were
a consequence of the fact that manufacturing took place in towns where wages
were high instead of in the countryside, where they were lower. The reason for
British and West European entrepreneurs to nevertheless choose urban loca-
tions were the permanent warfare and accompanying violence that plagued the
countryside in war-infested Europe and that made it rational to protect capital
behind city walls, even when overall cost were higher there. Those permanent
wars were a consequence of the splintering of Europe into a substantial number
of fiercely competing states-systems, which unintentionally brought about
consequences for relative factor-prices in the end and thus lay at the basis of the
successful industrialisation of parts of the region. In the words of Wong “…the
threat of war induced European entrepreneurs to locate behind city walls to
572 For these agrarian paternalist policies of the Qing government see under note 1133.
573 For the opinion of Jan de Vries on this book see De Vries, ‘Review of Rosenthal and Wong,
Before and Beyond Divergence’.
574 In their view too industrialisation, without much further ado, is identified with the Great
Divergence!
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protect their capital, even as food costs, mortality threats, and labour costs were
higher in cities than in the countryside … relative factor prices made techno-
logical change cheaper and more worthwhile in Europe than in China.”575
To be honest, this theory is about as simple as it is unconvincing, because, to
begin with, so much manufacturing did not take place in cities in the early
modern era; this is especially true of the production of mass products that would
be at the heart of industrialisation. Proto-industry was mainly a rural phe-
nomenon. Often, manufacturing took place in towns because guilds wanted it
that way. In towns, as a rule, the more specialised and expensive finishing took
place by members of guilds that overall tried to monopolise their trades and ban
rural competition. Safety did play a role but certainly was not always decisive.
Those guilds to a very large extent failed to have things their way : as a rule in the
early modern era in Western Europe – and I confine myself to that period, the
one most relevant to my question – the countryside was more ‘industrialised’
than towns were, as Bin Wong definitely knows.576 The rural non-agricultural
share of the population in Britain, for example in 1750, was thirty-two per cent;
most of those people were working in manufacturing. This rural manufacturing
was a widespread phenomenon all over Europe.577
What is also highly problematic about the Rosenthal-Wong thesis is that
Britain, the first and for quite some time the only major industrialised country in
Western Europe, was never invaded after 1066 and never saw any real wars on its
soil ever since. That, of course, is not to say that there was no violence. It knew
two civil wars in the seventeenth century, the last, relatively peaceful one in
1688 – 1689. But comparatively speaking, it was an extremely peaceful part of
Europe. As an explanation for the emergence of industry in the first industrial
nation, their thesis connecting frequent war, urban manufacturing and ex-
pensive labour therefore a priori does not sound very convincing. What actually
happened during the first decades of Britain’s industrialisation also does not
exactly confirm their ideas. Most of Britain’s first factories actually were located
in the countryside. The availability of raw materials or energy together with the
presence of a relatively easy market outlet in Britain or in particular for cotton
production abroad as a rule determined where a factory would be built, not wage
levels per se. In the cotton industry up to the 1830s, waterpower was more
575 Wong, ‘Economic history in the decade after The Great Divergence’, 19.
576 See his China transformed, 33. Wong distinguishes there between “three periods of Euro-
pean industrial activity beginning in the early modern period” and then describes period 2,
from the mid-sixteenth to mid-eighteenth centuries, as the period of “rural cottage indu-
stries”, a sign of “a breakdown of feudal control”, adding in note 1 that: “…the pheno-
menon of rural industry is widely recognized as an important precursor of the Industrial
Revolution.”
577 Allen, Global economic history, 21 – 23.
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important than steam. It therefore, as a rule, was located in the countryside. The
iron industry was located near to the coalfields. Moreover, and that is my final
comment, most industry during Britain’s’ industrialisation initially was not
located in those areas that had the highest wages in the South, in the relatively
wealthy agricultural areas there or in London where wages were highest, but in
the North of England, where they were lower, which of course also does not
exactly make their thesis very probable.578
Moreover, even if industrialisation were connected to the urban location of
manufacturing and the ensuing high labour cost, then what explains the Neth-
erlands, which in the seventeenth century had a highly developed urban industry
with high wages, for example in Leiden, a major cloth-producing, industrial
town? The challenge of high urban wages here received the response not of
innovation of the mode of production but of a transfer of many parts of pro-
duction to the countryside and a decline of urban manufacturing. We will briefly
return to the intriguing question why ‘the Netherlands’ did not become the first
industrial nation later on in this text. Another region that comes to mind that was
highly advanced and had a high-wages urban economy but where technological
innovation faltered and no take-off took place is Northern Italy. During the Late
Middle Ages, it was far more important as a manufacturing region in Europe
than Britain. It had the highest per capita income and the highest rate of ur-
banisation in the world. The region was famous for its highly developed wool
production, which took place in towns where labour was relatively well paid.
Following Wong and Rosenthal – and Robert Allen – it must have been an ideal
environment for technological innovation.579 But in the early modern era, this
region was one of relative decline rather than dynamism; strikingly enough, that
has very often been explained by referring to the high wages that guilds in towns
managed to enforce. High-wage towns here lost out in competition to the low-
wage countryside. High wages clearly were not a stimulus to innovation here.
Silk manufacturing, a new and very important industry, did also settle in a town
like Bologna, the most industrial town of Europe at the end of the seventeenth
century, but it primarily developed in the countryside. In general we see a
movement of manufacturing to places with low wages.580
Referring to cities as centres of innovation is of course not new or original.
We already referred to economists and other social scientists who have claimed
578 See, for the locating of industry, Jones, Locating the Industrial Revolution and Tim Cooper,
How to read industrial Britain. For the specific economic structure of London and its
peculiar development, see Schwarz, London in the age of industrialisation.
579 See for Allen’s claims page 199 ff.
580 See, for a brief analysis of the loss of Italian leadership in wool production (and ship-
building and trade), Zamagni, Introduzione alla storia economica d’Italia, chapter 1, and
Malanima, La fine del primato, chapter 2 and pages 183 – 190.
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that cities have played and play a specific and highly important role in eco-
nomic development.581 Several important scholars explicitly referred to the
role of cities in the specific economic development of the West. Adam Smith as
well as Karl Marx both emphasised the importance of the division of labour
between town and country. Marx even claimed: “The foundation of every
division of labour that is well developed, and brought about by the exchange of
commodities, is the separation between town and country. It might be said that
the whole economic history of society is summed up in the movement of this
antithesis.”582 Max Weber was convinced that the European city and its
bourgeoisie was something peculiar and of eminent importance for Europe’s
exceptional development and its capitalism.583 Fernand Braudel always was
fond of describing towns, or to be more precise, Western towns with their, in
his view, unique characteristics, as signs and centres of modernity, dynamism
and capitalism. He described urbanisation as “the sign of modern man” and
towns as “electric transformers,” and “outposts of modernity”, claiming that
capitalism and towns were basically the same thing in the West.584 His de-
scriptions of capitalist cities are reminiscent of Saskia Sassen’s ‘global cities’ or
what other scholars call ‘world cities’, agglomerations with an international
centre-function in banking, stock exchange, finance, insurance, and real es-
tate, which are homes to the largest firms and a dense service sector.585 Paul
Bairoch thinks the increase of urban population in Europe during the eight-
eenth century – particularly distinct in Great Britain – was important for
economic development because “technological innovation proves to have been
of distinctly urban origin.”586
Table 24: Urbanisation ratios in Europe and parts of Asia, 1500 – 1890: population in cities
with 10,000 inhabitants and over as percentage of total population.
1500 1600 1700 1800 1890
Belgium 21.1 8.8 23.9 18.9 34.5
France 4.2 5.9 9.2 8.8 25.9
Germany 3.2 4.1 4.8 5.5 28.2
581 See pages 89 – 90.
582 For Adam Smith see e. g. Mumy, ‘Town and country in Adam Smith’s The wealth of nations’,
The quote by Marx is from MEW 23, page 373.
583 See e. g. the text devoted to the European city in his Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Part Two,
Chapter 9, 7. There are many versions, editions and translations of this text. For the re-
ception and discussion of his ideas see Bruhns and Nippel, Max Weber und die Stadt im
Kulturvergleich and Feldbauer, Mitterauer and Schwentker, Die vormoderne Stadt.
584 See for these quotations Braudel, Civilization and capitalism, 15th – 18th century, I, pages
556 – 558, 479, 512 and 514. For the originality of Western towns see page 509 of that volume.
585 See for further explanation Braun and Schulz, Wirtschaftsgeographie, 198 – 199.
586 Bairoch, ‘The city and technological innovation’, 165.
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(Continued)
1500 1600 1700 1800 1890
Italy 12.4 15.1 13.2 14.6 21.2
Netherlands 15.8 24.3 33.6 28.8 33.4
Portugal 3.0 14.1 11.5 8.7 12.7
Scandinavia 0.9 1.4 4.0 4.6 13.2
Spain 6.1 11.4 9.0 11.1 26.8
Switzerland 1.5 2.5 3.3 3.7 16.0
England & Wales 3.1 5.8 13.3 20.3 61.9
Scotland 1.6 3.0 5.3 17.3 50.3
Ireland 0.0 0.0 3.4 7.0 17.6
Western
Europe
5.8 7.9 9.5 10.2 29.6
China 3.8 4.0 n.a. 3.8 4.4
Japan 2.9 4.4 n.a. 12.3 16.0
Source: Angus Madison, Contours of the World Economy, 1 – 2030 A.D. Essays in Macro-
economic History, Oxford 2007, 43.
The fact that urbanisation in Qing China was much lower than in eighteenth-
century Britain will certainly have had consequences for the dynamism of its
economy.587 Pomeranz points out that Qing China’s low urbanisation rate was
not a sign of economic failure – which, as far as I know, no one ever claimed – but
admits it may have made certain kinds of future success less likely.588 In this
respect as well, Britain, where London was a booming economic metropolis and
the capital of the country, was in a far better position than China, where the
economic and the political centre were not identical and towns were admin-
istrative rather than economic centres. In my view, differences in this respect
between different parts of the world would deserve much more attention from
economic historians interested in growth. Development, growth and, most
importantly, innovation have always tended to be more prominent in cities than
587 For a discussion of urbanisation rates in China as compared to (Western) Europe see e. g.
Malanima, Pre-modern European economy, 239 – 253. For an excellent comparative analysis
of differences and similarities in urbanisation in Europe and China – and of its causes and
consequences – in the period from the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries see Winter,
‘Population and migration’. Actually, the differences between Western Europe and China
especially regarding the ‘impact’ of cities in their economies and societies were even bigger
than they seem in table 24, as any increase of the total population of an early modern city
required a permanent influx of people from the countryside to that city. For north-western
Europe, any unit increase of total urban population is estimated to have required on average
twice as many people permanently moving from the countryside to its cities. See the article
by Anne Winter, page 404, under reference to calculations by Jan de Vries.
588 Pomeranz, ‘Ten years after’, 23.
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in the countryside, which of course does not at all exclude the possibility that
they often also were the place whose vested interests tried to block innovation.
When they are centres of trade, exchange and (im)migration, cities show a
high degree of openness. I already referred to the connection that Amy Chua and
William McNeill see between openness and development and power. Although
the way that Chua implements her thesis is somewhat over the top and its
empirical underpinning not as impressive as one would like it to be, its main
thrust – that whatever the potential advantages, a country definitely also pays a
price for keeping the foreign and the foreigner out – sounds highly plausible. In
this respect too, Qing China’s potential for rapid economic development was in
principle smaller than that of Britain. Its economy and society and first and
foremost its government were in all respects imaginable less open than that of
Britain. I am of course not claiming China was a closed country. It clearly was
not. But, as always, we are discussing orders of magnitude and it simply cannot
be denied that, whether it be goods or ideas, Qing China simply was more closed
than Britain, or, for that matter, Western Europe at the time. To claim like Joanna
Waley-Cohen, that “from the late sixteenth to the late eighteenth century, then,
Chinese were extremely interested in Europe and all it had to offer” is silly.589
Europeans were incomparably better informed about China than Chinese about
Europe, to provide just one example.
5. Labour: scarcity and abundance
We have already made several references to labour. Let us now enter the debate
about its role – in terms of quantity, quality and, of course, costs – in the emergence
of modern economic growth. Economists have produced some quite general
statements in this regard, which may have their relevance for debates on the Great
Divergence. We begin with some comments on the assumed specific consequences
of land-labour ratios first for institutions, in this case property-rights and pro-
duction-relations, and then for income and wage levels, which in turn are all
supposed to have had consequences for growth. Douglass North and Robert
Thomas, economists as well as economic historians, in their highly influential
book The rise of the Western world, take a quite explicit suggestion as their point of
departure. In their view, in the right political context, labour scarcity would imply
better property rights for those with land and better wages or working conditions
for those employed by others. They take it for granted that better secured property
rights and a free labour market have a positive effect on economic development
and growth as in their view their favourite example, Britain after the Glorious
589 Waley-Cohen, Sextants of Beijing, 128. See for critique Landes, ‘Why Europe and the West?’.
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Revolution, would show. Actually they only study the situation in Western Europe
from the year 900 onwards, comparing Britain and the Dutch Republic with France
and Spain, but the suggestion clearly is that they think their findings have general
validity.590 In all these regions, labour scarcity, primarily caused by the Black
Death, in the end strengthened the position of agriculturists as labourers and as
‘owners’ of land versus their lords. It can be supposed to have had similar positive
effects for those working as craftsmen. But what, as they themselves indicate,
determines the final impact of labour scarcity (or abundance) was the political
context. Differences in that context caused the emergence of differences between
Britain and the Dutch Republic, with ‘good’ institutions that protected property
rights optimally on the one hand and France and Spain on the other hand with
where that protection was much less developed. The importance of politics or
rather power relations is even more obvious when one looks at East and Central
Europe where, notwithstanding the emerging labour scarcity, the position in
particular of peasants deteriorated instead of improved. Historians even refer to
their situation as the emergence of a second serfdom.591
At the time, there certainly was not a simple market mechanism at work in
which supply and demand ruled supreme. Sheer power and force played a very
important role. Apart from highly exceptional real market-economies, the im-
pact of relative factor scarcity – because of factor endowment – on property
rights and the position of labour are determined by variables that are exogenous
to the economy to such a great extent, that, in practice, referring to factor
endowment hardly explains anything at all.592 That major role of institutions is
quite plainly illustrated by the fact that several scholars start from assumptions
that are almost the opposite of those suggested by North and Thomas in regard to
the impact of the relative availability of land and labour on the social status of
labour. I will restrict my own references to a theory suggested by the economist
Evsey Domar.593 He claims it is to be expected that those with power and money
will try to own the factor of production that is scarce, i. e. either labour or land. If,
given a situation with abundant free land, they are not in a position to control
labour, then there will be no rents for them to be gained and they will as a rule not
invest. That suggests a positive statistical correlation between ample availability
590 North and Thomas, ‘Economic theory of the growth of the Western world’.
591 See for an analysis Aston and Philpin, Brenner debate, and Chirot, Origins of backwardness
in Eastern Europe. This critical juncture in European history is referred to by Acemoglu and
Robinson, Why nations fail, chapter 4: ‘Small differences and critical junctures. The world
the plague created’ to show the fundamental importance of institutions over factor endo-
wments.
592 For a methodological critique of North’s and Thomas’s approach here see Field, ‘Problem
with neoclassical institutional economics’.
593 Domar, ‘Causes of slavery and serfdom’. See more in general Nieboer, Slavery as an in-
dustrial system and for some specific comments Evans, ‘Some notes on coerced labor’.
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of free land on the one hand and serfdom and slavery on the other. He then
theorises this connection as follows: “of the three elements of an agricultural
structure … free land, free peasants, and non-working landowners – any two
elements but never all three can exist simultaneously. But he too has to admit that
the combination to be found in reality will depend on the behaviour of political
factors.”594 That e. g. in the end peasants became free after the Black Death in
Britain whereas in Russia most of them were given the status of serfs is the
outcome of a political process and in his view, too, cannot be explained by simple
land-labour ratios. In many parts of Africa, population density over the entire
early modern era was low and land was so abundant as to be worthless. Slavery
indeed was quite common there, as to be expected, but wages for free labour were
quite low, which is somehow surprising.595 Labour only became abundant in
several regions of Africa during the later twentieth century.596 This meant that
the typical technique for agricultural production was land extensive and labour
saving. That ‘geographical’ fact, at least according to Jeffrey Herbst in his book
on states and power in Africa, would go a long way in explaining why so many
African states are relatively weak. When land is abundant, states are not needed
to protect private property rights and conversely are not able to collect taxes.597
Here, too, I would think that depends on the circumstances, not simply on
geography. In Russia in the early modern era, basically until the abolishment of
serfdom, labour was scarce enough and land abundant: but that did not help
labour because it was weak politically. There was a centralized despotic state that
did collect a fair amount of taxes and protected the property rights of the
landlords over their peasant-serfs, in order to ensure it had enough soldiers at its
disposal.598 Landlords knowing their country could not do without a big army
did not object to this ‘arrangement’. In descriptions of Spanish America, the
focus has always been on coercive labour relations, but more and more histor-
ians are now convinced that free labour and wage labour actually were quite
normal. In the words of Rafa¦l Dobado-Gonzlez and H¦ctor Garca-Montero:
“encomienda, repartimiento, mita and slavery were neither ubiquitous nor
permanent” and institutions of extractive nature “tended to contract or even
disappear.”599 This fact is then explained by referring to … the overall scarcity of
labour! We have already discussed the fact that in the United States and Canada
overall labour was scarce and land abundant but that this – with the very im-
594 Domar, ‘Causes of slavery and serfdom’, 21.
595 Allen, Global economic history, 96 – 97. The nature of slavery in Africa, however, was quite
different from that of slavery in the Atlantic.
596 Austin, ‘Resources, techniques and strategies south of the Sahara’.
597 Herbst, States and power in Africa.
598 See e. g. Hellie, Enserfment and military change in Muscovy.
599 Dobado-Gonzlez and Garca-Montero, ‘Neither so low nor so short’, 4.
Labour: scarcity and abundance 191
portant exception of course of the Southern States – did not lead to the emer-
gence of widespread coerced labour.
When it comes to explaining why Britain in the end became a country with
such exceptionally high numbers of landless wage labourers that also to a large
extent is a matter of politics rather than pure economics. It was a political
decision to ‘accept’ that peasants lost their land or even support policies with
that outcome. In China there continued to be free land until the very end of the
period discussed here, peasants continued to be free and the country had a non-
working class of landowners. Here, too, politics overruled economic ‘logic’.
China’s rulers did not want landowners to become powerful landlords with a
massive coerced labour force nor did they want the free peasantry to disappear
knowing full well that the last thing they as tiny foreign elite needed were huge
peasant revolts. What might also have played a role is the fact that most land-
lords, here and in many other parts of the world, actually often were not keen on
turning peasants into slaves or serfs. For many peasants the marginal product of
their labour descended to the subsistence level, which means they could not be
profitably exploited. It may well be the case that many societies had no coerced
labour because labour could not produce goods with such a high value added
and such ample outlet that it was worthwhile to coerce it. Plantations like those
set up by Westerners in their peripheries in that sense were quite special and
exceptional. The problem as always in history is that so much depends on
circumstances, agency and path dependency.
But let us finish our tour d’horizon of general claims made with regard to the
possible effects of certain land- and labour-ratios and switch to claims that might
be more directly relevant for explaining the Great Divergence. We begin with the
thesis of Julian Simon, who explicitly discusses the Great Divergence, or in his
terminology ‘the Great Breakthrough’ or ‘Sudden Modern Progress’, and claims
that increasing population size was the impetus behind the sharp rise of standards
of living that started in the late eighteenth century. Gradual improvements of
technology allowed increased population, which assisted technological improve-
ments, which fed back into population growth. When population in Europe hit a
particular point, a feedback-cycle set in. On page 11 of his book on the Great
Breakthrough, he writes: “The proximate cause of the higher present wealth is the
present level of technology… But what was the cause of technology … being what
it is?” This is his answer: “…the size of humanity (and the nexus of human
numbers with technology) has been the main driving force. Starting at any par-
ticular moment in the past, the length of time it took to reach the modern
breakthrough depended on the number of people endowed with intellect and
training who lived thereafter, together with the amount of technology in existence
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at the particular moment about which the question is being asked.”600 Institutions
and their changes in his view definitely are important but from a very long-run
perspective they themselves are the result of population growth: “…in the very
long run, all political, social, and economic dimensions are a function of pop-
ulation size and density and constitute endogenous intermediate variables rather
than independent causal variables.”601 His interpretation is, as he calls it, explicitly
mono-causal: “…the central point of this essay is that population size was both
necessary and sufficient for the history that occurred, whereas no other variable
among those that were necessary was also sufficient to determine the path of
resulting progress.”602 It is a major error to think population increase would lead to
diminishing returns. Quite the contrary : progress is dependent on idea sharing.
As population density increases, the availability of new ideas and the differ-
entiation of occupation allow those with extra time to make use of these ideas.
Rational optimist Matt Ridley agrees and argues that population density is nec-
essary for trade and division of labour, which is the route to economic prosperity.
The division of labour leads to inventions, which leads to further specialization.
Specialisation requires a large enough market to support it and as a result pop-
ulation density is the friend of economic progress. The prologue of his Rationalist
optimist on “when ideas have sex” basically is an improvisation on the theme of
‘increasing returns to knowledge’, a subject very dear to endogenous growth
theory.603 Oded Galor also thinks along these lines.
According to my unified growth theories the transition from stagnation to growth is an
inevitable outcome (sic PV!) of the process of development. During the Malthusian
epoch technological progress permitted an increase in the size of the population, while
population size affected the rate of technological progress. The size of the population
determined the supply of, and demands for, ideas. It also influenced the diffusion of
ideas, the degree of specialisation in the production process that stimulated ‘learning
by doing’, and the level of international trade that further fostered technological
progress. At the same time, the rate of technological progress and its effect on the
resource constraint, enabled population growth.604
Mancur Olson does not provide an extensive explanation for his finding but he
does claim that analysing all countries for which the required data were available at
600 Simon, Great Breakthrough, 179.
601 Simon, Great Breakthrough, 139.
602 Simon, Great Breakthrough, 179.
603 Ridley, Rational optimist, ‘Prologue’. His position, to be honest, is not entirely clear as he
also tells us that increasing population caused a decline in the living standards of e. g. Japan
and Denmark. Increasing population there decreased the value of labour and therefore
impacted negatively on the market for specialization and inventions, which to my view also
is what happened in Qing China.
604 See the interview with him ‘Towards a unified theory of economic growth’, 124 – 125
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the time he wrote his text in 1996, he found a positive and statistically significant
relationship between population density and per capita real income: “the greater
the number of people per square kilometre, the higher the per capita income”605
Amongst historians, John Komlos is one of the few who to my knowledge
explicitly stresses Boserupian effects in his analysis of the Industrial Revolution
and argues: “Population growth was … the proximate cause of the industrial
revolution … the achievement of the pervious millennia were the preconditions
for sustaining the economic momentum precipitated by the rise in pop-
ulation”.606 Gregory Clark gives a quite idiosyncratic twist to this idea by claiming
that what really grew during Britain’s Industrial Revolution and what lay at the
base of Britain’s hegemony was not so much its economy – with very low growth
rates – as its population.607 For him the actual drive behind industrialisation was a
growing population that needed more food. That extra food had to be imported
and paid for by manufacturing: “The food and raw material imports of the
Industrial Revolution had to be paid for by exports of manufactured goods. It was
this, rather than technological advances, that made [sic! PV] Britain “the
workshop of the world.”608 The way I read it, this can only mean that Britain’s
industrialisation was caused by its population increase, which strikes me as a very
far-fetched and unconvincing line of reasoning that is also hard to square with
other claims by Clark. The contrast he draws between paying for imports by
exporting manufactured goods on the one hand and making technological ad-
vances on the other, is strange: Britain could export more thanks to those tech-
nological advances. The simple fact that Britain imported food can hardly have
worked as an incentive for any concrete entrepreneur in Britain to start exporting
more manufactured goods. The claim made in the quote also conflicts with
another claim that Clark, as we already indicated, quite explicitly made in the very
same book, when he writes that the essence of Britain’s take-off consisted in the
expansion of its useful knowledge. That last claim could be reconciled with his
comment on growing population if we assume that a growing number of people
ipso facto lead to more innovation, especially in a country like Britain that,
according to Clark, was inhabited by a quite special kind of people.
The problem is that, in practice, the positive ‘Boserupian’ connection that all
the scholars just referred to assume between population density, innovation and
605 Olson, ‘Big bills left on the sidewalk’, 48.
606 Komlos, ‘Thinking about the Industrial Revolution’, 205.
607 See Clark, ‘What made Britannia great?’ and Clark, Farewell to alms, 249: “The unusual
growth of population during the Industrial Revolution in England, and the simultaneous
expansion of the cultivated area in the United States, were more important than the specific
technological advances of these years for the transformation of the economy and the
society.”
608 Clark, Farewell to alms, 248
Part two: Actual explanations of the Great Divergence194
growth is anything but obvious and certainly not universal. For the history of
Western Europe over the last thousand years, for example, it would be very hard,
or rather simply impossible, to prove it. David Landes describes the European
Middle Ages as, “one of the most inventive societies that history has ever
known.”609 But, strikingly enough, many inventions and innovations occurred in
the Late Middle Ages when the population decreased sharply in the wake of the
Black Death. The period of, and just after that pandemic, at least in Western
Europe, saw the introduction of several technological innovations in production
as a reaction to labour scarcity and high costs.610 Eric Jones calls the fifteenth
century “… a period of distinct technological advance”.611 Technological prog-
ress, according to him, has not slowed since, permanently creeping forward and
remaining unchecked, a circumstance he calls ‘unique’.612 Renaissance Italy was a
highly inventive society, as were Golden-Age Holland and eighteenth-century
England. At the time of their apex, these were among the most densely inhabited
regions of Europe. There does not seem to be an overall uniform pattern. With
regard to the situation in pre-industrial England, Nicolas Crafts and Terence Mills
conclude: “There is no evidence of a positive feedback from increasing pop-
ulation size to technological progress as postulated by unified growth theory.”613
Moreover, if a clear correlation existed, then what to think of Qing China,
where the population increased from some 150 million to over 400 million
between 1680 and 1850? Why wasn’t it the most technologically innovative
society on the globe and the place where the Great Breakthrough took place?
Simon devotes an entire chapter of his book (chapter 5) to this question,
comparing Europe to China, but what he writes there, surprisingly enough, does
not support his main thesis at all. What really matters in understanding the
difference between these two regions, as he claims there, is the fact that both
regions had different political-institutional systems. He then adds two quite
peculiar comments: firstly, that they both were parts of the same larger system,
which would imply that the question of why they differed would not be a
question of any importance to his book, which only addresses the question of
why Sudden Modern Progress began anywhere in the world ; and secondly, that
an answer to the question “Why Europe and not China” cannot be given sci-
609 Landes, Wealth and poverty, 45.
610 For a general analysis see Pamuk, ‘The Black Death and the origins of the Great Divergence
across Europe’, and Herlihy, The Black Death and the transformation of the West. For
specific examples, see Mokyr, Lever of riches, chapter 3.
611 Jones, European Miracle, 59.
612 Jones, European Miracle, 63.
613 See the Abstract of their ‘From Malthus to Solow’. On page 91 of that text they conclude that
basically from the mid-sixteenth century to 1800 there was “no general tendency for
technological progress to accelerate as population increases”.
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entifically614 (Italics in original). That is a depressingly weak and evasive answer,
to say the least. The previous paragraphs also indicate that the less far-fetched
thesis – namely, that at least for the period in history before science and tech-
nology became large-scale and institutionalised, there indeed was a positive
correlation between the size and growth of population and the level and devel-
opment of technology – is also indefensible. With increasing population as a
rule, the number of clever minds indeed also increases, as does the chance that
innovations will occur.615 Justin Yifu Lin has applied and defended this thesis for
Song China, a period when the country was quite densely populated and ex-
tremely creative and innovative. Without an epistemic basis in ‘theory’ or ‘sci-
ence’, however, that provided a basis for experiment-based technology, this
experience-based knowledge bled to death.616
Considering the recent and big success amongst economists of Oded Galor’s
unified growth theory, which explicitly postulates links between population
density on the one hand and (modern) growth and innovation (or their absence)
on the other, some brief extra comments are in order here. Actually, any his-
torian can come up with many examples that contradict his grandiose claims. Let
us focus on the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain, the central explanandum
of this text.617 Can unified growth theory throw light on this fundamental phe-
nomenon that is generally considered to be the take-off to modern economic
growth? Can it explain why it occurred in Great Britain and why in the eighteenth
/ nineteenth centuries? To figure that out, one would in any case also have to
compare Great Britain with other countries in the world and those centuries with
other periods in time. Galor never does this. He, moreover, starts from certain
assumptions and makes certain claims that simply do not fit the case of Great
Britain. He assumes, for example – strikingly enough only focusing on fertility –,
that all societies till about the eve of industrialisation would have been Mal-
thusian in the strict sense in which demographers use the word. For Great
Britain, that simply is not the case. Another assumption is that before in-
dustrialisation, consumption would have been at or very near subsistence. As a
matter of fact, even ordinary labourers in early modern Great Britain had an
income clearly above bare subsistence. Galor’s claim that there would have been
macro-inventions before industrialisation so that the innovations we associate
614 Simon, Great Breakthrough, 160 – 161.
615 A claim (also) made in e. g. Clark, Farewell to alms, XX; Diamond, Guns, germs and steel,
407 – 408, and Persson, ‘Malthus delusion’, 171 – 172.
616 See e. g. Justin Yifu Liu, ‘Needham Puzzle’. This is also the basic position of Mokyr. See e. g.
his Gifts of Athena, chapter 1. The question of why Qing China was far less innovative still
remains.
617 All my following comments refer to unified growth theory as Galor presents it in the book
with the same name.
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with that revolution cannot per se cause it, ignores the very specific character of
the main inventions of the Industrial Revolution, in particular the steam en-
gine.618 Galor’s unified growth theory relates industrialisation to a new demo-
graphic regime with lower fertility. With better prospects, so he claims, in-
vestment in the education of children and choosing for their quality instead of
their quantity began to pay. But there is a broad consensus amongst economic
historians that the bulk of the population in Great Britain only experienced
growth in terms of increasing real income per capita from the 1830s or even
1850s onwards. That means that, in terms of unified growth theory, it was only
then that parents would have had a good reason to get fewer children. Many
historians would claim that in the early stages of industrialisation there actually
was some deskilling of the labour force.619 Even if over time a connection be-
tween a demographic transition, rising education, and industrialisation indeed
developed, it simply did not exist at the time when the economy of Great Britain
took off. Investment in education in terms of official schooling only increased
there after 1870. Besides, fertility declined in France before it did in Great
Britain. In Qing China in all probability, households with high status and a very
high investment in education practiced fertility control, but there was no in-
dustrialisation. I have already referred to the in-existence of any clear correlation
between population size and inventiveness several times. In my view, one can
only conclude that unified growth theory has nothing to offer historians when it
comes to explaining why exactly eighteenth-century Great Britain was the first
country to know modern economic growth. Overall its assumptions are so
unrealistic and its main claims so easily refutable that one can only wonder why
economists would take unified growth theory seriously.
Fairly direct connections between changes in population and innovation
definitely do emerge sometimes, but, as far as I see it, these cannot be reduced to
one general, overall logic. That can hardly be made clearer than by the fact that
many scholars hold the exact opposite view from Boserup, Simon and others and
claim that a scarce labour force is to be preferred over a numerous one for such
extensive economic development that depends on technological innovation.
They claim that a numerous population tends to act as a brake on development
and leads to all sorts of Malthusian trouble, whereas labour scarcity – in any case
when expressed in high wages – would stimulate innovation. The thesis that
labour in the West would have been relatively scarce and that this then would
have had positive effects on its development has never been without support, in
618 See for a similar claim Robert Lucas, Lectures on economic growth, 114, a new version of his
text ‘The Industrial Revolution: Past and Future’. Just like Galor, Lucas also claims that with
industrialisation it became rational and worthwhile to limit fertility.
619 See my comments on page 225.
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particular amongst scholars trying to explain the Great Divergence on the basis
of structural, specific characteristics of Western European society. That relative
scarcity is assumed to have had several favourable effects on development and
growth. It is supposed to have played a role in the emergence of relatively strong
property rights and of a relatively free labour force in the West. These would have
become the mainstays of a capitalist economy, which according to most econ-
omists and economic historians, was a better guarantor of growth and wealth
than any known alternative. That labour scarcity, moreover, would in any case
have led to high wages in Western Europe. These would have prompted em-
ployers there to look for less labour-intensive and more capital-intensive ways of
producing. The impact of that strategy would have been felt through the entire
economy because nowhere in the world (full) wage labour was as normal as it
was in the West (in Britain first and foremost).
This is a line of reasoning with a long pedigree in European economic history.
We find it, for example, in the book by Jones on the European miracle to which we
already referred a couple of times. He suggests that a tendency to choose capital-
intensive strategies existed in Europe because of the relatively low density of
population. The fact that the type of agriculture that prevailed in Western Europe
required animals, heavy ploughs and mills to mill grain only reinforced this
tendency to look for capital-intensive solutions.620 Landes too refers to the positive
effects of labour scarcity in Europe.621 I already referred to scholars who have
pointed at the incisive effects of the Black Death.622 Although claiming there is a
connection between labour scarcity and innovation seems quite obvious, it on
second thoughts is not, in particular because it is not obvious what labour scarcity
actually means, how it might be measured and even more important here, how it
might be compared. In principle, scarcity is a relative concept defined by the ratio
between supply and demand. That means that one has to be careful in simply
taking population density as a proxy. The same goes for nominal or real wages.
That is not particularly unproblematic when one compares different economies.
To my mind, the best indicator of the relative scarcity of labour in one society as
compared to another society would be its relative cost as compared to other factors
of production. There are good reasons to think that labour in that sense indeed was
relatively scarce in early modern Europe as compared to in any case East Asia,
although in my view, not many scholars have actually put this claim to a very
systematic test. Let us expand some more on its possible implications.
620 Jones, European Miracle, pages XXVII and 227.
621 See his ‘Reply to Peer Vries and Om Prakash’, 9: “… I would give more attention to … the
persistent European scarcity of labour by comparison, say, with Asian societies. Much,
though not all, of the European fascination with and demand for machinery, and the eager
substitution of capital for labour, can be understood in these terms …”
622 See note 610.
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6. Factor endowments: labour-saving Britain versus
labour-absorbing China
Many mainstream economists accord a prominent role to factor endowments in
economic development and, like Heckscher and Ohlin in their theorem, ‘predict’
economic specialisation on the basis of factor prices. In practice, however, it is
not unequivocal what that would mean in concrete cases. High wages can be a
good reason to look for labour-saving innovations, but ceteris paribus those
same high wages make it less easy for entrepreneurs to accumulate and find
money to invest in innovations. With low wages, in contrast, innovation may be
less urgent but, again ceteris paribus, accumulating money is easier. In debates
about the Great Divergence, one can come across both arguments. Very recently,
Robert Allen has turned labour scarcity in terms of high wages as compared to
the costs of other factors of production into the essence of his explanation of
Britain’s Industrial Revolution. He bases his analysis on the premise that Britain
had very high real and nominal wages when its industrialisation began: with
parts of what now is the Netherlands, the highest in the world. ‘Absolute’ labour
scarcity may well have played a role here but high wages in Britain certainly were
also related to the fact that the very high remunerations in London’s service
sector – that would have been inconceivable with the rise of Britain’s fiscal-
military state and its position as global trader – overall drove up payment in the
relatively small and integrated British economy, without, however, creating one
fully integrated labour market with one wage level.623 This, combined with rel-
atively low cost of energy and relatively low interest rates, in his view, made a
capital- and energy-intense route the natural course for Britain’s manufacturing.
This, for similar and some specific reasons we already referred to, also applied to
Britain’s agriculture.624 He systematically and explicitly tackles the question of
(non-) industrialisation from the perspective of factor-endowment, as the fol-
lowing quotations illustrate: “The Industrial Revolution was the result of high
wages – and not just their cause.”625 Elsewhere it reads: “…the explanation [of
why the Industrial revolution was British] lies in Britain’s unique structure of
wages and prices” and “Britain’s high-wage, cheap-energy economy made it
profitable for British firms to invent and use the breakthroughs of the Industrial
623 Allen made this connection between commerce and high wages in Britain already very
explicit in an unpublished paper from 2006, called ‘The British Industrial Revolution. How
commerce created the Industrial Revolution and modern economic growth.’ He later pu-
blished ‘Why the industrial revolution was British: commerce, induced invention, and the
scientific revolution’. This clearly indicates that his explanation is not solely and cannot
solely be conceived in terms of simple factor-endowments.
624 Allen, British Industrial Revolution in global perspective.
625 Allen, Global economic history, 13.
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Revolution.”626 Borrowing money for investment was quite cheap too in Brit-
ain.627 That of course is not irrelevant, even if at the moment no scholar would
endorse this claim by T.S. Ashton (1899 – 1968) in a classic text about the In-
dustrial Revolution in England:
If we seek – it would be wrong to do so – for a single reason why the pace of economic
development quickened about the middle of the eighteenth century, it is to this that we
must look [i. e. the lowering of the rate of interest] . The deep mines, solidly built
factories, well-constructed canals, and substantial houses of the industrial revolution
were the products of relatively cheap capital.628
It need not come as a surprise, still according to Allen, that there was so much
interest in machines in Britain. In a context where labour was expensive and
capital cheap, they were profitable.629 High wages for Allen not only serve as
explanation for economic growth in industrialising Britain. They also figure very
prominently in his explanation for the economic development of the United
States, in which he follows in the footsteps of John Habakkuk and his claim that
the ample availability of free land there caused high wages which in turn made
entrepreneurs keen on introducing labour-saving technologies.630 He even goes
as far as to postulate a kind of virtuous circle for the Western world: “…high
wages induced more capital-intensive production that, in turn, led to higher
wages. This spiral underlies the rising incomes of rich countries.”631
626 Allen, Global economic history, 31. Actually it was not so much ‘energy’ that was cheap in
Great Britain but coal and then in particular in specific regions.
627 For information on interest rates in Britain see e. g. Ashton (See the next note); Mathias,
First industrial nation, under ‘interest’, and Flandreau, ‘Bell Jar’. For concrete examples see
Temin and Voth, ‘Private borrowing during the Financial Revolution’. Here again, however,
context matters. Low interest rates indeed can facilitate investment, but they can also be an
indicator that profitable opportunities to do so are lacking and that the economy with those
low interest rates is in a ‘stationary state’. As Adam Smith wrote: “ …as the usual market
rate of interest varies in any country, we may be assured that the ordinary profits of stock
must vary with it, must sink as it sinks, and rise as it rises. The progress of interest,
therefore, may lead us to form some notion of the progress of profit.” Smith, Wealth of
Nations, IX 4, page 105.
628 Ashton, Industrial Revolution, 9.
629 See e. g. Allen, Global economic history, 32 – 33.
630 Habakkuk, American and British technology in the nineteenth century.
631 Allen, Global economic history, 47. Apparently, though, things do not always work out like
this, even in Allen’s perception. On page 24 of his Global economic history, he refers to the
silver influx into Spain that began in the sixteenth century and then comments that it led to
much higher inflation there than in the rest of Europe and made Spanish agriculture and
manufacturing uncompetitive. High wages here apparently were a liability, not an asset. Is
that only because other factors of production would be expensive in Spain at the time? Just
to show that there is always an economist claiming the opposite: Francois Simiand (1872 –
1935), a quite influential French economist-historian, was convinced that periods of low
prices and wages, in his terms periods best described as ‘phase B’, would be periods that saw
most innovation. See for his ideas and methods F. Vayssiere, ‘Raison collective et progrÀs
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On the other hand, he associates low wages with economic stagnation and
poverty traps. In very poor countries “…labour is so cheap that businesses have
no incentive to invent or adopt machinery to raise productivity.”632 He clearly
suggests that the cheaper labour is relative to other factors of production, the
fewer incentives there are to industrialise: “It only pays to substitute that much
capital for labour when wages are high relative to capital costs.”633 The point
Allen is making specifically for Britain had already been often made with ref-
erence to entire Western Europe. According to several scholars, that region was
characterised by a quite exceptional labour to capital goods ratio, and therefore
had a more technology-driven economy than other regions of the world already
from the High and Late Middle Ages onwards. Joel Mokyr, for example, wrote in
1990, “… medieval Europe was perhaps the first society to build an economy on
nonhuman power rather than on the backs of slaves and coolies.”634 Landes in
1998 made a similar claim: “Europe, as nowhere else, was a power-based civi-
lization.”635 Labour scarcity is supposed to have led to the introduction of new
technologies – in particular in towns but also in the countryside – such as
watermills and windmills, and much more importantly when it comes to the
total amount of energy they provided, the use of animals, wood, and in some
regions peat and coal. That labour in Western Europe overall was relatively free
and therefore at times had a good bargaining position certainly also played a role
in this tendency to substitute it with capital.
In China, as Allen argues, energy, money and certain resources were relatively
much more expensive and wages much lower, which made choosing a labour-
intensive option the rational thing to do. In their comparison of the economy of
the Yangzi Delta and the Netherlands at the beginning of the nineteenth century,
Jan Luiten van Zanden and Bozhong Li also found clear indicators that the
economy in China’s core region was on a different, more labour-intensive tra-
jectory from that chosen in the economic core of Western Europe.636 The many
recent publications on a specific East Asian path of development, e. g. by the
Japanese economic historian Kaoru Sugihara, also associate Western in-
dustrialisation, the first in world history, with a specific factor endowment in
which the labour supply was less ‘unlimited’ than it would be in East Asia’s
¦conomique: la th¦orie du cycle de FranÅois Simiand’, http://dumas.ccsd.cnrs.fr/docs/00/
81/78/54/PDF/2012 – 06_VAYSSIERE_RAI.pdf consulted on 04 – 06 – 2013.
632 Allen, Global economic history, 13.
633 Allen, Global economic history, 51. See also ibidem, 51: “Labour has to be very expensive to
make it worthwhile to build all that extra capital” and 55: “Industrial technology, however,
was not cost-effective in other parts of the world where wages were lower.”
634 Mokyr, Lever of riches, 35.
635 Landes, Wealth and poverty, 46. Both Mokyr and Landes refer to the medievalist Lynn White
as their ‘source’ for this claim.
636 Bozhong Li and Van Zanden, ‘Before the Great Divergence?
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industrialisation as it set in later on and that Sugihara describes as labour
intensive.
Table 25: Pre-industrial energy consumption in Britain and China, (%)
Britain 1600 1700 1800 China 18th century
Food 27.5 19.9 7.4 47
Fodder 25.6 16.4 8.8 43
Firewood 28.7 13.4 4.4 8 (firewood and fossil fuel)
Fossil fuels 16.7 48.6 77
Wind 0.5 0.8 2.3 2 (wind and water)
Water 1 0.6 0.2
Precise figures for a comparison of non-human energy use in Britain with that in China are
lacking. But all estimates we do have in any case suggest it was several times higher in
Britain than it was in China.
Based on: Paul Warde, Energy consumption in England and Wales, 1560 – 2000 (Naples
2007) 69 and 73, and (for China) on Paolo Malanima, Energia e crescita nell’Europa
preindustriale (Rome 1996) 124. See also S.A.M. Adshead, Material culture in Europe and
China, 1400 – 1800 (Houndmills Basingstoke 1995) chapter 5, and Paolo Malanima, ‘En-
ergy crisis and growth 1650 – 1850: the European deviation in a comparative perspective’,
Journal of Global History 1,1 (2006) 101 – 122.
Graph 8: The increase of energy consumption since the beginning of industrialisation in
billions of tons
Source: The Economist December 31st 1999, page 81.
Britain not only had much more non-human energy per capita. It also had much
more land per agriculturalist. Farms on average were much bigger there and had
far more animals and more implements.637 British farms took advantage of
637 See my Zur politischen Ökonomie des Tees, 97 – 126.
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positive scale effect and used far more ‘outside’ labour that worked for wages.
Reasons abounded to try to substitute labour with capital goods. What is
striking is not only that such clear differences existed between Britain and
China, but that they tended to increase over time on top of that. In Britain, the
amount of land, animals and capital goods per agriculturalist tended to increase
and farms tended to become bigger, in China exactly the opposite happened. In
that respect, the situation in Japan was quite similar to that in China in the period
from the seventeenth until the first half of the nineteenth century.638 Considering
all the characteristics we associate with industrialisation, – first and foremost
high energy use, the use of scale effects, and wage labour – chances clearly were
far greater that it would occur first in Britain.
The contrast presented between the situation in Great Britain and in China in
the previous paragraphs might give the impression that the situation of China
was increasingly more Malthusian – that is, it was characterised by a tension
between population and resources – than that of Great Britain, even though over
the entire period discussed here, from the 1680s to the 1850s, Great Britain’s
population was far from stagnant. Malthusians, as indicated, focus on the dis-
advantages of population growth, on the permanently lurking danger of over-
population. In the what-went-wrong-story for China, the country often has been
portrayed as the example par excellence of an economy that had entered a
Malthusian cul-de-sac ; a ‘land of famine’ having too many people and not
enough resources.639 The dangers of overpopulation, of course, were not un-
known in Europe. Malthus was an Englishman and undoubtedly also had the
situation in his own country in view when he wrote down his ideas. But ac-
cording to many scholars, those dangers would – in particular in Western Eu-
rope – in the end have been kept in check by a conscious policy of limiting
population growth.640
Current scholarship admits the existence of clear differences between the
demographic systems of China and Western Europe, but most scholars now
think that those differences did not make much difference strictly in terms of
638 See e. g. Macfarlane and Harrison, ‘Technological evolution and involution’.
639 See Mallory, China: Land of famine.
640 It has always been a stock in trade argument of ‘Eurocentrists’ to point at the West European
marriage pattern – in particular characterised by the fact that people married late and a
high number of them married never at all – as uniquely European and as a way in which
Western Europe in contrast to other parts of the world kept its population increase in check.
At the moment, most scholars would accept it indeed was uniquely Western European but
would doubt that it functioned as a more efficient means of population control than the
means used in e. g. early modern China. For the uniqueness of the Western European
marriage pattern see Engelen and Wolf, Marriage and the family in Eurasia. For alternatives
when it comes to checking population growth, see Lee and Wang Feng, One quarter of
humanity.
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population growth. In both regions population grew over the period 1680 to
1850: In China from an estimated 150 million to an estimated 400 – 410 million
and in Western Europe from some seventy-five million to some 170 million and
in both there were Malthusian pressures. In Great Britain, the population over
that period increased from some seven to some twenty-one million. It is, of
course, rather rash to make firm statements about the relative overpopulation of
any of these regions on the basis of such aggregated data. They had very different
population densities to begin with in their core regions, population was spread
differently, and they had completely different agricultural systems and resource
portfolios, and so on. But at least aggregated figures and analyses of the situation
in both countries regarding available resources per capita do not provide any
clear proof that China got into trouble because of population pressure, whereas
‘Europe’ had developed strategies to prevent such pressures from even emerging.
Population pressure clearly existed and increased in high Qing China, but overall
its effects became so problematic because China did not industrialise rather than
that China did not industrialise because it was in a fatal Malthusian predicament.
Britain actually was already experimenting with solutions to break its Mal-
thusian constraints before it had really hit its Malthusian ceiling. In any case, as
we have already seen on pages 189 – 221, it is very hard to make clear, mono-
causal statements about connections between population resources and growth.
What is clear is that whatever the exact relationship may have been between
population pressure and economic problems in China in the nineteenth century,
population pressure clearly was not the only cause of the economic hardship.
Demography in the wider sense of the word definitely played a role in setting
China on a path that, while not making growth impossible, did inhibit the
emergence of modern industry and modern economic growth. I will refer here to
its predominant household mode of production with its specific power relations
that in my view really set China’s economy on a trajectory quite different from
that of Britain. I already referred to some effects of that mode of production
when it comes to consumer behaviour, opportunities to specialise and profit
from scale effects, investment patterns and the development of a market for wage
labour. I will later on expand further on them.641 The prevailing power relations
and familial norms and values also had their impact on economic life. They
made it, for example, less easy for Chinese women to work outside their home
under one roof with non-family members.642 Family and firm, as a rule, were not
separated. China’s inheritance system very much favoured splitting up in-
641 See pages 339 – 342.
642 See note 734.
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heritance under all heirs. Overall its system of law was more based on dealing
with members of families than with individuals.643
The question how an economy that had once been as productive and dynamic
as China’s could have become so poor and static has captured the attention of
economic historians. Two interpretations have dominated the debate when it
comes to the role of demographic factors – and those are the one we are focusing
on here – in explaining that development. Their overall assessment of the de-
velopment of China’s economy, first and foremost its agriculture, in the end
leads to fairly similar results but their points of departure and their general
assessments are quite different. The first interpretation, which is always asso-
ciated with economic historian Philip Huang, looks at that development in terms
of ‘involution’.644 The opportunity costs of family labour were quite low. Mem-
bers of the family had to be provided for anyhow and when they were at home
and had time to spare, that time was not considered money. So there was a
tendency to increase the labour input of family members even when marginal
returns decreased, to use them for all sorts of extra activities and to not or at least
as little as possible hire external labour.
Mark Elvin, who claims that China’s pre-industrial economy would have
ended up in a high-level equilibrium trap, represents the other interpretation, in
according to which the initial strengths and positive dynamics of pre-industrial
China’s economy receive more attention but that in the end too focuses on the
stasis, that came to characterise China’s economy because of Malthusian
problems.645 What he refers to clearly is a Malthusian trap:
Clearly the shortage of many resources grew more severe. … A major cause of these
shortages was of course the continuing growth of the population under conditions of
relative technological standstill.646
Traditional inputs, whether in the form of irrigation works, fertilizer or labour, were
also nearly as high as they could be without running into sharply diminishing or even
negative, returns.647
The following quotation indicates why it is called high-level equilibrium:
… in late traditional China economic forces developed in such a way as to make
profitable invention more and more difficult. With falling surplus in agriculture, and so
643 Idiosyncratic in dealing with these and related topics but also quite interesting, is Gates,
China’s motor.
644 See e. g. his Peasant economy and social change in North China ; Peasant family and rural
development in the Yangzi Delta, and ‘Development or involution in eighteenth-century
Britain and China’. For the definition of involution see page 182 of this book.
645 Elvin, Pattern of the Chinese past, chapter 17, plus idem, Another History, chapters 2 and 3.
646 Elvin, Pattern of the Chinese past, 301.
647 Elvin, Pattern of the Chinese past, 306.
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falling per capita income and per capita demand, with cheapening labour but in-
creasingly expensive resources and capital, with farming and transport technologies so
good that no simple improvements could be made, rational strategy for peasant and
merchant alike tended in the direction not so much of labour-saving machinery as of
economizing on resources and fixed capital. Huge but nearly static markets created no
bottlenecks in the production system that might have prompted creativity. When
temporary shortages arose, mercantile versatility, based on cheap transport, was a
faster and surer remedy than the contrivance of machines. This situation may be
described as a ‘high-level equilibrium trap.’648
According to Elvin, China’s economy went through a “medieval revolution”
during the Song and Yuan dynasties, in which its agriculture and systems of
transport as well as its monetary and credit system, its market-system, and its
science and technology became very efficient and sophisticated. What emerged
was a situation in which labour became relative abundant and cheap, resources
in contrast relatively scarce and expensive. In many respects, the economy
continued to function at a very high level of development also after that medieval
apogee, especially when it comes to the production of food and the efficiency of
markets and transportation. It was in a trap nevertheless, as machines or large
scale co-ordination that may have led to a real qualitative breakthrough, were not
needed – although they might have been very helpful – and, more importantly,
often simply were not directly profitable. In fact the situation here had become
the exact opposite of that which existed in Britain in the eighteenth century
according to Robert Allen and in that case corroborates his ideas on why Britain
did industrialise, although Allen never explicitly refers to Elvin’s trap. In case
bottlenecks occurred, solutions were found with recourse to extra very cheap
labour and to the very well functioning markets. Buying up land and then renting
it out and by lending money against high interest rates could result in high
earnings. For those who wanted to make productive investments, it was neither
easy to find capital nor to find profitable investment outlets. As a whole, the
economy produced a substantial surplus and ordinary people clearly need not
necessarily have been poor as in classical involution stories. The problem was to
find profitable innovative investment for that surplus. Over time, so Elvin
claims, per capita surplus decreased and with it demand, which of course means
profitable outlets for investment in capital goods became even scarcer. In his
ReOrient, Gunder Frank uses exactly this demographical-economical model to
explain ‘the decline of the East’, in this case China.649
The arguments of Allen, Huang and Elvin look plausible and their empirical
underpinning looks solid. The point is whether their arguments actually provide
648 Elvin, Pattern of the Chinese past, 314.
649 Frank, ReOrient, 297 – 330.
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good and sufficient explanations for what occurred in China and how that is
different from what occurred in Britain. Where Allen postulates that relatively
high wages as compared to the costs of other factors of production (implements,
energy, money) acted as a spur for innovation in Britain, Huang and Elvin, in a
kind of mirror image for China, postulate that relatively low wages as compared
to the costs of other factors of production (implements, energy, money and also
land) led to a ‘trap’. Are they right?
7. High wages and low wages: stimuli and traps?
Allen’s thesis, in a nutshell, boils down to the claim that labour in Great Britain
was expensive, whereas energy and capital were cheap and that therefore the
economy of the country took a labour-extensive and capital- and energy-in-
tensive road, which led to what we call the first Industrial Revolution. He
sketches the situation in China in quite different terms. Without explicitly re-
ferring to them, he supports the Elvin-Huang interpretation of China’s early
modern economic history that characterises its economy as labour-abundant
with expensive non-human energy and capital goods and that looks at it in terms
of a high-level equilibrium trap or even an ‘involutionary’ dead-end street.
Allen’s thesis looks very convincing and logical indeed and is supported by
serious empirical research and data. In the context of the debate on the Great
Divergence and in particular on industrialisation, however, several cases come to
mind that indicate that in general matters probably were more complicated. We
already made several comments in our discussion of the thesis by Wong and
Rosenthal. A first problematic ‘case’ that one might refer to is the country that is
now called the Netherlands, a case that Allen discusses but which to my view he
cannot entirely fit in into his explanatory scheme. That country was at least as
wealthy as Britain, if not wealthier during the eighteenth century. Overall wages
were not lower than in Great Britain, with the exception of London. But in Great
Britain, London clearly was an outlier and not the place where industrialisation
began. Wages in Amsterdam e. g. were comparable to if not higher than those in
towns in South England.650 Wages in other towns in Holland were quite similar
and definitely not lower than e. g. in Lancashire. Interest rates in the Dutch
Republic were not higher than in Britain.651 Nor need energy have been more
expensive, as Newcastle coal could easily be shipped overseas to Amsterdam as
650 We of course speak here in terms of overall orders of magnitude and rough equivalences. See
Allen, ‘Great Divergence’, passim, and De Vries and Van der Woude, First modern economy,
chapter 12, e. g. tables 1 and 8.
651 De Vries and Van der Woude, First modern economy, chapter 4.
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soon as that was cheaper than buying peat at home.652 The Dutch Republic and
later on the Kingdom of the Netherlands continued to be a very wealthy, highly
developed country, but it did not become an early industrialiser, and was no
longer a technological innovator.
Another highly advanced region with high wages that we also already referred
to but where technological innovation faltered and no take-off took place is
Northern Italy. During the Late Middle Ages it was far more important as a
manufacturing region in Europe than Britain. It was famous for its highly de-
veloped wool production in towns where labour was relatively well paid. As I
already indicated in another context, it should have provided an ideal envi-
ronment for technological innovation. But in the early modern era, this region
was one of relative decline rather than dynamism and strikingly enough that has
very often been explained in reference to the high wages that guilds in towns
managed to enforce. High-wage towns, in this case, apparently lost out in
competition and high wages apparently were no stimulus for innovation. As
indicated, emerging silk manufacturing found a centre in Bologna, but ‘industry’
in general moved to places with low wages in the countryside and technological
breakthroughs did not occur.653 When it comes to high wages, I could also refer
to Spanish America, where according to Letitia Arroyo and colleagues, and even
according to Robert Allen, who is much less optimist about those wages, income
during the early modern era expressed in silver often was higher than on the
European Continent.654 In particular in case the figures by Arroyo and colleagues
would be correct, that would mean that high wages as such – as Allen is of course
aware – do not suffice to set an economy on a capital-intensive path.
For the specific cases of Britain and China, I think the factor-endowment
approach of Allen, Elvin and Huang certainly is very valuable, although it of
course cannot explain all there is to explain. What is interesting and should at
least provide food for thought is, as I have stated above, that industry in Britain
did not initially arise in its highest-wage regions, i. e. London and more in
general the South, but in regions where wages were, for British standards, quite
low.
As E.H. Hunt, an expert in the field, writes:
652 For coal prices in various European cities at the end of the eighteenth century see Allen,
Global economic history, 25, and idem, British Industrial Revolution, 99 – 103, for energy
prices, i. e. prices of coal, charcoal and peat. For the possibility to import (more) coal
cheaply from Newcastle to the Netherlands see De Vries and Van der Woude, First modern
economy, 718 – 719.
653 See under note 580.
654 See Arroyo Abad, Davies, and Van Zanden, ‘Between conquest and independence’ and the
figures calculated by Allen and colleagues in Table. 33.
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Major regional differences in wages already existed at the beginning of the classic
industrial revolution. Because industrial growth focused on parts of the North where
wages were low, industrialization initially eroded the pre-industrial pattern of wage
differentials.655
From a global perspective, even those wages in Britain’s industrialising North
were high but in my view it is clear that the fact that industrialisation did not
begin in Britain’s high wages regions makes Allen’s explanation less obvious and
convincing. That many experiments with steam engines e. g. by Thomas New-
comen (1683 – 1729), James Watt but also by Richard Trevithick (1771 – 1833),
took place in Cornwall in tin or copper mines where wages were low and coal was
expensive also does not really support Allen’s factor-endowment thesis. Neither
does the fact that regions such as Scotland and the Northeast that were well
endowed with coal and industrialised quite early, contributed very few ‘labour-
saving’ innovations and had relatively low wages.656 The problem is that one
might also set up a fairly obvious and convincing argument in which low wages
would facilitate industrialisation as Joel Mokyr, without any doubt just as ca-
pable and respected as an economic historian as Robert Allen, indeed has done:
…it is clear [sic] that the successful economies relied on a reservoir of cheap, elastically
supplied labour … The lesson to be learned from the experience of European countries
during the Industrial Revolution is that low wages, all other things being equal [sic!],
facilitated the accumulation of the capital necessary for the diffusion of the new
technologies, and that eventually these new technologies raised wages, thus eventually
eliminating the conditions that made their acceptance possible.
Rising wages and living standards are the reward that society reaps for the diligence,
abstinence and ingenuity of past generations.657
We will later discuss the possible connections between low wages and in-
dustrialisation on in this text658 but first continue our analysis of the British and
Chinese cases.
Industrialisation triggered an economic reallocation in which the heart of
England’s economy shifted to the North. Lancashire, the West Riding, and the
West Midlands, in that order, led the development of modern industry in Eng-
655 Hunt, ‘Wages’ and Morris Atlas of Industrializing Britain 1780 – 1914, page 64. It is very
important to realise that wages in London were exceptionally high, much higher than in the
regions where industrialisation took off. On average between 1700 and 1789 wages of
building craftsmen in London were sixty per cent higher than in Kent, Oxfordshire and
Lancashire on the whole. Such craftsmen on average over that period earned about twice as
much in London than in Lancashire. I take these figures from Malanima, ‘When did England
overtake Italy?’
656 See for that comment Dudley, Mothers of innovation, 125 – 130.
657 Mokyr, ‘Dear labor, cheap labor and the Industrial Revolution’, 195.
658 See pages 214 – 221.
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land for decades: they all were among the poorest and most backward regions of
the country in 1660 and even at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Lan-
cashire, the symbol par-excellence of industrialisation, was amongst the very
poor regions of England during the Middle Ages and the Restoration period in
terms of wealth assessed for tax.659 It was the second wealthiest region of the
entire country in 1843. In the period 1767 – 1770 Lancashire and the West Riding
were among the eleven countries with the lowest wages in Britain. Those mostly
were in Northern England. By 1794 – 1795, however, the regional picture of wages
had already been reversed completely. Then six of the eleven countries with the
highest wages were in the North, with the West Riding having the highest wages
of them all. In 1843, when Lancashire was the second wealthiest region of the
entire country, its wages were the third highest.660 Scotland, known for its very
low wages in the eighteenth century, quickly caught up with the industrialising
regions, i. e. it industrialised fast and in the process saw its wages increase. One
might argue that already in the 1840s it had become more industrialised than the
rest of Great Britain.661
Would not all this suggest that, in Great Britain and in British circumstances,
industry caused high wages in industrializing regions rather than the other way
around? In my view, Allen has developed a tendency to focus too exclusively on
wages and to underestimate the role of location. In the very important case of the
rise of the cotton industry, for example, what in my view was fundamental for its
emergence at specific places was the combination of relatively low wages and two
more strictly ‘locational’ advantages: being close to a harbour that could provide
a cheap and easy import of raw materials and an easy export of cloth and being
close to cheap energy-sources, first streaming water and then from the 1830s
onwards, coal. In the case of the iron industry, which needed heavy raw material
and tremendous amounts of fuel, I would also not underestimate the importance
of location. Britain did not become one integrated economy until the 1840s with
the advent of railroads. Only then did location become less determining. Overall,
also outside Britain, industry did not emerge first in regions where agriculture or
the service-sector was highly developed. As a rule, it did in a context of relative
poverty and backwardness, not high wages. London’s high wages, for example,
promoted the migration of shipbuilding to ‘out ports’ up the coast and around
the Isles towards pools of cheaper labour in the North, Scotland and Ireland.662
659 Information in this paragraph and the next one, unless indicated otherwise, is taken directly
from Inikori, Africans and the Industrial Revolution in England, chapter 2: ‘The English
economy in the longue dur¦e’.
660 I took this information from Hunt, ‘Industrialization and regional inequality’.
661 Devine, ‘Scotland’, 400.
662 See Parkinson, Trade Winds, 1793 – 1814. I found this reference in O’Brien, ‘Contributions
of warfare with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France’. Aversion of it has been published on
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Different factors costs certainly played an important role in setting economies
on different roads and facilitating different outcomes and Allen clearly has made
some very important points in his analyses. But industrialisation was not only a
matter of factor endowment (labour scarcity, fortunate endowment with coal
and easy money). In the Dutch Republic, factor costs that were fairly similar to
those in Britain did not trigger any industrialisation. Location, politics, in-
stitutions and the more or less autonomous development of science and tech-
nology also had their parts to play. The Industrial Revolution was about more
than just saving labour, or, more generally, cutting the cost of more expensive
factors of production and using more of the cheaper ones. One can find many
efforts to save coal via more efficient machines even though it was relatively
cheap. But there are also examples of coal being wasted because it was cheap.
Inventors themselves did not regard saving labour their main goal.663 Even if
high wages indeed functioned as a trigger to mechanisation, one would still have
to deal with the question of why this effect occurred in cotton production and,
more specifically, in cotton spinning.664 Relative factor-costs certainly played a
role but they certainly do not provide the entire story. Joseph Needham (1900 –
1995) already pointed out that imperial China with its dense population devel-
oped numerous labour-saving technologies much earlier than its European
counterpart and added: “…it is remarkable that we have never so far come
across any important instance of the refusal of an invention in Chinese society
due to fear of technological unemployment before the nineteenth century.”665
In that respect, it is striking how positive Allen is about the effects of high
wages on an economy. We already indicated he refers to a virtuous circle of high
wages – innovation – high wages in his history of Western industrialisation. That
description is hard to square with the history of Western capitalist economic
development with its permanent shifting of the economic cores where wealth
and innovation are concentrated. Although there are surprising continuities in
the Internet as a Working Paper of the Department of Economic History of LSE: http://
www2.lse.ac.uk/economicHistory/workingPapers/2011/WP150.pdf. For London’s econo-
my I refer to the book by Leonard Schwarz mentioned in note 578.
663 See for critical comments on the high-wages and low-energy cost argumentation defended
by Allen, e. g. Mokyr, Enlightened economy, 267 – 272, and McCloskey, Bourgeois dignity,
chapter 22. See Macleod, Inventing the Industrial Revolution for the various reason in-
ventors and innovators had – or in any case claimed to have – for their inventions and
innovations.
664 With Parthasarathi, I would claim the answer must be sought in the challenge of Indian
cotton textiles production. See Parthasarathi, Why Europe grew rich, passim.
665 See Joseph Needham, a.o. Science and civilization in China, Volume 7, Part II. General
conclusions and reflections (Cambridge 2004) 4. The original source is his article ‘Science
and society in East and West’, of which various versions exist and that was first published in
1964.
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the wealth and poverty of regions in Europe over the last thousand years666,
economic primacy there was not something self-perpetuating. There are several
stories of their rise and (relative) decline. Braudel, e. g. in his analysis of early
modern Western capitalism, refers to the following sequence of economic cen-
tres: Venice, Antwerp, Genoa, Amsterdam, London, and he could have added
New York for the period after the First World War.667 As we already indicated for
Northern Italy and for the Dutch Republic as well, where real wages were almost
frozen from 1680 to 1820, high wages became something of a trap. They have
done so in many regions over time.
Allen persistently claims that low wages create a poverty trap.668 But are low
wages by definition bad for innovation? One can easily think of exceptions and,
as we saw, Joel Mokyr with his claim that “successful economies relied on a
reservoir of cheap, elastically supplied labour” would think those ‘exceptions’
are the rule.669 What about a situation, for example, where labour to all intents
and purposes is cheap but machine-production nevertheless wipes out non-
machine production, as was the case in the second half of the nineteenth century
when British machine-produced yarn began to undercut Chinese hand spin-
ning? Would that not provide China’s businessmen with an incentive to invent or
adopt machinery to raise productivity? Maybe the Chinese situation was not
very well suited to being first but one would tend to think that with its ‘unlimited
supplies of labour’ it was quite suited to catching up  la Arthur Lewis. It may well
be that for a Chinese entrepreneur investment in machines at the time was
extremely expensive, as it indeed was. But that would ceteris paribus of course
not be the case for an entrepreneur from let us say Britain investing in China.
Ceteris paribus those same machines in any case would be even more productive
and profitable with cheap labour. According to E.A. Ross in 1914 “The cheapness
of Chinese labour is something to make a factory owner’s mouth water.”670
Ceteris paribus one would expect an enormous drain of investment from high-
wage to low-wage countries that as a rule have ‘unlimited supplies’ of labour. Not
by accident most (neo) classical economists have always liked to predict global
economic convergence. There indeed are many examples of situations where this
actually occurs, which shows that low wages can be an advantage and attract
investment. On the other hand, apparently, ‘other things’ often were not ‘equal’
and the bulk of ‘modern’ production remained in high-wage countries. The main
point, I would guess, is not the height of wages as compared to other factors of
production at a certain place, but their height as compared to what those who
666 See e. g. PolÀse, Wealth & poverty of regions, maps, 1, 2 and 3.
667 Braudel, Civilization and capitalism, 15th – 18th century, III, 27 – 35.
668 See e. g. Allen, Global economic history, 13.
669 See Mokyr, ‘Dear labor, cheap labor’.
670 Ross, Changing Chinese, 117.
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receive them actually produce, i. e. their productivity as compared to that pro-
ductivity someplace else. If, in principle machinery, technology and knowledge
are transferable but nevertheless – even with enormous wage differentials – so
much industry stays in high-wage countries, this shows other factors than wages
per se must play a large role. Would that not, amongst other things, force us more
extensively to discuss the problem that Clark tackled in his Farewell to alms, i. e.
the quality of labour, its skills, discipline et cetera?671 Apparently it is not that
simple to spread skills and effective use of technology.672
The level of wages in China in the period just before and during in-
dustrialisation in Britain could indeed have had a negative effect in the sense of
retarding and hindering massive industrialisation. As a general statement,
however, I think it clearly does not make much sense to directly blame its low
wages for the fact that China did not industrialise in the nineteenth century.
Before foreign machine-made goods massively entered their country, China’s
entrepreneurs basically competed amongst each other or, at best, with other
entrepreneurs who also lacked modern machinery. I fail to see why the simple
fact that Chinese wages, where low, in themselves, would then be a serious,
overall disincentive for them to try to invent or at least use almost any new
machinery or implement, considering the enormous domestic market for Chi-
nese goods. Even if something like a high-level equilibrium trap had existed,
does that mean profitable innovation of any kind would have been unthinkable?
Can one not think of any innovation that would have given Chinese producers an
opportunity to simply cut their costs and even undercut their competitors –
almost without any exception Chinese who had to pay ‘Chinese’ wages – on the
Chinese market – that was all but closed to foreign commodities – just as it did
for British entrepreneurs in their county, where wages were higher? Were
‘profitable’ labour-saving innovations impossible simply because labour was
cheap? There are good reasons to doubt that. For various sectors of Qing China’s
economy such as copper mining and irrigation and even coal mining, in-
novations could have been profitable even with the existing low wages. Even
Mark Elvin, who coined the expression ‘high-level equilibrium trap’, and con-
vincingly explained its logic, admits that he wonders why Qing China had so few
innovations.673 It was not struck in a poverty trap. It was not per se starved of
capital.674 In principle again, ceteris paribus, it should in any case have been very
671 See for some comments pages 226 – 231.
672 For some further comments see Amsden., Rise of ‘the rest’ under ‘skill deficits’ (pages 46 –
48); chapter 3: ‘Tribulations of technology transfer’ and chapter 5: ‘Lack of manufacturing
experience matters’.
673 See e. g. Elvin, Another history, chapters 2 and 3.
674 See for an underpinning of that thesis e. g. Lippit, Economic development of China and pages
240 – 241.
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attractive for foreign investors to move their machines from their high-wage
home countries to countries like China.
8. Labour-extensive and labour-intensive routes to growth?
The connection between low wages and the (non-) emergence of modern eco-
nomic growth deserves closer attention. Recently, the debate on industrialisa-
tion and modern economic growth, no doubt because of the East Asian Miracle
and the rise of economies like Brazil, has taken a different turn in which relatively
low wages and a relatively high labour-intensity are seen in a more positive light
as providing a specific labour-intensive route to growth. Here, I will focus on the
most important and most widely discussed example, that of the so-called East
Asian path of economic development, that especially in its take-off phase would
have had more traits of an ‘industrious’ than of an ‘industrial’ revolution, and on
the debates about it which clearly also impinge on how scholars now look at the
Industrial Revolution in Britain. During the nineteenth century, when the great
gap between rich and poor emerged, both the economies of China and Japan
were resource-scarce and labour-abundant. But China’s economy had a couple
of specific characteristics that ensured that it did not (yet) embark on a broad
labour-intensive industrialisation.675 Basically, it only did after 1978. So the focus
here will be on Japan, the country for which the concepts ‘industrious revolu-
tion’ and ‘labour-intensive industrialisation’ were originally coined. The scholar
who introduced this concept in economic history was Akira Hayami, an eco-
nomic historian from Japan, who first coined the term to describe economic
developments in Tokugawa Japan but later gave it a wider connotation.676 His
ideas have been very much popularised by Kaoru Sugihara, and are now en-
joying wider popularity amongst economic historians dealing with Asian Eco-
nomic development. I will base myself on his description and analysis.677
In his view, scholars theorising about industrialisation have to take on board
the different way(s) in which Asian countries industrialise or industrialised.
According to him, it is now clear that industrialisation can occur, and has
675 See page 276.
676 See e. g. Hayami, ‘Great transformation’; idem, ‘Industrious Revolution’: idem, ‘Industrial
Revolution versus Industrious Revolution’.
677 See in particular Sugihara, ‘Labour-intensive industrialisation in global history : the second
Noel Butlin Lecture’; idem, The state and the industrious revolution in Tokugawa Japan,
GEHN Working Paper no 2 (London, London School of Economics 2004) and idem ‘East
Asian path of economic development’. See also Pomeranz, ‘Is there an East Asian deve-
lopment path?, and Osamu Saito, ‘An industrious revolution in an East Asian market
economy?’ Very informative is Austin and Sugihara, Labour–intensive industrialization in
global history.
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occurred, in different cultures under a variety of factor endowments. In his
perception the ‘classic’, Western interpretation of industrialisation always fo-
cused on capital rather than labour. Talking about industrialisation in Western
capitalist economies as a rule meant talking about savings and investment,
capital goods, factories and scale effects. In analyses of the first, Western path to
industrialisation, the emphasis always lay on capital-intensive and resource-
intensive technology. He also argues that the role of labour was fairly un-
problematic. It was present, homogeneous and disposable. The rise of East Asia
shows a fundamentally different, what he calls ‘East Asian’, route to in-
dustrialisation that uses labour more fully and relies less on substituting capital
for labour. He explicitly considers East Asia’s labour-intensive industrious in-
dustrialisation as an alternative to the Industrial Revolution as it took place in
the West. In it, the family, in particular the peasant household continues to be the
predominant, labour-absorbing unit of production during the take-off stage.
Specialisation takes place inside this unit of production – the household – and
mainly in the countryside and not like in the West, predominantly between
different regions with individuals, in particular in towns, specialising in dif-
ferent skills. A lot of East Asian industry is rural-based, small-scale and more
labour-intensive and productive per unity of capital than its large-scale Western
counterpart. At the basis of these differences in ‘mode of production’ there
would be differences in factor endowment: high-wage economies, i. e. econo-
mies where labour is relatively scarce will be capital-intensive, low wage
economies where labour is relatively abundant will be labour-intensive. Regions
with labour-intensive industrialisation will export labour-intensive goods and
import capital-intensive ones. The Western capital-intensive and labour-in-
tensive path according to Sugihara and several colleagues is not the only one. The
global diffusion of industrialisation in any case was made possible by the de-
velopment of labour-intensive and resource-saving technologies that at the
moment provide the bulk of the world’s industrial employment, combining
cheap labour with Western technology. Considering the enormous population of
industrialising Asia, one might claim that this specific way of industrialising up
until now has been the main route by which mankind could escape the Mal-
thusian trap of overpopulation, not ‘Western’ industrialisation.
Those who think in terms of a specific East Asian development path tend to do
this on the basis of a quite specific interpretation of how Western Europe in-
dustrialized. I think that they overrate the capital-intensity of industrialisation
in the West and underrate its labour-intensity, at least when we look at the
beginning of the process. At any rate, the contrast between the beginning of
industrialisation in Britain and the beginning of industrialisation in ‘East Asia’
was not as great as they suggest. As indicated earlier on, over the last decades the
image of industrialising Britain has undergone some major changes. These in-
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clude the recognition that in the manufacturing sector, capital-intensity was not
as high and big factories not as normal as the traditional image of the industrial
revolution, with its focus on large scale mechanised production, i. e. steam,
machines and factories, and sudden, fundamental change suggested. It now is
recognised that factory production was much less predominant and that the role
of all sorts of flexible production combining work in factories, sweat shops or at
home, had been severly underestimated.678 In brief, what happened in Britain, in
many other European countries but also in the United States during the first
stages of industrialisation, often looked far more like the Asian model than
Sugihara cum suis assume in their East-West dichotomy. That dichotomy is quite
problematic anyway as there actually is no uniform Western route to a uniform
Western industrialisation. A comparison of the economic histories of Britain,
France or Germany, for example, over long nineteenth century suffices to make
that quite plain.679
That Japan and for that matter China went through an industrious revolution
is in no doubt, but it is becoming increasingly clear that such a revolution also
occurred in Western Europe in the early modern era and probably until far into
the nineteenth century as in particular economic historian Jan de Vries has
shown in several publications.680 There are unmistakable signs that in the cen-
turies before industrialisation and during it first decades, in Western Europe
labour input substantially increased. Paolo Malanima, in his overview of Eu-
rope’s pre-modern economy, concludes that, “On the whole it can be said that,
during the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries the overall number of working days
in Europe increased by some fifteen per cent.”681 A larger share of the population
began to work, and they worked longer and harder. Over the period 1750 – 1850,
working time for men of prime working age in England is estimated to have
increased with twenty to thirty-five per cent. The number of annual working
hours in industry reached its limit in 1830 with 3500; that is about double the
number of hours English labourers work now.682
A very substantial part of this extra labour input took place in domestic
industry, where we see an increasing involvement of especially agrarian families
in market-oriented craft production. During the early modern era this was a
678 See Hudson, ‘Industrial organisation and structure’. For a European-wide analysis see Sabel
and Zeitlin, World of possibilities.
679 See the literature referred to under note 55.
680 For specific data see De Vries, Industrious Revolution, chapter 3.
681 Malanima, Pre-modern European economy, 143.
682 See for this information Voth, ‘Living standards and the urban environment’. For long-term
data specifically for England, see Allen and Weisdorf, ‘Was there an ‘Industrious Revolu-
tion’ before the Industrial Revolution? See also Muldrew, Food, energy and the creation of
industriousness.
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phenomenon of truly global dimensions. It came in several varieties: the put-
ting-out system organised by merchant capitalists who provided raw materials
and then collected processed products; a system in which merchants only ad-
vanced money and the actual producers took care of buying raw materials and
sold their products after processing them, or in a system in which producers
operated as independent buyers and sellers. In particular for early modern
Europe, a debate was waged during the 1970s and 1980s about whether this
domestic industry, first and foremost in its putting-out variety, should be re-
garded as a form of ‘proto-industry’, that is as the first stage of industrialisa-
tion.683 This proto-industrialisation-theory that implied a rather crude linear
progression from artisans, putting-out systems, to the factory, did not stand up
the test. In the context of our discussion of an assumed Asian route to in-
dustrialisation via an industrious revolution, this of course is highly significant.
In the history of Western Europe, domestic rural industry at times indeed was a
kind of preparatory stage of industrial production, but very often it was not and
turned out to be a dead-end street, a route to impoverishment hardly dis-
tinguishable from ‘involution’ as it has been described as a serious problem in
China’s economy during its pre-industrial era.684 The system of domestic in-
dustry that prevailed in Qing China can be best characterised as a Kaufsystem,
which means that ‘centralised’ coordination, financing and capital accumulation
were much less important than in the putting-out system, which according to
most scholars prevailed in Western Europe.
Jan de Vries in that respect points at differences in the industrious revolutions
as they occurred in certain parts of Europe and its North Atlantic offshoots on
the one hand and in the rest of Europe and East Asia on the other hand. In his
view in north-western Europe and its north Atlantic offshoots, industriousness
were linked to consumerism, which was not or far less the case in the rest of
Europe and East Asia where in his view a far more involutionary road was
taken.685 In all regions of the globe with increasing population, labour-intensity
tended to increase too, in order to counteract the tendency of decreasing mar-
ginal productivity in agriculture. That was also the case in Western Europe,
although the level of labour-intensity very probably was always highest in East
Asia. But according to De Vries, industriousness in north-western Europe was
not so much a matter of supply-side constraints as of demand-side aspirations.
683 Mendels, ‘Proto-industrialisation’.
684 For a general overview see Ogilvie and Cerman, European proto-industrialisation. For a
critical evaluation of the British case, see Hudson, ‘Industrial organisation and structure’, in
particular 29 – 34. Paolo Malanima clearly rejects the proto-industrialisation thesis. See his
Pre-modern European economy, under ‘proto-industrialisation’.
685 De Vries, ‘Industrious peasants in East and West’. All the comments here are paraphrases of
his text. Only in case of literal quotations do I give a further reference.
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In his words, “…consumer aspirations played an important role in motivating
the strategic deployment of the productive resources of the household …”686
This consumption-motivated industrious revolution began in North-western
Europe and was long restricted to that region plus its North American settle-
ments. North-western Europe had a capital-abundant environment where
households or household members could specialise because of the broad
availability of factor and commodity markets. They could increase productivity
as they had ample opportunity to shed and acquire labour and become a link in
an extending division of labour.
De Vries’s industrious revolution in these regions had a clear element of
increasing total productivity by means of ‘improving’ the division of labour and
allocating one’s labour to activities that might lead to higher yields. It was not
just or not even primarily a matter of working harder but of increasing pro-
ductivity by wide-ranging specialisation made possible by extended markets.
Adam Smith would have approved of it. As late as 1879, only five per cent of the
working population lived from wage labour in Japan. In China, the figure would
have been similarly low. Peasant households only released and hired a very
limited amount of labour. In that East Asian context, and in most of Europe apart
from the northwest, by-employments were more part of a survival strategy
driven by the simple necessity to increase labour-input and a matter of self-
exploitation than of a growth strategy. De Vries’s comparative analysis of the
industriousness of East Asian peasants nowhere creates the impression that he
regards the East Asian industrious revolution as in any kind the beginning of a
process of modern growth, in any case not for the period he explicitly refers to.
He only rather in passing refers to Sugihara’s focus on labour-intensive in-
dustrialisation as embracing the gradual improvement of the quality of labour
and its ability to in that case become the “main route by which mankind escaped
the Malthusian trap of overpopulation and the Ricardian trap of rising food
prices.”687
It is still a matter of debate to what regions and sectors the ‘optimist’ inter-
pretation of the industrious revolution by Jan de Vries applies. As indicated, he
himself confines it to North-western Europe and its North Atlantic offshoots, for
which regions he considers it a real boost to development and growth. For those
exceptional regions he looks at it in terms of increasing industriousness, dy-
namism and development. Overall, even for Europe, a fairly negative inter-
pretation prevails. In his overview of Europe’s economic history over the last
686 De Vries, ‘Industrious peasants’, 108.
687 Kaoru Sugihara claimed this in his paper, ‘Labour-intensive industrialization in global
history’ presented at the 13th International Economic History Conference in Buenos Aires,
2001.
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millennium before industrialisation, Malanima claims that this extra effort
mostly was a matter of hardship, in any case in the countryside: “Peasants
became industrious because they had no other choice.”688 For Britain, Allen and
Weisdorf agree regarding the situation in the countryside but think that the
situation in towns was more like De Vries describes it, which would mean that
industriousness there was positively connected to major changes in consumer
behaviour.689 Very probably, optimists and pessimists – as in the previous debate
on proto-industrialisation – both have a point, depending on the circumstances.
In that respect, Sugihara’s rather positive interpretation of East Asia’s in-
dustrious revolution as a distinct path to modern economic growth could also do
with some qualifications. Industrialisation as it began in Britain differed from
industrialisation as it occurred later on in parts of East Asia. But in East Asia too,
working hard and diligently simply did not suffice to become really wealthy, as
began to be clear some time later in Japan. To reach Western levels of wealth and
really escape from poverty, more was needed. During the first stages of its
industrialisation, Japan changed and adapted Western technology to make it
cost-effective for its low-wage economy and it in all probability indeed took a
labour-intensive route. After 1945, however, it switched to very capital-intensive
technologies and built very highly capital-intensive industries. No big country
has ever become rich on the back of small firms.690 It was only then, that it really
began to catch up with the West in terms of wealth. In China at the moment
industrialisation walks on two legs, i. e. it combines capital-intensity and labour-
intensity.691
Table 26: Real GDP per capita incomes in 1990 international PPP dollars compared over
time
GDP per capita in: Japan China UK Netherlands
1700 570 600 1,250 2,130
1820 669 600 1,706 1,838
1913 1,387 552 4,921 4,049
1950 1,921 448 6,939 5,996
1973 11,434 838 12,025 13,082
2003 21,218 4,803 21,310 21,480
Source: Angus Maddison, Contours of the World Economy, 1 – 2030 A.D. Essays in Macro-
economic History, Oxford 2007, 382.
Only in 1950 did real income per capita in Japan reach the level of the United
Kingdom in the 1830s and it was still lower than real income per capita in the
688 Malanima, Pre-modern European economy, 238.
689 Allen and Weisdorf, ‘Was there an ‘Industrious Revolution’?’
690 I here paraphrase Studwell, How Asia works, 134 – 135.
691 See for a very brief discussion Allen, Global economic history, 122 – 123, 135 – 137 and 140.
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Dutch Republic in 1700. The real Japanese miracle after the Second World War
was not a labour-intensive miracle. The situation in China was even worse. Per
capita in real terms, people there in 1973 still earned less than half of what the
Dutch earned over two and a half centuries earlier when real income per capita in
the Dutch Republic amounted to 2130 dollars of 1990.
The East-Asian path to industrialisation thus looks more like an intermediary,
temporary path that can lead a country to the take-off stage than like a full-grown
‘alternative’ to Western industrialisation.692 After some time, being industrious
simply no longer suffices to increase production. To reach the level of wealth that
became normal in the Western world, one simply cannot do without the massive
input of non-human energy sources and modern technology. Japan, in this
respect, has become just like the rest of the industrialised world: in wealth and
consumption of energy and capital-intensity. To me, the best yardstick for
measuring energy- and labour-intensity would be the amount of energy used or
the number of hours worked per international dollar of real income. At the
moment (2012), the Chinese use more energy per dollar of real income than
many Westerners.
Table 27: Energy consumption and real income
Consumption per
head in kg oil
equivalents
Real income per capita
as percentage of US







Source: The Economist. Pocket World in Figures 2013 Edition (London 2012). All figures
refer to the year ending 31 December 2010.
Labour-intensive industrialisation, moreover, also does not look like an in-
dependent road but rather like a temporary possibility created by the very fact
that its industrialisation turned the West into a high-wage region. That created
room for mass production of simple commodities by cheap labour in developing
countries. But a strategy of simply increasing labour and capital inputs ceteris
paribus must sooner or later lead to decreasing returns. Substantial and sus-
tained increases in wealth require technological innovation and the use of a lot of
non-human energy. You will not become really wealthy via low wages and in-
692 For Japan’s energy consumption during its early industrialization see Minami, Power re-
volution in the industrialization of Japan.
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dustriousness. Those may be able to put you on a road to wealth, but a high GDP
per definition requires high average wages, in particular in countries where
incomes are relatively equal. This is not meant to devalue the East Asian de-
velopment path: a global diffusion of industrialisation indeed only looks pos-
sible via labour-intensive industries and these employed and employ many
millions of people.
The debate on labour-intensive industrialisation has not yet been waged very
intensively and systematically. To settle it or at least make it more solid, one
would need a systematic comparison of labour-, capital- and energy-intensities
per entity of real production of the countries discussed. Sugihara, time and
again, also points at the specific quality of labour-input in his East Asian in-
dustrialisation, but he never provides a systematic comparison with the sup-
posedly very different situation in the West. Did or do differences in the level of
training, discipline, industriousness, formal and informal schooling of Western
countries and East Asian countries really exist as they began to industrialise, as
he consistently claims, with the East having a clear advantage over the West?693 I
doubt that.694
9. Human capital: labour and its skills
This brings us to the importance of the quality of labour, a subject that under the
label human capital is now at the very heart of economic thinking about growth
and development. An increasing number of scholars, businesspeople and poli-
ticians refer to the ‘modern’, ‘developed’ economy as a ‘knowledge economy’ in
which the ability to increase knowledge and to innovate is considered the es-
sence of growth. We have already indicated that the main effort of many new
growth-economists consists in trying to ‘endogenise’ innovation in the eco-
nomic system. That of course is only possible with a sufficiently skilled labour
force. It will not come as a surprise that the role of human capital in the Great
Divergence is also receiving ample attention. Although – which is very striking
and, to be honest, in my view rather incomprehensible – members of the Cal-
ifornia School tend to completely ignore it, the main and very important ex-
ception being Jack Goldstone. Scholars like Andre Gunder Frank, Robert Marks,
Kenneth Pomeranz or Roy Bin Wong never explicitly and systematically deal
with questions of literacy, numeracy, skills formation, or the way in which all
693 See for example his ‘Labour-intensive industrialisation in global history’.
694 I found no clear indication whatsoever of a high level of education of Japan’s labour force
before World War Two. Formal vocational, scientific and technical training only took off in
the 1930s. See e. g. Landes, ‘Japan and Europe: contrasts in industrialization’, 108 – 111.
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sorts of knowledge and their application evolve. For them, they apparently are
just epiphenomena, automatic responses to obvious challenges. Here again we
see a fascinating difference between thinking about growth in economics, where
knowledge is increasingly holding centre stage, and in global economic history,
where a surprisingly large number of scholars emphasises factor endowments
and factor prices and all but ignores ‘knowledge’.
As far as I can see, there seems to be a consensus that literacy, numeracy, and
all sorts of specific skills formation that are necessary ingredients of processes of
industrialisation and growth, were nowhere in the world in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries as high as in north-western Europe.695 Robert Allen quite
explicitly makes this claim and thinks this fact is not so much due to Protes-
tantism – as an old tradition has it – but to the existence of a high-wage, com-
mercial economy that enabled people to pay for education, which in turn could
lead to higher income.696 Recent research by two economists points in the di-
rection that there nevertheless may have been an advantage of Protestant regions
or countries over non-Protestant ones in terms of education and literacy.697 As
regards our task, explaining why Britain was first, this difference of opinion of
course is inconsequential: Britain was a Protestant, high-wage commercial
economy. No doubt its literacy rates were amongst the highest of Europe, though
definitely not the highest.698
Table 28: Adult literacy in Europe, 1500 and 1800: the percentage of the adult population











Source: R.C. Allen, Global economic history. A very short introduction (Oxford 2011) 25.
695 See for a general overview of the situation in Western Europe, Reis, ‘Economic growth,
human capital formation and consumption in Western Europe’.
696 Allen, Global economic history, 26. See for his comments on education and literacy from a
global economic perspective under ‘education and literacy’ in the index.
697 Becker and Wössmann, ‘Was Weber wrong?’
698 See e. g. Allen, Global economic history, 25; Mitch, ‘Education and skill of the British labour
force’ pages 334 – 345 and 351, and Van Zanden, Long road to the Industrial Revolution, 193.
Part two: Actual explanations of the Great Divergence222
I never came across any study in which not literacy rates of north-western
Europe in the early modern era were regarded as the highest in the world,
although the figures one finds for Tokugawa Japan are also quite high. It had an
estimated literacy rate at the beginning of the Meiji Restoration in 1868 of forty
to fifty per cent for men and of thirteen to seventeen per cent for women.699 For
China at the end of the eighteenth century, it is estimated at some fifteen per cent
for men. For women it was much lower, some two to ten per cent in the beginning
of the nineteenth century. The figure for male literacy in the beginning of the
1930s still only was some thirty per cent.700 More broadly, Western Europe is now
claimed to have had a clear advantage over the rest of the world in terms of book
producing and reading.701 Even if the amount of printed texts as such had not
been higher in north-western Europe: all the evidence we have points in the
direction that when it comes to texts containing useful and reliable knowledge
that was directly relevant for increasing and enhancing production, its quality
and efficiency this region would be in a better position than any other part of the
word.
In any case, a very interesting hypothesis from Alfred Crosby holds that by
1600 more people were thinking quantitatively in the West than in any other part
of the world.702 Western Europe was the first region in the world to know all sorts
of ‘newspapers’ and it had much more of them when industrialisation took off.
Let me give a couple of figures specifically for Britain from Roy Porter’s very
informative book about the British Enlightenment. During the 1620s, about
6,000 printed titles appeared in England, increasing to almost 21,000 during the
1710s, and to over 56,000 by the 1790s. The total of separate book and pamphlet
titles published between 1660 and 1800 was over 300,000, with an estimated 200
million copies sold. By the 1770s, when there were nine dailies in London and 50
provincial weeklies, the total annual sale of newspapers was over twelve million;
by 1800 it was some sixteen million. There then were 250 periodicals in England.
Ten thousand copies were printed of the third edition (1787 – 97) of the Ency-
clopaedia Britannica.703 Differences with China or the Islamic world in this
respect are striking. Western Europe had more formal and public schooling,
more systems of apprenticeship and guild education and more universities, by
699 Passin, Society and education in Japan, 44 – 47.
700 I took these figures from Clark, Farewell to alms, 265 – 266 who bases himself on data in
Rawski, Education and popular literacy in Ch’ing China, 17 – 18, 90 and 140.
701 See e. g. Baten and Van Zanden, ‘Book production and the onset of modern economic’, and
Buringh and Van Zanden, ‘Charting the ‘Rise of the West’. See also Van Zanden, Long road
to the Industrial Revolution, chapters 2 and 6. For a more general overview see Burke, Social
history of knowledge I and II.
702 Crosby, Measure of reality. For an analysis and critique see Goldstone, ‘Whose measure of
reality?’
703 Porter, Enlightenment, 73 – 92.
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the eighteenth century some 150 across Europe.704 Numerous publications came
on the market in which craftsmen could find instructions, and that could help
them to prepare for their master exams and meet the guilds’ quality standards.
They normally contained a mixture of practical technical know-how and ele-
ments of science and assumed much tacit knowledge, but they certainly were
useful in enhancing craftsmanship. What was fixed were the quality standards of
production rather than what to produce. The competition between skilled
craftsmen who would become apprentices to whom and who would become
master could be fierce. In this respect, the existence of guilds and all sorts of
artisanal organisations and the tradition of moving around to learn one’s trade
certainly must have had a positive effect on skill-formation. Dutch economic
historian Jan Luiten van Zanden has pointed at the interesting fact that the so-
called ‘skill premium’, the increased income one earns because one has acquired
extra skills, was lower in Western Europe than in the rest of the world and claims
this would indicate that labour there overall was more skilled, that households
there had access to relatively efficient labour and capital markets, and that the
institutions for the formation of human capital were working well.705 The fact
that people married relatively late in Western Europe and often worked for
several years for wages before they married, meant that they could more easily
acquire all sorts of skills and some capital to set up an independent household
when they married. Labour markets for skilled labour enhanced the possibilities
of specialisation and the efficiency of the allocation of labour.
One must be wary, though, not to exaggerate the intellectual and skill re-
quirements for the initial phases of industrialisation. Any take-off would require
an ample supply of entrepreneurs able to run factories or other large firms, of
inventors and innovators, and of skilled mechanics able to deal with machinery.
Britain clearly had enough of these entrepreneurs, inventors and innovators and
– as is not contradicted by any scholar I know – more of such skilled mechanics
than any other country in the world. More people participated in a ‘scientific-
technological’ culture there than anywhere else. In comparison to other parts of
the world, knowledge in Europe was more a public and traded ‘commodity’.
There existed fewer barriers to its exchange. Contacts between ‘entrepreneurs’
and ‘engineers’ were closer there than anywhere else.706 In 1790, there were
704 See Huff, Intellectual curiosity and the Scientific Revolution, 305 – 307.
705 See, for several articles dealing with the skill premium and more generally human capital in
pre-industrial Europe from a global comparative perspective, Van Zanden, Long road to the
Industrial Revolution, in particular chapter five. I paraphrase from page 175. See also idem,
‘Skill premium and the Great Divergence’. Prak and Van Zanden, Technology, skills and the
premodern economy in the West and the East was published after I finished my manuscript,
but it will certainly prove to be a very important contribution to the debate.
706 See Mokyr, Enlightened economy, and Jacob, Scientific culture and the making of the in-
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already 220 academies for the promotion of useful knowledge in Britain. By the
middle of the nineteenth century, the country counted 1,020 associations for
technical and scientific knowledge with a membership of roughly 200,000.707 But
I do not want to make the claim here claim that mass education was a necessary
pre-condition for Britain’s take-off, or that a simple overall correlation between
levels of schooling and the likelihood of a take-off existed. As indicated, there
were countries with higher levels of literacy but more importantly, according to
David Mitch, as late as 1841 only five per cent of the working men and two per
cent of the working women had a job that required them to really be ‘literate’.708
In the first stages of industrialisation there overall even was a noticeable des-
killing of the labour force as machinery and factory discipline made many jobs
simpler instead of more complicated. Modern scholarship tends to subdivide the
Industrial Revolution into two phases: “a first phase with skill-saving techno-
logical change and minimal educational requirements, and a second phase
where technological change increases the demand for human capital as skills
become necessary for production…”709 Expenditure on formal education was
surprisingly low in Britain and increased only very modestly during the nine-
teenth century. Informal education apparently must have been adequate as was a
certain technological, enlightened culture. The fact that there were careers open
to talent also will have had a positive effect.710 And finally there is the funda-
mental fact that between 1750 and 1850, the British political system unflinch-
ingly supported technological progress.711 This was really different from the
situation outside Europe.
In the most recent analysis of the causes of the first Industrial Revolution, in
which human – and social – capital get pride of place, Leonard Dudley brings
many of the elements referred to earlier on together. He sets out to explain why
over the century and a half between 1700 and 1850 in certain regions of Britain –
and France and the United States – there was a sharp acceleration in the rate of
dustrial West. I endorse Mokyr’s claim that, “what set Britain apart from other European
countries was not its capacity to accumulate more and better science or even a higher
propensity to invent, but the much higher level of competence of its skilled workers. Britain
could draw on a large cadre of highly skilled craftsmen and technicians.” See Mokyr,
‘Institutional origins of the Industrial Revolution’, the web-version, page 24.
707 See for these figures Musson and Robinson, Science and technology in the Industrial Re-
volution, 58, and Inkster, Science and technology in history, 73 and 78 – 79.
708 Mitch, Rise of popular literacy in Victorian England, 14 – 15.
709 Becker, Hornung and Wössmann, ‘Education and catch-up in the Industrial Revolution’, 95.
710 See for these comments Mitch, ‘Education and skill’. For the role of guilds in skill formation
see under note 377 and 705. For skill-formation in Britain via apprenticeship see Hum-
phries, ‘Rent seeking or skill creating? For the economic sectors that characterised the so-
called Second Industrial Revolution, for example chemical industry and the production of
electricity, Britain’s informal system of skill-formation was no longer adequate.
711 Mokyr, Lever of riches, 256.
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innovation.712 He explicitly points out and shows that this was not the case in the
Netherlands, that initially were both richer and more literate than Britain and
France, in other countries in Europe like Germany, Belgium and the Scandi-
navian countries, or anywhere else in the world. He does appreciate the im-
portance of the presence of a certain institutional setting, cheap energy or skilled
labour and the existence of markets of a certain size but thinks none of those
suffice to on their own give a satisfactory explanation. In his view the final and
fundamental explanation must be sought somewhere else. In his fascinating, but
quite repetitive, study he ascribes this acceleration in those regions to the ex-
pansion of social networks of co-operation and trust in which suspicion was
overcome. In his view, innovation thrives in a context of openness, diversity and
indeed co-operation. Successful major inventions and innovations as a rule are
not the result of the efforts of isolated, fiercely competitive individuals but of
synergy between differing mind-sets and concrete ideas and co-operation be-
tween people. Following Malcolm Gladwell, he refers to three types of persons
that are indispensable to turn new ideas into major innovations: mavens, con-
nectors and salesmen. A maven is an individual who accumulates information
and willingly shares it with others. A connector in turn is an individual with a
talent for bringing people together to share their common interest. A salesman is
an individual who convinces people who are initially unconvinced by a partic-
ular message.713 The innovative regions he studies had an extraordinary amount
of such people, who moreover – and he believes this to be of the utmost im-
portance and forms the main new angle in his approach – could profit from the
fact that their co-operation was facilitated and enhanced by the existence of a
shared, standardised, national language. In emphasising this, he builds upon
ideas he already put forward for a much broader context in his Information
revolutions in the West.
10. Human capital: labour and discipline
It has often been suggested that Western labour was more disciplined and in-
dustrious and therefore became more productive than labour in other parts of
the world. David Landes was quite explicit in that respect: “… what counts is
work, thrift, honesty, patience, tenacity … too many of us work to live and live to
be happy. Nothing wrong with that; it just does not promote high productivity.
You want high productivity? Then you should live to work and get happiness as a
by-product. Not easy. The people who live to work are a small and fortunate
712 Dudley, Mothers of innovation.
713 Gladwell, Tipping point.
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elite.”714 Niall Ferguson, in his book on Western civilisation, thinks there is a
Western “work ethic” (and “word ethic”) that was one of what he calls “Western
killer applications” that caused Western wealth and dominance.715 That dis-
cipline and disciplining played a fundamental role in Western society in the
period under discussion here as well as earlier on, i. e. during the early modern
era and some would even say already in the high Middle Ages, is indisputable.
Many different labels have been used to describe quite similar and in any case
related forms of social disciplining. Weber focused on what he called ration-
alisation, Elias on civilisation, Foucault on disciplining and normalisation, many
scholars on reform, and reformation of manners. People were affected as sub-
jects of their rulers, as believers, as government officials, as members of the
military and as participants in a popular culture that according to all sorts of
elites had to be reformed, and so on.716 Especially interesting from the per-
spective of the economic historian are the numerous initiatives to create a dis-
ciplined labour force. Those efforts became ever more pressing and more a
matter of public policy as people increasingly began to work for wages on behalf
of other people who were not family. Concepts of work, leisure and poverty
(were) changed.717 The idea that work was a job, maybe even a calling, but in any
case a duty, began to prevail. Workhouses, poor houses, prisons and the like were
created all over Europe to ‘reform’ those who did not comply.718 They were forced
to work in an effort to create, in Foucault’s terms, ‘docile bodies’.719 Begging and
vagabondage became punishable offences. Not to work was now considered a
crime. Penal workhouses proliferated throughout Northern Europe. They be-
came quite numerous in the Netherlands, Germany and Austria, where they were
called tuchthuizen (in the Netherlands) and Zuchthäuser (in Germany and
Austria), both translate as ‘houses of discipline’. In England, by 1750, almost
every market town and industrialised parish had its own workhouse. European
states were very active when it came to disciplining their subjects to become
714 The quotations are from Landes, Wealth and poverty of nations, 523. On page 478 he had
already written about economically successful Chinese in Malaysia: “… they live to work.
… Members, then, of a rare aristocracy : most people work to live.”
715 Ferguson, Civilization, chapter 6. For the term ‘killer applications’ or ‘ killer apps’, see page
12.
716 The amount of literature on social disciplining in early modern Europe is staggering. I just
refer to the following, somewhat older syntheses: Burke, Popular culture in early modern
Europe ; various publications by Robert Muchembled, originally all in French, though there
is a translation of one of his books under the title Popular culture and elite culture in France,
1400 – 1750 and Pieter Spierenburg, Broken spell. A book that I found fascinating in this
context is Bauer und Matis, Geburt der Neuzeit. More recent is Gorski, Disciplinary revo-
lution.
717 See for a broad overview Lis and Soly, Worthy efforts.
718 See for a general survey e. g. Jutte, Poverty and deviance in early modern Europe.
719 Foucault, Discipline and punish, 135 – 170.
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‘active’ and instigating ‘a reformation of manners’. These policies, poverty and
new patterns of consumption led to an increase in the number of people who
worked, in the number of hours they worked, and in the intensity of their work.
With the coming of factories, having disciplined labourers – not by accident were
they often simply called ‘factory hands’ – became even more urgent and sys-
tematic. One cannot imagine a factory without discipline. There is a substantial
amount of literature in which the importance of a disciplined labour force in
modern industry is highlighted. A scholar like Stephen Marglin would go as far
as to claim that the primary reason to build factories was to ensure that ‘bosses’
could really control the production process and thus discipline their labour
force.720
This kind of discipline always goes with the efficient use of time. Exactly
measuring labour productivity is impossible if one cannot exactly measure time.
It is no accident that the clock became the symbol of the factory for many who
worked there. As Lewis Mumford already put it: “The clock, not the steam-
engine, is the key-machine of the modern industrial age,”721, not just as the pro-
type of a machine but just as much as the facilitator of a more efficient ordering
of daily life. Many Western scholars have already pointed at the Western ob-
session with time, time keeping and increasingly time saving.722 The eighteenth
century in this respect too was an age of accelerating change. This is what
Douglas Allen writes about the situation in Britain: “By the end of that century
[i. e. the eighteenth century] and certainly by the middle of the nineteenth
century, pocket watches were not only accurate to within minutes each day, but
were priced so that an ordinary individual could own one. There was, for all
practicality, a collapse to zero in the variance of time measurement between 1750
and 1850. For the first time in history, it actually meant something to tell
someone to be at a specific place at a specific time.”723 In this context one can also
point at the standardisation of measures and weights, also an example of Weber’s
720 For introductory literature on the disciplining of labour in general and the specific pro-
blems related to disciplining factory labour, with a focus on Britain see, in alphabetical
order : Biernacki, Fabrication of labour ; Deakin and Wilkinson, Law of the labour market ;
Furniss, Position of the laborer in a system of nationalism ; Gauci, Regulating the British
economy ; Lis and Soly, Poverty and capitalism in pre-industrial Europe, and Worthy efforts,
chapter 7, in particular 468 – 478: ‘Employment and the active society’; Marglin, ‘What do
bosses do?’; Pollard, Genesis of modern management ; Rule, Labouring classes in early
industrial England; Steinfeld, Invention of free labour ; Thompson, Making of the English
working class ; idem, ‘Time, work-discipline and industrial capitalism’, and Voth, Time and
work in England.
721 Mumford, Technics and civilization, 14 – 15.
722 I just refer to Landes, Revolution in time ; Le Goff, Time, work and culture in the Middle Ages
and of course Thompson, ‘Time, work-discipline and industrial capitalism’, for develop-
ments at the beginning of industrialization.
723 Allen, Institutional revolution, 31. See for further comments, ibidem, 28 – 31.
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rationalisation of life that had efficiency-enhancing effects.724 For Britain in
particular we see many measures to standardise production and products. They,
interestingly enough, often were instigated because the existing system of tax
collecting required them.725 That is also true for many measures to rationalise
the system of land taxation and to give it a firmer base in a cadastre of sorts.726 In
general, there was an increasing interest in fact-finding and information gath-
ering, in statistics, public records and the creation of economic facts.727 The
importance here of the state and its policies is obvious. Many European rulers in
the eighteenth century, especially the ‘enlightened’ ones, would agree with
Habsburg Emperor Joseph II: “If one is to rule countries well, one must first
know them exactly.”728
References to Western discipline, industriousness and punctuality have al-
ways been stock in trade in discussions of Western exceptionalism. Interestingly
enough, an author such as Prasannan Parthasarathi, who is not exactly enthu-
siastic about European exceptionalism, recently also pointed out that Western
labour was ‘successfully’ subjected to much harsher discipline than labour in
India and he clearly thinks that explains in part why Europe grew rich whereas
India did not. But he does not expand on how exactly this would have made a
difference and how much.729 Gregory Clark is far more explicit. According to
him, workers in poor countries lack the qualities of “discipline and engagement”
and “…differences in labor productivity must stem from differences in the
quality of labor in production across societies, differences that stem largely from
the local social environment.” Specifically about the situation in India, he writes:
“The socially induced lethargy that afflicted Indian labour may have extended
throughout the society : had the deficiency been limited to the ranks of Indian
managers and entrepreneurs, these inputs could have been relatively easily
imported…”730 Clark’s book has been extremely controversial but in that sense
724 For Europe see Roland Wenzlhuemer ‘The history of standardization in Europe’ in: Euro-
päische Geschichte Online (2010) http://www.ieg-ego.eu/wenzlhuemer-2010-en, with ample
references. For Britain see Hoppit, ‘Reforming Britain’s weights and measures’. For an
extensive discussion see Velkar, Markets and measurements in nineteenth-century Britain.
725 Ashworth, Customs and excise, Part 5.
726 Kain and Baigent, Cadastral map in the service of the state. In this respect, Britain was not
exactly a frontrunner, far from.
727 See, for an introduction, Headrick, When information came of age and Poovey, History of
the modern fact. Specifically for Britain, see Higgs, The information state in England ;
Palmer, Economic arithmetic and Rothschild, ‘English Kopf ’’. Very interesting for the Dutch
case is Lesger, Rise of the Amsterdam market and information exchange.
728 I found this in Kain and Baigent, Cadastral map, 195.
729 Parthasarathi, Why Europe grew rich, e. g. , 146 – 147.
730 See Clark, Farewell to alms, 15, 352 and 365. See also Clark and Feenstra, ‘Technology in the
Great Divergence’. There is a comment by Joel Mokyr in the same volume in which their text
appears, pages 314 – 321.
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also influential.731 We will discuss his ideas later on in this text under the heading
of ‘culture’ as he presents his views on industriousness and discipline as part of
his analysis of how, in his opinion, culture works and cultural traits are trans-
mitted.
As indicated, an increase in ‘industriousness’ as such definitely was not a
uniquely European phenomenon. But as I see it, the setting in which people in
Europe worked often differed substantially. Let us again focus on the comparison
between Britain and China. The Chinese state, too, was quite concerned with
disciplining and instructing its people, but from an economic perspective, the
disciplining and instructing of Western states was more important because,
apart from anything else it may have intended, it had a very clear focus on
efficiency whereas, to put it somewhat simplistically, the Chinese focus was much
more on decency. China’s government certainly showed interest in the behaviour
of its labour force. The overwhelming majority of that labour force, however, was
rural and worked in the setting of a household-economy. Administration of
discipline was not lacking there. But it was carried out by the (male) head of the
household, to whom an almost unrestricted freedom had been delegated by law
to do as he saw fit, not by some unacquainted stranger or by an abstract state.732
In Britain, working with or for non-family was quite normal. In China it cer-
tainly was not. Proletarian wage labour, which had become a substantial part of
the entire labour force in Britain as early as the eighteenth century, was next to
absent in Qing China.733 For its rural households, China’s rulers systematically
promoted the canonical gender division of labour, which stipulated that spin-
ning and weaving was women’s work while cultivating the land was men’s
work.734 Irrespective of whether this was met with much success, I would regard
such advice much less an expression of concern with economic efficiency than
with decency and tradition.
As is so often the problem, how can one connect discipline to growth and in
731 In this respect too Clark’s book, overall, was not very well received. The role of skills and
discipline in countries that tried to catch is referred to briefly in Amsden, Rise of the rest,
46 – 49.
732 See for example, Wolf, ‘Europe and China: Two kinds of patriarchy’ and De Moor and Van
Zanden, ‘Girl power’.
733 See for further details page 340.
734 For the thesis that there was a strong cultural pressure to keep women at home see, for
example, Huang, Peasant family and rural development in the Yangzi Delta, under ‘women’;
Mann, Precious records, chapter six, and Goldstone, ‘Gender, work and culture’. See also for
some examples my Zur politischen Ökonomie des Tees, 112. For a less negative inter-
pretation stressing that women, whether at home or elsewhere, did more than their share of
production, see Bray, Technology and gender and Pomeranz, ‘Women’s work, family and
economic development in Europe and East Asia. Robert Gardella points at the widespread
existence of female wage labour in the production of tea. See his Harvesting mountains,
172 – 173.
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particular to modern growth in a measurable, ‘verifiable’ way? Suppose we
accept the existence of even substantial differences in productivity between
workers in British and Indian cotton textiles factories and in British and Indian
railways in the beginning of the twentieth century (the example Clark mainly
builds upon) using identical machinery and having similar management. The
main question then, of course, is how much of the more than seven-to-one gap in
real GDP per capita between those countries in 1913 can be explained by such
differences in labour quality. Although Clark claims that total output per person
in Britain was about eight times higher than it was in India and the total effi-
ciency of Britain’s economy, that is the amount of output per unit of all inputs,
some five times higher, that question as such still seems to be open.735
11. Consumption
As indicated in my introductory comments, an increasing number of scholars
have begun to realise that in studying modern economic growth and its emer-
gence, one cannot confine oneself to the supply-side but has to take con-
sumption on board as well. Of course, this focus is not completely original.
Elizabeth Gilboy wrote about the role of demand in the Industrial Revolution as
early as the 1930s, and Joel Mokyr wrote a kind of reply to her article in which he
contrasted demand and supply and their importance for that revolution in the
1970s.736 At the moment, some of the most interesting debates on the origins of
modern growth explicitly tackle the importance of consumption and often even
refer to a ‘consumer revolution’ that would have preceded or accompanied the
industrial one. Changes in consumption patterns, implying a switch to more
‘semi-luxurious’ or ‘popu-lux’ and in any case new goods were a global phe-
nomenon in the early modern world. To refer to just a couple of non-Western
examples: one can also find them in Tokugawa Japan and in the empires of the
Qing, the Ottomans and the Safavids.737 What to my view, however, set the West
735 See Clark, Farewell to alms, 328 – 351. The figures I refer to are on page 336.
736 See Gilboy, ‘Demand as a factor in the Industrial Revolution’ and Mokyr, ‘Demand versus
supply in the industrial revolution’. For a very compact ‘refutation’ of the demand-side
explanation of the Industrial Revolution see Mokyr, ‘Editor’s introduction’, 59 – 66.
737 For the early modern era, Jan de Vries confines the connection between industriousness
and consumerism to north-western Europe and its American settlements. Bayly, in con-
trast, tends to look at it as a phenomenon that – admittedly within limits – also occurred in
China and Japan. See his Birth of the modern world, 56 – 59. See further for China, Pome-
ranz, Great Divergence, chapter 3; for the Ming period several publications by Timothy
Brook and Craig Clunas, and for the Qing publications by Antonia Finnane, plus the
somewhat older Adshead, Material culture in Europe and China. For Japan see Francks,
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apart, and again in particular Britain, is that these changes in consumption gave
clear stimuli to change production, especially via import-substitution. That
word is used here for lack of a better expression, because the process actually
involved much more than just substituting. We are not talking about a me-
chanical reflex but about a considered choice for a certain strategy that also
could not have been made and that also could have failed. Actually there were
two varieties, although the expression is usually exclusively confined to the first
one, i. e. direct import substitution. In this case, the importing of manufactured
commodities induced a process of reallocation of labour at home in order to
start producing the imported goods there. A similar motivation, diminishing
one’s dependency on imports, was behind Western efforts to get a grip on the
production of the raw materials one imported from abroad. An example of this
would be the creation of plantations for their production in colonies – or for that
matter ‘peripheries’, where one’s grip was more informal but nevertheless
clearly present.
In Europe mercantilist governments – which in the early modern era means
just about all governments – were not fond of importing products from abroad,
least of all when these products had a high value added or were considered
luxuries. They therefore tried, where possible, to prohibit such imports, keep
them at a minimum, or best of all, substitute them with products made at home.
Britain, actually a far more systematic and successful mercantilist power than
France, after an extended period of protecting its own market managed to
produce several goods, e. g. cotton and silk textiles, porcelain and iron that had
been imported from India, China and Sweden, at home. It also started to take
care itself of the production of some raw materials it imported, e. g. sugar from
the West Indies, and later on, from the 1840s onwards, tea from British India and
Ceylon as a substitute for tea from China, or indigo from Bengal, when it was no
longer imported from the former colonies in North America. With the passing of
time in the nineteenth century, India became an important source of raw cotton.
These systematic policies of import substitution and manipulation via tariffs,
bans and taxes on consumption and production, are a very important and quite
idiosyncratic characteristic of Western European mercantilism, first and fore-
most and most successfully in Britain.738 Their importance for industrialisation
can hardly be overestimated. Because of the tendency amongst economists and
economic historians to assume that such ‘mercantilist’ policies simply must have
Japanese consumer. For the Ottoman Empire see e. g. Quataert, Consumption studies and the
history of the Ottoman Empire. For the Safavid Empire see Matthee, Pursuit of pleasure.
738 See for manipulation via tariffs, banns and taxes in this respect Ashworth, Customs and
excise; Nye, War, wine, and taxes ; O’Brien, ‘Taxation for British mercantilism from the
Treaty of Utrecht (1713) to the Peace of Paris (1783) and idem ‘Triumph and denouement of
the British fiscal state For Britain’s mercantilist policies more in general see under note
1159.
Part two: Actual explanations of the Great Divergence232
had a negative impact on growth, systematic and detailed analyses of how they
might actually have worked out quite well for the British and others are still few
and far between.739
It would of course be interesting – and relevant – to know whether similar
strategies were tried elsewhere in the world and with what results, and if not, why
not. Let us again focus on the comparison between Great Britain and China,
based on the understanding that most of what is said here would also, be it to a
somewhat lesser extent, apply to other Asian Empires. For the Chinese, there
simply was not much import to substitute. When we confine ourselves to
manufactured goods for mass consumption, imports were negligible. The bulk
of China’s relatively small imports from the West consisted of silver and, after
1800, when silver began to leave the country, of opium. For the first product, one
did not look for a substitute and a potential alternative would in all probability
not have created much of an industry. For opium, one did in the end, late in the
nineteenth century, but that simply meant that more opium was grown in China.
This case is also interesting because here a closer parallel with developments in
north-western Europe can be drawn. According to several scholars, the enor-
mous increase in its consumption, in particular by the elites, can often be
described in terms of “yanghuo re”, i. e. “the craving for foreign stuff” which are
reminiscent of the fascination of European consumers with ‘exotic’ goods.740 But
both imports here did not trigger any direct positive spin-offs or challenges for
manufacturing. It has even been pointed out, correctly in my view, that those
massive silver imports may actually have had a negative impact on China’s
economy as the Chinese had to produce a lot of commodities to only get back
‘money’ i. e. silver, that they also might have printed themselves almost for
free.741 Chinese who wanted to purchase ‘luxury’ goods, by and large could do so
by buying domestic products or certain ‘exotica’ from other parts of Asia.742 The
country produced cotton, silk, porcelain, sugar, tea and tobacco itself, so there
was no need to import them or to try to get colonies or peripheries in order to
produce them there. Government never embarked on policies of import sub-
stitution in the period discussed in this book. Such policies were all but absent
outside Western Europe and its colonies. In the Ottoman Empire, government at
times went so far as to actively promote imports. It, in any case, was not per-
manently keen on thwarting them.743
739 Recent work by economists like Ha-joon Chang and Reinert and historians like Ashworth
and O’Brien indicates, however, that things might change.
740 See Zheng, Social life of opium in China, 8.
741 See e. g. Flynn and Girldez, ‘Money and growth without development’ and Li Xiantang,
‘Paradoxical effect of silver in the economies of Ming and Qing China’.
742 See e. g. Tagliacozzo and When-chin Chang, Chinese circulations.
743 One of the main characteristics of the economic policies of the Sublime Porte in the
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Many recent studies have dealt with the economic effects of changing con-
sumption patterns in Britain and in particular with the question to what extent
they might have functioned as a kind of trigger to industrialisation through their
impact on production. Studying the topic at the moment is very fashionable and
the results promising. Most scholars would agree that changes in consumption
triggered changes in production and led to successful import-substitution, and
that Britain in particular was quite successful in these respects.744 Consuming
new commodities – often very highly taxed and coming from other continents –
of course is only possible when one has enough purchasing power. This brings us
to the question of accumulation: how were the consumption and the production
of the first industrial revolution and all that we associate with it, paid for?
12. Accumulation, income and wealth
Everyone who was ever introduced to economics was told that increasing pro-
duction as a rule means investing and thereby increasing or improving the stock
of (fixed) capital. The money to make those investments has to come from
somewhere. If it is not borrowed, it has to come from savings or more broadly
from accumulation, any ‘amassing of resources’ that in principle can be invested.
To acquire more or better capital goods, you need funds. The inference that poor
countries are poor because they lack sufficient capital and then get stuck in a
poverty trap is thus easily drawn. For decades, development aid was defended
with the argument that it would help the poor to get out of this trap by providing
them with extra funding or resources or by ‘teaching’ them how to acquire those
Ottoman Empire was its ‘provisionism’. This is the principle that the government was
responsible for seeing to it that the populace at large and the army and capital in particular
could be sure that they would not be short of their necessary means. This implied a policy of
supporting imports while controlling exports. See GenÅ, ‘Ottoman industry in the eigh-
teenth century’. This policy was very explicit in the Ottoman Empire but, as I see it, no
region of the world was so much anti-import as the mercantilist West. See my ‘Governing
growth’. See for a brief comparison, for example, Pearson, ‘Merchants and states’. See for a
brief discussion of different reactions to cotton imports from India in Britain, France and
the Ottoman Empire, Parthasarathi, Why Europe grew rich, chapter 5.
744 For a personal selection from an enormous amount of literature, see Berg, Luxury and
pleasure in eighteenth-century Britain ; Berg and Eger, Luxury in the eighteenth century ;
Brewer and Trentmann, Consuming cultures, global perspectives, historical trajectories,
transnational exchanges ; Brewer and Porter, Consumption and the world of goods ; Overton,
a.o. Production and consumption in English households ; Trentmann, Oxford handbook of
the history of consumption and Jan de Vries, Industrious revolution. Very interesting in this
respect is the role of fashion: i. e. whether people in their consumption were guided by
changing collective tastes and whether they were allowed to buy and consume what they
wanted without being bothered by all sorts of sumptuary laws. For the case of textiles, see
Belfanti, ‘Was fashion a European invention?’.
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themselves. Before industrialisation and modern economic growth, the main
fixed capital goods consisted of land, buildings, ships, implements or animals.
Most of the ships and implements, and many of the buildings, were so perishable
and wore out so quickly that the difference between fixed and liquid capital was
rather fluid. The bulk of economic investment was in liquid capital. In-
dustrialisation, so the classic story goes, implies a substantial increase of the
entire capital stock, but in particular of fixed capital like machines, factories and
infrastructure. This is how John Hicks succinctly put it : “What happened in the
Industrial Revolution, the late eighteenth-century Industrial Revolution, is that
the range of fixed capital goods that were used in production, otherwise than in
trade, began noticeably to increase.”745 In this line of reasoning, the absence of
economic growth points to a lack of investment. The main way to counteract
that, assuming there were sufficient possibilities to profitably invest, was finding
the means to invest more.
In current debates on the Great Divergence, ‘accumulation’ in all its varieties
certainly still plays a role, although in many studies the focus is now much less
explicitly on ‘How has it all been paid for?’ than it used to be. One way in which
the importance still attached to it shines through is in the many efforts to
determine the exact wealth of various parts of the world on the eve of the First
Industrial Revolution. Even if it is not stated explicitly, one cannot help thinking
that those worldwide comparisons of GDPs and real-wages are undertaken based
on the assumption that a country needed ample resources to be the first to take
off and that with its wealth its chances to industrialise would increase.746 Both
claims are not correct. Let us begin with the second claim. The richest nations, let
alone the richest regions, were not necessarily the first ones to industrialise or to
witness substantial and sustained growth. When Britain started to industrialise,
average per capita real income in the Dutch Republic was higher. In 1913 that was
no longer the case. In the middle of the eighteenth century, in all probability,
Japan was somewhat poorer than China and not as developed; in 1913, the tables
had clearly turned. In the long nineteenth century, growth in most countries did
not strongly correlate with wealth.747 When it comes to the first claim: the
amounts of money Britain actually needed to take off were not yet staggering,
although of course they would increase with the passing of time. In strictly
monetary terms, several countries could have afforded the investments that
Britain made during take-off, at least until the railway age. There were quite a few
countries where sufficient amounts of money were available to pay for the re-
745 Hicks, Theory of economic history, 142 – 143.
746 See for examples note 78.
747 See Maddison, World economy, 265, where he presents annual average compound growth
rates for twenty countries and regional totals for the entire period 0 – 1998. See also for GDP
figures page 264.
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quired investment and whose average real income was high enough to, in
principle, find the consumers without whom new modes of producing made no
sense. Many investments in Britain actually were paid for out of profits that were
ploughed back. This means there was no need at all for any major previous
primitive accumulation. Whether money was invested in new ways of producing
was far more a matter of the allocation of capital – what alternatives were
available and what preferences existed – than of its sheer availability.
Some figures for Britain in its early stage of industrialisation can convincingly
show that. The following comparison by John Brewer is quite enlightening
The capital assets of a large business in the early eighteenth century rarely exceeded
£10,000. Ambrose Crowley’s iron works, regarded as the wonder of their age, had a fixed
capital of £12,000. A substantial multi-storey cotton spinning mill built at the end of the
century cost a mere £5,000. By comparison naval vessels cost a small fortune. In the late
seventeenth century the navy spent between £33,000 and £39,000 to build a first-rate
ship, between £24,000 and £27,000 to build a second-rate, and between £15,000 and
£17,000 to construct a third-rate vessel. By the second half of the eighteenth century the
cost of constructing the largest ships had nearly doubled. In 1765 the 100-gun first-rate
Victory cost £63,174 to build. Even the smaller royal naval vessels were more expensive
than most industrial plant.748
A new, seventy-four gun ship, fully outfitted, might typically cost almost £50,000
in the 1780s.749 Just to be able to put things in a broader perspective, three other
comparisons might also be helpful. One is with the value of sugar estates on
Jamaica. A medium-sized estate on Jamaica in 1774, including 200 slaves, was
worth some £20,000. A big one with 300 slaves at the time might well cost some
£30,000. Towards the end of the century, some sugar plantations on the island
were even worth as much as £70,000.750 Another one concerns the incomes one
could earn in government service. For Britain, I found these figures for 1773:
most government officers then had a yearly income of a couple of hundred
pounds sterling. The Secretary of State, however, per year had an income of
£8,000, whereas the Receiver General, who was in charge of the collection of
customs revenue in England and Scotland, earned £2,100 per year.751 An ordi-
nary working-class family in London at the time may have earned some thirty
748 Brewer, Sinews of power, 34.
749 Baugh, ‘Naval power: what gave the British navy superiority?’, 238. The costs of a seventy-
pieces carrying man-of-war to be built in Amsterdam in 1781 were estimated at 510,000
guilders, i. e. some 40,000 pounds. See Brandon, Masters of War. 133.
750 Blackburn, Making of New World slavery, pages 410, 415 and 419.
751 Shawn Ni and Pham Hoang Van, ‘High corruption income in Ming and Qing China’, Part
Two: Historical evidence of low salaries and high corruption. A pound sterling was the
equivalent of some 111 grams of silver.
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pounds sterling per year.752 Differences remained huge. The Superintendent of
British trade in China in 1833, William Napier, had a salary, at ambassadorial
level, of £6,000 per annum.753 A building labourer in London at that time earned
fifty pounds per year at best, working 300 days. A couple of examples from a
completely different kind of government service: when the British defeated the
Spanish in 1762 at Havana, the commanders in chief each received £70,000. In
1799, three frigates brought two Spanish ships to Plymouth. Each frigate captain
got £40,700, each lieutenant £5,091, each warrant officer £2,478, each midship-
man £791, and each seaman and marine £182 4 s. A seaman’s pay at the time was
about fourteen pounds sterling per year.754 As a last example, I refer to the
incomes of peers in Britain over the eighteenth century. For the end of the
seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth centuries, estimates of their
average income ranged from £2,800 to £6,030 per year. Several peers at the time
had an income of over £25,000 per year. By 1801, the average annual income of a
British peer was £8,000 per year, ten times as much as an average merchant.
There was no lack of rich people in Britain, the bulk of them interestingly enough
not earning their money in industry but, until the 1840s in public office, and –
mostly in combination with office holding – by owning land. In 1850, to present
one last figure, 7,000 people owned four fifths of the land of the British Isles.755
Many inventors and industrialists, surprisingly enough, did not become rich.
The really big fortunes continued to be found someplace else, in agriculture or
services, i. e. trade, finance and public service.
In terms of money, the ‘business’ of war completely dwarfed all other busi-
nesses. That applies to all major European countries. Let me again extensively
quote John Brewer for the situation in Britain:
In the first half of the eighteenth century the British navy boasted twenty ships of the
first and second rates, approximately forty vessels of the third rate, as well as an
additional 120 smaller vessels of the fourth, fifth and sixth rates. If we assume that the
costs of ship construction had not risen since the late seventeenth century, then the
entire fleet amounted to a capital investment of nearly 2.25 million whose replacement
cost was approximately four per cent of national income. This can be compared with
the total fixed capital in the 243 mills in the West Riding woollen industry in 1800,
which has been estimated at £402,651 with an average of £1657 per textile mill. The
fixed capital in one of the largest sectors of the nation’s most important industry was
752 If we assume the male breadwinner worked some 250 days a year and the rest of the family
would add some twenty-five per cent to his income.
753 Lovell, Opium War, 1.
754 All these examples come from Allen, Institutional revolution, 121.
755 I took all these figures from Allen, Institutional revolution, chapter 3, pages 71 – 76. For
other striking incomes, see e. g. ibidem, 121 and 194.
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therefore a mere eighteen per cent of the fixed capital required to launch the British
navy.756
This is what Peter Mathias writes about the total costs of the French Wars of
1793 – 1815 in an article about financing the Industrial Revolution:
…the total military costs of the French wars for Britain between 1793 and 1815
amounted to approximately £1,000 million pounds sterling, with over £500 million in
mobilized savings produced for government loans by way of the long-term capital
market, spread over twenty-two years, whereas the total accumulated capital in the
canal system, from 1750 to 1820 was about £20 million Moreover, transport investment
was one of the ‘lumpiest’ forms of productive investment to be undertaken. In 1809 –
1810 it was reckoned that the annual investment in fixed capital in the entire cotton
industry was £0.4 million. This was less than one per cent [sic]! of the military budget of
£45 millions, spent during that year.757
For the rest of Europe, similar stories could be told.758 One can, of course, start a
debate here discussing to what extent investment in the military was conducive
to economic growth, a question that in any case would be very hard to settle in
principle and very complicated even to satisfactorily tackle in practice. Investing
in the military meant investing in ships, armaments, ammunition and all sorts of
provisions for military and other personnel. Some of the invested money might
otherwise have been ‘idle’. It offered employment to people who might otherwise
have been unemployed. One can think of all sorts of ‘military Keynesianism’.759
Such investments could provide all sorts of direct and indirect spoils of war, help
to conquer markets or protect trade, or simply be inevitable because without
them one would be defenceless. The costs are obvious. I do not intend to enter
that debate here, as it is not relevant for the point that I want to make here, which
is that Western-European countries as such were not so starved of money that
they could not possibly have paid for industrialisation before they actually did.760
756 Brewer, Sinews of power, 34 – 35.
757 Mathias, ‘Financing the Industrial Revolution’, 72.
758 See, for the absolutely staggering amounts of money that European states spent on war,
Bonney, Economic systems and state finance ; Bonney, Rise of the fiscal state ; Storrs, Fiscal-
military state in eighteenth-century Europe and Torres Snchez, War, state and develop-
ment.
759 See, for an attempt to chart the positive effects of warfare and preparation for warfare on
Britain’s industrialisation, O’Brien, ‘The contributions of warfare with Revolutionary and
Napoleonic France to the consolidation and progress of the British Industrial Revolution’.
We will come back to this topic briefly when we analyse the role of the state.
760 See for further information my ‘Governing growth’. For the costs of war for (Great) Britain
and China see my ‘Die Staatsfinanzen Chinas und Großbritanniens im langen 18. Jahr-
hundert. The article was also published, in English, as working paper no 167/12 on the
website of the Department of Economic History at the London School of Economics and
Political Science http://www2.lse.ac.uk/economicHistory/workingPapers/economicHi
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The ample availability of liquid capital in Great Britain and later the United
Kingdom also shows in the fact that governments there had an enormous public
debt that was overwhelmingly shouldered by their own subjects, and on which
the government never defaulted. Over the entire period from 1750 to 1850, that
debt was never lower than Great Britain’s GDP. Just after the Napoleonic Wars, it
was more than 2.5 times as big. Britons held the bulk of it – as a rule over eighty
per cent. Let me just provide a couple of figures with no other purpose than to
give an idea of orders magnitude: On average public debt of the United Kingdom
over the period 1802 – 1850 amounted to about £800 million. Debt charges,
almost entirely paid to wealthy British subjects, over that same period amounted
to on average twenty-seven million pound sterling per year. In 1850, Great
Britain’s national income was less than £600 million. Income from mining,
building and manufacturing in total was £179 million. Investment in railways
during the railway boom of 1846 – 1848 was about the same size as debt charges
at the time, some thirty million pound sterling. Gross domestic fixed capital plus
net foreign investment together in 1860 – I found no data referring to previous
years – amounted to some ninety million pounds sterling.761
At the beginning of industrialisation, (fixed) capital requirements overall
were quite low particularly in comparison to costs of, for example, warfare, and
in many countries, the required amount of money could have been found. This
remained the case for decades. The rate of gross investment in capital formation
to national income did indeed rise in industrialising Britain as much more
money was invested. It rose from an estimated five to six per cent in the 1760s to
an estimated ten to twelve per cent a century later.762 My point is that this was not
very problematic. Investment in liquid capital, moreover, continued to be a
surprisingly large part of total capital investment for quite some time. In 1760, in
England, fixed capital in the form of machines and equipment for transport
made up only eight per cent of total fixed capital (excluding residential build-
ings). Most fixed capital therefore consisted of buildings. In 1830, fixed capital
costs had risen to fourteen per cent and in 1975 to forty-five per cent of total
capital costs.763 In Britain’s cotton textile industry in the 1830s, fixed capital still
only amounted to twenty to twenty-five per cent of total capital outlay.764
Great Britain clearly was not exactly caught in a poverty trap. The same
story/home.aspx. Literature dealing with fiscal-military states in Europe and their enor-
mous expenditures on warfare is abundant. I refer to note 15 of this article.
761 For all these figures see Mathias, First industrial nation, 463, 478, 283 and 458.
762 I want to emphasize that these are estimates, as the calculation is fraught with difficulties
and wide margins of error. I took this estimate, which is in the orders of magnitude that one
finds in all the relevant literature, from Feinstein and Pollard, Studies in capital formation in
the United Kingdom.
763 Malanima, Pre-modern European economy, 320 – 321. The exact figures are on page 321.
764 Crouzet, First industrialists, 9. With the railway-age, things of course began to change.
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applies to other European countries. In the beginning of the nineteenth century,
Dutch investors annually derived more than fifty million guilders as income
from foreign investments. That is roughly twenty-five guilders – or some 2.5
pounds sterling – per capita at a time when national income per capita amounted
to 150 to 200 guilders. Total foreign investment per capita at that time was an
estimated 1.75 times as big as GDP per capita. Total investment in domestic and
foreign government debts, to give another indicator of Dutch liquidity,
amounted to more than 1.5 billion guilders. That is the equivalent of 400 million
taels, far more than the entire annual income of China’s government at that
time.765 The late industrialisation of the Netherlands certainly was not caused by
an overall lack of money.
In all the more advanced economies of the world in the eighteenth century as
such, more than enough liquid capital was available to pay for factories and all
those other things we associate with the First Industrial Revolution. There was
more than enough surplus, even if one allowed elites to enjoy their conspicuous
consumption and rulers their wars, in principle to be able to find liquidity.
According to William Easterly, the existence of a poverty trap is part of a legend
that gave birth to and was used as a justification of development aid. He refers to
the situation in the twentieth century when, in his view, even the poorest
countries were not so poor that they could not invest in development and
growth.766 I think that applies even more to the situation in the eighteenth
century, in any case for all those countries that one could call ‘advanced organic
economies’.
‘Poor’ China, to make the comparison with that country once again, had
enough wealthy individuals. Between 1738 and 1804, the so-called ‘factory
merchants’ and ‘transport merchants’, who held the monopoly of producing,
transporting and selling salt from the Liang-Huai salt district had to pay nearly
forty million taels as official exactions to the imperial treasure. Considering the
fact that their yearly profits have been estimated at between six and seven million
taels, this burden must have been quite bearable.767 A tael is some thirty-seven
grams of silver, which is one third of a pound sterling, which itself is equal to
some 111 grams of pure silver. We know of individuals in China during the
eighteenth century who had a personal capital of more than ten million taels,
mostly earned in trading salt.768 The aggregated profits of the salt merchants of
Yang-chow in the second half of the eighteenth century have been estimated at
765 De Vries and Van der Woude, First modern economy, chapter 4.3.2.
766 Easterly, White man’s burden, chapter 2. Robert Allen, in contrast, as we already saw,
believes in the existence of such a trap for poor countries. See Allen, Global economic
history, 13.
767 Feuerwerker, China’s early industrialization, 50 – 51.
768 Osterhammel, China und die Weltgemeinschaft, 75.
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something like fifty million taels.769 To put things in perspective: the total sum of
taxes, including the so-called surcharges, that were levied for central govern-
ment at the time, has been estimated at between fifty million and eighty million
taels.770 The total value of Chinese goods exported via the British East India
Company between 1722 and 1833 never surpassed 6.2 million taels per annum.771
In the nineteenth century, too, one could still make a fortune: in 1834 the
Howqua house of foreign trade had amassed some twenty-six million silver
dollars which is more than five million pounds sterling in terms of silver. That,
according to contemporaries, made merchant Howqua the owner of the largest
mercantile fortune on earth.772 Overseas trader Pan Youdu in 1820 had accu-
mulated a family fortune of ten million Mexican dollars i. e. 7.3 million taels or
27,000 kg of silver, equivalent of more than two million pounds sterling.773
The income of the Chinese gentry-class was enormous. According to an es-
timate, the total average income of an official in China in the 1880s was about
5,000 taels annually : some 500 taels of it official income, the rest ‘extras’. A
provincial governor could in total earn about 180,000 taels per year, a district
magistrate some 30,000. A secretarial assistant serving a district magistrate
could still bring home 250 taels. At the time, an ordinary agricultural labourer
earned some five to ten taels annually plus food; his total income would never
amount to more than twenty taels. At the end of the nineteenth century, there
were some 1.5 million gentry in China.774 Ruan Yuan, a very successful official,
who ended his career in the highest rank, earned over six million taels, that is
150,000 taels per year in total over the period of 1793 to 1835, excluding three
years from 1809 – 1812. At that time, subsistence for an adult man in China’s
towns was less than fifteen taels per year.775 The tiny official incomes were
replenished by legal extras, so-called honesty-nourishing fees, by ‘customary
fees’ the population had to pay for services, and by whatever payments officials
could collect.
Let me give just two examples from India. It is claimed that Mulla Abdul
Ghafur, one of the richest merchants of Surat, conducted trade equal to that of
the entire East India Company of Britain. When he died in 1718, he left an estate
worth abouth one million pounds sterling in terms of silver.776 We have to realise
769 I found this figure in Hsü, Rise of modern China, 71. Hsü refers to a text by Ping-ti Ho that I
was unable to consult.
770 Vries, Via Peking back to Manchester, note 102, page 97.
771 Zhuang Tea, silver, opium and war, 158 – 159.
772 I found this figure in Hsü, Rise of modern China, 71. Hsü refers to a text by H.B. Morse that I
was unable to consult. A silver dollar at the time was about twenty-five grams.
773 Deng, ‘Foreign staple trade of China in the pre-modern era’, 281.
774 Chung-li Chang, Income of the Chinese gentry, 42, 197 and 12.
775 Wei, Ruan Yuan, 301.
776 Das Gupta, Merchants of maritime India, XII and 111. For the immense wealth of some
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that the wealth of rulers could be far higher! Mahmed Amin Khan – one of the
most powerful men of the Mughal court – in 1684 bequeathed in cash and
valuables alone a sum estimated at 110 million rupees which is about eleven
million pounds sterling in terms of silver. To compare: All assets of the Dutch
East India Company in Asia at the time had a value of about thirty-two million
guilders, or some three million pounds sterling in terms of silver. And that was
still apart from his vast flocks (more than 8,000 camels alone), immense pos-
sessions in Bengal and on the Coromandel coast and innumerable other estates
belonging to his family. Aside from those main pursuits, Amin Kahn also had
some shares in ships on the Coromandel coast.”777 There are always and ev-
erywhere potential surpluses available. What counts is what is done with them.
A fundamental question that raises itself in the context of my analysis after
referring to this wealth is what the relationship between inequality and growth
might be. In the literature, one comes across two main viewpoints. Inequality
implies a high level of accumulation in the hands of a small group of people and
thus the wherewithal for investing. When it indicates high returns for extra-
ordinary efforts or qualities it might stimulate efforts by all to try and better their
human capital. In that case, its effects overall will be positive. If, however, in-
equality is an effect of rents, for example, when a small group of people owns
relatively fixed resources, the effects are rather the opposite.778 This clearly is the
situation that scholars like Sokoloff, Engerman, Acemoglu, Johnson and Rob-
inson have in mind when they emphasise that inequality would be bad for
development, in Latin America, the case the most often refer to, but also in other
instances. Implicitly and often even explicitly, most institutionalist economists
claim that ‘too much’ inequality is bad for development and growth and impedes
a take-off. In discussions about the catching-up of Asian countries such as
China, India, and in particular Korea or Taiwan, scholars often refer to the
positive impact of the fact that in those countries inequality of income and
wealth was much lower than in Latin America.779 The debate about the existence
Indian merchants, which dwarfed the wealth of European merchants, see further, for
example, Habib, ‘Potentialities of capitalist development in the economy of Mughal India’,
71 – 73. For the wealth of Dutch merchants, see De Vries and Van der Woude, First modern
economy, chapter 11.5. In Amsterdam there were only a couple of people owning more than
a million guilders in the 1630s. Burgomaster of Amsterdam Jeronimus de Haze de Georgio
was considered extremely wealthy. When he died in 1725, he left 3.3 million guilders, the
equivalent of some 300,000 pounds sterling. See page 589 of the book.
777 Barendse, Arabian Seas, 1640 – 1700, 118. One rupee equals some eleven grams of silver and
thus about one tenth of a pound sterling.
778 I here base myself on some comments in Williamson, Trade and poverty, 164 – 165.
779 Amsden, Rise of the rest, the Index under, ‘Income’, distribution of. This equal income
distribution then is normally connected to the fact that those Asian countries experienced
extensive programmes of land reform. This is the case in Amsden’s work but even more in
the recent book by Studwell on the development of East Asian economies. Fascinatingly
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of a general relation between inequality and growth and what that relation would
look like is actually not settled. Elhanan Helpman synthesizes his even-handed
analysis of the existing literature very cautiously : “My tentative conclusion is
that inequality slows growth.”780 Joseph Stiglitz just published a book in which
he cautions against the dangers of increasing inequality in particular for
American society at the moment.781 Considering the fact that no country has ever
existed where there was no inequality at all, the real question seems to be how
much inequality would be ‘too’ much to enable a country to take-off. As a
corollary to that question one would have to deal with the question of whether
taking-off would by definition not cause a temporary increase of inequality, as
Simon Kuznets claimed.782
Apart from the fact that the matter apparently has not been settled in theory,
there are some major problems in practice. It for example – and that of course
touches upon the essence of our analysis – is not at all clear that income and
wealth in Britain just before and during its take-off would be more equally
distributed than in other, non-industrialising countries, as is constantly sug-
gested in (neo)institutionalist literature referring to Britain’s take-off after 1688.
Recent research suggests rather the opposite, as for example can be deduced
from the information in Table 29.783
enough in the case of industrialising Britain they were both absent. Britain at the eve of its
take-off had a high inequality of income and a high concentration of the ownership of land.
In its case, however, these are normally presented as favourable to development – be it not
for many Britons – as they are assumed to enable accumulation and create a capitalist wage
economy. Again, apparently context determines outcome. Studwell very explicitly time and
again makes the claim that household farming was the recipe for success in East Asian
economic development. See How Asia works, Part I: ‘The triumph of gardening’ and his
‘Epilogue’. For Amsden’s view see e. g. her Rise of the rest, 16 – 18.
780 Helpman, Mystery of economic growth, 93.
781 Stiglitz, Price of inequality.
782 See for the debate on the so-called Kuznets-curve Helpman, Mystery of economic growth,
86 – 87, where the thesis that in periods of emerging modern economic growth, inequality
would always first increase and then decrease is rejected. That is also the case in Milanovic,
The haves and the have-nots. See under ‘Kuznets, Simon’ and ‘Kuznets, hypothesis’. For the
situation in early modern Europe, that seems to be much more in accordance to Kuznets’
expectations, see Van Zanden ‘Tracing the beginning of the Kuznets curve’.
783 I would also like to refer here to the income-tables on Peter Lindert’s website http://gpih.
ucdavis.edu/Distribution.htm and Hoffman Jacks, Levin, and Lindert, ‘Real inequality in
Western Europe since 1500’.
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Table 29: Pre-industrial Gini-coefficients and inequality extraction ratios
Country / region, year Gini Inequality extraction ratio (%)
Roman Empire, 14 39.4 75.0
Byzantium, 1000 41.1 94.1
England and Wales, 1290 36.7 69.2
Tuscany, 1427 46.1 66.6
South Serbia, 1455 20.9 64.8
Holland, 1561 56.0 76.3
Levant, 1596 39.8 57.6
England and Wales, 1688 45.0 57.1
Holland, 1732 61.1 71.7
Moghul India, 1750 48.9 112.8
Old Castile, 1752 52.5 88.0
England and Wales, 1759 45.9 55.4
France, 1788 55.9 76.1
Nueva EspaÇa, 1790 63.5 105.5
England and Wales, 1801 51.5 60.6
Bihar (India), 1807 33.5 76.7
Netherlands, 1808 57.0 68.5
Naples, 1811 28.4 53.7
Chile, 1861 63.7 83.0
Brazil, 1872 43.3 74.2
Peru, 1876 42.2 78.1
Java, 1880 39.7 72.8
China, 1880 24.5 55.2
Japan, 1886 39.5 58.8
Kenya, 1914 33.2 96.8
Java, 1924 32.1 48.0
Kenya, 1927 46.2 100.0
Siam, 1929 48.5 78.1
British India, 1947 49.7 96.8
Average 44.3 74.9
Source: Jeffrey G. Williamson, Trade and poverty. When the Third World fell behind
(Cambridge Mass. and London 2011) 149. A Gini coefficient of zero expresses perfect
equality, where all values are the same (for example, where everyone has an exactly equal
income). A Gini coefficient of one (100 on the percentile scale) expresses maximal in-
equality among values (for example where only one person has all the income). The
extraction rate indicates how much of available societal surplus above subsistence is
extracted by the existing elite. See for further explanation Williamson, Trade and poverty,
chapter 9.
In the end, for the take-off phase, the question of how big a part of the population
could afford to buy certain industrial commodities is, in all probability, more
important than the question of how unequal income and wealth were spread. It
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now seems firmly established that ‘ordinary’ people in the West, in particular in
north-western Europe and (what was to become) the USA had more purchasing
power than their counterparts on the rest of the globe. The thesis that societies in
those regions, moreover, would have had a relatively bigger group of ‘middle-
incomes’ so important in the beginning of their consumer revolution is finding
broad support.784 The mass market without which industrial capitalism seems
inconceivable in principle was there to be exploited. The rest of the world may
have been poorer, but it still contained a huge number of people wealthy enough
to buy the mass consumer products of the First Industrial Revolution whose
prices tended to sink rather fast and in this way also created for themselves a
market in ‘poor’ countries fairly soon. Overall, it therefore is not at all obvious
that Britain industrialized because its entrepreneurs had a larger market for
their products. We will return to this question later on.785 What to me is clear is
that Britain had a large middle-income market, maybe not larger than in other
parts of Western Europe but certainly than in China, India or the Ottoman
Empire, which developed into a mass market as prices sank. Frank holds the
view, without providing any data to support it, that the major Asian economies
on the eve of Great Divergence had a “polarised distribution of income” that
“constrained effective domestic demand for mass consumer goods.”786 But, and I
think that is quite relevant: the consumer revolution that triggered so much
innovation began as a broad middle-class phenomenon.
13. Primitive accumulation: bullion and slaves
In global histories dealing with industrialisation and the origins of modern
economic growth in the West, unsurprisingly, the focus is not so much on
whether accumulation had taken place but on the extent to which it was external.
The fact that the first industrial nation ruled over a big empire and was the
world’s major trading nation, almost inevitably led many scholars to wonder
whether these facts were connected. The idea that they were has always been
quite popular and found expression in the claim that the West became rich ‘over
the back’ of the Rest or even actively underdeveloped the rest of the world in
order to be able to take off. Discussing the many questions related to the (as-
sumed) connections between industry, trade and empire, means entering a web
of very complicated debates in the knowledge, moreover, that one in all prob-
ability will never come up with answers that will convince all parties partic-
784 See e. g. Lindert’s website note 783.
785 See pages 350 – 358.
786 Frank, ReOrient, 301.
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ipating in them. In my view, the main problem in analysing the emergence of
modern economic growth from this angle consists in the fact that it is all but
impossible to really disentangle causes and effects and to sharply distinguish
between ‘supernormal’ turnovers and profits as a result of manipulation or even
coercion and luck on the one hand and (super) normal turnovers and profits
obtained in a process of free, fair and voluntary trade.
Those turnovers and profits obtained on a free and fair market are basically
part of the thing to be explained, not of the explanation. If some people make
profits by trading freely and fairly, that as a rule is a sign of the strength of their
economy rather than its explanation. In specific cases, outlets and profits could
be ‘super-normal’ in such a situation too, due to specific luck or natural mo-
nopoly. The distinction drawn here in theory is often extremely difficult if not
often impossible to make in practice. For the West, we are discussing the Age of
Mercantilism in which ‘power’ and ‘profit’ often were almost inseparably con-
nected. In case of doubt, I have always opted for the strategy to consider turn-
overs or profits as the results of what we would now call unfair trade in order to
maximally support a thesis that I myself actually do not endorse, to wit, the thesis
that the contribution of the periphery to the rise of Western Europe would have
been fundamental in terms of the accumulation it made possible. In my view
there is a tendency to suggest or imply that European exchange with the rest of
the world in the early modern era would always have been non-consensual or at
least manipulated in such a way that as a rule the profits for the Europeans were
above normal and more like ‘rents’ than like real profits. That, however, is not
true for many trade relationships in Asia. In their trade with China, Japan, and
the Mughal, Ottoman and Safavid Empires, to mention only the big Asian
players, the Europeans simply were a party on a market for most of the period
discussed here. They were not in any way able to forcefully impose their will and
had to pay prices they could not themselves fix. The same goes for the buying of
slaves in Africa and trade with the United States after its independence.
Let me begin with some general comments on the overall likelihood of the
thesis that ‘the West’ became rich over the back of ‘the rest’, a thesis which is
meant to convey that exploitation and coercion were the or at least a funda-
mental basis of Western wealth and the main motor of its growth. As a general,
straightforward claim this thesis clearly is indefensible: the correlations and the
numbers simply do not fit. The economies of the countries in the West with the
biggest, super-normal, ‘windfall’ incomes, Portugal and Spain, never seem to
have really profited from them and ended up being quite poor and under-
developed. Portugal had a huge and very profitable slave trade and in no country
more slaves were employed to work for Western employers than in its colony
Brazil, a colony that became a major sugar producer and moreover exported
enormous amounts of gold to Portugal. Nevertheless, Portugal continued to be
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poor and underdeveloped, which by the way was also the case for Brazil, not-
withstanding the fact that after its independence, it continued to import slaves
and set millions of them to work.787 Anyone thinking in terms of (primitive)
accumulation will have to deal with the question of why Portugal – the longest
running European colonial empire – continued to be so poor whereas Switzer-
land – a landlocked country which never had any overseas colonies – became so
rich.788 A similar question can of course be raised with regard to Spain; a country
that acquired enormous amounts of bullion and land, but that according to the
most recent estimates saw a decrease rather than an increase in real income per
capita over the entire early modern era and where economic development was
not exactly impressive.789 The Conde-Duque de Olivares already in 1631 won-
dered whether discovering the New World had been a blessing for ‘Spain’: “If its
great conquests have reduced this Monarchy to such a miserable condition, one
can reasonably say that it would have been more powerful without that New
World.”790 New World bullion brought inflation and financed many wars that
were not exactly successful for Spain and, on top of that, created a lot of havoc all
over Europe. Over the entire early modern era and on a per capita base no
country in Europe had a larger amount of trade with the non-European world
than the Dutch Republic. But whereas that trade became even more important
for its economy during the eighteenth century, its per capita real income stag-
nated or even declined then and the country’s economy did not take off.791 The
part of Indonesia’s net national income or GDP that the Dutch siphoned off in
the period 1868 to 1930 was far bigger than the part of national income or GDP
that the British ever managed to drain from India between 1801 and 1930. As
compared to Spanish extraction in New Spain, at the end of the eighteenth
century, again expressed as a percentage of the income of the region, Britain’s
overall drain to India was also relatively low.792 For Britain, during take-off,
colonies were not more relevant – rather less so – than for several other European
countries at that time. As Eltis and Engerman point out: “…France’s Caribbean
plantations produced forty-three per cent more crops by value than did Britain’s
on the eve of the American Revolution. The phenomenal expansion of St.
Dominique between 1770 and 1791 meant that that French planters widened the
787 For the economic history of Portugal, see, in Portuguese, Lains and Ferreira da Silva,
Histûria econûmica de Portugal, 1700 – 2000.
788 I paraphrase http://lorenzo-thinkingoutaloud.blogspot.com/2009/08/great-divergence.html
consulted 5 – 1 – 2012. Blog of 7 – 8-2009.
789 For development of real income per capita, see e. g. Malanima, Pre-modern European
economy, 290. For a relatively optimistic analysis of Spain’s economy during the very long
eighteenth century, see Ringrose, Spain, Europe and the Spanish miracle.
790 Elliott, Spain and its world, 25.
791 De Vries and Van der Woude, First modern economy, chapters 10 and 13.
792 See Williamson, Trade and poverty, 163 – 165.
Primitive accumulation: bullion and slaves 247
gap dramatically.”793 France’s economy, of course, was much larger than that of
Britain. But when it comes to fractions of the national economy the colonies of
Spain and Portugal at the time definitely were more important for their moth-
erlands than those of Britain were for Britain.794 That country took off at a time
when it no longer ruled what became the United States, from which, after in-
dependence, it increasingly began to import its raw cotton. Countries that in-
dustrialised quite early, such as Belgium and Switzerland or, somewhat later,
Germany, that with its huge population became an industrial super power, had
no or hardly any colonies and were not exactly global traders.
Having colonies did not necessarily make you rich, as according to several
scholars also shows in Japan’s experiments with colonialism. Not having them
did not doom you to poverty. Being one definitely increased your chance of
ending up poor, as in particular the case of Africa quite convincingly shows. Real
income per capita overall clearly tends to be higher in non-colonized countries
than in countries with a colonial past. We are talking about correlations here.
That means there are exceptions. We, moreover, have to realise that correlation
need not be causation and that neither colonising nor colonised countries were
identical so that many different factors may have played a part. But there can be
no doubt that the colonial heritage of bad institutions and extractive elites in
particular had a negative impact on growth and development in colonised
countries.795 Overall, Western colonialism clearly had many negative effects on
the economies of the countries it affected. But, as indicated, here, too, there are
differences according to time and place, and colonizing power. Countries that
were held longer as colonies perform relatively better today and are relatively
more democratic. Colonies of the British perform relatively ‘better’ than colo-
nies of the French.796 Japan and China definitely profited from the fact that they
have never been actually colonised. But here, too, there are exceptions. The real
per capita income of the USAwas already a little above that of Western Europe in
1820, less than fifty years after it had become independent. The country then was
just as rich as Denmark and what we now call Belgium. In Western Europe. only
the Netherlands and Britain were richer.797 Other settler colonies of Britain, such
as the dominions Canada, Australia and New Zealand, also did not fare badly.
793 Eltis and Engerman, ‘Importance of slavery and the slave trade to industrializing Britain’,
123 – 144, 130 – 131.
794 Ibidem.
795 I here want to refer in particular to Bertocchi and Canova, ‘Did colonization matter for
growth’ and, somewhat less explicitly, Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, ‘Institutions rule’.
For more information – in particular for Africa – see under note 61 and Gozzini, Idea di
giustizia, chapter four, ‘Colonialismo e ineguaglianza’.
796 See Fenske, ‘Causal history of Africa’, 22 – 26.
797 Maddison, Contours of the world economy, 382.
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Economically speaking, in the end, colonial experience was a good thing for
Taiwan and Korea.798 The Newly Industrialising Countries in Asia and post-1978
China took off without colonies. Real income of countries in Latin America
developed quite differently in the first century after independence, rising in
some countries and declining in others. All these comments do not prove or
refute the existence of specific connections between foreign exploitation and the
rise or decline of specific countries: what they do, however, is show that general
statements in terms of ‘the West climbed over the back of the Rest’ are simplistic
and indefensible. As such, it is also striking that during the nineteenth century,
apart from Britain, Europe’s overseas trade was smaller as a percentage of GDP
than it had been in the previous century.799
Modern economic growth is not simply a matter of having easy income at
one’s disposal – although that of course might help. But let us try and figure out
the orders of magnitude of ‘primitive accumulation’ – and focus on two ex-
amples. They will refer to the two forms of Western exploitation and windfall
profits that have kindled the imagination most. They are also very illuminating
in showing how small even the biggest ‘windfalls’ are as compared to the entire
economies whose development or non-development we want to explain. We of
course are only talking in terms of orders of magnitude. First of all there is
bullion. The idea that shiploads of bullion must have made those who received
them rich is almost irresistible. But what amounts are we actually talking
about, and what is their value as compared to the national incomes of the
countries whose wealth they are supposed to explain? According to the best
available estimates, total bullion production in the Americas in silver equiv-
alents (i. e. silver plus gold, expressed in silver equivalents) over the entire
period from 1493 to 1800 amounted to 130,000 to 150,000 tonnes.800 Let us take
the highest figure and assume a total production of 150,000 tonnes; that is 150
billion grams of silver over roughly three hundred years. That boils down to
500 million grams per year on average. What is relevant here is the amount that
reached Europe, as not the entire production was exported. Let us, moreover,
not look at Europe as a whole but only at its Western half, where bullion first
arrived. Taking Europe in its entirety would of course reduce the amounts per
capita. During the second half of the eighteenth century, exports reached their
798 See e. g. Amsden, Rise of the rest, the Index under ‘Korea’, Japanese colonialism and ‘Tai-
wan’, Japanese colonialism. This of course, but I hope that is obvious, is not a justification of
colonialism, which cannot be justified, nor a whitewashing of many crimes.
799 Etemad, ‘Colonial and European domestic trade’.
800 All the information about bullion in this and the next paragraphs is taken from: Barrett,
‘World bullion flows’ and all the information about silver wages in Europe from Allen,
‘Great Divergence in European wages and prices.’ After 1800, silver production in and
exports from the Americas dwindled.
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highest point ever, on average 600 tons per year over the fifty years period. That
is some 600 million grams of silver-equivalents for the roughly 100 million
people that were on average living in Western Europe at the time. That would
amount to six grams of silver per person per year. How much is that? Let us
compare this amount of money to the wages of unskilled labourers over that
same period as Robert Allen reconstructed them. According to him, London’s
unskilled labourers had the highest wage rate of all European cities he dis-
cusses: 11.5 grams of silver per day. The lowest rate he found in Krakow, 2.9
grams of silver per day. In the last quarter of seventeenth century, when
Western Europe had some 80 million inhabitants, on average some 370 tonnes
of silver equivalent reached the region, more than ever before. That would boil
down to some 4.5 grams per capita. The highest daily wage rate for unskilled
labourers then again was that of London, to wit 9.7 grams of silver per working
day ; the lowest again that of Krakow, at 2.7 grams.
Table 30: Average annual estimates (in tonnes) of production and movement of silver and




















1501 – 1525 45 40 5
1526 – 1550 125 105 20
1551 – 1575 240 205 35
1576 – 1600 290 205 85
1601 – 1625 340 245 95 100 145
1626 – 1650 395 290 105 125 165
1651 – 1675 445 330 115 130 200
1676 – 1700 500 370 130 155 215
1701 – 1725 550 415 135 190 225
1726 – 1750 650 500 150 210 290
1751 – 1775 820 590 230 215 375
1776 – 1800 940 600 340 195 405
Source: Ward Barrett, ‘World bullion flows’ in James D. Tracy, ed., The rise of merchant
empires. Long-distance trade in the early modern world 1350 – 1750 (Cambridge 1990)
224 – 254, pages 242 – 243.
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Table 31: Nominal wages of ordinary labourers (grams of silver per day)
1500 – 49 1550 – 99 1600 – 49 1650 – 99 1700 – 49 1750 – 99 1800 – 49
North
America
Boston 4.7 5.0 5.7 9.8 20.9
Philadelphia 8.5 13.8 24.5
Maryland 6.2 6.4 9.9
Latin
America
Potosi 17.0 12.8 12.8 13.0
Bogota 3.2 3.5 6.4 6.4 6.9
Mexicourban 9.1 9.1 10.1
Mexicorural 0.3 1.9 4.3 5.6 5.4 5.5 6.1
North-west-
ern Europe
London 3.2 4.6 7.1 9.7 10.5 11.5 17.7
South Eng-
lish Towns
2.5 3.4 4.1 5.6 7.0 8.3 14.6
Antwerp 3.0 5.9 7.6 7.1 6.9 6.9 7.7




Valencia 4.2 6.6 8.8 6.9 5.7 5.1
Madrid 6.3 8.0 5.1 5.3 8.0
Florence 2.9 3.8 4.7
Milan 5.9 4.1 3.2 2.9 3.1
Naples 3.3 3.5 5.3 4.8 4.8 3.8 3.8
Leipzig 1.9 3.5 3.9 3.7 3.1 4.4
Vienna 2.7 2.6 4.4 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.1
Asia
Beijing 3.5 3.4 2.8
Lower Yangzi 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2
Delhi 0.8 1.3 1.6 2.1
Bengal 0.7 0.9 0.8
Source: Robert C. Allen, Tommy E. Murphy and Eric B. Schneider, ‘The colonial origins of
the divergence in the Americas: A labour market approach’, The Journal of Economic
History 72, 4 (2012) 863 – 894, Online Appendix page 29, Table 2.
Primitive accumulation: bullion and slaves 251
The bullion imports, impressive as they are in absolute terms, were quite small as
compared to total income, even if we assume that in an average family more than
one person would bring in some income. A lot of all this bullion, moreover, left
Europe. Over the entire period from 1600 to 1800, an estimated 400 tonnes of
silver equivalent were exported to the Levant, 461 tonnes via the English and
Dutch East India Companies to the Far East, and 459 tonnes to the Baltic, all in
exchange for imports from those regions. The bulk of imports from Asia con-
sisted of products that Europe could easily have done without. The annual net
balance in the end per inhabitant of Western Europe was some 3 grams of silver
in 1700 and some 4.5 grams in 1800. Even though the Portuguese and Spaniards
did their utmost to profit as much as possible from the bullion they appropriated
in Latin America, its extraction was not a free lunch. There were substantial costs
involved in mining and transporting all that bullion, which of course as far as
possible were paid for via additional extraction. But the actual gains must have
been smaller than the figures presented here – which only refer to total gross
production and transfers – suggest. Besides, as already indicated, an increasing
amount of bullion stayed in the continent in the form of tax income that was
spent there.801
Whether the amounts mentioned are big or small can always be turned into a
matter of debate, but I fail to see how they might be regarded as the cause or even
a major cause of the emergence, let alone the permanency of modern economic
growth in north-western Europe. Portugal and Spain, which, however one wants
to look at it, must have had the easiest and biggest windfall gains, were not set on
a road to take-off. They, in particular the Spanish government, spent most of
their bullion in war, and in that way, as indicated, wreaked havoc and destruction
all over Europe. But waging war was what basically all governments did with
most of their income. The rest of Europe acquired most of its bullion by selling
something to the Iberians: that is as payment for products, not for free. Lots of
the bullion disappeared as payments for goods from elsewhere that were not
necessities. One might even consider this bullion as ‘wasted’. Scholars like
Dennis Flynn, Arturo Girldez, Andre Gunder Frank and several others claim –
incorrectly – that so much – more than half or even two-thirds – of the silver
Europe imported ended up in China that those who want to think in terms of
‘primitive accumulation’ might well wonder why China didn’t profit more from
all that silver.802 If we are to believe Frank, it was with the bullion from the
801 See Barrett, ‘World bullion flows’, 242 – 243, plus the comments by Grafe and Irigoin re-
ferred to on page 39 about taxes leaving the continent.
802 For my critique on this thesis see my ‘California School and beyond’ and my Zur politischen
Ökonomie des Tees, 61 – 78. For an estimate of the total amount of American silver that
ended up in China, see Jan de Vries, ‘Connecting Europe and Asia’, 81. He estimates those
imports even when they were at their highest, between 1725 and 1750, at not more than
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Americas, especially silver, that “… the Europeans bought themselves a seat, and
then even a whole railway car on the Asian train”.803 That of course is a nice
metaphor, but what can it mean? That Europe became richer and more devel-
oped by buying products from Asia? The logic and implied causality of such a
claim escape me. Per capita, much more bullion stayed in Latin America, that
around 1800 still had only some twenty million inhabitants, than ever reached
Western Europe. Why then did that region not take off ?804
A specific way in which all the extra bullion might have helped Western
Europe is in making money cheaper. Even if the extra bullion may have had some
effect in this respect, it cannot explain the overall development of interest rates in
various countries and their differences. Money in Europe overall was cheapest in
Great Britain and the Dutch Republic, much cheaper than in Spain or Portugal,
because those first two countries acquired a substantial stock of bullion via their
trade, but also and probably even more because they developed a sophisticated
financial and monetary system in which the direct dependency on (semi-)
precious metals lessened. Interest rates for commercial loans as well of for
government bonds, as far as those existed at all outside Europe, were the lowest
in the world, far lower than they were in Asia.805 That clearly is not irrelevant:
Schumpeter defines capitalism as “…that form of private property economy in
which innovations are carried out by means of borrowed money, which in
general, though not by logical necessity, means credit creation.”806 But again, in
Western countries where interest rates were low, that certainly was not just an
effect of massive bullion imports, which – again – were not just some windfall
but had to be paid for.
The second ‘windfall’ for the economies of Western Europe, even more than
the previous one based on brute coercion and easily connected with increasing
wealth, consisted of the slave trade and the use of slave labour.807 Here too, some
thirty per cent of Latin American production. See also note 741 for possible negative effects
of silver imports in China. China received no gold at all from the Americas.
803 Frank, ReOrient, 277.
804 For the size of the populations of Western Europe and Latin America see Maddison, World
economy, 241.
805 For figures on interest rates and further references see Van Zanden, ‘Road to the Industrial
Revolution’, 342 – 345 and here under notes 627-628. I am not convinced by the quite
complicated and far-fetched arguments of Wong and Rosenthal, in chapter 5 of their Before
and beyond divergence, that in terms of costs of borrowing, differences between Western
Europe and China in practice would be fairly small or irrelevant.
806 Schumpeter, Business cycles, 223.
807 For general introductory literature on the Atlantic slave trade, see: Klein, Atlantic slave
trade ; Northrup, Atlantic slave trade and Olivier P¦tr¦-Grenouilleau, Les traits n¦griÀres.
For a more analytical, econometric approach, I refer to publications by Nathan Nunn
dealing with the slave trades originating in Africa and their consequences. See Nathan Nunn
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/nunn/papers_nunn. For the impact of slave
trade and slave labour, see Benjamin, The Atlantic World, which gives a very readable and
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basic figures again, indicating orders of magnitude, can give an impression of
how relevant the phenomenon may have been from a macro-economic per-
spective.
Table 32: Slave Carriers
Portugal, including Brazil 4,560,000
Britain 2,600,000
Spain, including Cuba 1,600,000
France, including French West Indies 1,250,000
Dutch Republic 500,000
British North America and United States 300,000
Denmark 50,000
Other 50,000
Source: Hugh Thomas, The slave trade. The history of the Atlantic slave trade: 1440 – 1870
(London and Basingstoke 1998; originally 1997) Appendix Three, page 805.
Table 33: The slaves were delivered to
Brazil 4,000,000
Spanish Empire, including Cuba 2,500,000
British West Indies 2,000,000
French West Indies, including Cayenne 1,600,000
British North America and United States 500,000
Dutch West Indies, including Suriname 500,000
Danish West Indies 28,000
Europe, including Canary Islands, Madeira, Azores etc. 200,000
Source: Hugh Thomas, The slave trade. The history of the Atlantic slave trade: 1440 – 1870
(London and Basingstoke 1998; originally 1997) Appendix Three, page 805.
Looking at the destinations of the slaves who made the Middle Passage, it again is
striking how big the involvement of the Spanish and Portuguese and their de-
scendants in Latin America was and how little this apparently contributed to
laying the basis of a lasting acceleration of development in the mother countries
as well as in the (former) colonies. In that respect one might of course also
wonder why not for example Russia, where many millions of serfs were ruth-
lessly exploited, did not see successful primitive accumulation and then take off.
To determine the potential economic contribution of slave labour to wealth, we
need to know what kind of labour slaves performed.
clear synthesis of what is now known about Atlantic interconnections. Also highly in-
formative is Blackburn, Making of New World slavery.
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Source: Hugh Thomas, The slave trade. The history of the Atlantic slave trade: 1440 – 1870
(London and Basingstoke 1998; originally 1997) Appendix Three, page 806.
The final impact of slave imports on the economies in which the slaves were
forced to work of course also depended on their mortality and fertility. In that
respect, differences were enormous. The British Caribbean imported about 1.6
million slaves between 1700 and 1800. At the end of the eighteenth century, its
slave population counted less than 600,000. Jamaica imported half a million
slaves between 1700 and 1774. In that period of time, its slave population in-
creased by little over 150,000. French Saint Dominique imported about 800,000
slaves between 1680 and 1776. In 1776, its total slave population nevertheless
‘only’ numbered 290,000. Slaves in these colonies apparently did not reproduce
themselves. The situation in Brazil and the Spanish colonies was similar. There
were a million and a half of them in Brazil in 1800, whereas up until then, more
than two million had been imported into the country. In Spain’s American
colonies in 1800, the total number of slaves was 250,000, only half the number of
slaves that had entered the region since the beginning of slave imports. British
North America in this respect was the exception to the rule. Whereas the number
of slaves imported there up until 1800 amounted to some 300,000, its slave
population in 1800 was over 850,000. In 1820, it numbered 1.5 million and in
1860 almost four million.808
In this context, it has to be pointed out that there is an increasing awareness
that the Atlantic slave trade was not the only major slave trade. More attention to
Western slave trade in other regions than the Atlantic, e. g. the slave trade of the
Dutch East India Company in ‘the East’ is needed.809 Europeans, moreover, were
not the only ones who enslaved Africans. Arabs and Muslims transported mil-
lions of them eastward via the Red Sea, the Swahili Coast and several Trans-
808 Blackburn, Making of New World slavery, 423, 424 and 441, and Benjamin, Atlantic World,
626 and 642.
809 See e. g. Vink, ‘“World’s oldest trade”’. The number of slaves involved was quite substantial,
the amount of money, however, much less so. Vink estimates that, for the seventeenth
century, the volume of the total Dutch Indian Ocean slave trade was fifteen to thirty per cent
of that of total Atlantic slave trade.
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Saharan routes. Exact figures for these trades of course are hard to get but there
are several estimates that all point to very high numbers. Olivier P¦tr¦-Gre-
nouilleau has come up with an estimate suggesting that seventeen million en-
slaved Africans would have been taken eastwards between the year 650 and 1910/
1920; some 9,000 per year during the eighteenth century and no fewer than some
43,000 per year during the next century. He bases his findings to a large extent on
figures by Ralph Austen, who later in his work came up with a lowered estimate
of some twelve million.810 Nathan Nunn thinks that some six million African
slaves were transported along these three routes between 1400 and 1900.811 The
number for the period before that, from the seventh century onwards, must in
any case have amounted to a couple of million.812 John Wright in his recent
publication, which, to me, looks the best substantiated of all, estimates that
between 600 and 1900, some six million slaves were transported trough the
Sahara.813 It, in any case, is not certain that Western, i. e. European slave trade was
more extensive than Eastern Arabic-Muslimic slave trade.814 It would be inter-
esting to know what happened with the money paid to those Arabic-Muslim
slave traders. If the slave trade and slavery are supposed to have been so im-
portant for Western economic development, why would that not be the case in
other instances?815
Slavery is here discussed in the context of the debates on the Great Di-
vergence.816 That means we have to discuss its relevance for Britain’s in-
dustrialisation. The coming paragraph will focus on that question. The debate on
the contribution of slave trade and slavery to Britain’s take-off, often waged as a
810 P¦tr¦-Grenouilleau, Traites n¦griÀres, 145 – 162. Tidiane N’Diaye, in his Der verschleierte
Völkermord, comes up with the same figures for about the same time span and points at the
fact that many millions of Africans must have died in the course of the hunt for these slaves.
See pages 211 – 214 of that book.
811 See http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/nunn/files/empirical_slavery.pdf
812 To get an idea of what is behind these figures about a trade of which so little is known see
N’Diaye, Verschleierte Völkermord. I refer to this book for an explanation of the rather
clumsy expression ‘Arabic-Muslimic’ slave trade.
813 Wright, Trans-Saharan slave trade, 39 and 168.
814 See also Bairoch, Economics and world history, under ‘slave trade’. For the Berber slave
trade in white slaves, see Davis, Christian slaves, Muslim masters. It is estimated that in total
more than a million white slaves were involved. For most of the nineteenth century the
number of slaves imported into the Ottoman Empire excluding Egypt, is estimated at
around 10,000 per year. See Toledano, Ottoman slave trade and its suppression, 90. Slaves
were regularly manumitted and slave breeding not practised, therefore the system needed
permanent replenishment.
815 See for the functioning of slavery in other economies, for example, Campbell, Structure of
slavery in Indian Ocean Africa and Asia ; Clarence-Smith, Economics of the Indian Ocean
slave trade in the nineteenth century and Toledano, As if silent and absent.
816 For a recent general analysis, see Zeuske, ‘Historiography and research problems’.
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debate about he so-called Williams-thesis, is still very much alive.817 It probably
will never be settled. We have to distinguish here between the gains from slave
trade as such, those of slavery as a mode of production and eventual further spin-
offs. Let us begin with the first question: how profitable was it to trade slaves?
Calculations made for the situation in Britain, which shipped about half of all the
slaves that crossed the Atlantic Ocean in the eighteenth century, do not show
super-normal profits: on average they would have been between five to ten
percent, probably somewhat closer to ten. This implies that as a percentage of
GDP they must have been tiny, especially considering the fact that most esti-
mates still use figures for Britain’s GDP over the eighteenth century that are too
low. Slave trade profits can never during the entire eighteenth century have
amounted to more than a few tenths of a percent of GDP, at best. Roger Anstey
estimated that over the period 1761 – 1807, the total gross profits of the British
slave trade – that is the difference between the total amount of money one paid
for slaves when buying them and the total amount of money one received when
selling them, without subtracting other costs!, amounted to forty-nine million
pounds sterling, on average some one million pounds sterling per year. Britain’s
GDP over these years increased from over 100 million annually to over some 250
million pounds sterling annually.818 To put things in perspective in a different
way : in the last decades of the eighteenth century, Britain had some 14,000
seafaring ships. Of these, never more than 204 were engaged in trading slaves. In
the Dutch slave trade, the total gross profits over the entire period from 1595 to
1829 have been estimated by scholars who want to show how big they were at
between sixty-three to seventy-nine million guilders. There were yearly averages
817 See Williams, Capitalism and slavery and two edited volumes discussing his thesis: Solow,
Slavery and the rise of the Atlantic system and Solow and Engerman, British capitalism and
Caribbean slavery. A brief, clear and nuanced discussion of the wide range of questions
involved can be found in Morgan, Slavery, Atlantic trade and the British economy.
818 For this estimate see Anstey, ‘Volume and profitability of the British slave trade’, 21. I want
to emphasise that what I am referring to is slave trade. For estimates with regard to the
profitability of trading slaves for Britain see, in alphabetical order, Blackburn, Making of
New World slavery, chapters 9 to 12, with a low estimate of direct trade profits but a very
high estimate of indirect effects; Eltis, Rise of African slavery in the Americas, 270 – 271; Eltis
and Engerman, ‘Importance of slavery and the slave trade to industrializing Britain’; Ete-
mad, De l’utilit¦ des empires, for a general discussion chapter 7; Klein, ‘Economic aspects of
the eighteenth-century Atlantic slave trade’; Morgan, Slavery, Atlantic trade and the British
economy, with a brief but helpful analysis 36 – 48; P¦tr¦-Grenouilleau, Traites n¦griÀres,
317 – 327, and Solow, ‘Caribbean slavery and British growth’. For estimates of Great Britain
GDP over the period 1688 – 1815, see O’Brien, ‘Political preconditions for the Industrial
Revolution’, 126 – 127. There is however is an emerging consensus that the estimates of GDP
like those by O’Brien for the eighteenth century are too low. See e. g. Steven Broadberry and
others http://www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/1/1714/papers/Broadberry.pdf, consulted 15 – 9-
2012, where it is indicated that Great Britain’s GDP already in the 1760s crossed the 100
million pounds sterling boundary and continued to rise afterwards.
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of between 200,000 and 600,000 guilders. At the very end of the seventeenth and
the second half of the eighteenth century gross profits at times reached levels of
way above one million guilders, with an absolute, all-time peak of 1.6 million
Dutch guilders. But one has to realize that in the second half of the eighteenth
century, total Dutch oversees trade was an estimated 300 million guilders per
year, which is in about the same order of magnitude as Dutch GDP at that time.819
In French slave trading, one was considered very lucky when average profits of
an enterprise were some six per cent.820 Trade with Africa, where it bought its
slaves, took up to fifteen per cent of the ships and thirteen per cent of the tonnage
that France devoted to colonial trade in 1788 and some ten percent of the value of
its total international trade.821 Information about the Portuguese-Brazilian case
is very limited. That is unfortunate, as it was the biggest and according to Robin
Blackburn “may have been the most profitable branch of the eighteenth-century
slave traffic.”822 Profits in the trade in general were not ‘supernormal’, because it
was an open, competitive business on the European side and slaves were bought
on a market where supply and demand ruled. Europeans could not fix prices.
Here, too, of course one would like to know more about other people involved
apart from Westerners. What about the profits of those who sold all these mil-
lions of slaves? Very probably, however, all the parties that were involved made
‘normal’ profits.
What about the gains from slave labour? Slavery in this context for Britain
first and foremost meant sugar and then from the end of the eighteenth century
increasingly cotton, imported from the independent United States. The case of
sugar, its production and trade, is a good illustration of how complicated it is to
determine what figures about prices mean in a setting that is not one of free and
fair competition and to untangle causes and effects in historical analysis. Sugar
prices – and those of rum – were artificially high as British sugar barons had a
monopoly on the markets of Britain and those parts of America that belonged to
the British Empire. Their gains to a substantial part were earned over the back of
costumers, mostly from Britain, who were deprived of the possibility to buy
cheaper sugar from other sellers. This ‘sugar planter’s subsidy’ amounted to
several hundreds of thousands of pounds sterling per year in the third quarter of
819 I took all these figures from Van Rossum and Fatah-Black, ‘Wat is winst?’ For those who read
Dutch, I can also refer to Emmer, De Nederlandse slavenhandel. For information on the
same topic in English I refer to Postma, The Dutch in the Atlantic slave trade.
820 P¦tr¦-Grenouilleau, Traites n¦griÀres, 318 and 324.
821 Klein, ‘Economic aspects of the eighteenth-century Atlantic slave trade’, 301.
822 Blackburn, Making of New World slavery, 391. Strikingly enough, however, Blackburn who
devotes so much energy to showing the importance of slavery and slave-trade for accu-
mulation and industrialization in Britain, simply makes this comment in passing and does
not even pause to consider what it might mean for his thesis.
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the eighteenth century. Only looking at the ‘private’ gains of sugar barons, at
least from a macro-economic perspective, is also rather misleading in another
respect: the British taxpayer had to pay the sometimes huge costs involved in
defending the sugar islands and their trade against foreign threats. When it
comes to determining cause and effect, there is the complicating factor that
many slave regions inside and outside Great Britain’s empire became good
outlets for British products but could only pay for them with money they had
earned in selling products to Great Britain. The Navigation Acts turned trade
between the ‘motherland’ and the colonies of the British Empire almost in-
evitably into a kind of communicating vessels. To count the imports from slave-
regions and what the British did with them as well as the export to these regions
both as gains from trading with them and having slaves there as Blackburn does
in his table printed here on page 260, can easily become a form of double
counting. It is very doubtful whether it will ever be possible to determine the
exact amount of profits or value added for those sectors where slaves provided
the labour force. For the main question at hand here, that fortunately is not
necessary. The value added produced and the profits made in selling the slave-
produced goods may well have been big enough to have functioned as a lever of
riches igniting industrialisation. The substantial amounts of money that were
earned in trading and employing slaves could in principle very well, in Eric
Williams’s own words, have “provided one of the main main streams of that
accumulation of capital in England which financed the Industrial Revolution”.823
But, and that is my main point, finding the money for investment was not a main
bottleneck for Britian’s economy as many sectors could have provided it and
escaping from the Malthusian constraints that characterised the old economic
regime was not simply and primarily a matter of having more funds. What is
relevant here is that you cannot build an entirely new economy on a relatively
small sector that only contributes a relatively small sum to total GDP and, very
importantly, has relatively few backward and forward linkages.
Let us briefly enter the numbers game and look at a very high estimate, by
Robin Blackburn, of the profits accumulated via slave trade and slave labour by
Britain at the eve of its industrialisation.
823 Williams, Capitalism& slavery, 52. Williams actually in his text often is much more nuanced
than many of the defenders of ‘his’ thesis. See e. g. on pages 105 – 106 of that same book,
where he writes: “But it must not be inferred that the triangular trade was solely and entirely
responsible for the economic develelopment. The growth of the internal market in England,
the ploughing-in of the profits from industry to generate still further capital and achieve
still larger expansion, played a large part.”
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Table 35: Direct and indirect profits in the triangular trade in the 1770s: a too optimistic





Slave trade profits 115,000
Subtotal 1,422,000
Indirect profits/surplus realization







West Indian trade 1,915,000
African trade 300,000




Source: Robin Blackburn The Making of New World Slavery. From the Baroque to the
Modern 1492 – 1800, London/New York 1998, 541.
Those estimated upper bound and grand total £4,336,000 for the profits of the
entire triangular trade – which of course is a very broad interpretation of the
profits from slave trade and slavery – would amount to some four per cent of
Great Britians’s GDP, if we accept the estimate for 1770 of some 100 million
pounds sterling. I came across several estimates that were substantially higher.824
Profits as well as the total amounts of money involved increased substantially in
absolute terms up to 1815, but so did Great Britiain’s population and the size of
its economy. Besides that, its price level rose substantially. Mutatis mutandis the
orders of magnitude of this table also apply for later decades.825
824 See O’Brien, ‘Political precondions for the Industrial Revolution’; Steven Broadberry and
others http://www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/1/1714/papers/Broadberry.pdf and Mokyr, En-
lightened economy, 167.
825 Total West Indies planting profits according to Blackburn, Making of New World slavery,
538, have to be estimated at some 13.9 million pounds in 1812. He bases this estimate on
information he claims to have taken from Colquhoun, Treatise on the wealth, power and
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Some comments are in order to more realistically assess the importance of the
figure provided. Firstly, it is very important that Blackburn in this calculations
takes on board indirect profits or as he calls it ‘surplus realization’ via
…backward linkages, or the inducement to invest in the production of such plantation
inputs and transportation equipment as ships, textiles, hardware and foodstuffs; for-
ward linkages, or the inducement to invest in sugar refineries and textile mills which
used the output of the export industry ; and final demand linkages, or the inducement
to invest in metropolitan industries which produced consumer goods for factors in the
plantation supply and processing sectors.826
This, of course, means that the concept ‘profits of the triangular trade’ – which
already provides a quite ‘broad’ interpretation of profits of slave trade and
slavery – itself is also stretched to if not over its limits. Applying this strategy
systematically, i. e. to every sector of an economy, would in the end lead to
absurdly high GDP figures. Secondly, we have to realize that in that figure, all
incomes are included, but no ‘hidden costs’ are deducted: that is, monopoly
subsidies paid by consumers to sugar producers and overhead costs for de-
fence.827 If one wants to measure the impact of the ‘New World’ and all its
ramifications on GDP and not on private wealth, that in my view is an omission.
On top of that, I do not think it is correct to include all the trade referred to as a
full side effect of the New World slavery. In my view, that clearly leads to ex-
aggeration. Finally, one may wonder whether there would have been alternatives.
Can one simply deduct the entire income from the triangular trade from national
income in case it would not have existed? Would all its inputs then simply have
been idle? The net financial transfer from India to Great Britain during the
period from the 1770s to the 1820s at its height amounted to little over one
million pounds sterling, that is less than two per cent of Great Britain’s income in
manufacturing, mining and building in 1800 and less than half a per cent of Great
Britain’s GDP at the time.828
To attribute great importance to a relatively small sum, a strategy very pop-
ular with those who want to attack the ‘small ratio’s argument’, by claiming e. g.
“X may not be much as compared to GDP but it is as compared to gross in-
vestment or net investment”, is futile, as it in principle would make every rel-
resources of the British Empire, 59 and information with regard to average profits. I am not
able to reconstruct his argument and his estimate looking at Colquhoun’s treatise and the
information it provides on pages 59, 379 and 380. GDP then definitely was far over 300
million pounds sterling.
826 Blackburn, Making of New World slavery, 533. The quote is from Sheridan, ‘Wealth of
Jamaica’, 59.
827 See the comment on the costs of military ‘protection’ incurred by the Dutch East Indian
Company on page 267.
828 See Esteban, ‘British balance of payments, 1772 – 1820’, Table 1, page 60.
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atively small sum much more important.829 Here I can refer to Eltis and Enger-
man, when, in discussing this strategy of ‘magnifying’ the profits Britain made
for the slave trade and sugar production, they write: “But what could have been
true for the slave trade or sugar could, under the same assumptions, also have
been the case for many other economic activities, both at home and abroad.”830
The claim that “X may not be much as compared to GDP but it nevertheless is
very important because it has so many backward and forward linkages” only is a
decisive counterargument when other variables that might be important have far
less impact in that respect. In this regard, I endorse the position taken by David
Eltis and Stanley Engerman: “If the value added and strategic linkages of the
sugar industry are compared to those of other British industries, it is apparent
that sugar cultivation and the slave trade were not particularly large, nor did they
have stronger growth-inducing ties with the rest of the British economy.”831
There is, however, theoretically at least, a way to support the argument that small
incomes from the periphery actually were greater, in the sense that they are more
relevant than they appear in pure amounts of money and that is by claiming that
early modern Britain, or Europe, had no alternative source of income – or
nothing that comes sufficiently close to it – for the income it earned in its
periphery. Personally I tend to think that this is exaggerated and that in any case
to a substantial extent, alternatives at home or elsewhere could and would have
been found.832 The backward and forward linkages of colonial products like
sugar and tobacco were quite small. With cotton, things, of course, were different
but in this case from the end of the eighteenth century onwards the independent
United States became by far the most important supplier, so Britain simply had
to pay the same market prices as everyone else and in that respect had no special
advantage over other countries.
829 Let me refer to just three examples amongst many : Blackburn, Making of New World
slavery, Chapter XII; Pomeranz, Great Divergence, 87 – 88, and Solow, ‘Caribbean slavery
and British growth’, 105. See for the logic of the counterargument McCloskey, Bourgeois
dignity, 222 and 229.
830 Eltis and Engerman, ‘Importance of slavery and the slave trade to industrializing Britain’,
135.
831 Eltis and Engerman, ‘Importance of slavery and the slave trade to industrializing Britain’,
the Abstract.
832 Interestingly enough, O’Brien and Engerman in their article think there indeed were not
many alternatives.
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14. Intercontinental trade
We began our discussion of the importance of exchanges between Western
Europe and in particular Britain – where industrialisation began – by discussing
clear cases of ‘unequal exchange’ in which the role of coercion and monopoly is
obvious. That does not mean, though, that it would be easy to exactly determine
the impact of that coercion. There simply are no ‘real’ market prices with which
the ‘manipulated’ prices can actually be compared and often it is not even
obvious that and how prices were manipulated. There is a tendency in histor-
iography to in general identify non-European trade with ‘unequal exchange’ and
intra-European trade with ‘ordinary’ trade, even though it is patent that in the
latter, there were all sorts of mercantilist intervention. Many parts of ‘the rest’ of
the world, however, were not in any sense ‘peripheral’, in the Wallersteinian
sense of the word, to Western Europe or Britain when that country began to take-
off. Their commercial contacts with Europe, though often closely watched and
regulated, in the end were a matter of supply and demand in an exchange in
which Westerners did not have any special leverage. Large parts of Asia traded
with Westerners under no extra-economic pressure whatsoever until far into the
eighteenth and in the cases of, for example, China and Japan even the nineteenth
centuries. In those two countries, the Europeans were only present on sufferance.
The Ottoman Empire still was quite autonomous up until at least the last decades
of the eighteenth century and only signed its ‘unequal treaties’, which basically
dictated its tariff and custom’s policies, in the 1830s.833 The United States of
America was independent since 1776, so trade connections with that region were
‘consensual’. Buying slaves in Africa, as indicated, was also done under market
conditions. Much of the intercontinental trade of the British was not based on
coercion but a matter of free exchange. That means that (a) in principle Britain’s
actual trade partners could also profit and that, (b) in principle, other parties
could just as well have been involved. If Britain profited from such free exchange,
in whatever way, that in principle was more an effect of economic superiority
than a cause.
On the other hand, however, large parts of Europe actually functioned as
‘peripheries’ for its north-western core, not – apart from the case of Ireland till at
least the first decades of the nineteenth century – in the sense of being politically
and formally dependent but in the sense that the British and other west-Euro-
peans often bought products in other parts of Europe that were produced by un-
833 I here refer to Anglo-Ottoman Treaty of 1838, sometimes referred to as the Treaty of Balta
Liman. Duties were set at three per cent on imports, three per cent on exports, nine per cent
on transiting exported goods, and two per cent on transiting imported goods. The Ottoman
government also agreed to the abolition of all monopolies.
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free labour or brought to markets in conditions of un-free exchange. That of
course is common knowledge, but the implications of this fact are still ignored or
taken for granted in many analyses. A systematic analysis of intra-European
core-periphery relationships would be most welcome: a great deal of Britain’s
ghost acreage, for example, actually was in Ireland and Central and Eastern
Europe and not outside Europe. To the extent that it indeed imported subsistence
goods to ease its Malthusian constraints, Britain did so primarily from its Gaelic
periphery and parts of Europe like Prussia and Russia over which it had no
political leverage whatsoever rather than from the Atlantic region.834 Imports
into Great Britain of grains, meal and flour, to give one example, over the period
1800 – 1814, amounted to in total twenty-one million quarters, one third from
Ireland, one third from Prussia and ‘Germany’, and the rest from ‘Holland’, the
United States, Russia and other countries.835 Until 1824 – 1826, trade with Ireland
counted as foreign in the statistics of (Great) Britain. It was quite substantial.
Exports of Great Britain to Ireland had a value of about one million pounds in
1772 and about 1.6 million pounds in 1797. That was 9.9 and 9 percent of total
exports. Imports from Ireland in those years amounted to 1.4 million pounds
and 3.2 million pounds or 10.6 and 13.1 per cent of total imports.836 In the 1820s,
exports to Ireland amounted to more than four million pounds, more than
eleven per cent of total exports.837 Of imported grains, meat and butter in Great
Britain in the period 1814 – 1816 until 1844 – 1846, some seventy per cent on
average came from Ireland. Their value amounted to an average of some ten per
cent of the total income of Britain in agriculture, forestry and fishing. On top of
that there was the import of a couple of millions worth of livestock.838
We have to realise that before the transport revolutions of the nineteenth
century, intercontinental trade by and large meant overseas trade on sailing
ships. Most of that trade was in the hands of Europeans. The total tonnage of
their fleet was low. It is estimated at about one million tonnes in 1600 and about
one and a half million tonnes in 1670. At the very end of the eighteenth century, it
still was less than four million tonnes. Ships were small. The average tonnage of
ships going to Asia from Europe during the early modern era was 600 to 700
tonnes. Oil tankers nowadays can measure as much as 500,000 tonnes. Transport
on such ships was slow. During the eighteenth century, it took a ship of the Dutch
East India Company an average of 235 days to go from the Netherlands to
Batavia. To Canton it was 225 days. Over the entire seventeenth and eighteenth
834 See Thomas, ‘Food supply in the United Kingdom during the Industrial Revolution’ or, with
basically the same information, idem, ‘Escaping from constraints’.
835 Brinley Thomas, ‘Food supply’, 143.
836 Etemad, Utilit¦ des empires, 146.
837 Evans, Forging of the modern state, 417.
838 Brinley Thomas, ‘Escaping from constraints’, 182 – 183.
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centuries, the total tonnage of outbound ships heading for Asia was less than
seven million tonnes. Of ships coming back from Asia to Europe, it was only
some five million tonnes. Total turnover of the port of Rotterdam alone at the
moment is over 400 million tonnes! As indicated, trade over the Atlantic overall
became much more important for Europe than trade along the Cape, but it
nevertheless is striking that shipping along the Cape in total amounted to less
than six per cent, at best, of total European shipping. Even for the most im-
portant West European trading countries, intercontinental imports were sur-
prisingly small. At the beginning of Britain’s take-off in the 1770s, total overseas
imports from the Western hemisphere and Asia, expressed in grams of silver per
capita per year, amounted to some 120 grams of silver in the case of Britain, some
170 grams of silver for the Dutch Republic and some 30 to 35 grams of silver for
France. Please note: these figures refer to total imports, not added value or
profit.839 They are quite flattered as a substantial part of those imports was re-
exported, often after some processing that in turn added value.840 Referring to
absolute sums in the end need not always be the best way to show impact.
Looking at the amounts of money involved in terms of percentages of GDP can
certainly also be enlightening. One indeed often encounters figures in the lit-
erature in which total foreign trade, imports or exports are compared with GDP.
These are the estimates that have been made for a couple of countries that are of
central importance for our analysis.
839 De Vries, ‘Connecting Europe and Asia’, 92 – 93.
840 For Britain’s re-exports see Deane and Cole, British economic growth 1688 – 1959. Trends
and structure, 320 – 321, and Evans, Forging of the modern state, 416. These two publica-
tions together cover the period from 1700 to 1870. In the 1770s re-exports on average
amounted to roughly forty per cent of the total value of imports at first costs. In France, too,
re-exporting of colonial imports was very substantial. In 1775 – 77, no less than 77.3 per cent
of total colonial imports were re-exported, in 1785 – 1789, 72.8 per cent. See Blackburn,
Making of New World slavery, 445. In terms of value, they amounted to 17.7 per cent of total
foreign trade in 1717 and 33 per cent in 1787. See P¦tr¦ Grenouilleau, Traites n¦griÀres, 350.
The Dutch Republic re-exported two-thirds of its trans-oceanic imports in terms of value in
the 1770s. See De Vries and Van der Woude, First modern economy, table 10.12. It added ten
million guilders in value to those imported goods that it re-exported. The value of total
transatlantic imports annually amounted to sixty-two million guilders, which is roughly
equivalent to six million pounds sterling.
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Table 36: Total exports plus imports as share of GDP, in percentages
c. 1720 c. 1755 c. 1790 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870
Austria 11.4 14.2 13.2 18.7 29.0
Belgium 19.0 26.7 31.3 35.6
Denmark 7.5 17.5 27.5 36.5 29.7 35.7
France 5.5 14 20 9.8 8.2 10.7 13.0 20.2 23.6
Germany 19.2 23.2 36.8
Netherlands 82.0 84.0 110.0 33.0 25.8 53.4 64.0 96.4 115.4
Spain 16.0 6.0 8.5 10.6 12.1
Sweden 5.7 6.8 13.8 20.0 29.4




13.5 11.5 15.4 18.1 24.8 29.9
Ibid. , net of intra-
European trade
3.8 6.4 8.9 9.2
Source: Kevin H. O’Rourke, Leandro Prados de la Escosura, and Guillaume Daudin, ‘Trade
and empire’ in: Stephen Broadberry and Kevin H. O’Rourke, eds. , The Cambridge Eco-
nomic History of Modern Europe. Volume I: 1700 – 1870 (Cambridge 2010) 96 – 121, page
106.
When it comes to (Western) European trade with other parts of the world there is
a huge amount of literature to which I can refer the interested reader for de-
tails.841 When we look at Britain, this is how Phyllis Deane and William Cole
describe the situation there at the time that is crucial for our analysis:
At the end of the seventeenth century [total] domestic exports of England and Wales
were between five and six per cent of national income and imports between nine and
ten per cent. By the end of the eighteenth century these proportions had more than
doubled – to about thirteen per cent and twenty-one per cent respectively – but in the
period of rapid industrial growth which followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars the
home market seems to have responded more readily than the overseas trade and United
Kingdom domestic exports averaged ten per cent or less of national income for most of
the first half of the nineteenth century. Imports began to expand in the late 1840s…842
841 See for information on Western foreign trade, including Britain and in alphabetical order :
Bairoch, Economics and world history, Part Two. ‘Major myths on the role of the Third Wold
in Western development’; Emmer, P¦tr¦-Grenouilleau and Roitman, A deus ex machina
revisited ; Etemad, Possessing the world. The book was originally published in French as La
possession du monde. Poids et mesures de la colonisation, XVIIIe – XXe siÀcles (Brussels
2000) and idem, De l’utilit¦ des empires; O’Brien and Prados de la Escosura, Costs and
benefits of European imperialism ; O’Brien, ‘Foundations of European industrialization’; De
Vries, ‘Connecting Europe and Asia’ and idem, ‘Limits of globalization in the early modern
world’.
842 Deane and Cole, British economic growth, 309 – 310.
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For Britain, total exports as a percentage of GDP over the period 1780 to 1850
hovered between nine and twenty per cent, total imports between ten and
twenty-five per cent.843
Actually, however, these comparisons, popular as they are, in a certain sense
are quite misleading when it comes to the actual direct contribution of trade to
GDP. What should be compared with GDP is not total turnover in terms of
money, as is done in all the figures just referred to, but only the value added in
foreign trade. What is produced in trade is only the mark-ups between buying
prices and selling prices, as far as they accrue to domestic income, not total
turnover. That means that one has to deduct the imports used in the production
of the exports from those exports to know how much value has really been
added. The differences can be enormous. The latest figures for the Netherlands
referring to 2011 indicate that in terms of value about forty per cent of total
Dutch exports consisted of re-exports and only about sixty per cent of value
added in the Netherlands.844 We have seen that re-exports were very important
for several Western European economies. For the period we are dealing with in
this book, overall, Europe’s first imports from other continents increasingly
consisted of raw materials that were then processed. This meant that the bulk of
added value ended in European hands – and was paid for by Europeans. With
industrialisation and the transport-revolution an increasing amount of finished
manufactured products also found their way into the emerging Third World. To
really measure that added value, one should also take into account that in the
early modern era in intercontinental trade protection, costs were quite high. To
give just one example: for the entire period 1613 – 1792, military expenditure in
the East by the Dutch East India Company is estimated to have been 257 million
guilders. That is about thirty per cent of all the company’s overseas invest-
ments.845 Often it was not or not entirely the traders who paid them, not even in
case of the chartered companies that were armed. This means there were many
hidden costs carried in particular by the armies and navies of the countries
involved. In fact, the highest private gains were often obtained in exchange for
the highest social costs. What further complicates an exact assessment of the
amounts of income involved is the fact that the prices at which commodities
843 See for specific information on Britain’s foreign trade, in alphabetical order : Esteban,
‘Comparative patterns of colonial trade: Britain and its rivals’; Engerman, ‘British impe-
rialism in a mercantilist age’; Morgan, Slavery, Atlantic trade and the British economy ;
O’Brien, ‘Exports and the growth of the British economy from the Glorious Revolution to
the Peace of Amiens’ (together with Stanley L. Engerman) and idem, ‘Inseparable con-
nections: trade, economy, fiscal state, and the expansion of empire, 1688 – 1815’.
844 http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?DM=SLNL& PA=70905NED& D1=a& D2=
a& D3=(l-14)-l& VW=T
845 Gaastra, ‘“Sware continuerende lasten en groten ommeslagh”, 87 – 88.
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were obtained often were below market level in cases where Europeans could
enforce extra-economic pressure, whereas on the other hand the prices at which
European (semi-) monopolists sold those commodities in the end in Europe may
often have been above market level.
When it comes to accumulation, most attention of course is devoted to the
profits the West made in its intercontinental trade. It has often been claimed on
the basis of anecdotal evidence that they were ‘supernormal’, for example by
Braudel: “Long-distance trading was not everything, but it was the only doorway
to a superior profit level.”846 Now according to even very magnanimous esti-
mates they appear to have been relatively small as compared to total earnings
and investments and fairly ‘normal’ as compared to profits made in other sectors
of the economy. I can refer here to recent work by Jan de Vries for the Cape-route
trade by the big, chartered companies from Europe,847 or to various texts by
Patrick O’Brien, who shows that even if the profits in intercontinental trade, in
his case that with all other continents, would have been supernormal, they would
still have been small as compared to GDP of Britain or other major European
trade nations.848 Trade with Asia was more monopolised than that with the
Americas, whose importance, on the other hand, for Western Europe, apart from
the Dutch Republic, quickly became much bigger over the eighteenth century
than that with Asia. In trade with the Americas, Britain of course lost its hold on
the USA when they became independent, whereas Spain’s government over time
increasingly had to ‘liberalise’ the trade between the motherland and its colo-
nies. Seville lost its position as sole port to Cadiz and in the eighteenth century,
several private companies received monopolies for privately trading also from
other ports. In the 1760s, major trade reforms began that in 1778 resulted in a
situation in which, in principle and with several exceptions, trade with the
846 Braudel, Civilization & capitalism, 15th-18th century, II, 601.
847 De Vries, ‘Connecting Europe and Asia’, 82 – 91. According to De Vries annual net profits for
the two biggest East India Companies, the Dutch and the English ones, are very difficult to
calculate. For the Dutch East India Company, literature speaks of a long-term deterioration
of profitability in the eighteenth century. Profits in the Netherlands fell steadily from nearly
three million guilders in the 1710s to a loss of 87,000 guilders a year in the 1750s. A
downward trend also characterised EIC profits. The profit calculations we have for the
period from 1710 to 1745 show annual profits of in total 399,000 pounds in the 1710s and of
only 164,000 pounds in the period 1740 – 1745. The return to invested capital by Chaud-
huri’s reckoning fell from 12.5 per cent per annum in the 1710s to 5.7 per cent per annum in
the decade from 1736 to 1745. Compare Steensgaard, ‘Commodities, bullion and services in
intercontinental transactions before 1750’, 15, where he presents figures for net profit rates
of thirteen ten per cent for the English company and ten per cent for the Dutch company for
the period 1740 to 1745. For some further comments see De Vries, Economy of Europe in an
age of crisis, 139 – 144.
848 For O’Brien’s view see O’Brien, ‘European economic development: the contribution of the
periphery’ and idem, ‘Foundations of European industrialization’.
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Americas became fully liberalised for all Spanish merchants and even more
closed than it already had been for all non-Spaniards.849 There is no need here to
refer to all countries involved. What is striking and relevant in this context is the
comment by Niels Steensgaard: “Most companies were failures. Practically all
companies were failures … the problem is why were only few companies very
successful, the Dutch and English East India Company?”850 Even these two
companies, I would add, often incurred big losses. The Dutch East India Cam-
pany in the end went bankrupt, the English one often had to be supported by the
state. Increasingly, the money these companies made came not from trade but
from ruling territories.851
The question that come up when calling something great or small, relevant or
less relevant, of course, always is ‘as compared to what?’ As compared to total
GDP, every specific economic activity tends to be fairly small. As compared to
the monetised part of the economies discussed, the amount of money involved in
intercontinental trade and the profits made there, of course already look more
impressive. The fact that in the economies of Western Europe, intercontinental
trade was the most dynamic sector of trade and even of the economies in their
entirety must also have had major consequences. But what does this prove other
than that the economies that profited from it were dynamic and ‘knew’ how to
trade? In other words, again, is all this not part of what needs to be explained
rather than of the explanation?
As we already pointed out earlier, the economic importance of commodities
need not be identical to their monetary value. Some commodities have much
more economic potential and impact than others. The nature of the goods that
Western Europe imported overall during its rise was not such that they could be
considered ‘necessities’ that in one way or another were indispensable for
growth. Think for example of sugar, coffee, tea, cocoa, tobacco, spices, textiles
and porcelain, which together formed by far the bulk of total and new imports
from outside Europe. They all entered the European markets as (semi-) luxuries,
although with the passing of time, they tended to become more ‘normal’ con-
sumer goods. Paying for them meant a drain of ‘good’ money for ‘superfluous
luxuries’, regretted and even abhorred by many contemporaries. It, indeed, is
easy to imagine that it would have been better for Europe not to import them.
One may of course also wonder whether certain imported goods might in one
way or another trigger development. Some definitely did, first and foremost silk,
porcelain and cotton. This does not as such explain why they figured so
849 Ringrose, Spain, Europe, and the Spanish miracle, chapters 4 and 5.
850 See his comment in: Cavaciocchi, Prodotti e techniche d’oltremare nelle economie Europee
secc. XIII – XVIII, 717.
851 De Vries, ‘Limits of globalization in the early modern world’, 727 – 728.
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prominently in Britain’s industrialisation. Many countries imported them and
even more could have done so. We already referred to the important effects that
the import of overseas commodities had on consumption and production, in
particular in Great Britain, when we discussed the consumer revolution and the
industrious revolution and the concept of import substitution. We saw that,
however important they were, it would be far too simple to claim that importing
certain goods from overseas caused the Industrial Revolution. Goods imported
from overseas also happened to function as sources of revenue for governments
that usually taxed them very heavily. But that only shows that many Western
European consumers were willing and able to buy heavily taxed goods. Inter-
continental trade gave birth to many institutional innovations and clearly was of
essential importance for the development of mercantile capitalism and all that
implies. But again, that is not simply a matter of being lucky and not a simple
automatism, as this formulation might hold: Global trade gives you the char-
tered company. Others could also have traded worldwide and developed all sorts
of institutions.
Let me try and synthesise what seems to have become the current consensus
by heavily paraphrasing the conclusions by Colin White in his recent Under-
standing economic development and the main theses and arguments by Paul
Bairoch in his Economics and world history. I fully endorse their positions. The
following quotations are from White’s Understanding economic development:
“The overwhelming weight of the evidence on the quantitative aspect of the
external trading sector, and the specific experiences of those countries which
have seen the inception of modern economic development, favour a largely
internal determination of a successful transition [to modern economic
growth].” He claims one should “… focus attention on the internal rather than
the external economy. … The general case is that the external sector represents a
market which is small relative to the internal market. … even in the most fa-
vourable cases, the contribution of the external sector does not seem decisive,
being at best, only supportive.”852
The following claims and arguments come from Paul Bairoch’s, Economics
and world history, Part II, ‘Major myths on the role of the Third World in Western
development.’853 During the period of 1800 to 1938, total exports from all de-
veloped countries were only some eight to nine per cent of their total GNP.
Exports to the Third World represented only 1.3 per cent to 1.7 per cent of the
852 For all these quotes see White, Understanding economic development, 234 – 235.
853 See chapter 5: ‘Were Third-World raw materials central to Western industrialization?’;
chapter 6: ‘Were colonial outlets crucial to Western industries?’; chapter 7: ‘Was colonialism
important in triggering the Industrial Revolution?’ and chapter 8: ‘The balance sheet of
colonialism.’ For the thesis that trade is hardly ever the engine of economic growth, see
ibidem, 136 – 138. Trade in the end is about re-allocation, not about adding value.
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total volume of their production; about half of those exports went to colonies. If
we confine ourselves to Europe, the figures are somewhat higher. Its exports to
the Third World, again over the period of 1800 to 1938, amounted to about 1.4
per cent to 1.8 per cent of GDP. In the exceptional case of Britain, the figure was
substantially higher : four to six per cent. For the period in which Britain began
its take-off, the 1720s until the 1780s, exports to non-European countries only
amounted to some two to three per cent of total demand in Britain. When it
comes to imports from the Third World into the developed world, the bulk of
them raw materials, we can only conclude that they were not as such crucial to
the process of industrialisation. The motor of modern economic growth is en-
ergy. Up until the end of the 1930s, the developed world produced more of it than
it consumed. It had a sizable net export surplus in it, one of the main exporters
being the United Kingdom. The story is very similar for the major minerals. In
fact the only type of important raw material for which the developed countries
depended on a Third World production surplus was textile fibres, but even here
the dependency was limited. We already discussed Britain’s imports from re-
gions outside Europe more in detail.
There definitely is no clear general connection between colonialism and the
emergence of modern economic growth in the sense that colonies would be a
necessary or sufficient precondition for take-off. Even for Britain, where over-
seas unequal exchange did play a substantial role, such a thesis cannot be upheld,
for the many reasons already presented but also because such a thesis does not fit
chronologically. Britain had already acquired large parts of its empire, including
large parts of India, before it industrialised, and had already lost its most im-
portant colony, the United States, when it took off, whereas the conquest of
several other parts was a result of industrialisation rather than a cause. The
developed world imported little as compared to its GDP from peripheries. The
peripheries, however, exported a lot as compared to their GDP and the impact of
their exports on their economies was much bigger and quite often not very
positive. That formal and informal colonialism, whatever else it may have done,
caused a lot of economic damage in what became the Third World is obvious. It
caused deindustrialisation. Much of the industry it did have was in hands of
foreign firms and (too) much of its production became concentrated in tradi-
tional sectors. Economic globalisation clearly did not per se cause overall global
convergence. Globalization in this period of roughly the 1820s until the 1930s
overall enhanced the further divergence between rich and poor economies. The
reasons why globalisation did or did not increase wealth in non-Western
countries, however, could vary. The predicament of several underdeveloped
countries may well have been to blame on the fact that they were not sufficiently
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integrated in the emerging global economy.854 There however are good reasons to
believe that in many cases globalisation and the Great Divergence were closely
interconnected in the sense that many countries did not profit from the enor-
mous increase in global trade or in any case far less than other countries. In the
following paragraphs I will show and explain this for many readers probably
quite unexpected connection.855
15. Globalisation and Great Divergence: How the Third World
came into existence
For mainstream economists almost without exception, trade is regarded as
positive for economic development and growth. That means that one might
expect that with the global trade boom that began in the 1810s when global mass
markets began to emerge, all countries involved would profit and global con-
vergence would set in. As Jeffrey Williamson, who is my primary source for my
description of the connection between global trade and global divergence,
shows, this in many respects and for many countries was not the case. What
happened? With industrialisation and with increasing incomes in industrialis-
ing countries, there was an enormous increase in demand for raw materials and
primary products. The transport revolution of the nineteenth century made
global trade in basic commodities possible and the overall lowering of tariffs
stimulated it. Industrialising countries sought outlets for their cheapening
products and therefore opened their own markets while at the same time pres-
suring other countries to open theirs. The nineteenth century could in this way
witness a global trade boom with improving terms of trade for countries ex-
porting raw materials and primary products up until the 1870s. The prices of
their exports rose, whereas those of manufactured goods exported by developed
countries fell. The Prebisch-Singer thesis that there would exist a secular de-
crease of the terms of trade of primary products, in any case does not apply to
this period. In the emerging world economy, there were gains of trade for all
parties involved. With it emerged a clear global division of labour, the so-called
‘Great Specialisation’.856 In 1880, of total ‘Third World’ exports ninety-eight per
cent consisted of primary products whereas, to give the most striking coun-
terexample, Great Britain’s exports consisted of some ninety per cent in man-
ufactured goods as early as the 1830s. This division of labour brought with it a
854 For a brief overview and comments going in that direction see Lindert and Williamson,
‘Does globalization make the world more unequal?’.
855 I will in particular base my thoughts on Williamson, Trade and poverty.
856 For this term see Robertson, ‘The future of international trade’, 6.
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division of wealth. The industrialised or at least industrialising countries were
rich; the poor countries were those that were not industrialised.
Table 37: Trade in primary products: regional shares, 1876 – 1913 in %
Region
1876 – 80 1896 – 1900 1913
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
UK and Ireland 29.7 3.1 25.8 3.9 19.0 6.2
NW Europe 39.3 22.6 45.0 27.6 43.1 25.2
Other Europe 11.2 20.2 10.4 18.1 12.3 14.7
US and Canada 7.2 16.1 8.5 18.7 11.3 17.3
Rest of world 12.6 38.0 10.3 31.7 14.3 36.6
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: A.G. Kenwood, A.G. and A.L. Lougheed, The Growth of the International Economy,
1820 – 1960 (London 1971) 98.
Table 38: Trade in manufactures: regional shares, 1876 – 1913 in %
Region
1876 – 80 1896 – 1900 1913
Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports
UK and Ireland 9.1 37.8 10.4 31.5 8.2 25.3
NW Europe 18.1 47.1 20.3 45.8 24.4 47.9
Other Europe 13.3 9.2 12.2 10.3 15.4 8.3
US and Canada 7.7 4.4 9.6 7.4 12.1 10.6
Rest of world 51.8 1.5 47.5 5.0 39.9 7.9
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: A.G. Kenwood, A.G. and A.L. Lougheed, The Growth of the International Economy,
1820 – 1960 (London 1971) 98.
In contrast to what most mainstream economists would expect, the gains of
trade were spread very unevenly and we see far more cases of asymmetrical
development than of convergence. Overall, of course with differences according
to time and place, enormous differences emerged in development and growth
between countries focusing on the production of primary products and coun-
tries focusing on manufactured goods. This divergence between industrial,
wealthy counties and primary products producing, poor countries was not only
a global phenomenon. It also, as far too often is forgotten or simply ignored,
occurred in Europe.
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Table 39: GDP growth and composition of exports 1870 to 1939









Austria 974 4,123 2.03 1,918 28 36
France 1,858 4,748 1.77 7,000 44 41
Germany 1,913 5,549 2.17 5,017 38 18
Italy 1,467 3,444 1.18 1,096 88 45
United States 2,457 6,568 1.46 4,488 86 48
United Kingdom 3,263 5,979 0.91 11,811 11 24
European periphery
Denmark 1,927 5,766 1.74 355 96 85
Greece 1,295 2,687 0.94 84 94 94
Norway 1,303 4,108 1.62 217 97 58
Portugal 1,085 1,739 0.73 183 96 61
Russia 1,023 2,237 1.27 2,456 98 82
Sweden 1,664 5,029 1.95 411 91 56
Serbia 822 1,412 0.83 59 96 86
Spain 1,376 2,127 0.73 796 71 84
Source: Jeffrey G. Williamson, Trade and poverty. When the Third World fell behind
(Cambridge Mass. and London 2011) 186.
Jeffrey Williamson’s analysis of the emergence of this gap is solidly neoclassical,
apart from his emphasis on increasing returns in industrial activities. Overall,
industrialising countries for many decades tended to have higher growth rates
than non-industrialising ones. There apparently were – and are – self re-en-
forcing mechanisms in industrial development. Williamson starts from the fact
that in the first decades of the nineteenth century, some countries were in-
dustrialised or at least industrialising, whereas others were not. Why this is the
case does not concern him in his analysis. The few comments he devotes to the
chronology and explanation of the Great Divergence make it clear that he does
not endorse the ‘surprising-resemblances thesis’. In his view, a substantial in-
come gap between Western Europe and a poorer periphery (a gap in terms of two
to one) already existed in 1820. This means that the search for an explanation of
that gap must in any case be before the industrial revolution; even, so he claims
later on, before 1700.857 On the other hand the nineteenth century witnessed, as
he puts it, an “accelerating divergence”.
857 Williamson, Trade and poverty, 2 – 4.
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Thus it is clear that divergence has been with us for 500 years of more, but while it took
western Europe many centuries to achieve incomes per capita double those of the
periphery in 1820, it took only one century to drive up the figure to 3.5 times in 1913 …
Thus the nineteenth century looks like a period of exceptionally rapid divergence
between core and periphery, and that divergence was most dramatic over the half
century 1820 to 1870.858
This accelerating divergence and the ways in which it might be related to the
world trade boom of the nineteenth century, form the subject of his book.
He regards it as quite logical that industrialising rich countries and non-
industrialising poorer countries specialised according to their comparative
advantages and concentrated on producing what they, relatively speaking, could
produce best, manufactured goods or primary products. Manufacturing in non-
industrial countries tended to succumb to the competition of modern industry
in industrialising countries which means that all the non-industrialising coun-
tries tended to ‘de-industrialise’, or more correctly but less catchy, lose much of
their manufacturing sector.
Table 40: Comparative de-industrialisation: Textile import penetration in the Third
World, 1800s to 1880s (in %)
Home textile market supplied by
Foreign imports Domestic industry
India, 1800 –6 to –7 106 to 107
India, 1833 5 95
India, 1877 58 to 65 35 to 42
Ottoman Empire, 1820s 3 97
Ottoman Empire, 1870s 62 to 89 11 to 38
Indonesia, 1822 18.1 81.9
Indonesia, 1870 62 38
Indonesia, 1913 88.6 11.4
Mexico, 1800s 25 75
Mexico, 1879 40 60
Source: Jeffrey G. Williamson, Trade and poverty. When the Third World fell behind
(Cambridge Mass. and London 2011) 65.
Those countries with un-competitive manufacturing sectors had to find an
answer to the challenges that Western industrialisation confronted them with.
They by and large did as Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin, building on Ricardo’s
theory of comparative advantage, predicted: countries with relatively few people
and many resources began to focus more on exporting primary resources,
whereas countries with relatively speaking many people and few resources began
858 Williamson, Trade and poverty, 4. On that same page he uses the expression “accelerating
divergence”
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to focus on labour-intensive production. If only for those reasons, globalisation
tended to have very different effects depending on whether a country was already
industrialised or not, but also according to its specific factor endowments and
specialisation, and as we will see later on.
Let us first comment on Japan, China and India. The two first countries both
had a relative abundance of people and were both relatively short on resources.859
Japan, after it was ‘opened’, experienced a trade boom and steeply rising of terms
of trade. It began its labour-intense industrialisation. Here apparently, as we will
discuss more extensively later on, globalisation in the end had positive effects.
The impact of the global trade boom was relatively weak in China. Foreign trade
continued to be relatively small as a percentage of its GDP. The country had
already been fairly open before ‘opening’ (as compared to Japan) and, what is
quite exceptional, its terms of trade fell. The country’s exports were becoming
cheaper as compared to its imports. In the first half of nineteenth century, its
main import product, opium, was getting more expensive not cheaper like
manufactured goods, the ‘normal’ import goods for non-industrial countries.
The price of its main export product, tea, in contrast, did not rise on interna-
tional markets. There were some de-industrialisation effects, e. g. in cotton
spinning, but domestic mills and handicraft still supplied more than eighty-one
per cent of the domestic market for cloth in the 1870s and until 1831 England
purchased more ‘nankeens’ (that is, cloth manufactured in Nanking and other
places in the lower Yangzi region) each year than it sold British-manufactured
cloth to China.860 The decline of Indian manufacturing had already set in before
1800. The reasons initially were internal: a less productive agriculture and an
increase of nominal wages – connected to climate change and the negative effects
of the disintegration of the Mughal Empire – caused a loss of competitiveness
against the rest of world. The country’s competitive edge had already been
eroded before Britain had developed a full-blown textile industry. Problems only
increased when the country was confronted with cheap imports from Britain,
with new high tariffs in its export markets, and with its inability to defend its
own market with high tariffs because of British rule. Around 1800, the export of
Indian textiles amounted to between four and twelve per cent of total production.
Williamson thinks six to seven per cent would be the most likely estimate. The
country had already then lost much terrain on the world market. Actual de-
industrialisation began already early in the nineteenth century, most of it in the
first half. De-industrialisation via globalisation was relatively weak.861
859 See for Williamson’s comments on these two countries, Trade and poverty, 71 – 74.
860 Feuerwerker, Studies in the economic history of late imperial China, 125.
861 For de-industrialisation in other emerging Third World countries elsewhere in the world
see Williamson, Trade and poverty, chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8.
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Findlay and O’Rourke, in their survey of the last millennium of economic
development, also point at a very substantial growth of world trade over the long
nineteenth century. They, however, are less pessimistic about the effects of the
global division of labour in that period when it comes to its effects on countries
exporting primary products.862 In their view openness was not an insuperable
obstacle to growth or even industrialisation. Overall, so they claim, there was a
clear increase in trade in primary products that, be it with big differences ac-
cording to place and time, did not yet see a clear deterioration of their terms of
trade. They too, like Williamson, think that until the last decades of the century,
those terms of trade overall improved, after which they then, overall, with several
exceptions and with difference between different products, deteriorated. They
strongly qualify the existence of a ‘resource-curse’ and of ‘Dutch-disease effects’
in countries exporting primary products at the time. In many countries, there
had never been much ‘industry’ to begin with, so they simply could not suffer
from serious ‘de-industrialisation’. In their view, trade could function as an
engine of growth. It, so they point out, did in North America that did not suffer a
resource-curse at all, as it actually used much of its resources itself. Parts of Latin
America profited from the combination of improving terms of trade and a
supply of labour that was not unlimited to begin with and kept rather limited via
immigration laws. The New World preferred labour from Europe, where wages
were relatively high and often rising, and therefore had to offer fairly high wages
itself. In resource-rich regions in Asia, the supply of labour was often so
abundant that wages stayed low. We already referred to the quite different types
of logic of development in China and Japan, and to the situation in India that
because of its colonial situation in turn also developed differently. Africa’s ex-
ports, according to Findlay and O’Rourke, increased substantially, but up until
then they had been very low. Following in the footsteps of Lewis, Findlay and
O’Rourke thus tend, given favourable circumstances, to be more optimistic
about the possibilities of resource-led growth in countries where the supplies of
land and labour are sufficiently elastic. Often though, they admit, that growth
was mainly extensive: the combination of more land and more people led to
more production and more export but not necessarily to more real income per
capita. In the end, they too cannot ignore that most resource-producing coun-
tries fell behind, even if they did not fall back. This means their position turns
out to be not that different from that of Williamson after all. Overall, the position
that specialising in the production and exports of primary products in the long
862 See Findlay and O’Rourke, Power and plenty, chapter 7, in particular 414 – 428. See also
Roland Findlay and Mats Lundahl, ‘Resource-led growth – a long-term perspective: the
relevance of the 1870 – 1914 experience for today’s developing economies’, WIDERWorking
Paper 162.
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run as a rule had and has negative consequences is finding increasing support
amongst economists. We encounter it not only in Jeffrey Williamson’s work but
also, very eloquently and convincingly, in the work of Erik Reinert, where he
points at the difference between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ kinds of specialisation and
the product-specificity of economic development.863
Williamson is not an institutionalist. Institutions and institutional differ-
ences in his view cannot explain when, exactly, certain developments will occur
and what will be their intensity. In his analysis, external terms of trade play a very
prominent role and thus the question of what commodities are produced and
exported. That according to him, however, is not a matter of choice but rather an
outcome determined by geography, factor endowments and international de-
mand. Institutions, so he thinks, hardly matter in this respect.864 In Williamson’s
view, basically, for most less advanced countries the global trade boom did not
and could not mark the beginning of a take-off. To my view, he has a point
regarding many regions, but he should in a really global analysis allow for many
exceptions – which he would – and not exclusively interpret his findings in terms
of factor endowments.865 Several countries industrialised or at least became
wealthy notwithstanding their factor endowment and their specific comparative
advantage and did so in a way in a way that would be inexplicable without
reference to their institutional set-up and the policies of their rulers. The work of
Sokoloff and Engerman, and of Acemoglu and colleagues, to my view shows that,
when it comes to explaining the different trajectories of the economies of the
USA and Canada on the one hand and those of Spanish America on the other,
factor endowments definitely did matter but were not as such decisive. When it
comes to factor endowments and comparative advantage, no region in the
Americas was destined to industrialise. Adam Smith advised the inhabitants of
Britain’s colonies, in what were to become the United States, to continue to invest
in agriculture where he considered its capital was best and most effectively
employed and to not divert it into manufacturing. He thought that would “retard
instead of accelerating the further increase of the value of their annual produce,
and would obstruct instead of promoting the progress of their country towards
real wealth and greatness.”866 Most economists would now admit that Smith’s
advice was not very good.
Often in countries specialising in the export of primary products, the supply
863 See page 92.
864 Williamson, Trade and poverty, 213 – 214 and 190.
865 See for critique of his approach the reviews by Nicolas Crafts in The Economic Journal
February 2013, 193 – 197, and by Tirthankar Roy on EH.net, Economic History Association
July 2011 http://eh.net/book_reviews/trade-and-poverty-when-third-world-fell-behind
866 Smith, Inquiry into the nature and causes, 367. This simply means he thought the com-
parative advantage of the thirteen colonies lay in agriculture.
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of labour was so abundant that wages continued to be low, which then did not
stimulate efforts at innovation and the development of domestic technology.
Low wages normally hamper the development of a domestic mass market, a
necessary precondition for the development of strong and broadly based na-
tional industries, and they normally have negative effects on the level of
schooling. In a country such as the United States in the nineteenth century, a
country that might have turned into a raw materials-exporting economy, how-
ever, labour was scarce. That actually stimulated the development of technology.
In principle, exporting staples can give a boost to development, but then the
exporting sector must develop sufficient backward and forward linkages with
the rest of the economy and create technological and financial spin-off that
actually is used domestically to diversify the economy. Without diversification
and upgrading of production, which require the creation of a domestic banking
sector, countries that have a large sector that exports primary products can
easily end up in a dead-end street. A strategy that has been successfully em-
ployed in several cases to avoid this has been to shut oneself off from expensive
imports via import-substitution. This strategy was, as most advocates of the
free-market love to forget, for example successfully implemented in in-
dustrialising Britain and many other countries that became rich. It could of
course only be tried in countries that were in charge of their own economic
policies and where elites were willing to shoulder it. But even when that was the
case, and in this respect proponents of free trade do have a point, import sub-
stitution policies and the creation of a diversified, developed economy failed
more often than not. With increasing capital outlays, production units needed to
have a certain minimal size for an import substitution strategy to be efficient and
it therefore increasingly only made sense in economies with an accordingly large
domestic market. Protectionism against foreign competition, a not un-
problematic policy anyhow, obviously was not enough to develop industries of
one’s own. Tariff and money policies could matter, but most of the Third World
countries were not autonomous in that respect. Strikingly enough, tariffs in the
periphery often were higher than in the core. Latin America already had the
highest tariffs in the world at the end of the nineteenth century. Not so much to
protect any ‘infant industry’ but as a form of rent seeking or simple protection
for labour-intensive sectors.
One can only conclude that one has to be wary of unspecified general state-
ments about factor endowments and trade, even in connection with institutions.
That also shows in the following brief analysis of developments in East Asia, as
interpreted by the influential Japanese economist Kaname Akamatsu (1896 –
1974), who claims that opening up to global trade in that region provided major
chances for catching up. He already in the 1930s presented the main elements of
his ‘flying geese model of economic development’, in his words “a sort of for-
Globalisation and Great Divergence 279
mula for the industrial development of less-advanced countries after they have
opened trade ports and entered into large-scale trade relations with the advanced
Western European countries”.867 It derives its name from the fact that it depicts
the relationship between more developed and less developed countries as that of
a group of geese flying in formation with the less advanced countries following
(and chasing) those ahead of them. The comparison with flying geese suggests
that the position of the leading goose will be taken over by one of the following
geese. This however is more suggested by the metaphor than actually claimed
and in any case is not what happened in practice. All the countries in the Asian
formation went through the stages from importing manufactured products, to
domestic import substitution, and then export but in that permanent process of
upgrading leaders did not necessarily lose primacy, but they did leave those
sectors of production where they no longer had a clear advantage and monopoly-
profits to others. Important from a global history perspective is the fact that,
according to Akamatsu, there were (and are) several of such formations in the
global economy in which countries can integrate themselves with Japan leading
one in Asia, and the United States and Western Europe leading two other ones.
For him global economic history is not a matter of ‘the West’ versus ‘the Rest’ or
‘North’ versus ‘South’.
Akamatsu’s model clearly is a model of catching-up and I discuss it here
because it connects this catching up to what Williamson describes as the global
trade boom but, in contrast to Williamson, focuses on the positive effects of that
trade boom and on other countries than Williamson does. For Akamatsu the
process of the opening up of the markets of less-developed countries by more
advanced countries was a process in which European capitalism “awakened the
less developed areas of the world to modern economic development”.868 For him,
the imports from those more advanced countries primarily were a challenge,
even a necessary condition, for the less advanced countries to catch up. He
focuses far less on their potential negative long-run consequences than, for
example, dependency theorists or Jeffrey Williamson do and tends to write as if
it would be ‘logical’ for the ‘awakened’ countries to in several stages catch up.
867 Akamatsu, ‘A historical pattern of economic growth in developing countries’, 11. Akamatsu
himself often refers to “a wild-geese flying pattern”. I took my information about Akamatsu
from this article plus his ‘A theory of unbalanced growth in the world economy’ and from
the synthesis in Bachinger and Matis, Entwicklungsdimensionen des Kapitalismus, chapter
3.2.
868 Akamatsu, ‘A historical pattern of economic growth in developing countries’, 3.
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Figure 7: The development model of Akamatsu
Stage of
Development
Industrial Structure Trade Structure
1. Stage
Underdevelopment Opening of markets by more
‘advanced’ countries. Destruc-
tion of local manufacturing
Import-dependency. Imports of
consumer goods from advanced
countries. Development of local
markets for imported goods.
2. Stage
Imitation Beginning of the development of
light industries producing con-
sumer goods.
Beginning of import-sub-
stitution of consumer goods.
Import of capital goods from
advanced industrial counties.
3. Stage
Advance Development of industries pro-
ducing capital goods. Copying
of products from advanced in-
dustrial economies. Com-
petitive advantage because of
low production costs and im-
proved quality of products.
Increasing export of domestic
consumer goods, but continued
dependency on imported capi-
tal goods.
4. Stage
Leadership Domestic capital goods
industry and production of
high-quality end products.
Exports of capital goods to
countries that originally were
more advanced, decreasing
exports of consumer goods.
Direct investments abroad.
Based on: Kaname Akamatsu, ‘A historical pattern of economic growth in developing
countries’ in: The Developing Economies. The Journal of the Institute of Economics Vol-
ume 1 (1962) 3 – 25 and taken from Bachinger and Matis, Entwicklungsdimensionen des
Kapitalismus, 299. The translation in mine.
In his model, the opening-up of less advanced countries puts strong pressure on
their domestic production of goods that are also produced by more advanced
economies and initiates a process of de-industrialisation. This, however, in
Akamatsu’s model, triggers a process of import substitution for the imported
consumer goods, whereas at the same time the less advanced country begins to
import capital goods. The emerging domestic demand for the (new) import
goods challenges domestic producers to start producing these themselves.
Considering the low overall production costs, it becomes possible to copy
products from other countries and increasingly sell them at home and even
export them. Meanwhile, one can begin to build up a domestic capital goods
industry and start the production and export of advanced consumer goods.
Akamatsu’s model basically is a stylized description of the successive stages of
Japan’s economic development after its opening, made possible by its perma-
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nent interaction with economically more advanced economies and an ensuing
division of labour with them and in Asia.
Although Akamatsu, as indicated, tends to present the process just described
as a logical, smooth succession of stages, it actually involves, as he knows and
admits, a lot of agency and strategy, the success of which to a large extent, in any
case in Japan, depended on the presence of a number of preconditions. This
means that in practice many less-developed areas did not – and could not –
manage to catch up as Akamatsu suggests they could. In the period before the
First World War, the best example of a country that did and the one that Aka-
matsu normally has in mind in his writings would be Meiji Japan. I, too, will
focus on that country, in which catching up and even becoming a leading
economy clearly was not just a spontaneous process of emulation and import
substitution that in turn might be simply explained by its factor endowment. As
the goal of my text is not to be encyclopaedic but to illustrate different kinds of
‘logic’ of growth and non-growth, this selectivity is not a problem.
In Japan, certain preconditions were present that were fairly typical for the
country and without which success would have been far more problematic.
Firstly, a certain mental flexibility was needed. I will only mention a willingness
to buy foreign goods and then try and substitute them with domestic products
and more in general a willingness – that in Japan even took the form of a genuine
eagerness – to learn new ‘Western’ ways, develop a ‘spirit of industrialism’ and
modernise the country. Then there is the country’s specific factor endowment. It
had a numerous, cheap and very industrious labour force. It also already had a
developed market economy and an income distribution that was much less
unequal than in many underdeveloped countries, which means that its domestic
market could absorb part of domestic industrial production. It, moreover, al-
ready had a fairly high level of general education. Additionally, Meiji Japan had
acquired a state that infrastructurally was very strong869 and had an efficient,
large bureaucracy that could effectively implement and find wide support for its
policies of ‘Fukoku kyōhei’, meaning ‘rich country and strong army’. The gov-
ernment was not and did not want to be dependent on foreign capital. Basically,
the country’s development under the Meiji was a matter of domestic capital,
domestic firms and domestic entrepreneurs. Japan’s population had been used
to paying fairly high taxes under Tokugawa rule and now much tax revenue was
used to directly or indirectly support development, i. e. for creating material
infrastructure, including (model) factories and funding education and the im-
port of capital goods. Government in this case could not erect a protective wall of
tariffs. That was prohibited by the unequal treaties, which were imposed on the
country in the years 1854 – 1858 and were only abrogated at the very end of Meiji
869 See for that concept pages 378 – 379.
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rule in 1911. But, all in all, this is a series of pre-conditions that set Japan – and
several other Asian countries later on – very much apart from most less-ad-
vanced countries and that indicates that there was far more to its economic
modernisation than just being opened to trade.
The example of Japan, in my view, is fascinating as it shows how in actual
processes of development and growth mono-causal approaches fail. What
happened to the Meiji-economy is not simply a matter of specific factor en-
dowment (abundant cheap labour and scarce resources), the presence of the
right human capital (hard working, skilled labour), capital accumulation
(‘forced saving’ via high taxes), a division of labour and trade (the opening up of
the country to international competition), institutions (the presence of a market
economy and a developmental state) and a certain culture (economic nation-
alism and an industrial spirit) but the combination of all these factors. For many
countries – including ‘peripheral’ countries in Europe – trade acted more as a
trigger of relative impoverishment than as an engine that got modern economic
growth started. Expanding global trade of course could and did contribute
massively to growth in parts of the global economy, but even there, I would not
regard it as the actual engine of modern growth. The best general rejection of
that claim can be found in the book by Deirdre McCloskey Bourgeois virtues,
where she convincingly shows that foreign trade – and global exploitation –
cannot have been the main causes of Britain’s industrialisation in particular and
the ‘rise of the West’ in general. Trade ceteris paribus is about reallocating
production to its existing optimum, but does not as such shift that optimum
itself. This means that absent technical and organizational change the increasing
returns caused by specialisation will necessarily reach their limit fairly quick-
ly.870 In the pre-industrial world, the ability to extend the market and to de-
termine which gains were possible with trade was always quite confined, con-
sidering the very high costs of transport and communication. The tyranny of
distance that characterised that world may be a thing of the past but not the
impact of distance per se. Many goods and services are not tradables. Even now
you do not go from Vienna to a hairdresser in Mongolia, even if he is cheaper.
Most countries continue to trade more with countries nearby than with coun-
tries far away. In that respect again, the question of why foreign trade is so
important arises. If a few hundred thousand customers in the West Indies make
such a difference for Britain’s economic development as, for example, Blackburn
or Pomeranz claim, then what to think of the over three-hundred million cus-
tomers on China’s domestic markets? But even on a market that would be
unlimited, the gains of trade in the end are limited if lacking innovation. This of
870 McCloskey, Bourgeois dignity, chapters 23 – 29.
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course is not meant to deny that the extension of the market can in principle be
an enormous stimulus for innovation.
Let me conclude these paragraphs on accumulation over (unequal) exchange
with a couple of general synthesising comments in which the fundamental
question of free trade versus protectionism will also be separately addressed.
The major cause of the Great Divergence does not reside in the existence of major
differences in the availability of physical or monetary resources between those
countries that became rich and those that stayed poor. In several advanced
organic economies, the availability of these resources as such was not a major
impediment for taking off. The resources to make a take-off possible in principle
could have been mobilised. In my view, the importance of international trade to
the Great Divergence therefore does not reside in the accumulation it might have
facilitated for countries that ‘made’ it. Trade, of course, provides all sorts of
gains. But even if a country earned much by trade, what does that mean as an
explanation of its economic primacy? As indicated, trading in a setting of free
and fair competition is an economic activity that yields most to those who are
best at it. Everyone could do it in principle: one cannot ‘blame’ someone for
doing it or turn it into an unfair advantage per se. It is a ‘moveable feast’ as the
expression goes. The French, or for that matter the Chinese or Indians, could
also have traded more with others.
It is clear, however, that without expanding demand the expanding supply
that characterised Britain’s Industrial Revolution – and that characterises
modern economic growth in general – would have been useless and that growth
would then have petered out. Much of that expanding demand was abroad. It is
also clear that much of Britain’s increased specialisation and exports would not
have been possible without imports. Findlay and O’Rourke use this angle to
claim that, in the end, trade was fundamental for the first industrial revolution,
so it is relevant to reconstruct their argument.871 In their view, foreign trade
ensured that technological change translated in a more sustained growth ex-
perience than otherwise would have been possible. Without its possibilities to
import and export – much of the latter facilitated I would point out, by the fact
that the prices of the exported manufactures fell – Britain’s growth would have
come to a halt during the eighteenth century. When it comes to technological
innovation, the importance of which they certainly do not ignore, they claim that
this at least to some extent also depended on the openness of the economy.
Without the growth of trade, the incentives to innovate would also have been
much smaller. That sounds quite convincing and I think it is even true. But what
does it mean for an explanation of the Industrial Revolution as it occurred in
Britain? Some comments are in order here. Without the imports and exports that
871 Findlay and O’Rourke, Power and plenty, chapter 6.
Part two: Actual explanations of the Great Divergence284
trade provided, growth would have hit a ceiling, so Findlay and O’Rourke claim.
But that of course applies to all countries in the world. Why exactly did Britain
have the trade it needed? Are Findlay and O’Rourke not simply assuming what
they have to explain? Most of the growing exports went to countries that vol-
untarily bought British goods because they apparently were value for money.
One must be wary not to exaggerate the importance of non-consensual trade in
the entire trade of Britain during its take-off. In my comments on the ‘windfall
advantages’ that, according to, for example, Pomeranz, Britain supposedly owed
to its ghost acreages, I will extensively discuss and criticise the way of arguing
that underlies the claims by Findlay and O’Rourke as well as Pomeranz and his
followers in this respect.872 Besides, but more about that later too, if, as they
claim, British military success artificially extended Britain’s markets and was
therefore so important in explaining why Britain became the first industrial
nation, then how can we explain that military success? Is that not in the end
largely a matter of disposing over more resources? When they state that in-
novation was stimulated by Britain’s openness and its growing markets, one can
of course immediately ask why in the eighteenth century innovation would not
have been stimulated in the Netherlands or in France, a country where at times
intercontinental trade was growing even faster than in Britain, or why the
enormous growth of China’s domestic market had not provided a stimulus for
Chinese innovators.
If one per se wants to regard ‘exchange’ in the widest sense of the word and the
accumulation it made possible as the motor of economic growth and more
specifically of modern economic growth – which I do not think it is – the
question would simply become: Why were certain countries that ‘happened’ to
all lie in the West so good at (global) trading that it provided them with the
wherewithal to take off and to sustain their growth? The answer can then only be
something that made their economies more efficient in terms of producing,
trading or both. This means that if trade were the or a major cause of economic
success, the relevant question would simply become what made that trade so
successful. Things, of course, are different to the extent that the ‘exchange’ we are
talking about was unfair, i. e. to the extent that coercion and manipulation would
be at the basis of Western advantage in it. For certain exchanges with certain
regions, this definitely was the case. The next obvious question is how this rather
small part of the world in terms of population and surface that we call ‘the West’ –
basically until the 1850s only Western Europe – could successfully and profitably
apply all that coercion. At the end of the eighteenth century, when the real
divergence set in and Great Britain began its age of industry and empire, the
world had about one billion inhabitants; Great Britain had some ten million! The
872 See page 290 – 298.
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other major European colonial nations also were dwarfs when it comes to
population and size. The Netherlands then had about two million inhabitants,
Portugal some three million, Spain some eleven million and France, in the Eu-
ropean context a giant, some thirty million. The successor states of Mughal India
that Britain confronted and that one by one were defeated or cajoled into some
kind of submission, around 1800 together had over 150 million inhabitants.
Bengal, which after the battle of Plassey of 1755 provided Great Britain with such
a handsome income, had over thirty million inhabitants, more than France,
whereas the population of England, Wales and Scotland combined at the time
will have been no more than seven million. This was at a time that Great Britain
had no technological advance whatsoever on Indian armies. The impact of in-
dustrialisation in warfare only began to be felt after the Napoleonic Wars. When
Great Britain confronted China in the first Opium War, that county had some 400
million inhabitants and Great Britain some twenty million. Great Britain sent a
couple of thousand troops and a couple of steam ships to China and it won.873 If
the thesis would be that coercion played a role in Britain becoming the first
industrial nation – which to my view it certainly did – the question would simply
become how such a small country with such a small population could become so
powerful, without as yet any clear technological advantage. If Britain in-
dustrialised because it was a centre exploiting a periphery, then how did it
manage to become centre? Even when India was incorporated in the British
Empire, that entire empire still had fewer inhabitants than China. In providing
an explanation for this fact institutions and institutional efficiency and strength
must have played a major role. Britain as a state and as an economy apparently
had an enormous and concentrated infrastructural power.
In my view, the fundamental gains of trade or, more broadly, ‘exchanges with
the external world’, when it comes to fostering development are not entirely, and
I would even think not primarily, confined to ‘accumulation’. They can also
reside in the more general positive effects that openness in terms of trade in-
tensity can have on an economy. Countries with higher trade shares are likely to
grow faster than other countries. Britain had a relatively open economy in the
873 The question why the West already had a military strength that enabled it conquer so much
of the world before it had really industrialised its warfare, has fascinated many scholars.
Westerners were already ruling over thirty-five per cent of the entire globe by 1789. Their
warfare was only really ‘industrialised’ from the Crimean War (1854 – 1855) onwards. I
regard the following texts as very informative: Black, Military power and the fate of con-
tinents; Black, War in the early modern world,; Hanson, Why the West has won; Headrick,
Power over people and Tools of Empire ; Hoffmann, ‘Prices, the Military Revolution, and
Western Europe’s comparative advantage in violence’ and ‘Why was it Europeans who
conquered the World?; Lynn, Battle ; Parker, Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare, and
Thompson, ‘Military superiority thesis’. For the industrialisation of Western warfare see
e. g. Murray, ‘Industrialisation of war, 1815 – 1871’ and Boot, War made new, 109 – 204.
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sense that its ratio of imports and exports to total GDP was far higher than in
huge empires like those of the Qing, the Mughals and their successor states, the
Ottomans, or Tokugawa Japan or Korea.
But one has to be careful in using the word ‘openness’ and always take the
context into consideration. The word can refer to trade intensity but also to the
level of barriers to foreign trade. When it comes to openness in terms of trade
intensity we have seen that in the specific setting of the long nineteenth century,
let us say from the French Revolution to the First World War, globalisation and a
further opening of the economy for many countries could easily lead to de-
industrialisation and relative impoverishment. Apparently, the effects of glob-
alisation for different parts of the world could be very different. In referring to
openness in terms of the existence of trade barriers, it is striking that, in contrast
to what mainstream economics predict, there is no clear relation between this
openness and growth in the sense that countries with low protective tariffs would
have high growth. Far from it, there are a surprisingly large number of examples
where the opposite is the case. In the case of intercontinental trade, the rise and
primacy of the West must not simply be identified with the rise of free trade and
openness. One can only agree with Findlay and O’Rourke when they write that
“the association between openness and growth becomes more blurred when
individual country performances are examined” and add that “simple mono-
causal relationships between openness [in terms of low trade barriers] and
growth are not supported by the data”.874 Openness, on the other hand, has not
been an insurmountable barrier to industrialisation, as the history of Japan in
the nineteenth century shows. The thesis that protectionism would in principle
be bad for economic growth is not supported by historical data. It can be
harmful, but that need not necessarily be the case and apparently often it indeed
wasn’t. Much, if not everything, depends on the circumstances, the kind of
protectionism and its duration.875 It should in any case not permanently keep
foreign competition out. In the end, the real litmus test to decide whether pro-
duction is efficient is whether it can compete on the world market. To permanently
shield it off inevitably will lead to non-optimal outcomes. For the long nineteenth
century, that for us is the most relevant period, there are clear indications that
protectionism did not always have a negative impact on the economies of countries
that applied it; far from it, this is particularly true for countries that were taking off
or had already reached a high level of wealth. On the other hand, free trade very
874 Findlay and O’Rourke, Power and plenty, 521.
875 See e. g. Bairoch, Economics and world history, chapters 2, 3, and 4; Ha-joon Chang, Kicking
away the ladder, passim; Reinert, How rich countries got rich, passim, but see for example
chapter two, where on page 60, quoting his landsman John Sannes he writes: “New indu-
stries need(ed) tariff protection, but the tariffs should gradually become superfluous.” and
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often did not have clear positive effects on the economies involved, in particular
not in case of Third World countries.876 For what was becoming the Third World,
Bairoch even as goes as far as to clam that trade liberalism meant its “road to
underdevelopment”.877 Apparently there is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ protectionism.
Figure 8: Two ideal types of protectionism compared
East Asian: ‘Good’ Latin American: ‘Bad’
Temporary protection of new
industries/ products for the
world market
Permanent protection of mature
industries/ products for the
home market (often very small)
Very steep learning curves
compared to the rest of the
world
Learning that lags behind the
rest of the world
Based on a dynamic
Schumpeterian view of the
world – market-driven ‘creative
destruction’
Based on a more static view of
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created did not lead to huge
(East Asian) demand for
education. Investment in
education therefore tends to
feed emigration
Meritocracy – capital, jobs and
privileges distributed according
to qualifications
Nepotism in the distribution of
capital, jobs and privileges
Equality of land distribution
(Korea)
Mixed record on land
distribution
Even income distribution
increased home market for
advanced industrial goods
Uneven income distribution
restricted scale of home market
and decreased competiveness
of local industry
Profits created through dynamic
‘Schumpeterian’ competition
Profits created through static
rent seeking
Intense co-operation between
producers and local suppliers
Confrontation between
producers and local suppliers
876 See e. g. Bairoch, Economics and world history, chapters 2, 3, and 4, and Findlay and
O’Rourke, Power and plenty, 395 – 402.
877 Bairoch, Economics and world history, 44.
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(Continued)








Source, Erik S. Reinert, How rich countries got rich … and why poor countries stay poor
(New York 2007) 311 – 312.
To illustrate how context-dependent relations between openness and growth are,
let me just refer to the results of research done by Halit Yanikkaya who looked at
the connection between trade openness and growth in some 100 developed and
developing countries over the period 1970 to 1999. The author used the two
trade-openness measures between which I also distinguish in this text. This is
from the Abstract:
The regression results for numerous trade intensity [italics mine] ratios are mostly
consistent with the existing literature. [i. e. they find a positive link between trade-
intensity and growth] However, contrary to the conventional view on the growth effects
of trade barriers [italics mine] our estimation results show that trade barriers are
positively and, in most specifications, significantly associated with growth, especially
for developing countries…878
Although trade did not actually make Third World countries poorer in the
nineteenth century it can hardly be called a motor of real growth and definitely
did not prevent them from falling behind, so here too apparently historical cir-
cumstances matter a lot. With regard to the effects of trade barriers the author
comes to these conclusions that I think are valid not just for the period he studied:
Thus, our results actually provide considerable evidence for the hypothesis that re-
strictions on trade can promote growth, especially of developing countries under
certain conditions. It is crucial to note that in this study, we have no intention of
establishing a simple and straightforward positive association between barriers to
trade and growth. Rather, our main goal is to show that there is no such relationship
between trade restrictions and growth. On the contrary, this relationship mostly de-
pends on certain characteristics of countries. In other words, restrictions on trade can
benefit a country depending on whether it is a developed or developing country,
whether it is a big or small country, and whether a country has comparative advantage
in those sectors that are receiving protection.879
Based on these figures, we may well argue that the successes of East Asian economies
over Latin American economies could probably be due to the fact that incentives for
878 Yanikkaya, ‘Trade openness and economic growth: a cross-country empirical investiga-
tion’.
879 Yanikkaya, ‘Trade openness and economic growth’, 84.
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exporting sectors and import-competing sectors have been evenly distributed in East
Asian economies but there have been a strong bias favouring import competing sectors
in Latin American countries.880
Consequently, we believe that the question that should be addressed is actually not that
of open economies versus closed economies but rather what kind of government in-
tervention or trade policy is better. Our overall estimation results for trade barriers
clearly indicate that there is no simple and straightforward relationship between trade
restrictions and growth, as the existing literature claimed.”881
When it comes to openness in overall, general terms, meaning the extent to
which a country is confronted at home and abroad with new products, new
contacts, new knowledge and ideas, and took up the challenges and possibilities
this provided, Britain of course was a far more open society than e. g. China. In
this broad sense it profited far more from globalisation, the more so as it was one
of its main actors instead of being acted upon.
16. Ghost acreages
In recent literature dealing with the Great Divergence, the importance of glob-
alisation and in particular of the ‘periphery’ for the rise of the West tends to be
discussed less in terms of sheer accumulation than in terms of the ‘ghost acreage’
it provided. This argument is particularly prominent in the work of Kenneth
Pomeranz. The concept was first introduced by Georg Bostrom882 and first used
in the context of the problem discussed here by Jones in his European Miracle.883
We will use it here to refer to the additional land that a country would need from
internal sources to provide that net portion of the sustenance of its economy that
it actually derives from sources outside its boundaries – including sustenance
from the sea – or in case of fossil fuel from underground sources. According to
this definition, ghost acreage is a kind of ‘phantom carrying capacity’. The recent
focus on ghost acreage is to a large extent a logical consequence of the tendency
to view the Industrial Revolution as an escape from Malthusian constraints. In
the end, those constraints were all a consequence of the limited availability of
(useful) land. Escaping from those constraints then has to involve increasing the
amount of such land, by making use of the sea and in particular foreign or
‘subterranean land’.884
880 Yanikkaya, ‘Trade openness and economic growth’, 78.
881 Yanikkaya, ‘Trade openness and economic growth’, 78.
882 See e. g. Borgstrom, Hungry planet. For a ‘precursor’ see Webb, Great Frontier.
883 See chapter 4 of the book: ‘The discoveries and ghost acreage’.
884 Sieferle, Subterranean forest.
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Table 41: Britain’s foreign trade (without Ireland), 1784 – 1846
1784 – 86 1814 – 16 1844 – 46
Imports
Raw materials £s (%) 9,585 (47.0 %) 36,408 (56.2 %) 51,033 (62.2 %)
Foodstuffs £s (%) 8,657 (42.5 %) 27,602 (42.6 %) 27,386 (33.4 %)
Manufactured goods £s (%) 2,144 (10.5 %) 731 (1.1 %) 3,544 (4.3 %)
Total 20,386 (100 %) 64,741 (100 %) 81,963 (100 %)
1784 – 86 1814 – 16 1844 – 46
Exports
Raw materials £s (%) 867 (6.8 %) 1,460 (3.3 %) 5,177 (8.9 %)
Foodstuffs £s (%) 1,165 (9.2 %) 4,995 (11.2 %) 1,809 (3.1 %)
Manufactured goods £s (%) 10,658 (84.0 %) 38,019 (85.5 %) 51,434 (88.0 %)
Total 12,690 (100 %) 44,474 (100 %) 58,420 (100 %)
Source: Joel Mokyr, The enlightened economy. An economic history of Britain 1700 – 1850
(New Haven and London) 168.
The social saving, i. e. the benefit to society provided by ghost acreage, actually
can be measured. For coal as source of heating that can be done in terms of the
amount of land needed for growing timber to yield the equivalent in heat. As
early as 1815, coal, according to Pomeranz, provided Britain with ghost acreage
of fifteen to twenty-one million acres.885 He estimates the total amount of its
arable land – in 1800 to be precise – at around seventeen million acres.886 The
importance of coal resided not only in its capacity to generate heat as fuel and
cokes; with the invention of the steam engine it could also provide steam power.
The steep rise in productivity in manufacturing – or for that matter in trans-
portation – would have been impossible without it. The social saving of steam
power can also be estimated, this time in terms of what would then be ‘ghost
labour’. Let us assume that one horsepower equals the labour power of ten adult
men.887 This of course is an estimate that ignores the fact that steam power, in
contrast to a human labour force, in principle – and normally also in practice – is
available the entire day. It does not get tired, does not strike, drag its feet or
contradict. Steam-power is more ‘reliable’ and constant than human labour
power, and can accomplish things that humans are incapable of, whatever their
885 Pomeranz, Great Divergence, 276. Compare Wrigley, Continuity, chance and change, 54 – 55.
886 Pomeranz, Great Divergence, 275. Overton, Agricultural Revolution in England, 76, esti-
mates it was only some 11.5 million acres, as does Robert C. Allen in his ‘Agriculture during
the Industrial Revolution’ in: Floud and Johnson, Cambridge Economic History of Modern
Britain, 96 – 116, page 104.
887 This is an estimate. I came across several different estimates in the literature, but this one
seems to be quite commonly accepted and not extremely high or low. See for some dis-
cussion and this estimate, Smil, Energy in world history, 9.
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number or effort. Besides, per entity produced it is cheaper than human labour
otherwise it would not substitute it. The impact of steam-power thus was even
much bigger than is suggested in my comparison.
Table 42: Steam horsepower and horsepower per person in terms of labour-units equiv-









1840 620,000 HP = 17 million
labour units equivalents




1870 4,040,000 HP = 121 million
labour units equivalents




1896 13,700,000 HP = 411
million
labour units equivalent




All figures with regard to horsepower are from David S. Landes, The unbound Prometheus.
Technological change and industrial development in Western Europe from 1750 to the
present (second edition: Cambridge 2003; originally 1969) 221. For working hours in Great
Britain, I have based myself on the figures in Hans-Joachim Voth, ‘Living standards and the
urban environment’ in: Floud and Johnson, Cambridge Economic History of Modern
Britain, 268 – 294, page 278. According to his data, around 1840, working hours per year in
cotton mills amounted to some 3400. In 1870 that figure had become lower than 3000. For
the end of the century it was fairly similar. Again, my facts are stylised and only intended to
show orders of magnitude.
That by 1896, engines in Europe and the United States alone provided no less
than fifty eight of the sixty-six million horsepower made available by steam
engines in the entire world, of course is quite telling.
This book intends to give a comparative analysis of several possible causes of
the Great Divergence. That means it would be would be quite interesting to
compare the extent to which Britain could profit from the labour power provided
by steam engines in terms of ‘steam slaves’ with the extent to which it could profit
from ‘real slaves’. Again, we can only provide rough orders of magnitude, but
even so the figures are telling. In total, over a period of more than two centuries,
some 2.5 million slaves were imported into Britain’s colonies, a figure that
includes the slaves who were imported into the United States after it had become
independent. Of course, it is not easy to exactly determine how many of them
were working at one specific moment in time, but the following figures for the
year 1800 would not be controversial as an approximation. For that year, it is
estimated there were some 600,000 slaves in the British West Indies and some
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150,000 in colonies occupied by Britain.888 The total population of England,
Wales and Scotland at the time was 10.4 million. That would mean that at that
moment about 0.07 slave was available per Great Briton, assuming – which of
course is a substantial exaggeration – that all slaves would be exclusively working
to produce for Great Britons. If we would add all the 857,000 slaves living in the
USA and assume they too were all working exclusively to produce commodities
for Great Britons, that would mean there were 0.15 slaves working per inhabitant
of Great Britain. This is a very ‘optimistic’ estimate (i. e. from the perspective of
Britain’s economy!). Even slaves on plantations spent a substantial amount of
their time providing for their own subsistence and in total worked ‘only’ 2500 to
3000 hours per year for their owners, which is less than British labourers in their
factories did for their employers up until at least the 1850s; of course, not all their
produce was exported to Great Britain. But that is fairly irrelevant to the main
thrust of my comparison. For the year 1812 – 1813, we have the figure by Patrick
Colquhoun who claims there then were 1,147,346, as he calls it, un-free ‘negro
labourers’ in the British Empire, i. e. in the West Indies plus the colonies and
dependencies in Asia.889 The total population of Great Britain at the time would
have amounted to some 12.5 million people. That would mean some 0.09 slaves
per inhabitant of Great Britain. If we would assume that all slaves in the United
States at that moment (more than one million) would spend all their working
hours for Great Britain that would, in total, bring the figure at 0.2 slaves per
inhabitant of Great Britain. To put things in an international perspective: the
million and a half slaves working in Brazil in 1800 meant that, under the same
assumptions, there was one slave for every two Portuguese. The situation for
Spain was again completely different. Whereas the motherland had over ten
million inhabitants in 1800, there were ‘only’ 250,000 slaves in its American
colonies. Britain did not (yet) substantially profit from those slaves, as trade
contacts with Latin America, apart from some cotton imports from Brazil, first a
Portuguese colony and from the 1820s onwards an independent country, were
negligible.
When Great Britain granted full emancipation to its slaves in 1838, their
number was 750,000, in comparison with a population at home of some eighteen
million.890 The country put an end to its slave trade in 1807 and abolished slave
labour in its realm in 1834 i. e. , apart from, India, where slavery was not abol-
ished until 1843. This of course did not immediately result in its demise.891 For
India, the number of slaves in the 1830s has been estimated at between eight to
888 See for these and the following figures with regard to the number of slaves in 1800,
Blackburn, Making of New Wold slavery, 581.
889 Colquhoun, Treatise on the wealth, power and resources of the British Empire, 7.
890 Walvin, ‘Freedom and slavery and the shaping of Victorian Britain’, 246.
891 Stein, History of India, 216 – 220.
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sixteen million, but hardly any of them were working to export goods as in the
USA or the Caribbean. After 1800, the number of slaves in the United States
increased steeply to 1.5 million in 1820 and about four million in 1840, a number
that hardly changed until Abolition. If we assume those American slaves worked
for Britain for three quarters of their time, they as well as the slaves emancipated
in 1838 would still ‘only’ have provided Great Britain with about 0.20 slaves per
inhabitant. British cotton imports from the USA increased steeply. Whereas
about one third of Britain’s cotton import came from the United States in 1800,
that was about three-quarters in 1840.892 Until slavery was finally abolished there
in the 1880s, yet another 1.7 million slaves were transported to Brazil and 700,000
to the Spanish Antilles. Many of them also would have produced for Britain at
some moment in time. Considering the steep increase in Great Britain’s pop-
ulation this, however, certainly will not have increased the ratio of slaves to
inhabitants of Great Britain. This following table indicates the importance of
several regions of the world for Great Britain in terms of exports and imports. It
provides at least some indication of how important slave labour there was for
Great Britain.
Table 43: The importance of several regions for British trade and in percentages of total
trade in millions of pounds
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892 Etemad, Utilit¦ des empires, 145.
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(Continued)
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Source: B.R. Mitchell and Phyllis Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics (Cam-
bridge 1962) 309 – 327.
Pomeranz clearly has a point when he emphasises the importance of coal as a
provider of ghost labour. We must, however, not forget that having coal, which is
so central to Pomeranz’s claims, of course is not identical to having steam
engines. Without science and technology, the ‘geographical good luck’ of coal
would have been confined to having more cheap fuel, i. e. for as long as one
managed to keep mines dry without steam pumps.
What these figures do show, although they are only rough estimations, is the
enormous importance of steam power – which consumed coal – for the devel-
opment of Britain’s economy as compared to that of slave labour and to illustrate
that steam power presented absolutely unprecedented and in an organic econ-
omy simply previously unthinkable means of increasing production. The im-
portance of ‘steam slaves’ dwarfs that of ‘real slaves’.893 The figures of course are
in no way meant to present slavery as less reprehensible. They on the other hand
do show that the importance of un-free labour was and for a long time continued
893 A similar calculation could be made for ‘steam horses’: In the late nineteenth century, some
30,000 to 40,000 km2 would have been required as farmland just to feed the 1.5 to two
million horses needed to replace trains for transport of goods. That is one sixth of Great
Britain’s total surface. Less would be needed if canals and sea routes were used too. Re-
placing transport by passenger trains (160 billion km per year) would take around three
million horses, needing 60,000 km2 of farmland just for their fodder. Taking them together,
even in a low estimate over 80,000 km2 would be needed just for fodder to replace the
railroad in Great Britain with horses. That is over thirty per cent of the total surface of Great
Britain. At the eve of the First World War, the figure would have increased to some
120,000 km2, half of its total surface. See for this calculation Sieferle, Transportgeschichte,
30 – 31.
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to be substantial, the more so as the slaves we referred to were far from the only
people working in or for Britain whose status as labourers was not free.894
The ghost acreage of the goods Britain imported from overseas can also be
estimated. Pomeranz himself made a calculation for the most important prod-
ucts that Britain acquired from its New World periphery. For 1815, he estimates
cotton’s ghost acreage at nine million acres, suggesting that Britain would have
needed that amount of land to feed the sheep to produce the wool needed to
substitute for the materials that were made from cotton. The estimate for 1830 is
twenty-three million acres, far more than the total acreage of British cropland.
The ghost acreage needed in terms of growing flax would only have been 200,000
acres (for 1815) and 500,000 acres (for 1830). For hemp, the orders of magnitude
are similar. Pomeranz claims that these materials, however, could, for various
reasons not really function as substitutes for cotton.895 Timber imports from the
New World amounted to one million ghost acres, as compared to the 650,000
ghost acres that Baltic timber provided.896 The import of sugar provided some
four per cent of Britain’s calorie intake around 1800. To acquire the same amount
of calories Britain would have needed an equivalent of at least 1.3 to 1.9 million
acres of grain in 1815. For 1831 this had increased to 1.9 to 2.6 million acres.897
The total ghost acreage Britain acquired by importing cotton, sugar, and timber
in 1830 was some twenty-five to thirty million acres, about the total extension of
arable and pasture in Britain at that time and more than the ghost acreage thanks
to coal.898
For Pomeranz, the importance of those imports for Britain’s economy is even
greater than that of coal. Let me give one quite explicit quotation in this respect:
… all the productivity-enhancing changes that we identify with modernity put to-
gether – technological change, organizational change, the fossil fuel revolution, a better
educated and healthier workforce, and so on – had about as much influence on di-
verting England from a Malthusian path in the century after 1840 as the expansion of
transatlantic trade did.
He regards this as a
…strong confirmation that “ghost acres” abroad helped whatever divergence may have
occurred by the mid-eighteenth century to be not only sustained but grow to an
unprecedented size over the next century and a half.899
894 See pages 355 – 358.
895 Pomeranz, Great Divergence, 315.
896 Pomeranz, Great Divergence, 314.
897 Pomeranz, Great Divergence, 275.
898 Pomeranz, Great Divergence, 276.
899 Pomeranz, ‘Ten Years After’, 22.
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Strikingly enough, considering his generally very systematic, comparative ap-
proach, Pomeranz pays no attention to the question of whether other countries
might have had ghost acreage too. Countries like Spain and Portugal, but also the
Dutch Republic had quite a lot of it.
Table 44: Western European empires: approximate square mile distribution by geo-
graphical area c. 1775 (in percentage of square miles).
Areas Empires
Spanish Portuguese Dutch British French Danish
Europe 3.9 0.9 2.5 11.3 81.8 99.1
Atlantic Isles 0.1 0.1 – 3.9 – –
Coastal Africa 0.0 9.1 38.0 2.7 0.7 –
Americas 93.7 89.6 22.5 59.3 17.4 0.9
SE Asia 2.4 0.2 37.0 22.8 – –
Total 4,937,994 3,666,777 651,533 788,846 259,627 15,580
Source: Carole Shammas, ‘The revolutionary impact of European demand for tropical
goods’ in: John J. McCusker and Kenneth Morgan, eds. , The early modern Atlantic
economy (Cambridge 2000) 163 – 185, page 167.
But let us again, in consideration of the main question underlying this book,
look at the case of China. As compared to acreage at home, it of course is
impossible for a country a huge as China to have as much ghost acreage as
Britain had. But that does not mean it had none. Mark Elvin claims that between
1785 and 1833, the single province of Guangdong imported, on average, six times
the amount of raw cotton each year from India as all Britain used annually at the
time of Arkwright’s first water frame.900 According to H.V. Bowen, 55.3 million
lbs. of cotton were shipped from British India into Canton in 1805. That cotton
was and continued to be substantially cheaper than Chinese cotton. At that time,
the retained imports of ‘wool cotton’ into Great Britain stood at 58.9 million
lbs.901 According to Prasannan Parthasarathi, to give a final example, in 1815, the
amount of Indian cotton that China imported via Canton roughly equalled
Britain’s cotton imports at the time.902 In terms of silver, that cotton from India
was no doubt much cheaper than that from America. In any case, it was sub-
stantially cheaper than that from China itself.903 On top of that, China produced
900 Elvin, Pattern of the Chinese past, 312 – 313. That water frame was patented in the 1760s.
901 Bowen, ‘British exports of raw cotton from India to China’, 115 – 116. I take the expression
‘wool cotton’ from Bowen.
902 Parthasarathi, ‘Review article: the Great Divergence’, 283 – 284.
903 In the year 1793 – 1794, raw cotton from India cost ten to twelve taels (37.8 grams of silver)
per picul of 60.4 kilos. Raw cotton produced in China cost three to five taels more. According
to two sources from 1804 and 1813, Indian raw cotton still remained cheaper than Jiangnan
cotton by around one picul per tael. See, for this information and references Bowen, ‘British
exports of raw cotton from India to China’, 124 – 125.
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enormous amounts of very cheap cotton at home. It was still the largest cotton
producer in the world in the eighteenth century. In the USA in 1860, total cotton
production after decades of increasing production and exports reached a level of
about 1.9 billion pounds.904 China at about that time, in 1870, grew about 1.8
billion pounds. Kenneth Pomeranz estimates the consumption of cotton yarn in
China for the period around 1750 at 6.2 to 8.0 pounds per capita. If we assume
that China at that time had 200 million inhabitants, that would be 1.24 billion to
1.6 billion pounds of cotton yarn.905 Why exactly did that massive availability of
land-intensive raw material not turn the province of Guangdong in which
Canton lies into a Chinese Lancashire of sorts? If the explanation has to be that
Guangdong had no coal, then why did it not at least lead to the development of
large-scale concentrated production in manufactures, i. e. a kind of factories
without steam engines? It is Pomeranz himself who writes that
By about 1750, at least three macro-regions (of China PV) – Lingnan, the Southeast
Coast, and above all the Lower Yangzi – depended on outside supplies of various
ecologically sensitive goods. All three of these regions imported significant amounts of
food (thirteen to eighteen per cent of total supply for the Lower Yangzi); all three
imported timber ; and at least the Lower Yangzi … also imported large amounts of
bean-cake fertilizer from Manchuria.
Lingnan, he adds,
…imported most of its cotton and also began to import much more bean-cake in the
nineteenth century…906
In his book on agricultural development in Jiangnan, Bozhong Li devotes an
entire chapter, called ‘The externalisation of agriculture’, to the importance for
the economy of that region of imports of grain and bean-cake from other parts of
China.907 When discussing the economy of the Pearl River Delta, Robert Marks
comments: “… the system as a whole was not sustainable without greater and
greater inputs from outside.”908 If we are to believe the figures presented in the
publications of these Californians, China’s heartland in fact was more dependent
on its ‘internal periphery’ than Britain was on its overseas periphery, in any case
for the period we are discussing here. What does that tell us? We will discus the
exact extent to which China used its ghost acreages and its ‘own’ internal’ re-
sources later on.909
904 William H. Phillips, ‘Cotton Gin’, EH.Net Encyclopaedia table 2.
905 Pomeranz, Great Divergence, 334 – 338.
906 Pomeranz, Great Divergence, 226. See also his ‘Beyond the East-West binary’, 583 – 584.
907 Bozhong Li, Agricultural development in Jiangnan, chapter six.
908 Marks, ‘Commercialization without capitalism, 76.
909 See pages 344-350.
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17. Innovation provides the key rather than accumulation or
ghost acreage
My main critique, however, of the ghost acreage approach when it comes to
importing land-intensive products as raw materials for manufacturing, is of a
more fundamental nature. In my view, that import is an effect of industrialisation
rather than its precondition. I severely doubt the causal connection that Pom-
eranz makes. As Jack Goldstone says,
It is true, of course, that by 1800 cotton grown in the New World was a major input into
the British cotton industry, one of the vanguards of British industrialization. However,
it was not raw cotton that made the industry but innovations in British machinery and
the harnessing of waterpower and steam power that made it worthwhile for Britain to
import cotton, spin it, and weave it into fabrics. If not for that machinery, it would have
made no sense to import raw cotton to England, as the cost of the finished product
would have been far greater than that of cotton textiles produced by raw cotton-
producing countries such as India and China. The new British machinery made it
profitable to import raw cotton, whether from India, Egypt, Turkey or the Americas.910
What goes for cotton mutatis mutandis of course also goes for other land-
intensive products Britain imported. Jan de Vries thinks likewise and claims that
(a) Britain never imported much raw cotton from its colonies and (b) that the
rise of cotton production in the United States was induced by Britain’s industry.
He moreover adds, quite correctly, that Britain had access there to cotton on the
same terms as any other country.911 So why, then, did other countries not profit
from that capability and start a cotton-revolution of their own? In Mokyr’s view,
the increased import of raw cotton was undoubtedly “an effect, not a cause, of the
developments in cotton technology”.912 Improvements in that technology were
impressive. Raw cotton prices from 1784 to 1830 fell from 2 shillings to 0.645
pence, while the price of cotton yarn over the same period fell from 10.9 to 1.2
shillings. The trend in raw cotton prices accounted for just fourteen per cent of
the fall in the price of cotton yarn.913 Whereas, according to Robert Allen, the real
costs of raw cotton remained almost identical over the entire period from 1760 to
1836, the real price of spinning one pound of cotton thread declined from seven
pennies to 0.34 pennies.914 The price of cotton textiles declined so much that only
the enormous increase in demand, also stimulated by lower tariffs and transport
costs, prevented the cotton revolution from being aborted. Strikingly enough, we
910 Goldstone, Why Europe, 67.
911 De Vries, ‘The Great Divergence after ten years: justly celebrated yet hard to believe’, 15.
912 Mokyr, Enlightened economy, 150.
913 This is an almost literal quote from Eltis and Engerman, ‘Importance of slavery and the
slave trade’, 136, note 42.
914 Allen, British Industrial Revolution, 185, 188 and 208.
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never hear any complaints about the structurally deteriorating terms of trade of
Britain’s exports at the time: that is because those exports consisted of manu-
factured goods with a quite elastic demand. For the rest of the nineteenth cen-
tury from 1819 onwards, the value of cotton textiles exports as a percentage of
the value of the final product always hovered between no less than fifty and
eighty per cent.915
As a rule, innovation created its own markets. It cheapened goods and con-
sumption (domestic and foreign) grew in response. Indeed, as Mokyr writes:
“…ingenuity and innovativeness … drove exports and trade, not the other way
around.”916 The terms of trade of Britain’s exports, which almost entirely con-
sisted in manufactured goods, fell, i. e. they became relatively cheaper as com-
pared to Britain’s imports that increasingly consisted in food, raw materials and
semi-manufactured products. In that way, industry led and trade followed, or to
put it more poetically : “Trade functioned as the handmaiden of industry.”917
Britain, from quite early on, had a major comparative advantage in manu-
facturing. At least from the 1780s, manufactured goods overwhelmingly domi-
nated exports.918 It was simply good economic sense to import an increasing
amount of food and raw materials and focus on what the country did best.
Britain did what all advanced economies tend to do: specialise in producing
products with high added value and import the ingredients one needs to produce
them. Of course, what we are referring to is a matter of interdependency not of
‘billiard-ball’ causality, but to suggest as Pomeranz and many others do that
Britain was heading for serious Malthusian trouble and could only escape – and
in the end industrialise – thanks to imports of raw materials and food definitely
is getting the main causality wrong. Agricultural production increased sub-
stantially during the country’s take-off.
British agriculture was one of the most productive agricultures in the world in
terms of labour productivity.919 But the gap between the rest of world and Britain
in terms of productivity was even wider in manufacturing. Therefore, special-
ising in manufacturing and importing food and raw materials was the logical
thing to do, a fact of which David Ricardo was already aware:
915 For cotton goods’ exports as compared to cotton goods’ production during the eighteenth
century see Blackburn, Making of New World slavery, 522. For the nineteenth century, see
Deane and Cole, British economic growth 1688 – 1959, 187.
916 Mokyr, Enlightened economy, 165. See also ibidem, 258: “Ingenuity, not accumulation,
drove economic growth in this period.” (i. e. 1760 – 1860, PV)
917 See for this interpretation Harley, ‘Trade, discovery, mercantilism and technology’; Thomas
and McCloskey, ‘Overseas trade and empire, 1700 – 1860’, and McCloskey, Bourgeois di-
gnity, e. g. chapters 23, 24, and 25.
918 Mokyr, Enlightened economy, 167 – 168.
919 See, for example, Clark, ‘Labour productivity in English agriculture’.
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… a country possessing very considerable advantages in machinery and skill, and
which may therefore be enabled to manufacture commodities with much less labour
than her neighbours, may, in return for such commodities, import a portion of the corn
required for its consumption, even if its land were more fertile, and corn could be
grown with less labour than in the country from which it was imported.920
For Europe as a whole, the suggestion that it was saved by ghost acreage in other
parts of the world and able to industrialise thanks to its imports of land-intensive
goods is even less convincing. Its total production of cereals tripled over the
period of 1815 – 1913, whereas population only doubled.921 Germany, which was
to become its new industrialising giant, exported grains for most of the nine-
teenth century, whereas in the run-up to the First World War, it imported just
under half of its iron ore, mostly from Sweden and France. Besides, imports from
outside Europe need not necessarily indicate shortages in Europe. By the first
quarter of the nineteenth century, the British government imposed duties of
approximately 100 per cent on all foreign timber while colonial timber was
accepted at nominal rates. The prices of timber from the Baltic and Scandinavia
were artificially raised to such an extent that in every year from 1816 to 1846,
Canadian timber accounted for at least sixty per cent and in most years for over
seventy-five per cent of all un-sawn timber imports into Britain despite the far
longer distance in shipping required to transport timber from Upper and Lower
Canada than from Scandinavia or the Baltic states.922
Moreover, in that context, one must strongly qualify the relative importance
of ghost acreage that is so central in Pomeranz’s argumentation, firstly, as re-
gards the explicit distinction made by Pomeranz between productivity-en-
hancing changes and ghost acreage. That does not strike me as very helpful:
most of Britain’s ghost acreage was just land that might be used. It only could be
and was effectively used thanks to those technical and organisational changes –
and the rise of total incomes – that are at very the heart of the process we call
industrialisation. In brief, there would have hardly been any ghost acreage if it
were not for productivity-enhancing changes. It was not so much ghost acreage
that generated modern economic growth but rather the other way around, with
ghost acreage being a necessary condition at best but never a sufficient one. This
thesis needs some further elaboration. We will again provide it via the case of
Great Britain and in response to Pomeranz’s comments.
Obviously, a country that wants to specialise in the production of manufac-
tured goods and services, as a rule, will (have to) import food and raw materials.
That, however, is not a free lunch: those imports have to be paid for. Britain, like
920 Ricardo, On the principles of political economy, and taxation, 154.
921 Hugill, World trade since 1431, 74 – 75.
922 Potter, ‘British timber duties, 1815 – 60’.
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all industrial nations in the West, did so by exporting manufactured goods. Not
just to its peripheries but all over the globe. It could do so because its manu-
facturing was efficient and its products became ever cheaper, that is because it
had a modern industrialising economy. What is more, it was the countries in the
West themselves that financed most of the production of the goods they im-
ported from ‘their’ ghost acreage as well as most of their transportation.923 Very
often, that production and in particular that transportation could only be un-
dertaken in a cost-effective manner because modern Western technology was
used. On top of that, those Western countries, to a very large extent, also often
provided the manpower. As long as slaves were traded they did so by buying
them and transporting them to the places where they were needed. When this
was no longer an option, they did so directly via their subjects who migrated to
their so-called settler colonies.924 In the case of Britain, to focus on that country
once again, some of its colonies, first and foremost of course India, were sup-
posed to pay for their own defence and administration. Others, e. g. the white
settler colonies, certainly did not.925 In brief, the active role and involvement of
Western Europe in what Cain and Hopkins describe as “calling the New World
into existence” i. e. ‘opening’ peripheral regions to then turn them into actual
export regions, were enormous.926 The following figures apply to Great Britain:




1875 – 1884 90
1900 – 1904 130
1905 – 1909 145
1910 – 1914 175
Source: Lance E. Davis, and Robert A. Huttenback, with the as-
sistance of Susan Gray Davis, Mammon and the Pursuit of Em-
pire, 1860 – 1912, (Cambridge 1986) 37.
923 For the enormous amounts of money Britain invested overseas during the long nineteenth
century, see Davis and Huttenback, Mammon and the pursuit of empire ; O’Rourke and
Williamson, Globalization and history, chapter 12, and Cain and Hopkins, British impe-
rialism, 1688 – 2000.
924 For European migration to European overseas settler colonies, see Chiswick and Hatton,
‘International migration and the integration of labor markets’.
925 See, e. g. Davis and Huttenback, Mammon and the pursuit of empire, chapter 5. On page 146
they refer to Sir Charles Adderley, an active critic of empire building, who, in 1860, asserted
that Great Britain contributed four million pounds sterling to the maintenance of their
security, while those colonies contributed less than £40,000.
926 Cain and Hopkins, British imperialism, Part Three. Cain and Hopkins use that expression in
chapter nine only in reference to South America, but I think its applicability is broader.
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To get an idea of orders of magnitude, I compare capital exports to Great Brit-
ain’s national income:









Source: Peter Mathias, The first industrial nation. An economic
history of Britain 1700 – 1914 (London 1969) 457.
In 1914, total British overseas investments amounted to some 20 billion dollars,
which is somewhat over four billion pounds sterling, as compared to a GDP of
some 2.5 billion pounds sterling. Investments were spread over the globe as
follows (in millions of dollars at almost five dollars to the pound):







half of it to India
Africa 2,450
Source: William Woodruff, The impact of Western man. A study
of Europe’s role in the world economy, 1750 – 1960 (New York
1967) 154 and 156.
Half of total overseas investment went to countries that were part of the British
Empire, and of that half three-quarters went to dominions. As the reader can see,
total foreign investment in 1914 of some 4,000 million ponds sterling was sub-
stantially higher than national income. The bulk of it was in railroads, harbours,
telephone and telegraph lines and the like.927 To get a realistic idea of total cost of
the supposed ‘windfall’ of “happening to have” colonies and ghost acreage one of
course would have to add the billions of pounds sterling that Britain spent from
927 For further information see Cain and Hopkins, British imperialism, Part Three; Davis and
Huttenback, Mammon and the pursuit of empire, and Williamson and O’Rourke, Global-
ization and history, chapter 11.
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the beginning of colonisation onwards to be able to conquer its colonies, to
prevent other European imperialist countries from conquering them and to keep
and where possible improve its position in the European states system. The
number of people leaving the British Isles, in particular for the United States –
who can also be regarded as a kind of overseas ‘investment’ – and a way to get rid
of surplus population – was enormous. For the period between 1815 and 1914, it
is estimated at 22.6 million, far more of course than ever before.928 As James
Belich shows in his fascinating Replenishing the earth, the period between
American Independence and the Second World War witnessed the emergence of
a real ‘Anglo-World’.929 The numbers involved in intercontinental migration
from Europe as a whole took on an entirely new dimension as compared to the
centuries before.
Graph 9: European migration to other continents
Source: Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen, ‘The mobility transition revisited, 1500 – 1900:
what the European case can offer to global history’, Journal of Global History 4, 3 (2009)
347 – 378, page 356.
Whereas costs of formal and informal empire building are not mentioned at all or
just in passing by Pomeranz and all those who endorse his thesis, its benefits in
terms of providing cheap, land-intensive resources are exaggerated. In his
publications Pomeranz systematically suggests and sometimes quite explicitly
claims that Britain could profit so much from available ghost acreage because
that ghost acreage was in countries over which it had political leverage –
therefore the frequent use of the term ‘non-consensual’ trade – and where it
could organise the economy as it saw fit.930 Actually, that is not true for many
countries that provided Britain with land–intensive raw materials and food. Just
think of the United States, an extremely important trade partner for Britain,
928 Harper, ‘British migration and the peopling of the empire’, 75.
929 Belich, Replenishing the earth.
930 See e. g. Pomeranz, Great Divergence, 7, 13, 24 – 25, 185 – 186, 188, 212 – 213, 264 – 265, 273,
296 – 297, for references to British or European coercion, exploitation and ‘non-consensual’
trade when it comes to relations with the periphery.
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destination of large amounts of British capital and of large numbers of British
migrants and Britain’s main provider of cotton during its take-off. From 1776,
they were independent. It only is true to some extent for the white settlement
colonies with ‘responsible government’ that played a similar role for Britain’s
economy but where the actual power of the mother country was quite minimal. It
is not at all true for countries in Central and Eastern Europe that exported food
and raw materials to Britain. The position of Ireland, in many respects a real
periphery, was a very specific one. Most of the regions where the British bought
their land-intensive raw materials and food in principle sold those on exactly the
same condition to other (potential) purchasers. Overall, the role of the market in
Britain’s economic exchanges with other parts of the world during the nine-
teenth century was greater and that of coercion smaller than Pomeranz suggests.
This is relevant because, of course, other countries, in principle, could also have
bought the produce of any ‘free’ region just referred to. Why did not others ‘use’
ghost acreage? Why exactly would one single out Britain as the country to profit so
much from ghost acreage that it became the first industrial nation when other
countries also had colonies or in any case could buy goods on the world market?
What to think of internal, i. e. domestic ‘ghost acreage’ or unused resources in
one’s own country : why would that not be even more of a windfall? What to think
of, for that matter, Russia, which, with Siberia, had a staggering amount of ghost
acreage in its own realm? Why would not having certain raw materials at home be
such a lucky draw as compared to having them? Is not the following claim by
Morris, who fully endorses Pomeranz’s ideas and takes them to their logical
extreme, actually nonsensical? Morris writes: “Geography made cotton the perfect
industry for Britain. Because its raw materials grew overseas, they did not compete
for land at home.”931 Would this not make silk the ideal industry for the Nether-
lands, wool for China and let us say hemp for the Sahara regions?
18. Innovation: technology and science
No one would deny that trade can have all sorts of positive effects for growth and
that growth without an extension of the market will fairly quickly come to a halt,
but in whatever form imaginable, it can not have been the motor of modern
growth as the West has known it for so many decades. Modern economic growth
did not emerge as a consequence of a simple piling up of resources, whether land,
labour or capital. Nor was it a simple consequence of a process of ever increasing
specialisation on ever growing markets. Whatever their impact, the accumu-
lation and division of labour were not the core and motor of the kind of growth
931 Morris, Why the West rules, 497.
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that started with industrialisation, although they clearly were important. In-
vestment and investment rates did increase substantially as did specialisation.
Production, however, increased far more than aggregated investment and spe-
cialisation as such would predict. The main reason for that is innovation, a catch-
all phrase that is used in particular for changes in the characteristics of the
means of production and the way in which they are combined. The innovations
that tend to catch the eye have always been ‘technological’ and the bulk of
scholars dealing with industrialisation – and with the Great Divergence – would
still agree that what in the end made the difference was technology. I already
referred to Jack Goldstone.932 In his recent book dealing with the subject, Robert
Allen wrote: “Technology was the motor of the Industrial Revolution”933 His
namesake Douglas Allen holds the same view.934 Joel Mokyr is even more ex-
plicit : “The best definition of the Industrial Revolution is the set of events that
placed technology in the position of the main engine of economic change.”935 For
Stephan Epstein industrialisation was first and foremost “a technological rev-
olution”, a view that is endorsed by Prasannan Parthasarathi.936 Fernand Braudel
– and Immanuel Wallerstein, who seems to fully endorse this claim – in this
respect now sounds somewhat exceptional “If there is one factor which has lost
ground as a key explanation of the industrial revolution, it is technology.”937
Californians and other revisionists of course cannot deny the enormous
importance of technology for the Great Divergence, although, as we saw, Pom-
eranz would not consider it to be more relevant than ghost acreage. But they all,
in this specific context including Jack Goldstone, refuse to attribute the tech-
nological breakthroughs that occurred in the West to a longstanding and broad
Western advantage. Their ‘surprising resemblances-claim’ also extends to the
fields of technology and science. In their view, the traditional dichotomy of a
dynamic and advancing West versus a static and backward Rest in this context
too is no longer acceptable. Eastern technology and science, in particular those
of China, are being rehabilitated, in as far as that was still needed. The work of
Joseph Needham, who has done more than anyone else to show how advanced
China’s science and technology have long been, is not that recent!938 We find this
932 See page 299.
933 Allen, Global economic history, 27.
934 Allen, Institutional revolution, chapter 9, ‘Conclusion’.
935 Mokyr, Enlightened economy, 5.
936 Epstein, Freedom and growth, 172 – 173. For Parthasarathi’s endorsement see his, Why
Europe grew rich, 85.
937 Braudel, Civilization and capitalism, 15th – 18th century, III, 566. See for Wallerstein’s po-
sition pages 363 – 364.
938 See the multi-volume Science and civilisation in China series edited by Joseph Needham. I
refer the interested reader with less time to Needham and Ronan, The shorter science and
civilisation in China and for a quick synthesis to Temple, Genius of China. Brief in-
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rehabilitation in the work of all Californians, most outspoken in that of John
Hobson who revels in pointing at Europe’s backwardness and at the Eastern
origins of Western civilisation, including much of the science and technology
needed for the Industrial Revolution.939 Quite recently, but in a much more
nuanced way, Prasannan Parthasarathi set out to present a similar rehabilitation
for India’s science and technology.940 Some revisionism was still overdue and no
one can object to that. But on the other hand, of course, no one, not even the most
revisionist Californians, can deny the enormous impact of the specific in-
ventions and innovations we associate with the Industrial Revolution, in par-
ticular the steam engine. And they don’t. What they, as indicated, do deny is that
those inventions and innovations would indicate a fundamental exceptionality
of Western societies and economies. They use various strategies, often in
combination with each other, to present their point of view. One is to turn all
those innovations into something fairly contingent, strokes of good luck that do
not require detailed analysis, which they accordingly never receive, except in
Jack Goldstone’s work. They might just as well have occurred someplace else.
Some Californians would claim that they fairly often actually did. Another
strategy is to suggest that Western inventions and innovations were solutions to
problems that were absent in other parts of the world. Those who adhere to this
strategy regard technology and science as responses to challenges and then
claim that different challenges get different responses. But whatever exact
strategy they follow, it is striking how little autonomy most Californians – but
also scholars like Morris and Parthasarathi – who regard them as nothing more
than responses to certain economic or political challenges – give to science and
technology and to what extent those scholars try to create the impression that
inventions and innovations were fairly disconnected and ad hoc and not part of a
broad and long-term development, which they in my view certainly were. In this
respect, again in my view, revisionism has clearly gone too far. Any serious
analysis of recent histories of global technological development would show
that, notwithstanding a lot of ‘contingencies’ and even more interconnections,
there clearly are distinct technological trajectories and path-dependencies in
distinct parts of the world.941
troductions to the ideas of Needham can be found in his Grand titration and Clerks and
craftsmen in China and the West and in Finlay, ‘China, the West, and world history’. The
many studies by Mark Elvin are obligatory reading. See for example his Pattern of the
Chinese past and Another history.
939 Hobson, Eastern origins of Western civilisation, e. g. chapter 9.
940 See e. g. Parthasarathi, Why Europe grew rich, Part Three.
941 I confine myself to just a small selection of literature that I found helpful: Adas, Machines as
the measure of men ; Friedel, A culture of improvement ; Headrick, When information came
of age ; idem, Power over peoples ; Lipsey,. Carlaw and Bekar, Economic transformations ;
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The challenge for those historians who want to refute Eurocentrism in this
respect would be to produce a list of technological innovations for other parts of
the globe during a similar period of time that would beat this one. They will not
manage to do so.
Table 48: A list of inventions that were directly relevant to production and led to in-
novations in Western Europe and the USA
Inventions in power
1700s Atmospheric steam engine
1740 Leyden jar
1752 Lightning conductor and experiments with electricity
1765 – 1769 Improved steam pumping with separate condenser and later use of cutoff
1774 Accurately bored cast-iron cylinders for steam engines
1774 Large cylinders developed
1781 Compound steam engine
1781 – 1786 Rotative motion
1800 Voltaic pile
1800 Compound steam engine
1804 Compound steam engine
1815 Compound steam engine patented
1820 – 1880s Electric generator and motor
1820 Magnetic field discovered
1827 High-pressure steam boilers
1827 Hydraulic (creation) turbine water wheel
1831 Electromagnetic induction
1840s Advances in hydraulic turbines
Inventions in metallurgy and machine tools
1709 Coke-smelting
1720 Cementation process of making steel
1740 Crucible or cast steel
1740 Cast-iron rolling process
1750 Carbon content of iron ore discovered
1750 Screw drive on lathe
1761 Air cylinders
1770 Screw-cutting lathe
1774 Satisfactory cast-iron cylinders for steam engine
1776 – 1780 Application of steam power to forging; first forge hammer
1783 – 1784 Improvements in puddling and rolling
1829 Hot blast furnace
1831 Hot blast furnace
1833 Iron smelting with anthracite
1833 A process for silver extraction
1838 – 1841 Steam drop-hammer
McClellan III and Dorn, Science and technology in world history ; Mokyr, Lever of riches, and
Pacey, Technology in world civilization.
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Inventions in industrial chemicals
1736 New process of sulfuric-acid manufacture
1746 Lead-chamber process for production of sulfuric acid
1774 Discovery of chlorine
1785 Discovery of chlorine bleaching properties




early 1700s Development of drainage in mines
1800 High-pressure non-condensing steam engine
early 1800s Crystallography
early 1800s Chemistry in relation to mineralogy






1819 – 1821 Clarification of mineral species
1820s Polarization of light
1830s Ventilation
1840s Introduction of rotary, hydraulic, water-flush system of drilling
Inventions in transportation and communication
1738 Iron rails substituted for wood
1764 Three-layer system of road making introduced
1769 Cugnot’s steam road carriage
1787 The Severn, barge with cast-iron plates
1790 Semaphore arms used for communication
1795 Multiple wire system for communication
1801 Trevithick’s steam road carriage
1803 Trevithick’s steam locomotive
1807 Steamship Clermont on the Hudson
1820s McAdam develops his principles of road-making
1825 Stephenson’s locomotive initiates rail age
1831 Gurney’s steam carriage
1836 Single-wire system of communication








1785 – 1787 Power loom
1801 – 1802 Jacquard loom
1809 Bobbin-net machine
1813 Machine made patterned lace
1822 Robert’s power loom
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1825 – 1830 Self-acting mule
1826 Goulding condenser
1826 – 1829 Ring spindle
1836 Crompton’s ‘fancy loom’.
Inventions in agriculture
1701 Seed drill
1750 – 1800 Selective animal breeding
1782 Seed drill
1784/ 1786 Threshing machine
1793 – 1794 Cotton gin
1797 First cast-iron plough
1800 Hay tedder
1800s Bone-dust fertilizer





Introduction and improvement of chilled-iron and chilled-steel walking
plows
1831 Mowing machine
1831 – 1833 Reaper with first successful cutting bar
1832 Flax-heckling machine
1840 Roller milling of grain
Source: Elias H. Tuma, European economic history. Tenth century to the present. Theory
and history of economic change (New York 1971) 229 – 237.
Attention is always focused on macro-inventions, i. e. big theoretical ‘break-
throughs’, which are then connected to completely new technologies. Actually,
however, technological development in practice resembles a fairly continuous
process of incremental refinements and improvements that is characterised by
flows far more than a process characterised by punctual breaks. In practice, for
economic history, it does not make much sense to talk about the invention of the
principle of the steam engine that would then have led to the introduction of the
actual machine. Existing machines were permanently changed and improved.
The efficiency of steam engines, for example, increased very substantially over
time. They not only needed far less energy to generate the same amount of
effective power, but also much less surface and cubic capacity.942 Real costs of
using steam power decreased sharply. According to Robert Allen, the real costs
of rotary power in Britain in the mid-1840’s was about one third of what it had
been in the early eighteenth century while the real costs of pumping power had
dropped by about half over that period.943
The (far from complete) list of innovations shown above covers such a broad
range of fields and is so long that the idea that the West simply ‘stumbled’ on some
942 Wagenbreth, Düntzsch and Gieseler, Geschichte der Dampfmaschine, 94.
943 Allen, British Industrial Revolution, 173.
Part two: Actual explanations of the Great Divergence310
innovations is indefensible. What is relevant for the topic at hand is that the
Western lead emerged and developed in particular in sectors that had most po-
tential for increasing productivity like energy, capital goods (iron, later on steel and
building materials) and weaponry. I am certainly not claiming the existence of an
overall and clear Western lead. Compared with China, for example, Britain’s ag-
riculture produced much less per acre of land. China was rightly famous for its
porcelain and silk production. In various respects its economy was much less
wasteful. Indian textiles and steel – to refer to a country that probably had, in many
respects, an even more impressive manufacturing tradition – were second to none
for a long time. But it is hard to imagine how – in any case during Qing rule –
China’s ‘strengths’ when it comes to production methods and products could have
triggered a take-off into modern economic growth. China simply was not on a
trajectory of increasing returns and synergy. Being increasingly more efficient, or
less wasteful in what you are doing, does not bring you sustained growth. For
Britain, suggesting an overall lead would clearly be a mistake, but it would also – or
even more – be a mistake to suggest its leap forward was only a matter of coal and
cotton. There is definitely more to its eighteenth-century wave of gadgets than just
‘contingency’ or ‘luck’ or simple responses to existing challenges. What we see are
many innovations on a row and over a broad front, an accumulation of new
knowledge in a quickening pace and quite concentrated in time and place.944
Table 49: Innovations in science and technology in China, tenth to nineteenth centuries
Century Number of Innovations
900 – 1000 29
1000 – 1100 38
1100 – 1200 27
1200 – 1300 34
1300 – 1400 37
1400 – 1500 18
1500 – 1600 36
1600 – 1700 43
1700 – 1800 7
1800 – 1900 2
Source: Jack Goldstone, – Why Europe? The rise of the West in world history, 1500 – 1800
(New York 2008) 122.
As it was primarily technological breakthroughs that triggered higher pro-
ductivity, people were required who invented, made, maintained and repaired all
sorts of tools, implements and machines. Europe had many of them and Britain
944 See, for example, Weightman, What the industrial revolution did for us and idem, Industrial
revolutionaries.
Innovation: technology and science 311
most, more than any other European let alone non-European country. The
country had a surprisingly high number of innovative entrepreneurs and en-
gineers and highly skilled mechanics. The thesis that north-western Europe and
first and foremost Britain would have been characterised by a unique techno-
logical and scientific culture, a thesis currently associated in particular with Jack
Goldstone, Margaret Jacob and Joel Mokyr, and also, be it with different em-
phases – in particular on the demand for certain skills and values – with Robert
Allen, in my view has not been refuted.945 Great Britain indeed had an ‘en-
lightened economy’ with an approach characterised by a very pragmatic com-
bination of theory and practice, and often fairly close connections between
scholars, engineers, mechanics, and entrepreneurs. James Watt cooperated with
Matthew Boulton (1728 – 1809), an entrepreneur, and with John Wilkinson
(1728 – 1808), an instrument maker and industrialist, and long worked for
Glasgow University. Several parts of Great Britain indeed had, as Dudley puts it,
dense “networks of innovation”.946 The country had the right institutional set-
ting for productive innovation. I would still defend the thesis that Western
Europe and in particular Great Britain in this respect were unique and that their
unique trajectory of economic growth from the eighteenth century onwards can
to a substantial degree be explained with reference to this unique culture of
cultivating what nowadays is called useful and reliable knowledge.947
In our current high-tech economy, the link between technology and science
seems quite direct and the importance of research and development is constantly
emphasised.948 When it comes to the role of science in the first stages of in-
945 See e. g. Goldstone, ‘Efflorescences and economic growth’, 353 – 389, and idem, Why Europe,
chapter 8 and ‘Conclusion’; Jacob, Scientific culture and the making of the industrial West ;
Jacob and Stewart, Practical matter and of course Mokyr, Lever of riches; Gifts of Athena and
in particular Enlightened economy. For the specific position of Robert Allen see his British
Industrial Revolution in global perspective chapter 10, where, on page 269, he claims, “The
cultural changes between 1400 and 1800 were immense and in the direction of promoting
invention.” See for the claim that basically the situation in eighteenth-century India was not
fundamentally different in this respect, Parthasarathi, Why Europe grew rich, in particular
chapter 7.
946 Dudley, Mothers of innovation.
947 See all the scholars and publications referred to in note 945. In this regard, I hope and expect
that the outcomes of a major comparative research project at the Department of Economic
History of the London School of Economics and Political Science, known as Useful and
Reliable Knowledge in Global Histories of Material Progress in the East and the West
(URKEW), will confirm my expectations. For some clarification, see the article by Patrick
O’Brien, ‘The Needham question updated – A historiographical survey and elaboration’, on
the website of the project at LSE. See also his ‘Historical foundations’.
948 The question of how important science actually was for economic growth during Britain’s
first industrial revolution and for modern economic growth in general remains highly
contested. I endorse the position taken by Joel Mokyr. See e. g. his Enlightened economy. For
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dustrialisation: that may not have been as big as has often been claimed. There
was a lot of tinkering, of simple trial and error, and of practical experimentation,
but science and especially scientific thinking definitely were not irrelevant, as to
my great surprise even Deirdre McCloskey seems to think.949 They were essential
for several inventions during Britain’s take-off, first of all the most important
one, the steam engine, but they mattered also in other sectors, for example the
production of ceramics, and they clearly became increasingly important over
time in preventing innovation from simply drying up.950 Douglass North’s claim
that “Learning by doing can explain the technology developed during the in-
dustrial revolution” simply is not true.951 Many anti-Eurocentrists will not be
amused by the following claim by Niall Ferguson: “Those who decry ‘Euro-
centrism’ as if it were some distasteful prejudice have a problem: the Scientific
Revolution was, by any scientific measure, wholly Eurocentric.”952 Of course, that
revolution had many non-European ingredients. It did not come entirely ex
nihilo and definitely was not completely European. Many scientific break-
throughs – and the same goes for technological breakthroughs, perhaps even
more so953 – that in the end occurred in Europe would have been unthinkable
without borrowing, imitating, applying, or improving upon theories and prac-
tices from elsewhere. But that of course does not change the fact that they in their
momentous fateful combination occurred in Europe. In my view there simply is
no denying that modern science in the end emerged and ‘took off ’ in the West.954
Let me again present a list of data as a challenge to anyone who would want to
make the – I think futile – effort to show it was otherwise.
a very relativising view, in which technology begets science instead of the other way around,
see e. g. chapter 8 of Ridley, Rational optimist.
949 See for her claim: “The cause was not science”, Bourgeois dignity, chapter 38 with that title.
This is about the only place where I disagree with the content of this otherwise brilliant
book.
950 For the essential and indispensable role of science in the invention of the steam engine, see
Cohen, ‘The rise of modern science as a fundamental pre-condition for the Industrial
Revolution’. Robert Allen apparently agrees as he describes steam power as a “spin-off of
the Scientific Revolution.” See Allen, Global economic history, 35.
951 North, Structure and change in economic history, 162.
952 Ferguson, Civilization, 67.
953 Let me, as one example amongst several, just refer to the enormous importance of Asia, in
particular India, for the development of Britain’s cotton manufacturing technology. See for
an excellent overview see Riello, Cotton.
954 For a comparative analysis of the origins of modern science in Europe, see Cohen, How
modern science came into the world plus, from a different angle and with a different per-
spective, Huff, The rise of early modern science and idem, Intellectual curiosity and the
Scientific Revolution. See also Goldstone’s Why Europe and his forthcoming A peculiar
path: The rise of the West in global context, 1500 – 1850.
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Table 50: The most important scientific breakthroughs of the period 1530 – 1789 in
Western Europe
1530 Paracelsus pioneers the application of chemistry to physiology and pathology
1543 Nicolas Copernicus’ De revolutionibus orbium coelestium states the heliocentric
theory of the solar system
1543 Andreas Vesalius’ De humani corporis fabrica supplants Galen’s anatomical
textbook
1546 Agricola’s De natura fossilium classifies minerals and introduces the terms ‘fossil’.
1572 Tycho Brahe records the first European observation of a supernova
1589 Galileo’s tests of falling bodies (published in De Motu) revolutionize the
experimental method
1600 William Gilbert’s De magnete, magnetisque corporibus describes the magnetic
properties of the earth and electricity
1604 Galileo discovers that a free-falling body increases its distance as the square of time
1608 Hans Lippershey and Zacharias Jansen independently invent the telescope
1609 Galileo conducts the first telescopic observation at night sky
1610 Galileo discovers four of Jupiter’s moon sand infers that the earth is not at the
centre of the universe
1614 John Napier’s Mirifici logarithmorum canonis descriptio introduces logarithms
1628 William Harvey writes Exercitatio anatomica de motu cordis et sanguinis in
animalibus, accurately describing the circulation of blood
1637 Ren¦ Descartes ‘La G¦ometrie, an appendix to his Discours de la m¦thode founds
analytic geometry
1638 Galileo’s Discorsi e dimonstrazioni mathematiche founds modern mechanics
1640 Pierre de Fermat founds number theory
1654 Fermat and Blaise Pascal found probability theory
1662 Robert Boyle’s Skeptical Chymist defines elements and chemical analysis
1662 Boyle states Boyle’s law that the volume occupied by a fixed mass of gas in a
container is inversely proportional to the pressure it exerts
1669 Isaac Newton’s De analysi per aequationes numero terminorum infinitas presents
the first systematic account of the calculus, independently developed by Gottfried
Leibniz
1678 Antoni van Leeuwenhoek discovers micro-organisms
1687 Newton’s Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica states the law of universal
gravitation and the laws of motion
1735 Carolus Linnaeus’ Systema naturae introduces systematic classification of genera
and species of organisms
1738 Daniel Bernoulli’s Hydrodynamica states Bernoulli’s Principle and founds the
mathematical study of fluid flow and the kinetic theory of gases
1746 Jan-Etienne Guettard prepares the first true geological maps
1755 Joseph Black identifies carbon dioxide
1775 Antoine Lavoisier accurately describes combustion
1785 James Hutton’s ‘Concerning the system of the Earth’ states the uniformitarian view
of the earth’s development
1789 Lavoisier’s Traite ¦l¦mentaire de chimie states the law of conservation of matter
Source: Niall Ferguson, Civilization. The West and the Rest (London 2011) 65 – 66.
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The emergence of modern science and sustained technological development is
an enormously complex phenomenon that cannot be extensively analysed and
discussed here. I will simply present a very simplified synthesis, almost literally
paraphrasing Jack Goldstone955, trying to describe what happened. Why it
happened would be yet another major question that, however, cannot be dealt
with here and for which I refer to the literature mentioned in the notes. Ac-
cording to Goldstone, during the early modern period, tradition and religion
were increasingly questioned in Western Europe, whereas, on the other hand, an
approach to knowledge gained ground that combined experiment and mathe-
matical reasoning. A ‘Baconian’956, methodical style of dealing with problems
began to prevail, in particular in Great Britain, combining observation, expe-
rience, experiment and rules of proof with a fundamental role for ‘instruments’
as means to measure and test. In Britain – and that is country we are focusing on
– in particular after the Glorious Revolution a climate of conformity and state-
imposed orthodoxy was substituted with one of tolerance and pluralism in
which even the official Anglican Church did not oppose science. Finally, and this
again applies in particular to eighteenth-century Britain, there was a great deal of
support for entrepreneurship in a context of close social relations between sci-
entists, entrepreneurs, engineers, and craftsmen. The fact that by the eighteenth
century there were almost 150 universities in Europe – even if they often were not
exactly at the cutting edge of science! – and that there was ample public debate
on a wide variety of topics must also have had its effects.957 Government in
Britain clearly was supportive, directly and indirectly, of innovation, also a
consumer of science itself and, what in all probability was even more important:
it in any case did not function as a brake.958 The contrast here with China over the
long eighteenth century becomes striking: there the government was often quite
active in spreading existing best practices but not exactly on the lookout itself for
major innovations nor actively promoting that its subjects would be.
19. A seriously underestimated factor: enhanced productivity
because of institutional and organisational innovation
In discussions of the Great Divergence and in particular the Industrial Revo-
lution, attention tends to be focused on technological innovations. It would be
955 Goldstone, Why Europe, 167 – 170.
956 After the philosopher Francis Bacon (1561 – 1626) the propagator of empirical inductive
methods in science.
957 Huff, Intellectual curiosity and the Scientific Revolution, ‘Epilogue’.
958 See for example Caton, Politics of progress and Spadafora, Idea of progress in eighteenth-
century Britain.
A seriously underestimated factor 315
absurd to deny their fundamental importance but in my view, more systematic
research into the productivity-enhancing effects of all sorts of managerial in-
novations, i. e. all those innovations in the way which production in the widest
sense of the word was organised, would be very welcome. Developed societies are
replete with managers of all sorts receiving at times incredibly high salaries
because they are supposed to make production more efficient and profitable.
Their focus on rationalisation undoubtedly often indeed has this effect. This
aspect of innovation to my view would need far more attention in analyses of the
Great Divergence. Not just in the context of private industrial production as, for
the first industrial revolution, has been described by Sidney Pollard, but also in
the context of agriculture and services.959 The role of services in modern eco-
nomic development continues to be under-estimated, which, considering their
obvious overwhelming importance is striking. Increases in productivity there
often depend to a large extent on changes in the way work is organised. The same
applies to government, whose share of GDP has structurally tended to increase
and whose importance to the overall economy also can hardly be over-estimated.
Admittedly, studying institutions and organisation has become very fashionable
in economic history, but the focus mostly is on what some institutions and
organisations are supposed to mean for the ‘real’ economy, how e. g. they enable
a lowering of transactions cost rather than on how efficient and productive in
economic terms the institutionalisation and organisation of certain behaviour
itself is. To be more concrete: we need studies of how banks or insurances might
lower transactions cost or how educational institutes increase human capital but
also how economically efficient and profitable they themselves are and how they
directly increase income.
There is more to industrialisation than increased productivity in manu-
facturing because of technological hardware and there is more to modern eco-
nomic growth than developments in industry. The difference between countries
with modern economic growth and those without accordingly consists of more
than industry and technological hardware. In studying the origins of modern
economic growth, the focus in my opinion tends to be too much on a very
specific part of total production, to wit industry, or more broadly the production
of physical commodities and the use of technological implements. Many people
suffer from a ‘manufacturing fetish’ as if other sectors of the economy would
simply not produce anything. In terms of added value, the service sector was just
as large – and soon even larger – than manufacturing in industrialising coun-
tries. The role of institutions and organisation in and for all sectors of the
economy and the role of other sectors than industry, in particular the service
sector require much more attention than they usually get. I can only endorse
959 See the classic Pollard, Genesis of modern management.
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what Albert Feuerwerker wrote about the importance of institutional break-
throughs “…one institutional breakthrough is worth a dozen textile mills or
shipping companies established within the framework of traditional society and
its system of values.”960
Max Weber was right when he regarded an increasing and overwhelming
rationalisation of all spheres of life as the essence of modernisation and of
Western exceptionality. The birth of modern economic growth in that respect
was just as much an institutional revolution as one in knowledge and re-
sources.961 The advantage of industrialising countries definitely lay not only in
technology but also in their permanent institutional innovation. This plea for
more attention also applies to the realm of the state. In the research I did for a
book on the role of the state in the economic development of Britain and China
during the period 1680 – 1850, I time and again encountered enormous differ-
ences in the efficiency and effectiveness of Britain’s state as compared to that of
China, whether it was in the field of finances and money, revenue collecting,
logistics, the military, the gathering and use of information.962 In my view,
Britain’s state during take-off – in any case till the end of the Napoleonic Wars –
could easily stand a comparison with any state in the world when it comes to
efficiency and effectiveness. The position of central government in British so-
ciety was a very strong one. It had already all but completely acquired the
monopolies that are ascribed to a full-blown modern bureaucratic state  la
Weber, i. e. the monopolies of legitimate violence, of public administration, and
of all public revenue collection. With respect to that last monopoly, it is fun-
damental that in Britain it indeed was only state government that collected
revenues that one might call ‘public’ and that almost all of that revenue was at its
disposal. No interest group could feed on the state and redirect public money to
private coffers. Aristocrats levied no feudal dues and in 1534 the right to collect
‘first-fruits and tenths’ had gone from the Pope and the monasteries to the
Crown. Anglican bishops may sometimes have acted as collecting officials, but
they did not keep the revenue. Taxes were not only collected very efficiently and
with no exceptions: they were also almost entirely sent to the capital in the form
of money. It was no longer possible to use or create (semi-)feudal sources of
power and income. There were no feudal exemptions and privileges such as
beneficia or immunities. There was no private property of means of military
violence and no significant private appropriation of parts of administration or
public income. There were no feudal rights that might be exerted, no trace of that
960 Feuerwerker, China’s early industrialization, 242.
961 See for this thesis and an interesting effort to show what a broad institutionalist approach
i. e. one that not only focuses on the hobbyhorses of institutionalist economists, could look
like Allen, Institutional revolution.
962 Vries, A world of surprising differences.
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blurring of the distinction between private and public that characterises feu-
dalism. All local self-government notwithstanding, the administration of the
British state was centralised, ‘centripetal’, uniform and efficient.963 Britain’s state
no longer had any competitors in any public domain. Its role in ‘rationalising’
society can hardly be overestimated. Just think of the standardisation of time and
its measurement, of measures in general, of weights and moneys, of the quality of
products and of the system of law.964 One may also think of the increasing
collection and use of statistics and public records, of mapping and of the de-
velopment of infrastructure. Many institutional innovations in the organisation
of economic life such as chartered companies, shareholding, the modern firm,
the Bank of England or investing in national debt were at the interface of the
private and the public.
20. Ultimate causes: institutions
The essence of modern economic growth is the fact that it is sustained – some
would even claim self-sustaining – and that it is driven by innovation. That of
course does not mean that innovation was its only source. The ‘old’ motors of
growth continued to play their part: more input of resources, just think of ghost
acreage; more input of labour, at least in the beginning of the process; an
enormous extension and deepening of the division of labour and of markets
which now really became world-wide, to a large extent thanks to the revolutions
in transport and communication and more capital goods. But traditional growth
has a tendency to incur decreasing returns. Innovation can counter that ten-
dency but for growth to be sustained, innovation has to be part of a system, an
‘endogenized’ element of the economy, and thus something to be expected, not a
matter of one-off accidents. As Morgan Kelly writes,
The industrial revolution marks the transition from a world where innovation is in-
termittent and haphazard to one where it is systematic and continuous: a transition
that Whitehead termed “the invention of the method of invention.”965
963 See the interesting analyses by Macfarlane in his ‘Cradle of capitalism’ in: Baechler, Hall &
Mann, Europe and the rise of capitalism and his Invention of the modern world, chapters 9,
10 and 11.
964 In my view institutional economists and economic historians would be well advised to
focus more on topics like these and less on property rights. The work by Douglas Allen in
this respect is promising.
965 Morgan Kelly, The invention of invention, http://www.ucd.ie/economics/research/papers/
2005/WP05.15.pdf, Summary, 13. The expression was coined by Alfred North Whitehead
(1861 – 1947), who claimed “The greatest invention of the nineteenth century was the
invention of the method of invention.” See his Science and the modern world, originally New
York 1925. I quote from the paperback edition, New York 1967, page 96. This expression had
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There would not have been a Great Divergence if innovation had stopped with
Watt’s steam engine. Modern economic growth presupposes an in-
stitutionalisation of improvement, the emergence and perfection of a set of rules
and organisations that foster and facilitate invention and innovation. The
question then becomes what facilitates, organises and pushes production? To
find out, we have to look for the underlying, ‘ultimate’ causes of economic
growth. Sustained growth is only possible in a certain stimulating and receptive
setting where change and innovation are not just accepted but even coveted and
systematically pursued. As Erik Ringmar, whose reflections on this topic I can
recommend, writes, change has become an intrinsic feature of modern life, no
longer a matter of individuals and contingency but of institutions and struc-
tures. The power of those institutions resides above all in their ability to enable
and dispose people to act in a certain, fairly predictable way. It makes people
coordinate their activities. In the modern world, institutions as a rule are such
that they turn society in a self-transforming machine.966 It is not by accident that
the period just before and in which Britain took off has so often been charac-
terised as an age of ‘change’, ‘improvement’, ‘progress’ or ‘Enlightenment’.967
As I mentioned earlier, there is ample discussion about how one would want to
define (good) institutions and how important they actually are. But to deny them
any importance would be an indefensible position. Economic historians dealing
with the rise of the West in the past used to think overwhelmingly in institutional
categories. All classic ‘rise of the West stories’ assumed there was something
specific about the way Western society worked and was organised, whether it
was its markets, its states, its military, or the way in which knowledge was
searched, spread or used. Scholars as diverse as Smith, Marx, Weber, Polanyi,
Jones, Braudel, Wallerstein or Landes and their ‘supporters’, in the end were and
are institutionalists, focusing on institutions like markets, states, guilds, firms,
corporations, family and so on and so forth. In the end most historians are. Erik
Ringmar eloquently reformulated their traditional claims in institutionalist
jargon. He explicitly points at the exceptionality in this respect of Europe as
compared to the rest of the world, which in his book he illustrates by comparing
it to China, where change in his view never became institutionalised. Chinese
society became ever more efficient in implementing what was already known but
it did not innovate. Its adaptive efficiency was admirable but it lacked crea-
tivity.968
So-called ‘Eurocentrists’ discussing the Great Divergence almost by defi-
already been used, without reference to Whitehead, by Landes in his Wealth and poverty,
chapter 4.
966 Ringmar, Why Europe was first.
967 See for example Borsay, ‘The culture of improvement’ and note 958.
968 Ringmar, Why Europe was first. For his comments on China see chapters 14 to 19.
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nition tend to be institutionalists. (Western) Europe, in their view, was institu-
tionally different and that is fundamental in any explanation of the Great Di-
vergence. Niall Ferguson is very outspoken: “The critical point is that the dif-
ferential between the West and the Rest was institutional” and “…the earlier
industrialization of the West reflected institutional advantages.”969 The ex-
planation for what he calls “Oriental underachievement” is “above all institu-
tional.”970 Alan Macfarlane would be another excellent example of an outspoken
institutionalist who, as institutionalists tend to do, thinks the roots of the Great
Divergence go back a long time in the past.971 Jan Luiten van Zanden is clearly
convinced that one cannot explain the Industrial Revolution in Europe without
looking at specific European institutions that go back as far as the Middle Ages
and whose efficiency was higher than in other parts of the globe.972 It is no
accident that Timur Kuran, who also uses the word ‘long’ in the title of his book,
likewise favours an institutionalist approach, even though he tackles the prob-
lem from the opposite side, as he wants to show “how Islamic law held back the
Middle East.”973 Michael Mitterauer also thinks the roots of European ex-
ceptionalism are deep and to a large extent institutional.974 Institutionalists tend
to work in a more Weberian tradition: the Great Divergence, in their view, is not
something that occurred quite late, quite sudden and quite contingently but
something that notwithstanding the undeniable acceleration in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries had deep roots and was the outcome of a long path-
dependent trajectory.
Some Eurocentric scholars, while not denying the importance of certain in-
stitutional settings for economic development, strongly qualify the existence of a
direct relation between specific institutional changes and the emergence of
modern economic growth and industry that is so prominent in the work of e. g.
North and his co-authors and of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson. Gregory
Clark explicitly rejects the thesis that institutions or institutional change would
have been at the basis of Britain’s industrialisation: “…institutions play at best a
minor direct role in the story of the Industrial Revolution told here … The
institutions necessary for growth existed long before growth itself began.”975
Like Malthus he wants to establish that for the Malthusian era “…poverty was
not the product of institutions, and that consequently [sic!: the logic is not
969 Ferguson, Civilization, 13 – 14.
970 Ferguson, Civilization, 21.
971 See e. g. his Invention of the modern world.
972 Van Zanden, Long road to the Industrial Revolution.
973 Kuran, Long divergence.
974 See his Why Europe?
975 Clark, Farewell to alms, 10. See also page 352 “…institutional explanations for the Great
Divergence (are) hard to sustain.” See further in the Index under ‘institutions’.
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flawless] changes in political institutions could not improve the human lot”. He
goes even as far as to claim that in that era “…good government in the modern
sense … would either make no difference to material living standards … or
indeed lower living standards.”976 In a well-governed and well-organised society,
population would increase which in the end would cause trouble. Deirdre
McCloskey, too, is not overly fond of the predominant institutionalist approach
in economic history, especially not when it bases itself so firmly on the ideas of
Douglass North cum suis and their emphasis on institutions as constraints and
on property rights as a fundamental factor in the explanation of the Industrial
Revolution.977 When it comes to the Industrial Revolution in Britain Findlay and
O’Rourke too reject an institutionalist explanation.978
Strikingly enough, considering the enormous popularity of institutionalism
amongst economists at the time, many modern global historians dealing with
the Great Divergence tend to actually minimise the role of institutions. Especially
in case they are anti-Eurocentrists, the difference in emphasis with modern
economists could hardly be bigger. Anti-Eurocentric global historians appa-
rently cannot imagine – and will not allow – that any European institution might
have been economically more efficient or helpful than institutions in other parts
of the world. Members of the California School almost as a rule deny any special
credit to European institutions.979 They prefer to claim that either institutional
differences were not that big or not that relevant or both. Referring to Pomer-
anz’s Great Divergence, Jones with good reason writes: “The Great Divergence is
intensively materialist, basing world history on relative resource constraints. No
credence is placed in the force of ideas … nor in the special characteristics of
European science and technology, nor yet in the state and its politics.”980 I fully
endorse this critique and extensively explained why.981
We already saw what Andre Gunder Frank thinks about the explanatory value
of referring to institutions.982 Roy Bin Wong in his China transformed is willing
to admit institutional differences between China and Western Europe – as a rule
not to the advantage of the West – but emphasises that those differences did not
make a real difference for economic growth and development before in-
dustrialisation.
European political economy did not create industrialization, nor was the European
political economy deliberately designed to promote industrialization. Instead, Euro-
976 See for both quotations Clark, Farewell to alms, 33 – 34.
977 McCloskey, Bourgeois dignity, chapters 33, 34, and 35.
978 Findlay and O’Rourke, Power and plenty, 349 – 350.
979 Jones, Cultures merging, 120.
980 Jones, ‘Time and culture in old-world economics’, 858.
981 Vries, ‘California School and beyond’.
982 See page 123.
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pean political economy created a set of institutions able to promote industrialization
once it appeared.983
In the book he wrote with Jan-Laurent Rosenthal, Before and beyond Divergence,
they both fiercely oppose the suggestion that there might have been anything
‘superior’ [sic!] in Western culture or institutions. They explicitly favour an
approach that “eliminates all possible arguments [sic!] that make European
cultural or political arrangements superior to those found in China.”984 On page
109 of the book it reads, “Early modern Chinese political economy was more
explicitly intended to foster economic growth than European political econo-
mies …” and on page 127, “Europeans can take little credit for the countless
discoveries that led up to the Industrial Revolution. Ours is a tale without heroes
and villains, in which the unintended consequences of political conflict are what
matter most.”985 They add, still on the same page “… and it may well have been
that given another several hundred years or so [sic!], machine invention would
have sprouted there [in China] too.” In the end, so they emphasise – as can be
seen in one of the quotations – it was unintended consequences of the differences
in political economies of Europe and China that made it significantly more likely
that industrialisation would happen in the former than in the latter region, not
some clever Western design.
Global historians who focus on geography like Jared Diamond or Ian Morris
hardly ever even refer to institutions. For Ian Morris, the only serious points of
reference are geography and individuals. That, to immediately voice my critique,
of course, is bizarre. Even if indeed, as he time and again claims, overall and in
large numbers, all men are equal: is it not a simple fact of life that if you put a
group of people in a pin factory their productivity ceteris paribus is higher than
that of an identical group of people who do not divide their labour? In most of his
book, he completely ignores the role of institutions and where he does not, he
simply cannot and does not try to integrate them in his approach. He evidently
has no real understanding of the way they work and what difference they can
make.986 If all forms of agency, institutions, culture, and policies, are so irrele-
vant, as he and several other global historians want us to believe, why not be
consequent and hold a plea to no longer bother about social science, the hu-
983 Wong, China transformed, chapter 6, in particular pages 142 – 151. The quotation is on page
151. One can only wonder who ever made the claims that Wong rejects.
984 Rosenthal and Wong, Before and beyond divergence, 101.
985 Why Europeans could claim little credit for those inventions escapes me. Why would Watt
not be entitled to credit for his invention after many years of extreme effort? I must say I am
always amazed about the disparaging way in which many historians and social scientists,
who produce nothing but words, write about people who invent things. When it comes to
those policies to foster economic growth; I simply fail to see them.
986 Morris, Why the West rules.
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manities and politics? That would be the logical conclusion if what those dis-
ciplines study makes no difference and then by implication what they find out
can have no positive political effect.
21. Markets and property rights
Probably the most popular ‘classic’ story of ‘the rise of the West’ in in-
stitutionalist economic terms has always been and still is that it basically equals
‘the rise of the market’. Industrialisation is then regarded as an acceleration of
that process because of attendant technological innovation and increasing in-
vestment. But basically the logic of the market as an innovation-producing
machine would suffice to explain it. That idea of course is stock in trade with all
(neo-)classical economists and all those influenced by them. Institutionalist
economists, who at the moment are very influential amongst economic histor-
ians and quite often act as economic historians themselves, do have some spe-
cific accents of their own, but they basically share the same frame of thought.
They too suggest and sometimes explicitly postulate that the Industrial Revo-
lution – the core of the Great Divergence – was the ‘logical’ outcome of further
(institutional) improvements in the functioning of the market, in particular in
the sphere of property rights, as for example John Hicks had already postu-
lated.987 For Douglass North and Paul Thomas, “The so-called industrial revo-
lution is simply a later surface manifestation of innovative activity reflecting this
redirection of economic incentives.”988 In the last sentence of their book The rise
of the Western world they claimed that around 1700 with the institutional
changes introduced by the Glorious Revolution, “The stage was now set for the
Industrial Revolution.”989 In his later book Structure and change in economic
history North again explicitly wrote that property rights, the institution that is
central to most institutionalist analyses, and markets are the best explanation for
Britain’s industrial revolution.990 John Wells and Douglas Wills two decades later
followed in his footsteps “… the resulting institutional changes (of 1688) ush-
ered in financial developments that laid the foundation for the Industrial Rev-
olution and ultimately established Britain as a world power.”991 Mancur Olson
wrote, “a few decades after stable and nationwide government had been estab-
987 See note 379.
988 North and Thomas, ‘An economic theory of the growth of the Western world’, 1. By that
redirection they in particular refer to the Glorious Revolution.
989 North and Thomas, Rise of the Western world, 156.
990 North, Structure and change in economic history, 166.
991 Wells and Wills, ‘Revolution, restoration and debt repudiation, 418.
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lished in Britain, the Industrial Revolution was on its way.”992 For Kenneth W.
Dam “the Glorious revolution provided a strong base for later enjoyment of the
fruits of the Industrial Revolution.993 Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and
James Robinson, to whom we have already referred several times, in all their
publications also put a very strong emphasis on the importance of property
rights and well-functioning markets for (modern) growth and regard the Glo-
rious Revolution in Britain in 1688 as the fundamental institutional landmark
and breakthrough that paved the way for that growth. In Why nations fail
Acemoglu and Robinson repeatedly postulate a direct connection between the
Glorious and the Industrial Revolution. The dynamics that led to in-
dustrialisation in their view were “unleashed by institutional change that flowed
from the Glorious Revolution.”994 When countries do not industrialise they time
and again in that book blame that on ‘extractive institutions’. Proponents of
unified growth theory and new growth theory both in their own way also claim
that certain institutional arrangements are necessary to increase knowledge, the
basis of all innovation, whether it is free-market exchange and competition of
ideas or rather a conscious policy of promoting research and development and
education. They seem less certain about the importance of property rights, at
least when it comes to intellectual property.
Amongst scholars specifically studying the rise of the West and in-
dustrialisation the idea that these ‘in the end’ were identical to ‘the rise of the
market’ has always been very popular. In Jones’ European miracle, the rise of the
market and ‘good governance’ provide the key explanation.995 In his subsequent
book Growth recurring, he claims that “Economic history may be thought of as a
struggle between a propensity for growth and one for rent-seeking; that is for
someone improving his or her position at the expense of general welfare.”996 The
basic rent-seeking explanation of differing economic performance between
nations according to him is a matter of institutions.997 Joel Mokyr in his im-
pressive and highly applauded book on the economic history of Britain from
1700 to 1850 argues along similar lines and explains much of Britain’s growth by
the fact that the country became “as much of a laissez-faire economy as can be
expected on this earth” and that “rent seeking … was approaching extinction.”998
992 Olson, Rise and decline of nations, 78 – 83 and 128.
993 Dam, Law-growth nexus, 84.
994 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail, 197. See also for example the title of chapter 7:
“How a political revolution in 1688 changed institutions in England and led to the Industrial
Revolution.”
995 Jones, European Miracle, ‘Summary and comparison’.
996 Jones, Growth recurring, 1.
997 Jones, Cultures merging, XI.
998 The quotation is on page 8 of his Enlightened economy. This thesis is defended throughout
the book.
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David Landes, just like Mokyr, regards ‘the invention of invention’, that is in-
stitutionalised innovation, as the main driving force behind growth in the West
and, again like Mokyr, thinks that this institutionalised innovation is ultimately
dependent on the proper functioning of the market mechanism, or to put it in his
terms: “In the last instance, however, I would stress the market.”999 Deirdre
McCloskey also ultimately agrees. She considers innovation as the essence of
modern economic growth and even though she does not endorse several claims
that have been made about the connection between capitalism as a market
economy and growth, it is quite plain in her entire work that she thinks that
without markets and competition such growth is hard to conceive.1000 Erik
Ringmar holds a similar view. For him, too, (capitalist) competition is essential
for growth. But he, correctly in my view, wants to emphasize that capitalism as an
economic system can only exist in a certain setting in which change is consid-
ered normal, acceptable and even positive.1001 In his recent book about the rise of
the West, Niall Ferguson explicitly mentions competition and property, in brief
the market, amongst the killer applications of ‘the West’ in comparison with ‘the
Rest’.1002 In his latest book, about the decline of the West, he not surprisingly
blames its Great Degeneration on its decaying institutions.1003 As a matter of fact,
referring to the role of the market (competition, property rights and thus in the
end, capitalism) has always been so much stock in trade in mainstream Euro-
centric explanations of how the West grew rich that it is impossible – and boring!
– to separately refer to all scholars who do so.1004
Discussing the rise of the market in West, as already pointed out, always
involved a strong emphasis on property rights and the fact that they would in
time have been uniquely well defined and respected in the West. So let us begin
our analysis with a discussion of their arguments in this respect. In the work of
those institutionalist economists who have been most influential in global
economic history, Douglass North and Daron Acemoglu with their co-writers,
the role of property rights appears as absolutely essential.1005 When Eric Jones
refers to the insecurity of property rights as the essence of pre-modern economic
999 Landes, Wealth and poverty of nations, 59.
1000 For McCloskey’s ideas about capitalism and the market see McCloskey, Bourgeois dignity,
‘Preface and acknowledgements’, and chapters 44 and 45.
1001 Ringmar, Why was Europe first, 6 – 12.
1002 Ferguson, Civilization, 12 – 14.
1003 Ferguson, Great Degeneration.
1004 For a couple of influential examples, apart from those already explicitly referred to, see:
Baechler, Hall and Mann, Europe and the rise of capitalism ; Bernstein, Birth of plenty ;
Crone, Pre-industrial societies: Gellner, Plough, sword and book ; Jay, Road to riches or the
wealth of man; Macfarlane, Riddle of the modern world ; Powelson, Centuries of economic
endeavor ; Rosenberg and Birdzell, How the West grew rich.
1005 See for one of many examples Acemoglu, ‘Growth and institutions’.
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history of Asia and the main reason the region did not take-off for so long, he
argues along similar lines and like David Landes places himself and the scholars
just mentioned in the tradition of thinking in terms of oriental-despotism that
has always been popular not only amongst (neo-) classical economists and
adherents of laissez-faire but also in Marxist circles.1006 Marx himself, for ex-
ample, approvingly referred to the seventeenth-century author FranÅois Bernier
in a letter and wrote that “…in all the various parts of the Orient – he (i. e.
Bernier) speaks about Turkey, Persia and Hindustan – there was no private
property. That is the real key to understanding the Orient.”1007 Engels, in a letter
to Marx, fully agreed: “The lack of property in land indeed is the key to un-
derstanding the entire Orient.”1008
For the mainstream and institutionalist economists referred to here, having
well described and respected property rights provides the main and best basis
for growth. In their view, such rights only really emerged in the Dutch Republic
in their Golden Age and in particular with the revolution of 1688 in Britain.
Acemoglu and Robinson explicitly write: “Prior to seventeenth-century Eng-
land, extractive institutions were the norm throughout history.” With the Glo-
rious Revolution, that is described in extremely momentous terms as “the
turning point”, that apparently changed.1009 As indicated, in their view the stage
therewith was set for industrialisation in Britain. As such, the importance of
property rights for any kind of economic development of course is quite obvious
but Deirdre McCloskey is right when she claims: “Numerous societies – in fact
all of them, or else they are not societies but wars of all against all – have
produced rules of property.”1010 The idea that there would have been no property
rights in Europe earlier on, for example for landowners [sic!], merchants or
proto-industrialists, actually is not exactly probable. They already existed in the
Roman Empire. That Empire by the way also had markets for labour and capital,
financial institutions that were better than the French counterparts in the
eighteenth century, and a per capita income comparable to seventeenth-century
1006 See Jones note 156 and Landes, Wealth and poverty e. g. 56 – 57 for China; chapter 11 for
Mughal India, and chapter 24 for the Islamic world more in general.
1007 MEW 28, page 254.
1008 MEW 28, page 259. It is striking that Marx and Engels so casually switch from those
‘various parts of the Orient’, in which no reference is made to e. g. China and Japan, to ‘the
Orient’ and even ‘the entire Orient’.
1009 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail, 184. ‘The turning point’ is the title of chapter 7
of their book, dealing with the Glorious Revolution.
1010 McCloskey, Bourgeois dignity, 316. Three pages further on in the same book she writes: “If
property rights were the crucial novelty of 1689, why not industrialization before and
elsewhere, in places in which property rights were also enforced?”
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Europe.1011 So why and how exactly would property rights explain Britain’s
industrialisation? That is not completely obvious. One can in any case only
repeat and endorse the comment by Gregory Clark that in Britain “… (T)he
institutions necessary for growth existed long before growth itself began.”1012
Leonard Dudley explicitly points out that for the wave of innovations that were at
the hearth of Britain’s industrial revolution, an institutional explanation cannot
suffice as Britain, institutionally speaking, was not really that different from the
rest of north-western Europe.1013 What is even more damaging for the in-
stitutionalists’ claim is that if we may believe Nicolas Crafts “… there was no
obvious improvement in institutions at the time of the Industrial Revolu-
tion.”1014 If Julian Hoppit is right and, to be honest, reading his work one can
hardly imagine he would not be, the famous Glorious Revolution did not lead to
better secured property rights at all but, on the contrary, improved the possi-
bilities for a now strengthened state to interfere with them.1015
Interestingly enough, but that is only an aside, the emergence of well-pro-
tected property rights in Britain was closely connected to cases of expropriation.
Henry VIII established property law in order to entice purchasers to pay his
price when he sold land that he had acquired via the dissolution of the mon-
asteries. Charles II granted security to those who had bought land in the forced
sales of Royalist estates under the Commonwealth.1016 It is undeniable that
property was very well protected in industrialising Britain. But as Adam Smith
already realized, this of course meant that those without property were not
protected: “Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the protection of
property, is in reality instituted as a defence of the rich against the poor, or of
those who have some property against those who have none at all.”1017 The
1011 See Manning and Morris, Ancient economy, and Temin, ‘Economy of the early Roman
Empire’.
1012 See Clarke, Farewell to alms, 10. See for a clear endorsement of this thesis with regard to the
existence of property rights long before 1688, Macfarlane, Invention of the modern world,
chapters 4, 9 and 10.
1013 Dudley, Mothers of innovation, e. g. 51 – 52, 121 – 125 and 240 – 241.
1014 I found this quotation in McCloskey, Bourgeois dignity, 343. She there refers to page 10 of a
manuscript by Crafts that I have not yet been able to find myself. For further information
see McCloskey. See for some general comments Getzer, ‘Theories of property and eco-
nomic development’. For my critique on the way in which Acemoglu and Robinson in-
terpret the Glorious Revolution and its economic effects, see my ‘Does wealth entirely
depend on inclusive institutions and pluralist politics?’ When I wrote that text, I had not
yet read Quinn, ‘The Glorious Revolution’s effect on English private finance’, in which the
author indicates that private interest rates, which are presumably what private investors
really cared about, actually increased in Britain after the Nine Years’ War of 1688 – 1697.
1015 Hoppit ‘Compulsion, compensation and property rights in Britain, 1660 – 1833’.
1016 Jones, Cultures merging, 124.
1017 Smith, Inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, Vol. II, 715.
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number of crimes punishable by death in England increased from fifty in 1689 to
200 in 1800. Most of those crimes amounted to some kind of theft. By 1800, at
least in theory “English property was protected by the most comprehensive
system of capital punishment statutes ever devised.”1018 But this protection did
not apply to all property in all circumstances. Robert Allen goes as far as to
claim, basing himself on research by Julian Hoppit, that in Britain in the
eighteenth century “growth was also promoted [sic!] by Parliament’s power to
take people’s property against their wishes … What the Glorious Revolution
meant in practice was that the ‘despotic power’ of the state that “was only
available intermittently before 1688 … was always available thereafter.”1019 Many
of the activities of the British state, “removed, reallocated, and in short, invaded
property.”1020 Monopolies and privileges – regarded as property by those who
had them – were attacked in Britain and far better (too well?) protected in e. g.
France, i. e. until the French Revolution when aristocratic and ecclesiastical
property was expropriated on a huge scale. Parliamentary control in various
respects led to less protection of property rights. In Britain, William Pitt the
Younger (1759 – 1806) explicitly said that government could always change
policy without compensation to those hurt by the change since otherwise no
government would be able to accomplish any change.1021
All the positive attention paid to property rights makes one almost forget that
such rights can also be bad for economic development and conflict with public
interest. In France, it was impossible to override private property rights on
behalf of public interest in contrast with Britain in the case of, for example,
enclosures, the construction of canals or turnpikes. For that reason in the
Provence, to give but one example, irrigation works were not undertaken al-
though they would have been profitable.1022 Landed property of French peasants
was better protected than that of British peasants in the sense that France’s
government did more to see to it that they did not lose their land than its
counterpart in Britain. In the long run, though, the disappearance of the peas-
antry as an important social class, overall, has come to be regarded as a necessary
phase in the economic advance of Britain – and as a matter of fact of any
country1023 – whereas protecting the property of the peasantry as was the case in
1018 Weisser, ‘Crime and punishment in early modern Europe’.
1019 Allen makes this claim in his Global economic history, 29, referring to and quoting Hoppit,
‘Patterns of parliamentary legislation’, 126. See also note 1015.
1020 Langford, Public life and the propertied Englishman, 146.
1021 I found this comment in Engerman and Sokoloff, Economic development, 348. See there for
further background and references.
1022 Rosenthal, ‘Development of irrigation in Provence’.
1023 For the thesis, in this case from a left-wing perspective, that the disappearance of a large
class of peasants in the end is a necessary precondition for economic modernisation, see
the epochal book by Barrington Moore Jr. , Social origins of dictatorship and democracy.
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France tends to be regarded as a brake on the country’s economic development.
Peasants in China under Qing rule, to refer to our regular ‘test case’, also were
better protected against eviction than their British counterparts. But most
economists would doubt that this in the end was good for China’s economic
development. Ending monopolies and privileges so typical to Europe’s Ancien
Regime in fact was a form of expropriation. Was it bad for economic develop-
ment? Was, to refer to the situation in France again, the expropriation of the
lands of the Church and the aristocrats during the Revolution bad for economic
development? Slave owners in the USA received no compensation when slavery
was abolished there: was that bad for the economy as a whole? Actually the role
of expropriation in Western economic history has been far greater than many
institutionalist care to admit.1024 Erik Reinert is quite sceptical of the importance
of property rights per se and thinks that they can actually make things worse
than they were in pre-capitalist societies without economic development and
without the right overall institutional setting.1025 As is so often the case in history,
things are more complicated, depending on context and a matter of degree. Most
institutionalists have a rather simplistic and optimistic idea of the dynamics of
economic development and in particular modern economic growth when they
seriously think that all it takes to create them are well-defined and secured
property rights, and the ‘right’ market-supporting institutions. One might wish
things were that simple.1026
Notwithstanding all the previous comments, the assumption that property in
Western Europe and in particular in Britain when it took off, was at least more
secure than anywhere else in the world continues to be fundamental to the
explanations of the rise of the West given by most (neo-)classical and in-
1024 For a recent study dealing with the topic, see Lorenzetti, Barbot and Mocarelli, Property
rights and their violations, in particular the ‘Introduction’. Actually, governments of early
modern Western Europe quite often defaulted or debased their currencies –- least of all
those of those of Great Britain and the Dutch Republic – or directly expropriated property
of, for example, religious institutions, aristocrats and any sort of people that for whatever
reason had the bad luck of becoming ‘public enemies’. Even there, many thousands of
people lost property.
1025 Reinert, How rich countries got rich, 220 – 221.
1026 That even is the case in the quite sophisticated recent analysis of North, Wallis and
Weingast. They never provide a concrete explanation of the actual first transition from a
limited-access-order to an open-access-order society as far as the emergence of modern
economic growth is concerned and never extensively discuss how economically speaking
modern societies emerged. They produce typologies and describe ‘doorstep conditions’,
but they never in any detail refer to actual mechanisms of transition. For them too, so one
cannot escape concluding, the actual, concrete emergence of modern economic growth in
the end is a matter of ‘contingency’. It, moreover, is a fairly long-drawn process: imple-
menting the doorstep conditions to the full in their view takes some fifty years. See
Violence and social orders, 27, where they claim such transitions occur in “relatively brief
(sic!) periods.”
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stitutionalist economists and by those inspired by them. Is that indeed the case?
Let us again make a comparison to Qing China. The literature that I have studied
strongly suggests, as was to be expected, that private property actually was quite
normal there although some important differences between the Chinese sit-
uation and that in Western Europe indeed existed. Let me focus on Chinese land
rights, the most important form of property. It is not easy to make firm and valid
general statements about them. We are dealing here with an extremely complex
topic, so complex that an expert on the topic concluded: “Complexity is the only
feature of the pre-Taiping land-tenure system (i. e. the period before 1850) that
can be noted with assurance.”1027 What definitely contributed to this complexity
was the quite current distinction between topsoil and subsoil rights, i. e. between
ownership rights and cultivation rights over one and the same tract of land. The
form of actual co-ownership this implied made eviction all but impossible, even
more so as rents, that often became fixed in monetary terms, could only be raised
by landlords with great difficulty if at all because of strong social pressure and
‘custom’. As long as a tenant paid his fixed rent he could feel secure that he could
continue to till ‘his’ land. What complicated matters even more is the fact that
those landowners who owned a substantial amount of land as a rule rented that
out in many separate, often quite dispersed plots, whereas on the other hand the
tiny farms of ordinary peasants often consisted of various separate plots. There
certainly were differences with the situation in Great Britain but they were
nowhere near as big that they can explain the Great Divergence. Overall, it seems
to me that in China, individual, absolute property rights were less common than
they were in Western Europe. Its property rights tended to be rather more
restrictive and collective. The concept of ‘conditional sale’, moreover, continued
to be important.1028 But we are talking about differences here not about funda-
mental contrasts.
1027 Bernhardt, Rents, taxes, and peasant resistance, 14. For general analyses and examples
considering the broad claims I make in this paragraph see the literature referred to in the
next note plus Bernhardt’s book and Huang, Peasant economy and economic change in
North China and idem, Peasant family and rural development in the Yangzi Delta, in
particular chapter six.
1028 For the point of view that individual property rights and individual freedom of enterprise
were restricted in Qing China, more so than in Britain at the same moment in time, see, for
example, Gates, China’s motor ; Macauley, ‘A world made simple’; Mazumdar, Sugar and
society in China ; Schurman, ‘Traditional property concepts in China’, Far Eastern
Quarterly 15 (1956) 507 – 516, and Wakefield, Fenjia. Household division and inheritance
in Qing and Republican China. For the opinion that in fact there was not much difference
between Britain and China, see Pomeranz, Great Divergence, 69 – 107. Buoye, Mans-
laughter, markets, and moral economy gives an interesting analysis of the conflict between
various perceptions with regard to property and ownership in eighteenth-century China
and refers to the existence and the erosion of a moral-economy perspective. Then, to
conclude, there is Isett, State, peasant, and merchant in Qing Manchuria in which the
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When it comes to legal protection and law, most experts now agree that
written contracts were quite normal in early modern China and their ‘juridical’
status not fundamentally different from that in Western Europe.1029 If one wanted
to prove one’s ownership of a piece of land, for example, one needed a ‘real’
contract, i. e. a contract with an official seal that could only be given by a state-
official. Receiving such a seal implied one had to pay taxes over the land, which
then turned into proof one officially owned it. This could lead to a situation
where people ‘volunteered’ to pay taxes to thereby show land was theirs.1030 I
guess, though, that the opposite, people preferring not to officially own land
because that implied paying taxes, will have occurred more frequently.1031 All this
information only refers to property rights and private contracts, not however to
tax manipulation and corruption that can of course have effects that are quite
similar to those of actual infringements of rights and contracts. In that respect,
the situation in Qing China from the later half of the reign of the Qianlong
Emperor deteriorated quickly. Corruption became an enormous problem and
must certainly have had a negative impact on economic development.1032 Since
the late 1970s, by the way, China has been experiencing a phase of enormous
growth with only very mediocre institutions. Be it as it may be, in the end the
fundamental problem with property-rights explanations is that there have been
far too many societies that had property rights and no modern economic growth
to claim that having them would solve the riddle of modern economic growth.
Special attention in this context has always been always accorded to property
rights in ideas or so-called ‘intellectual property rights’. Many scholars consider
protecting them via patents as fundamental for growth. Such patents are a form
of monopoly claim on the use of a really novel idea for a limited period of time.
As such, of course, the idea of any kind of monopoly should not be popular in
circles of mainstream economists but in this case they and many others regard
them as a kind of necessary evil because without them, inventors would run the
risk that copycats and competitors would reap the benefits of their efforts – and
thus take away the (economic) incentive to invent – as anyone could immediately
and freely copy any inventions. The potential advantage of the patent for the
inventor – that amongst other things depends on how complicated and costly it
is to get a patent; for how long it lasts and under which conditions – of course
analysis of property relations in Manchuria and China holds centre-stage. For the British
situation with respect to property rights in land, see Daunton, Progress and poverty,
chapters 3 and 4.
1029 For the role of contracts in China’s early modern economy see, Zelin, Ocko and Gardella,
Contract and property in early modern China.
1030 See Osborn, ‘Property, taxes and state protection of rights’.
1031 Mark Elvin made this point in a presentation during the Great Divergence Conference at
the London School of Economics and Political Science, 26 June 2009.
1032 See note 1298.
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might exactly be the disadvantage for society at large. Monopolies acquired via
patents hamper a quick spreading of innovations over the entire economy.
Douglass North is aware of the problem, but takes what I think is the majority
stance after formulating the ‘dilemma’ at hand in terms of a rather stark con-
trast: “But as compared to no protection at all, the value of some property rights
over invention is not an issue.”1033 The debate, however, is not settled. Matt
Ridley, for example, is very ambivalent about them. He thinks many inventors
did not care about them; that in many cases they did more harm than good and
that there is no clear proof that patents explain why at some moments in time and
in some places people are more innovative than at other moments in time and in
other places.1034 William Rosen, in contrast, in a book published in exactly the
same year as the one by Ridley I just referred to, thinks that the main reason
eighteenth-century Britain was such a fertile soil for inventors and innovators lay
in the fact that in particular thanks to patents they had the right to own and profit
from their ideas.1035 In an even-handed and knowledgeable overview of the
debate, Joel Mokyr comes to the conclusion that they were not as fundamentally
important as institutionalists like to postulate but not irrelevant either.1036
22. Institutions: markets and varieties of pre-industrial
capitalism1037
Property rights are regarded as so important for economic development as they
would provide a necessary precondition for the emergence of a class of en-
trepreneurs without whom (in any case capitalist) development would be un-
thinkable. Therein resides their fundamental importance. Why invest, if one
cannot be sure one can keep at least some returns of one’s investment? For many
decades there has been a consensus amongst economic historians – and very
probably it still exists amongst broad layers of the population – that Europe was
the cradle of capitalism or as people now tend to call it ‘the market-economy’ and
that no convincing story could be told about the economic rise of the West
without reference to this ‘uniquely European’ phenomenon. Proponents as well
1033 North, Structure and change in economic history, 164 – 166, quote on 165.
1034 Ridley, Rational optimist, chapter 8: ‘The invention of invention’.
1035 See his Most powerful idea in the world with its numerous references to patents. By the
most powerful idea in the world he actually means the patent right that added, to quote
Abram Lincoln, “the fuel of interest to the fire of genius”. See there page 324.
1036 Mokyr, ‘Intellectual property rights, the industrial revolution and the beginnings of mo-
dern economic growth’. I can do no better than refer to this publication.
1037 I want to emphasise that I here refer to pre-industrial varieties of capitalism and not to the
varieties of capitalism discussed in Hall and Soskice, Varieties of capitalism.
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as opponents of capitalism agreed that it came to its full development in Europe –
and only there – and that from there it incorporated ever larger parts of the
world. Members of the California School and several other revisionist global
economic historians now fiercely contest this thesis.1038 According to them this is
just another example of an exaggerated sense of European exceptionalism. To my
view, their contestation rests on the basis of a serious misconception or at least a
quite one-sided conception of what ‘Eurocentrists’ actually mean when they talk
about capitalism.
They can be excused in as far as capitalism, like all key concepts in the social
sciences, is a highly debated and complex term that over time has received many
different and shifting interpretations.1039 Personally I always use the word in the
classic, basically Marxist and Weberian sense of an economic system that is
characterized by the following features: (1) private property, including and
fundamentally, private property of capital goods, (2) private enterprise, (3)
widespread commodification of goods and services (land, labour, capital and
money)1040 and (4) the formally free, i. e. non-coerced, exchange of those goods
and services on formal or ‘abstract’ markets. I consider these characteristics a
conditio sine qua non to apply the term to an economy. I distinguish between
four main varieties or interpretations that for the sake of convenience I will call
Smithian (after Adam Smith), Marxian (after Karl Marx) Weberian (after Max
Weber) and Braudellian-Wallersteinian (after Fernand Braudel and Immanuel
Wallerstein). My distinctions are not watertight nor exhaustive.1041 They just are
an attempt to create some order and structure my brief analysis. Between the
interpretation inspired by Adam Smith and that by Karl Marx as author of Das
Kapital there are clear differences particularly in emphasis in regard to the
importance of the private ownership of capital and capital goods and its effects.
Smithians, with their focus on exchange as it takes place on markets, regard
labour not so much as a commodity that is bought and has to sell itself but as a
category of agents who on the basis of a formally free and rational choice offer
their labour power for the best available wage. For Marxians – and Weberians –
the private ownership of capital and capital goods gets particular attention
1038 See part 2 chapter 23.
1039 For an excellent overview see Kocka, Geschichte des Kapitalismus, and idem, ‘Der Kapi-
talismus und seine Krisen in historischer Perspektive’.
1040 I would define a commodity here, for the sake of simplicity, as everything produced for
exchange. That means everything that has use-value as well as exchange-value.
1041 I could for example also refer to Schumpeter’s definition of capitalism as “that form of
private property economy in which innovations are carried out by borrowed money”. See
note 806. I doubt whether this would in any way consolidate the Californian position that
Qing China also was somehow capitalist. If we take the Schumpeterian definition of
innovation, Qing China simply was not very innovative and the role of money borrowed
for innovation looks much less important there than in North-western Europe.
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because it leads to the emergence of a situation in which people who no longer
dispose of (sufficient) means of production to provide for their subsistence have
to sell their labour to other people and to work for them for wages. Smithians put
the emphasis on the fact that labour is formally free, Weberians and Marxists on
the fact that it is actually quite unfree.
In the Marxian interpretation of capitalism, the focus is on the modes and
relations of production and on the specific position of labour as a very idio-
syncratic commodity in a system of asymmetric relations of production.
Whatever else capitalism may mean for Marxists, they first and foremost as-
sociate it with classes, i. e. with proletarians who must sell their labour for
subsistence, and capitalists, i. e. those who employ those proletarians, and with
relations of production.1042 This is how Marx himself put it :
…the capitalist mode of production and accumulation, and therefore capitalist private
property as well, have for their fundamental condition [sic!] the annihilation of that
private property which rests on the labour of the individual himself ; in other words, the
expropriation or the worker.1043
For the conversion of his money into capital, therefore, the owner of money must meet
in the market with the free labourer, free in the double sense, that as a free man he can
dispose of his labour-power as his own commodity, and that on the other hand he has
no other commodity for sale, is short of everything necessary for the realization of his
labour-power.1044
The loss of means of production (or better subsistence) by many, i. e. ‘prole-
tarianisation’ is just the other side of the coin of the accumulation of capital for
investment by others. Capitalism as Marx defines it, cannot exist without wage
labour. Several modern Marxists like Robert Brenner, in my view correctly, still
defend this position. He claims that, “…separation from the means of sub-
sistence … is the sine qua non [Italics mine.] for the emergence of a capitalist
dynamic”.1045 In his view those who no longer have their own means of sub-
sistence are “rendered dependent on the market for their inputs” and “subject to
competition in production to survive.”1046 This gives a distinct logic and dyna-
1042 See e. g. Brenner’s critique on neo-Smithian Marxism in his ‘Origins of capitalist deve-
lopment’; his ‘Property and progress’, and his publication under note 1045. This point of
view of course is also at the basis of the so-called ‘Brenner Thesis’. See Aston and Philpin,
The Brenner Debate.
1043 MEW 23, page 802.
1044 MEW 23, page 183.
1045 Brenner, ‘The Low Countries in the transition to capitalism’, 275 – 338, page 278, note 2.
His views are shared by e. g. Isett in State, peasant, and merchant in Qing Manchuria, and
Meiksins Wood, Origins of capitalism.
1046 Brenner, ‘The Low Countries in the transition to capitalism’, 278.
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mism to capitalist economies as all producers are forced to permanently increase
productivity or at least cut costs.
In debates on the rise of the West, one comes across many references to Max
Weber’s ideas about capitalism. These are then presented as adding up to a
specific variety of capitalism that is associated with a strong emphasis on its
mental-cultural aspects. Weber’s capitalism is primarily presented as a form of
economic rationality. The connection Weber postulates between Calvinism and
capitalism is then regarded as his fundamental thesis regarding capitalism.
Actually, references to ‘the spirit of capitalism’ are only part of Weber’s overall
interpretation that for the rest is all but identical to Marx’s. In that respect, the
tendency to focus so exclusively on what distinguishes both scholars, although
there are differences, can be quite misleading. Weber’s position on the role of
‘free labour’ and the importance of classes e. g. is entirely identical to that of
Marx. In his list of pre-conditions for capitalism, this is one:
Free labour, that means that persons are available who are not just legally able but also
economically necessitated to freely sell their labour on a market. It contradicts the
essence of capitalism, and its development is impossible (sic! PV) when such a social
group that lacks property and therefore is forced to sell its labour is absent and also
when there is only unfree labour.1047
For those who did not get the point he on the same page adds that by ‘free’ he
means: “Formally free but actually forced by the whip of hunger.”1048
In capitalism all those ‘free’ economic actors – and here Smith, Marx and
Weber basically agree – meet on a formal, abstract market where they exchange
on the basis of formally free decisions. On the labour market, labourers sell their
labour-power in order to earn a living. Employers employ that labour in order to
1047 Weber, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Kapitel, IV, 1 ,Begriff und Voraussetzungen des Kapita-
lismus’, 240. The book was first published in 1923. I here used the fifth edition, which is a
corrected and completed version of the original text and was published 1991 in Berlin.
Several English translations exist under the title General economic history. The translation
is mine. In German the text reads: “Freie Arbeit, d. h. dass Personen vorhanden sind, die
nicht nur rechtlich in der Lage, sondern auch wirtschaftlich genötigt sind, ihre Arbeits-
kraft frei auf dem Markt zu verkaufen. Im Widerspruch zum Wesen des Kapitalismus steht
es, und seine Entfaltung ist unmöglich, wenn eine solche besitzlose und daher zum Ver-
kauf ihrer Arbeitsleistung genötigte Schicht fehlt, ebenso, wenn nur unfreie Arbeit be-
steht.” In his famous Vorbemerkung zu den Gesammelten Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie
originally published in 1920/1921 and of which numerous editions and translations exist –
in English as Introduction to the sociology of world religions – we also find this strong
emphasis on the rational capitalist organization of (formally) free labour and on the
existence of capitalist enterprises separated from households and owned by members of
the bourgeoisie. Just as in the case of Marx’s definition: There simply cannot be capitalism
as Weber defines it without wage labour and employers.
1048 Weber, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 240. In the original it reads: „…formal freiwillig, tatsächlich
durch die Hungerpeitsche gezwungen.“
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earn a living, but also to be able to permanently invest in order to withstand
competition from other capitalists. The motor of capitalist development there-
with resides in sustained capital-accumulation for sustained profitability.
Competition forces all those operating in a capitalist regime to be as efficient as
possible. In particular for capitalists, but basically for all parties involved, to be
able to figure out whether what they do actually is efficient, or as economists
would say ‘rational’, means to have the possibility of calculation which implies
some kind of bookkeeping and the monetisation of all economic activities. It
‘ideally’ also implies a separation of household and firm.1049 In this respect too,
Weber and Marx agree. Effective calculation requires predictability, which in
turn requires the existence of rational, predictable laws, a point that is empha-
sized by Weber.
Considering all these pre-conditions, a capitalist economy can only flourish in
a capitalist society. Its logic can only prevail when ruling elites in a society
tolerate or preferably even support it. That means there has to be synergy
between the economic order (capitalism in the strict sense of the word) and the
political order that we for the sake of convenience will call ‘the state’. Talking
about the role of the state and of power in capitalism brings us to yet another
major difference in the way it is interpreted, this time primarily between Smi-
thians on the one hand and those arguing in line with Braudel and Wallerstein on
the other. The essence of Smithian capitalism is the free market, the logic of the
invisible hand. In it competition is free and fair and all parties are price-takers.
In capitalism as Braudel and Wallerstein see it, visible hands play a much bigger
role. Braudel goes even as far as to claim that “Capitalism only triumphs when it
becomes identified with the state, when it is the state”1050 and to define it as an
‘anti-market’. In ‘real existing capitalism’, so he claims, capitalists and rulers,
profit and power, tend to collude. There are many visible hands instead of one
invisible one. Markets are essential but they are manipulated and non-trans-
parent, with capitalists continuously trying to create monopolies. Actually
‘capitalism’, especially but definitely not only in the early modern era in Western
Europe, functioned far more like Smith’s ‘mercantile system’ than like his
‘commercial society’.1051
1049 For the development of the firm or the company in Western capitalism, see Micklethwait
and Wooldridge, The company. One must by wary not to exaggerate the importance of the
‘modern’, i. e. limited-liability, joint-stock companies for Great Britain during its take off.
On page 40 of their book they write: “Symptomatically, the two most dynamic and con-
troversial parts of the British economy – the slave trade and the growing industrial sector –
both preferred partnerships (and occasionally joint-venture associations) to joint-stock
companies.”
1050 Braudel, Afterthoughts on material civilization and capitalism, 64 – 65.
1051 For further explanation see my ‘Europe and the rest: Braudel on capitalism’.
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Smithians and Braudellians/ Wallersteinians both claim that markets and
capitalism were cornerstones of Europe’s economic development and they both
emphasise that capitalism was uniquely European. But confusingly enough, as
these brief characterisations show, they define it in almost diametrically oppo-
site ways. Traditional Marxists also tend to pay a lot of attention to ‘visible hands’
in what they call ‘monopoly capitalism’, but while they associate that, as a rule,
with ‘late capitalism’, for Braudel and Wallerstein, monopoly and the collusion of
power and profit are essential for capitalism from the very beginning. In their
work there is no reference to capitalism as a distinct stage in a succession of
modes of production as we find in classical historical materialism. Yet another
difference with classical Marxism would be that the Braudellian-Wallersteinian
definition of capitalism puts far more emphasis on exchange than suits the taste
of classic Marxists whose primary focus is on production.1052 In the approach of
Braudel and Wallerstein capitalism is a world-system – a quite confusing term
indicating that it encompasses more than one country and has a life and ‘logic’ of
its own – of which the centre region, as yet located in the West, is well developed,
specialises in the production and export of commodities and services with high
added value, has a well-paid and skilled, free labour force and strong states with
representative organs or in any case possibilities for power sharing for elites. In
the periphery the situation in those respects is exactly the opposite.1053 In their
view it is essential that capitalists and the state collude, in what Charles Tilly
(1929 – 2008) aptly called “liaisons dangereuses”, in which both parties need
each other but also have good reasons to mistrust each other and in a setting in
which the political system (the state) and the economic system (capitalism)
clearly overlap to some extent but are never identical.1054 Capitalism in their view
by definition encompasses a wider a system of polities. Max Weber, by the way,
already realised that:
This competition [between competing national states] created the best chances for
modern capitalism in the West. Every single state had to compete for the mobile capital
that dictated the conditions under which it was willing to bring it to power. This
enforced alliance with capital produced the national citizenry, the bourgeoisie in the
modern sense of the word. Therefore it is the closed national state that guarantees
1052 See under notes 1042 – 1045.
1053 Amongst neo-Marxists scholars like Giovanni Arrighi, however, the perspective of Braudel
and Wallerstein, has found support. See e. g. Arrighi, The long twentieth century and idem,
Adam Smith in Beijing. Both Wallerstein and Braudel have never denied that they have
been heavily influenced by Marx’s work, which they both admired and held for extremely
influential and important.
1054 Tilly, Coercion, capital, and European states, 58 – 61.
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capitalism its chances of continued existence: as long as it is does not cede to a global
empire, capitalism will exist too.1055
23. Wage labour and world-system: Why it does not make sense
to call Qing China capitalist and why capitalism’s origins
should be considered uniquely Western
Whatever may have been their exact interpretation of the term, up until quite
recently, all major participants in the debates on ‘the rise of the West’ endorsed
the claim that capitalism was something uniquely Western and that Britain was a
highly developed capitalist country. Now, the ‘surprising-resemblances thesis’
implies that capitalism, if such a thing ever existed at all, which of all people
Gunder Frank at the end of his life denied, was not uniquely or even typically
European or Western. Scholars like Pomeranz, Wong, Goody, and Frank indeed,
as we will discuss in coming paragraphs, explicitly make this claim. By doing so,
they break with a long and established historiographical tradition. So it would be
interesting to know what exactly they mean by their claim and how exactly they
back it up. They do have a point in the sense that in various respects differences
have been exaggerated or even invented. But to only focus on resemblances in my
view means ignoring major differences and thereby erring in the opposite di-
rection. Overall references made in ‘revisionist’ literature dealing with the Great
Divergence tend to only point at capitalism  la Adam Smith and his focus on
exchange and to then claim – to a large extent correctly – that (this) capitalism
was not uniquely or even typically European. When one, however, also takes on
board what Marx, Weber, Braudel and Wallerstein wrote about capitalism, things
look quite different. I just want to focus on two major differences between the
West, in particular north-western Europe and the Rest that in this context to my
view are essential: (1) The fundamental and exceptional place in Western, and in
particular British capitalism of ‘free’ wage labour  la Marx and Weber1056 and (2)
1055 Weber, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 288 – 289. The translation is mine. In German the text reads:
„Dieser Konkurrenzkampf (between competing national states PV) schuf dem neuzeit-
lich-abendländischen Kapitalismus die größten Chancen. Der einzelne Staat musste um
das freizügige Kapital konkurrieren, das ihm die Bedingungen vorschrieb, unter denen es
ihm zur Macht verhelfen wollte. Aus dem notgedrungenen Bündnis des Staates mit dem
Kapital ging der nationale Bürgerstand hervor, die Bourgeoisie im modernen Sinn des
Wortes. Der geschlossene nationale Staat also ist es, der dem Kapitalismus die Chancen des
Fortbestehens gewährleistet: solange er nicht einem Weltreich Platz macht, wird also auch
der Kapitalismus dauern.“
1056 One has to be careful here: global comparative research into the importance of wage
labour is only just beginning and it might be the case that European exceptionalism in this
respect is only matter of a lack of knowledge about regions outside the West. I would be
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the specific collusion of profit and power and the emergence of a modern world-
system of which North-western Europe became the core, that are so central to
capitalism  la Braudel and Wallerstein.1057
Let us begin with some comments on free wage-labour and the fact that,
overall, the Californians simply do not discuss it. Jack Goody constantly refers to
capitalism, and even wrote a book called Capitalism and modernity, but never in
any of his four last books devoted to ‘the West and the Rest’ does he show any
awareness of the fundamental role that free wage labour plays in definitions of
Western capitalism and never does he systematically compare the position and
status of labour in various parts of the world.1058 The same goes for Pomeranz.
Nowhere in his magnum opus does he explicitly discuss wage labour and
compare it systematically to other types of labour. Nowhere are the modes of
production in Britain compared to those in China. In its ‘Index’ terms like
‘proletariat’ or ‘proletarian’ are absent. He uses the word ‘capitalism’ in the
context of the economy of Qing China because it had a market economy for
consumer goods, and to a somewhat lesser extent for land and money, and
because labour overwhelmingly was free in the juridical sense of the word.
Indeed, that type of labour was the rule in Qing China, more so than in many
parts of Europe. But he never discusses whether China also had a huge labour
force that was ‘free’ in the fundamental other sense of the word, i. e. bereft of its
means of subsistence. He clearly knows it did not1059, but apparently thinks that
does not make a relevant difference for the debate on the Great Divergence. Bin
Wong thinks Qing China can be called a ‘capitalist’ market economy or, as he
prefers to call it, an economy with ‘Smithian’ dynamics for the same reasons as
Pomeranz does.1060 Parthasarathi, to briefly refer to the case of India, claims that
this country in the early modern era was basically just as capitalist as Europe. He
does so because it too had a very lively and extended exchange of goods and
entrepreneurs and merchants who were running sophisticated firms and be-
haved ‘rationally’.1061 Frank, of course, again is quite extreme. After having spent
the major part of his life attacking Western capitalism, he ended it vociferously
claiming that there is no such thing as a capitalist mode of production. He too
surprised if that research would result in the discovery of other regions with a similar rate
of proletarians but one cannot exclude that beforehand. As indicated earlier on for Spanish
Latin America, an increasing number of scholars now points at widespread free wage
labour there. Let my here refer to a major research project at the International Institute for
Social History in Amsterdam into global labour relations: http://socialhistory.org/en/
projects/history-labour-relations-1500 – 2000.
1057 Research into the political power of mercantile elites in different parts of the world already
has a much longer tradition. I refer here to my ‘Governing growth’.
1058 For those four books see note 13.
1059 See note 1069.
1060 Wong, China transformed, Part I.
1061 See e. g. Parthasarathi, Why Europe grew rich, 80 – 85.
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does so without ever actually discussing whether, when it comes to the com-
modification of labour, i. e. to proletarian wage-labourers working for employ-
ers, there may not have been substantial differences between (parts of) the West
and the East. On page 332 of ReOrient he, with his usual lack of nuance and
overdose of self-assurance, writes: “best just forget about it [i. e. capitalism], and
get on with our inquiry into the reality of universal history.”1062
I do not want to deny that Qing China had a Smithian economy or, as Adam
Smith himself would call it, a ‘commercial society’ as regards consumer goods
and even capital goods. On the eve of Britain’s industrialisation in the eighteenth
century, the Chinese bought and sold massively. Qing China by no means was a
primitive, hardly monetised society, where people lacked property rights and the
bulk of the population consisted of peasants only producing for their own
subsistence. That is a clich¦d image that certainly needed to be deconstructed.
But calling a society with hardly any commodification of labour, i. e. hardly any
wage-labouring proletarians – and thus also hardly any bourgeois-en-
trepreneurs – ‘capitalist’, is really stretching the term over its limits. In no
publication about China’s economic history during the early modern period
have I ever come across an estimate of the number of people who had to fully
depend on wage labour that was higher than five per cent of the entire labour
force. Pomeranz very recently himself wrote that even in the highly commer-
cialized Yangzi Delta at most fifteen per cent of the rural Chinese lived primarily
on wages.1063 The situation, by the way, in Japan was quite similar. There, as late
as 1879, no more than five per cent of the entire labour force worked for
wages.1064 In this respect, the difference between Britain and China is simply
staggering. Whereas in Qing China there were hardly any real proletarians, in
Britain they already quite early on had become the norm in the countryside.
Proletarianisation there was really massive. In 1851, seventy-three per cent of
those working in England’s countryside were wage labourers. According to
Gregory King already in 1688, two-thirds of the rural population was landless.1065
Wage labour was also quite common in cities. To work outside one’s own
household in the period between childhood and marriage was very common,
almost the rule. Between 1574 and 1821, 13.4 per cent of the population in
English communities were servants or apprentices.1066 All this was highly ex-
1062 See further Frank, ReOrient, Index under ‘capitalism’ and under ‘mode of production’, e. g.
330 – 332.
1063 Pomeranz, ‘Ten years after’, 23.
1064 De Vries, ‘Industrious peasants in East and West’, 112.
1065 Overton, Agricultural Revolution in England, 178, and Lindert und Williamson, ‘Revising
England’s social tables, 1688 – 1812’.
1066 See De Moor and Van Zanden, ‘Girl power’, in particular pages 11 – 16. For the claim that
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ceptional in Qing China, and quite normal in Western Europe as a whole.1067 All
circumstantial evidence we have, moreover, in particular that with regard to the
level of migration to towns, suggests that labour mobility overall, but especially
that of female labour, was less high in China than in Europe.1068
One cannot simply ignore this fundamental difference between China – but
also India and Japan – and in particular Britain – but also several other regions in
Western Europe – even if it did not make a big difference for the wealth of both
countries before industrialisation and even if it in the end would turn out not to
make a big difference for the Great Divergence. Discussing capitalism without
discussing capital and labour – that is without wage-labour, is bizarre. It is taking
the Prince of Denmark out of Hamlet. One cannot seriously discuss economies
without analysing their modes of production. China certainly had several
markets but it had no capitalist organisation of its production processes. Its
predominant productive entities were households that functioned according to a
logic quite different from that of firms. Together, those households constituted a
quite different economy. Capitalism, as Marx and Weber defined it, as an eco-
nomic system in which wage labour is the norm, is a European invention: no-
where in the world – as far as we know now – during the eighteenth century was it
as highly developed as in Britain. The fact that as a rule household and firm in
China were not separated whereas that separation is regarded as a pre-requisite
for a capitalist mode of production by Marx as well as Weber would be yet
another reason not to call Qing China’s economy capitalist, as would be the fact
that book-keeping and monetisation played only a relatively minor role in it, and
the fact that, to all intents and purposes, the predictability and ‘rationality’ of
China’s juridical system – a necessary precondition for an efficient functioning
of capitalism according to Weber – were less than in Britain. Although one
should be wary not to exaggerate in this last respect: Britain never took, as
Weber himself indicates, Roman law as basis of its juridical system. Its common
law system was a system of case law that operated on the basis of persuasive
authority. This means that conscious action and interpretation by law makers
and judges, elements that Weber thinks should be eliminated as much as pos-
sible in any full-blown, rational-bureaucratic system of law, continued to be very
important.1069
between 1574 and 1821, 13.4 per cent of the population in English communities were
servants or apprentices, see page 11, note 16.
1067 By 1750 over half of the population of Europe except Russia seems to have depended on
wage labour to some extent. See Tilly, ‘Demographic origins’, 30 – 34. I am convinced this is
far more than anywhere else in the world.
1068 Winter, ‘Population and migration’.
1069 That at least is the overall impression one gets when reading Weber, although it has been
claimed that Weber is ambivalent on the role of formal state laws in the development of
capitalism. See e. g. Cotterell, ‘Development of capitalism and the formation of contract
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Of course, differences with Britain were not absolute but a matter of (large)
orders of magnitude. But Marx and Weber in any case would certainly reject the
Californian claim that Qing China was capitalist. In my view, the consequences
of having a system based on wage labour like in Britain rather than a system in
which a household mode of production prevailed like in China, must be huge,
not necessarily when it comes to wealth or poverty, but definitely when it comes
to the direction in which an economy can or cannot, will or will not evolve. I have
analysed these consequences in some detail elsewhere and will not repeat myself
here.1070 What is striking is not only that there were so many proletarians and
capitalists-entrepreneurs in Britain but even more that those capitalist-en-
trepreneurs were part of the ruling class of their country. Nowhere else in the
world were capitalists in a major country in a politically powerful position like in
Britain.1071 There with the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the importance of the
‘moneyed interests’ in government certainly increased, which partly explains the
focus on that Revolution in many analyses of Britain’s socio-economic history.
One must, however, again be careful not to exaggerate: by far the bulk of the
members of Parliament up to 1832 consisted of wealthy landowners who tended
to behave like capitalists but nevertheless were not the proto-type merchants-
entrepreneurs that many people think began to rule the country. But never-
theless, all the major differences enumerated here and elsewhere in the text
between Britain’s and China’s mode of production simply must have made – and
did make – a difference.
Braudel and Wallerstein too, definitely would not endorse the thesis that Qing
China was capitalist, in the sense in which they use the term. I pointed out two
main characteristics of ‘their’ capitalism. Firstly, there is the collusion of power
and profit. In capitalist countries in the early modern era, in their view, mer-
chants had major political clout. They received all sorts of support such as
monopolies from government but in turn supported government, in particular
financially. None of this existed in China, or in any other major and economically
advanced state elsewhere outside Europe. People acting like capitalists never
even came close to having the kind of political clout they had in Britain or in
other mercantile states in Western Europe. There was no institutionalised col-
lusion between them and the state. In contrast, the state as a rule fiercely opposed
the emergence of a merchant class that might become a threat to its power.
law’. For British law see e. g. Macfarlane, Invention of the modern world, chapters 9, 10 and
11.
1070 See my Zur politischen Ökonomie des Tees, 97 – 111, and my ‘Un monde de ressemblances
surprenantes?’.
1071 For an introductory comparison see Pearson, ‘Merchants and states’. Interestingly enough
this thesis of the fundamental importance of bourgeois rule is defended by ‘marxisant’
scholars like Arrighi, Braudel, Brenner and Wallerstein, as well as by more mainstream
institutionalists like North c.s. and Acemoglu c.s.
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This can be illustrated very neatly by comparing the English East India
Company traders with the Chinese Co-Hong merchants they traded with in
Canton. The British East India Company had a charter, which meant that it could
act autonomously when it came to daily routines. It was a formal organisation,
which means it could attract external capital. Its relationship with government
was not antagonistic. Often, they shared interests and acted together. In China,
merchants who worked together with government officials, even when they had
some sort of official ‘monopoly’ always only were minor partners. That was the
case with the famous salt merchants but also with the Hong merchants who were
responsible for dealing with foreign traders in Canton. In comparison to Western
chartered companies, their, ‘guild’, the so-called Co-Hong formed only a weakly
integrated group. The Hong merchants, who were its members, did not have a
charter, were more dependent on government decisions and could not attract
external capital as a joint-stock company could. They never managed to fully
control supplies. Efforts by the Co-Hong to get such a position of real monopoly
in the end were always countered by government and its representatives in
Canton. It was feared that when prices became too high that would drive away
foreign customers and so reduce income for government. Hong merchants were
not allowed to collectively bargain or decide on a common price or common
strategy. They always had to bargain with foreign merchants separately. They
were watched and extorted by the Hoppos, the imperial super-intendants. To
keep their power in check, government used to allow outsiders to claim a certain
percentage of the trade that fell under the ‘monopoly’ of the Co-Hong, as a rule
some thirty per cent. This was also the case with tea. For some products, trade
was entirely free.1072 Even though Paul van Dyke in a recent study has clearly
qualified the idea that the Chinese state would actually and permanently control
the merchants who traded with Westerners in Canton and Macao, the differences
in their position as regards the rule of law and their autonomy as compared to
British traders remain quite striking.1073
Braudel explicitly refers to China to support his claim that a capitalist super-
structure is not just a logical and normal extension of a lively market-economy.
According to him, China did have a solidly established market economy in the
early modern era, but lacked the top level of economic life that he calls capital-
ism.1074 He points out that “… the gap between the West and the other continents
appeared late in time and to attribute it simply to the ‘rationalization’ of the
market economy, as too many of our contemporaries are still inclined to do, is
1072 See my Zur politischen Oekonomie des Tees, 78 – 91; Balazs, ‘China as a permanently
bureaucratic society’ and ‘Birth of capitalism in China’, and Mann, ‘Liturgical governance
and the merchant class’ in: idem, Local merchants and the Chinese bureaucracy, 12 – 28.
1073 Van Dyke, Merchants of Canton and Macao.
1074 Braudel, Civilization and capitalism, 15th-18th century, II, 588.
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obviously over-simplifying.”1075 He explicitly claims that in China for the devel-
opment of capitalism “the chief obstacle was the state.” In his view, “the imperial
administration blocked any attempts to create an economic hierarchy.”1076 Wal-
lerstein, who is strongly influenced by Braudel, holds quite similar views with
regard to China. It developed no capitalism and all that goes with it mainly
because it was an empire of its own in which the emperor did not need to co-
operate with merchants to the extent that was necessary for rulers in (north-)
Western Europe, just as there was no urge or need to exploit peripheries.1077 The
ideas of Giovanni Arrighi who in turn is strongly influenced by both Braudel and
Wallerstein in this context will be discussed later on in this paragraph.
The second main characteristic of capitalism  la Braudel and Wallerstein is
that it entails the creation of a supranational economic system with a centre and a
periphery. Neither Qing China, nor any other highly advanced state outside the
West, turned itself into the core of an economic system like Britain and several
other Western countries did. It never created a specific division of labour with
‘peripheral’ regions, inside its borders or with regions outside its own territory.
No clear hierarchical division of labour developed between China Proper and
other regions in terms of the goods that were produced and exchanged, nor do
we see regional specialisation with differing modes of production per region
according to its ‘role’ or ‘function’ in some sort of economic ‘system’. Of course
some regions were more important and in that sense more ‘central’ than others,
but the differences and their impact are incomparable to those existing between
Britain and its peripheries. Strikingly enough, that is also true in political terms.
China may have regarded itself as the centre of its world surrounded by tribute
states but it did not even try to actually rule them or use them as an outlet for its
surplus population. Pomeranz does refer to this difference between China and
Western capitalist countries but does not discuss it per se, even though overseas
non-consensual exchange plays such a prominent role in his work.
China’s political economy was entirely different from Britain, which was a
fiscal-military, or rather a fiscal-naval, mercantilist and empire building state.
Giovanni Arrighi (1937 – 2009) in his Adam Smith in Beijing provides a succinct
but very enlightening description and analysis of the main differences between
the political economy of Western European ‘capitalist’ states on the one hand
and China on the other, domestically as well as in international affairs.1078 Arrighi
tones down the ‘traditional’ view that states and an interstate system were
something typically European. In the early modern era, as he claims, there also
1075 Braudel, Civilization and capitalism, 15th-18th century, II, 134.
1076 Braudel, Civilization and capitalism, 15th-18th century, II, 136 and 586.
1077 See Wallerstein, Modern world-system, I, in the Index under ‘China’ and under ‘empire’.
1078 Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing, chapter 11: ‘States, markets and capitalism, East and
West’, 309 – 344.
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was a China-centred state system. Both systems in his view were similar enough
to make a comparison of them analytically meaningful. There were major dif-
ferences, though. The dynamic of the European system was characterised by
incessant competition among its national components and by a tendency to-
wards the geographical expansion both of the system and of its shifting centre.
What is crucial in this respect is the absence of any tendency among East Asian
states to build overseas empires and to engage in an armament race on a scale
comparable to what occurred in Europe. Qing expansion, at least till the 1760s,
was meant to change borders that were hard to defend into a pacified periphery
and a buffer against raiders and conquerors from Inner Asia. In the West we see a
ceaseless and in principle limitless expansionism. There is no Chinese equivalent
to Cecil Rhodes’ famous quip: “I would annex the planets if I could.” China was
the clear and undisputed centre of an East Asian states-system, but the states that
paid tribute to it were not colonies, nor were they peripheries of a Chinese core.
In Western Europe there was more of a balance of power with various contenders
for hegemony. Arrighi, I think correctly, claims that the extraversion of the
European power struggle was a major determinant of the peculiar combination
of capitalism, militarism, and territorialism that propelled the globalisation of
the European system. Western Europe was much more interested in long-dis-
tance trade and in general the importance of that trade was bigger there than it
was in the East. In the East Asian system we see an opposite dynamic, which is
understandable in light of the success of Asia’s development as the largest
market economy at the time. For China, control of trade routes was much less
important than peaceful relations with neighbouring states. Foreign trade was
often discouraged rather than encouraged. Adam Smith already pointed out that
China’s foreign trade might have been bigger :
…the great extent of the empire of China, the vast multitude of its inhabitants, the variety
of climate, and consequently of productions in its different provinces, and the easy
communication by means of water carriage between the greater part of them, render the
home market of that country of so great extent, as to be alone sufficient to support very
great manufactures, and to admit of very considerable subdivisions of labour. The home
market of China is, perhaps, in extent, not much inferior to the market of all the different
countries of Europe put together. A more extensive foreign trade, however, which to this
home market added the foreign market of all the rest of the world; especially if any
considerable part of this trade was carried on in Chinese ships; could scarcely fail to
increase very much the manufactures of China, and to improve very much the productive
powers of its manufacturing industry. By a more extensive navigation, the Chinese would
naturally learn the art of using and constructing themselves all the different machines
made use of in other countries, as well as the other improvements of arts and industry
which are practiced in all the different parts of the world.1079
1079 Smith, Inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, II, 680 – 681. In this
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The European dynamic led to a sequence of ever more powerful states that
identified themselves with capital and capitalists. There is no parallel in East Asia
for that. It also led to the development of superior military force that was to
become the key to the subjection of East Asia to the West.
That overseas expansion of the West, with all the huge differences between
various countries over time, always implied a strong element of exploitation and
an effort to create peripheries in the ‘Wallersteinian’ sense of the word.1080
Westerners as a rule tried to create relations of exploitation and unequal ex-
change in which the economies of their overseas possessions were actually
transformed and manipulated, if need be by brute force, to serve the interests of
the ‘core’ region that had incorporated them. They always tried to create a
division of labour in which the ‘core’ specialised in producing goods with high
added value and the peripheral regions were often made to specialise in the
production of raw materials or basic products that was labour-intensive, added
little value and earned the un-free labourers only low incomes. Western ‘core’
states used their military and economic power to back up the functioning of this
division of labour and to channel profits in their direction. A very clear example
in the British case – only one among many – would be Britain’s possessions in the
Caribbean. Their entire mode of production was changed and geared to Britain’s
economy : their labour force (i. e. slave labour) to a very large extent was actually
imported by the British, their products, predominantly sugar, and much of the
profits earned in producing them, were exported to Britain, whereas most of the
goods that one did not produce locally were imported from or via Britain. A lot
of the ghost acreage that accrued to Britain and that according to Pomeranz was
context I consider the following comment quite relevant: “It is our contention that the
absence in the East of the intra- and intercontinental grain market integration found … in
the West as early as by mid eighteenth century, may be interpreted as a form of Western
exceptionalism. We identify several significant dissimilarities between West and East
concerning grain market integration: geo-economic scope (intra- and intercontinental
versus national); evolution over time (secular progress versus reversal in the nineteenth
century); role of agents (market forces versus state and others as leading forces) and
policies (relative openness to foreign trade versus relative closeness). Therefore, West and
East were different in this important respect both before and after the Industrial Revo-
lution. The restrictive trade policy practiced by the East (China, Japan and Korea) might
have been one of the biggest economic policy mistakes ever committed since it prevented
that part of the world from taking advantage of the direct (static and dynamic gains) and
indirect (institutional) benefits resulting from the expansion of foreign trade during the
Early Modern Era.” The quotation is from Rafael Dobado-Gonzlez, Alfredo Garca-
Hiernaux and David E. Guerrero, ‘West versus East: early globalization and the Great
Divergence’, a paper that can be downloaded under filename SSRN-id2296852. I quote
from page 2 of the paper.
1080 The best brief introduction to Wallerstein’s ideas with regard to the core-periphery re-
lations that were created by the capitalist West still is Wallerstein, Modern world-system, I.
These relations need not be supported by formal, ‘imperialist’ relations like they exist
between colonised and colonising countries.
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so fundamental for its industrialisation would not have existed without the
collusion between Britain’s capitalists and the British state.
The relation, during Qing rule, between China Proper, Manchuria with its
specific status as the homeland of the ruling Manchus, and their various new
territorial acquisitions, was quite different. It clearly was not one between ‘core’
and ‘periphery’, as Wallerstein and other modern-world system theorists de-
scribe it. New territories like Taiwan, Mongolia, Tibet or Xinjiang, were not
‘forced’ in one way or another to make their economies serve that of China.1081
No fundamental changes in their mode of production were instigated by their
new relationship with Qing China, nor did their overlords in China put them
under pressure to introduce such changes. The migrants or sojourners, who
went to China’s ‘frontier’, inside or outside China Proper, replicated the China
they came from. The modes of production, trade, transportation, and finance
inherited from China Proper, were reproduced or passed on with little or no
change.1082 We do not see the emergence of any plantations where sugar, tea,
tobacco, silk, or cotton were grown, not in the newly conquered regions, not in
the internal periphery nor, for that matter, in China Proper itself.1083 Possibilities
to profit from the new lands as they presented themselves often were not utilised.
Government often was reticent to let Han Chinese settle in peripheral zones. It
did not exactly promote trade in or with its new territories. There are various
examples of government discouraging or even prohibiting the mining of pre-
cious metals and minerals in Xinjiang, or the starting of various projects that
might help in developing the region.1084 Tibet was known, in any case in the West,
to be rich in minerals. This explains Western, i. e. British, interest in the region.
The Qing state did not take it upon itself to exploit them, nor did it encourage or
help others to do so.1085 During the eighteenth century, it not only tried to strictly
regulate migration to Taiwan, it also frequently restricted its trade.1086
In this respect, what happened in Manchuria or rather what did not happen
there is highly interesting and will serve as an example. We see some ‘filling up’
here too. The ‘frontier’ moved somewhat northward and the region became more
1081 See e. g. for the situation in Manchuria, Isett, State, peasant, and merchant in Qing
Manchuria, and Reardon-Anderson, Reluctant pioneers, 170.
1082 Compare Bin Wong’s interesting comments on the ‘fractual’ quality of China’s societal
structure in Wong, China transformed, 121 – 122.
1083 See for that observation, for sugar, Mazumdar, Sugar and society in China e. g. ‘Conclu-
sion’, and, for tea, Gardella, Harvesting mountains, e. g. chapters 2 and 4. See further my
Zur politischen Ökonomie des Tees, 97 – 114.
1084 See, for examples, Dabringhaus, Das Qing-Imperium als Vision und Wirklichkeit, 77 and
79, and Fletcher, ‘Ch’ing Inner Asia c. 1800’, 66.
1085 See, for example, Dabringhaus, Das Qing-Imperium als Vision und Wirklichkeit, 111 and
112, and Teltscher, High road to China.
1086 Pin-tsun Chang, ‘Chinese migration to Taiwan in the eighteenth century : a paradox’, 112.
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or less a developed province. According to Yong Xue, specialist in Chinese his-
tory at Suffolk University in Boston, however, the region could have functioned
as a huge reservoir of ghost acreage – and also as a provider of coal – for China
Proper during the very long eighteenth century.1087 One can only agree with him
when he writes: “The vast virgin lands in Manchuria offered a real windfall,
representing a piece of geographical luck for Jiangnan.”1088 Manchuria enjoyed
extra-ordinary natural endowments. The breath of its farmland was enormous.
Qing Manchuria in its entirety, until the Russians took over part of it in the 1850s,
measured about 1.2 million km2. That is a tract of land roughly twice as big as
contemporary France. Whereas many forests in China Proper had been stripped
bare by the end of the eighteenth century, the Manchurian lands remained
cloaked in what appeared to be endless woodlands. The region had plenty of fur
bearing animals, fish, and oysters. Its soil contained gold and, as one discovered
late in the nineteenth century, copper, lead, and tin. It was famous for its gin-
seng.1089 The point is that the Qing elite simply did not really care.
It would, of course, be incorrect to suggest that nothing happened. The virgin
lands in Manchuria did provide China Proper with soybean. But they could have
done so much more and much earlier. That becomes only too apparent after the
‘opening’ of Manchuria when the region was turned into the biggest soybean
producer in the world.1090 Manchuria could have become a major grain supplier
for the capital : it had excellent soil and enough water for farming. Grain prices
there were only half what they were in China Proper. People at the time knew this
and made suggestions about how to use the region’s potential. He Qizhong, an
imperial censor, for example, did so already in the middle of the eighteenth
century. Let me again quote Yong Xue:
If the Qing government had coordinated a series of agricultural projects in Manchuria
instead of prohibiting immigration into the region, if commercial institutions in China
had been effective enough to channel the large amount of capital needed to develop the
frontiers and establish large plantations as the British did in North America, then a
large amount of Manchurian grain could have flowed into Beijing.1091
For the nineteenth century, talking about industrialization means talking about
coal. That was yet another resource that Manchuria could have supplied to parts
of China Proper. In 1745, He Qizhong, the imperial censor to whom we just
1087 Yong Xue, ‘Fertiliser revolution’.
1088 Yong Xue, ‘Fertiliser revolution’, 219.
1089 See for these descriptions Reardon-Anderson, Reluctant pioneers, 9 and 103 – 104.
1090 Yong Xue, ‘Fertiliser revolution’, 196 – 197 and 218 – 219. It is quite striking that the Qing
government did not abolish all restrictions – which were meant to protect Manchurian
consumers – on transporting soybeans and bean cakes by sea out of their ‘homeland’
definitively until 1722. See Yong Xue’s article pages 202 and 209.
1091 Yong Xue, ‘Fertiliser revolution’, 220.
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referred, reported abundant coal resources in Fengtian (modern Liaoning),
which were located fairly close to seaports. He urged that this natural bounty be
exploited to relieve the shortage of firewood in the region.1092 Nothing of the sort
happened. One cannot therefore, with Yong Xue, escape the conclusion that the
opportunities provided by Manchuria, which indeed could fittingly be labelled
‘China’s geographical luck’, were squandered. With him one can point at various
reasons for that, such as tensions between Han and Manchu’s or internal in-
stitutional defects of the Ming and Qing states. But whatever the exact reason,
one can only conclude that government was unwilling to grasp those oppor-
tunities or give private entrepreneurs the possibility to do so.
In capitalism as conceived by Braudel, Wallerstein and Arrighi, the state plays a
very prominent active role. If we are to believe Pomeranz, ‘coal’ and ‘colonies’ were
the two main reasons that Britain could industrialise and leave China behind. The
British state played a major role in facilitating and supporting the exploitation of
both.1093 My thesis would be that China, in a way, also had its ‘coal’ and its ‘colonies’,
but that government there was a serious hindrance in making the most of them. In
China government did not collude with ‘capitalists entrepreneurs’ or support them
but normally controlled or at least mistrusted them. As regards coal mining, the
Qing rulers often prohibited opening mines in the first place, or wanted those
already opened, closed down.1094 Initiatives by government itself to open mines or
to ‘modernise’ them were absent. When it comes to the exploitation of newly
incorporated territories or of Manchuria, we can only conclude that many chances
were not utilised, or rather not even considered. A policy of colonisation like we see
in the West was never tried. Chinese merchants who were active overseas were not
supported either. Roy Bin Wong comments that the Chinese state was more likely to
invest in peripheries than to extract resources from them.1095 As a staunch re-
visionist, he ultimately comes up with an interpretation of Manchu rule in China
1092 Yong Xue, ‘Fertiliser revolution’, 219.
1093 For ‘colonies’ that of course is evident. For the ways in which government supported the
coal and iron industries in Great Britain see, for example, Parthasarathi, Why Europe grew
rich, 162 – 170.
1094 For various examples in China Proper, see Xu Dixin and Wu Chengming, eds., Chinese
capitalism, 1522 – 1840 (New York 2000) under ‘copper’, ‘copper mines’, ‘coal’, ‘coal mi-
ning’, ‘silver’ and ‘gold extraction’; the Volumes 9 and 10 of the Cambridge History of
China in the Index under ‘mining’ and ‘mines’ and Sun, ‘Ch’ing government and the
mineral industries before 1800’. One of the reasons was that government was afraid of
creating great gatherings of ‘unruly elements’. It in this respect is striking that coal miners
in Qing China almost without exception had a very low social status and were closely
watched whereas in several parts of Europe this was not the case. According to Lis and Soly
miners were the only large group of wage earners not subject to legal restrictions curtailing
their mobility, at least in Central Europe. See for some further explanation Lis and Soly,
Worthy efforts, 439 – 440. For China see e. g. Sun, ‘Mining labor in the Ch’ing period’.
1095 Wong, China transformed, 148.
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that is static and conservative: “The Chinese state aimed for and to some degree
achieved its goal of static efficiency ; that is, spreading the best techniques available
across a vast area. This goal made sense in a world of limited possibilities.”1096 That
is surprisingly similar to what most Eurocentrists he likes to attack have always
claimed! He basically in this respect repeats the claim made by the famous Chinese
sociologist Fei Xiaotong who in his From the soil. The foundations of Chinese society
writes that China’s imperial state was an inactive state, with a policy of leaving well
enough alone.1097
24. Markets: sizes and characteristics
All the scholars discussed in the previous paragraphs on Western capitalism, apart
from Fernand Braudel, who explicitly refers to China’s market economy, share the
conviction that in the West, whatever interpretation they adopt of capitalism, the
market became more important and more dominant in the economy than else-
where. In all their interpretations, commodification plays a central role. For many
scholars, as indicated, ‘the rise of the West’ is ‘the rise of the market’. That can only
mean that they assume that in the rest of the world the market was (a) less
prominent (b) did not function as well (c) grew less, or a combination of these. Is
that true? Did Britain and Western Europe have more extended and better func-
tioning markets than the rest of the world? Let us start our brief discussion with
some comments on domestic markets. England and Wales formed one centralised
‘uniform’ territorial state in the eighteenth century. Of course, geography and
distance played a role but there were no administrative impediments to a free
exchange of goods in the form of tariffs, tolls, specific regional arrangements and
the like. In that sense they indeed were one integrated market. In 1707, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain consisting of England, Wales and Scotland was created.
In many respects that are relevant for our analysis that focuses on the economy,
Scotland continued to be a separate entity during the period discussed here. But
that did not impact negatively on the extent to which Great Britain became one
market. It was only in 1801 that Ireland joined Great Britain to form the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. It then took still a couple of decades before
the former ‘settler colony’ and its coloniser officially became one integrated
economy. ‘Nationalisation’ of the markets, i.e. the elimination of internal tariffs
and customs zones but also introducing all kinds of standardisation – while at the
same time creating barriers for foreigners – was a major project of all mercantilist
rulers. In Great Britain, the project definitely was successfully implemented over
1096 Wong, China transformed, 280.
1097 Fei Xiaotong, From the soil.
Part two: Actual explanations of the Great Divergence350
the eighteenth century. In many other parts of Europe, economic unification in the
sense of creating one national level playing field for all buyers and sellers made less
great strides. At the eve of the French Revolution, national integration was still far
from completed in France. The same goes for ‘Spain’, which in several respects still
was a composite state, and the Habsburg Empire. Germany and Italy did not even
exist then. In this respect internal markets in Continental Europe remained badly
integrated until deep into the nineteenth century, and relatively small as compared
to the in principle huge markets in the big empires of the Qing, the Mughals or the
Ottomans that politically were far less ‘dispersed’.1098 Between countries in Europe,
mercantilist policies prevailed for decades in the nineteenth century. When Great
Britain took off, it was a mercantilist country. In contrast to the common idea that
it would have been the realm of free trade and France a ‘Colbertist’, mercantilist
state, it actually was more rather than less protectionist than France.
Graph 10: Average customs’ tariff revenue as a fraction of all imports for France and Great
Britain, 1820 – 1910
Source: John V.C. Nye, War, Wine, and Taxes. The Political Economy of Anglo-French
Trade, 1689 – 1900 (Princeton/Oxford 2007) 4.
There was so much intervention, regulation and taxation in international trade
that it is not very hazardous to assume that it would have been larger in a free-
trade context. Intercontinental trade clearly increased fast, which is not so
surprising considering that it started from such a low level. As for trade with the
1098 For differences in economic integration in Western Europe as measured by the importance
of internal customs zones and a discussion of other criteria to measure economic ‘frag-
mentation’, see Dincecco, Political transformations and public finances, chapter two. Here
again England looks different, as it was an integrated economy from very early on, with up
until 1788 a bigger integrated domestic market than e. g. France, that still consisted of
several customs zones.
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East, monopolies and manipulation continued to be very important until the end
of the eighteenth century, if not longer, although all sorts of private trade were on
the increase. In the Far East, Europe’s presence actually was quite marginal until
that region was ‘opened’ during the nineteenth century. In the trade over the
Atlantic, which for Europe was far more important and was dominated by
Western traders, the role of real chartered companies was much smaller. But as a
rule, European governments did their utmost, with varying results, to keep
foreign competitors out of their colonies. In trade over the Pacific, between East
Asia and the Americas, up to the 1820s, the importance of the Manila Galleons,
and thus of controlled trade, remained paramount.1099 So the thesis that the ‘rise
of the West’ would have been ‘the rise of market’ can clearly do with a lot of
qualification. Markets there were badly integrated. Foreign trade was often quite
regulated, subject to all sorts of tariffs and taxes, at times even in the hands of
monopolists, and the total number of people involved was not impressive as
compared to other markets in the world. Europe was and for a very long time
continued to be a patchwork of many small ‘states’.
Which brings us to the corollary of that thesis, which would be that in other
parts of the world the market economy would have been much less developed. In
any case for China – and I again confine myself to that country – this is simply
untrue. The idea that its agricultural sector (almost) completely consisted of
subsistence peasants who avoided the market is a myth. Whatever barriers there
may, at times, have existed for foreign trade, the internal domestic market was
practically free. There were not many internal customs and (official) tariffs were
low. In that respect, China’s domestic economy must have been more rather than
less Smithian than Europe’s economy as a whole and even more than the
economies of most European states. As many scholars have shown, there was an
enormously dense net of markets. Long-distance rice trade in China was far
bigger in terms of the total amounts involved than long-distance grain trade in
Europe.1100 The number of potential buyers and sellers was much higher not only,
obviously, than in Great Britain itself, but also than in Britain and its entire
empire combined. China alone had more inhabitants than Europe, the Americas
and Africa together. According to Carol Shiue and Wolfgang Keller, the level of
market integration in Qing China on the eve of the Industrial Revolution would
have been just as high as in Europe.1101 In principle, the country must have
1099 See Schurz, Manila Galleon and Legarda Jr. , After the galleons.
1100 For an analysis of China’s market system, see Skinner, ‘Marketing and social structure in
rural China’ For the comparison of the long-distance rice trade in China and long-distance
grain trade in Europe, see Pomeranz, Great Divergence, 34.
1101 Shiue and Keller, ‘Markets in China and Europe on the eve of the Industrial Revolution’. In
India markets seem to have been less integrated. See Studer, ‘India and the Great Diver-
gence’.
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offered enormous possibilities for developing an advanced division of labour
and specialisation. In several sectors it clearly did. In Jingdezhen, the capital of
porcelain production in the world during the Ming and Qing Dynasties, the
production process was divided in more than seventy steps, each operated by
trained craftsmen.1102 The production and sale of tea, to just give another ex-
ample, was also very specialised.1103 If sheer extension of the market were the
foundation of modern economic growth, Qing China should have been the place
where it would have emerged first. Adam Smith says he has seen his famous pin
factory himself. There, however, are claims that he actually may have been
inspired by the French Jesuit Francois-Xavier d’Entrecolles (1664 – 1741) and his
description of the production of porcelain in Jingdezhen or by a description of a
pin factory in a text by a Persian scholar called Al-Gazhzali (1058 – 1111).1104 At
any rate, it is far from clear that total trade volumes as such in Western countries
were bigger than those in other densely populated developed parts of the world.
It is no accident that amongst economic historians, and especially amongst
members of the California School, the idea that there would be a smooth and
somehow ‘natural’ transition from Smithian to Schumpeterian modern growth
has lost much of its support.1105
As usual, things are more complicated. The absolute amount of goods en-
tering Chinese markets indeed was huge but it is not clear whether the per-
centage of goods marketed as a percentage of all goods produced was higher or
lower in the most developed parts of China than in Britain, which would be at
least as relevant here. Considering the fact that China had less urbanisation, and
relatively speaking a smaller middle class, less wage labour and less exports than
Great Britain, I would tend to think the rate and diversity of commercialisation
were higher in Britain than in China. What really matters in the end for economic
growth in this respect is not so much the size of the market per se but the extent
to which division of labour and specialisation developed and thereby a di-
versification of production. In that respect, I am not convinced that China’s
markets had a similar impact to those of Great Britain. All the comments so far
refer to commodities. The buying and selling of land was subject to several
restrictions in China, but the land market in Britain, at least regarding large
estates, was even less free. China’s labour market may have been fairly free but it
was tiny. As compared to Great Britain its importance was marginal. As far as
1102 Finlay, ‘Pilgrim art: the culture of porcelain in world history’.
1103 See e. g. Gardella, Harvesting mountains, 66 and 68.
1104 See e. g. Adshead, China in world history, 296, and Graeber, Debt, 279.
1105 For an explicit rejection see e. g. Pomeranz, Great Divergence via the Index and references
to ‘markets’; Wong, China transformed, 13 – 31, and Wrigley, Continuity, chance and
change, chapter 4.
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interest rates are a good indicator, the money market in China was not func-
tioning as well as in Great Britain. Interest rates overall were much higher.
China’s trade with other countries in absolute terms was quite substantial but,
as compared to total GDP, it was negligible. In the beginning of the nineteenth
century, it still amounted to less than one per cent. Up until the first decade of the
nineteenth century, it had a surplus on its balance of trade, in the sense at least
that it accumulated huge amounts of silver that were brought by Europeans as
payment for their purchases. Many estimates circulate in texts by global his-
torians, most of them wild exaggerations. One can hazard the guess that in total
between a fifth and a fourth of all the silver exported from Latin America be-
tween the last decades of the sixteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth
centuries in the end arrived in China, over Europe or directly from Acapulco via
the famous Manila galleons.1106 In the eyes of contemporary mercantilists, China
must have looked like a quite successful country. Even so, however, for China’s
economy in its entirety, the impact of foreign trade can only have been quite
small, at least in terms of values and in terms of spin-off effects. The country
definitely was not closed but it was self-sufficient to a high degree. Foreign
imports, basically silver and then opium, provided no real challenge to domestic
production. Exports of course could have regional impact as in the case of tea but
were tiny as compared to total GDP. There was no urge to start some sort of
import-substitution. There was no ‘jealousy of trade’, no competition with other
trading nations and no economic nationalism or mercantilism.
What matters in discussing markets is not just their size but also how exactly
they functioned. Most scholars identifying ‘the rise of Europe’ with ‘the rise of
the market’ actually mean the rise of free and fair markets, that is, markets in
which competition is not tampered with by external ‘political’ forces and in
which none of the parties involved is so large as to be able to influence prices on
it own. On such markets, all parties, in brief, are price-takers. Of course that is an
‘ideal’ situation that has never actually existed anywhere in history. For con-
sumer goods, Qing China came quite close to the Smithian ideal of a market with
free and fair competition. Markets for capital goods and money were less
‘transparent’ and free. Let us focus here on the labour market, where to my view
the biggest differences existed between our two countries.
As far as a labour market actually existed in China, it was free, albeit with
some exceptions, for example convicts or people in debt peonage. Surprisingly
enough, considering the connection usually made between capitalism, wage
labour and freedom, the importance of un-free labour was far higher for Great
Britain’s economy than for that of China. I already referred to Great Britain’s
1106 See note 802. China, by the way, exported gold although the value of that export was
dwarfed by that of silver imports.
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slave trade and to slaves working outside Great Britain but producing goods that
were bought by Great Britain. But this does not exhaust the ways in which the
British economy profited from un-free labour, outside as well as inside the
country. There were tens of thousands of convicts, or political deportees, doing
coerced labour in its colonies. Great Britain in all deported some 50,000 convicts,
in particular from Ireland, to its North American colonies. When that was no
longer possible, Australia became the favourite destination for convicts. Be-
tween 1788 and 1868, no fewer than 165,000 were sent there to perform hard
labour.1107 Then there was indentured labour. In this form of labour relation the
indentured labourer signed a contract that obliged him to work for a couple of
years for his master in a position as servant, which left him hardly any free-
dom.1108 According to one estimate, of the total number of Europeans that im-
migrated to the thirteen colonies that were to become the United States between
1700 and 1775, only 152,000 were free, 52,000 convicts, and 104,000 indentured
servants.1109
Tens of thousands of people were forced into Britain’s army and in particular
its navy. For the navy, there was the forcible recruitment or ‘impressment’ of
seamen and all males between the ages of eighteen and fifty-five who ‘used the
sea’, to man its fleets in wartime. This policy was not abolished until 1833. Let me
give some figures. During the Seven Years War (1756 – 1763) roughly 185,000
men were enlisted at least once on one of the ships of the Royal Navy. That is nine
per cent of all adult males: probably half of them were impressed. That would be
some 90,000 men.1110 In the period from 1776 to 1783, about one third of the
people serving – that is some 80,000 people – had been pressed into their job.1111
Impressment as such was almost non-existent in the army but coercion of one
kind or another did play a substantial role in enrolling military men too.1112
Whatever way people were enrolled, when they were serving the army or the
1107 See for information Yang, ‘Indian convict workers in Southeast Asia in the late-eighteenth
and early-nineteenth centuries’; Meredith and Oxley, ‘Condemned to the colonies’; Bosma,
‘European colonial soldiers in the nineteenth century’ and, with also some information on
the French case, Moulier-Boutang, De l’esclavage au salariat, 163 – 168.
1108 See, for the exact meaning of this concept, Wikipedia under ‘indentured servant’
1109 Fogleman, ‘From slaves, convicts, and servants to free passengers’, table A.3, page 71. See
also Galenson, ‘Rise and fall of indentured servitude in the Americas’. I found even higher
estimates in terms of the ratio of free versus indentured labour in Moulier-Boutang, De
l’esclavage au salariat, 156. For a general overview of developments after the abolishing of
slavery in the British Empire, see Northrup, Indentured labor in the age of imperialism.
1110 Rogers, ‘Vagrancy, impressment and the regulation of labour in eighteenth-century Bri-
tain’, 107 – 108.
1111 Rodger, Command of the ocean, 396.
1112 See James, Warrior race, 296 – 301, for information on how the state could compel people to
join the forces.
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navy, discipline was extremely harsh.1113 Discipline on merchant ships, by the
way, also was extremely harsh and labour conditions there were very though
too.1114 If need arose in the West Indies and in the colonies in North America, the
British army also used slaves.1115 Britain’s armed forces were a major productive
force. They functioned as a collective of ‘military workers’ who defended and
expanded Britain’s economy. Overseas they, moreover, also often performed
more than just military tasks and were used to build roads, fortresses et cetera.
The Royal Navy was used for collecting all kinds of information imaginable (e. g.
with regard to geography, botany or zoology) in an effort to ‘map the world’, to
then be able to order, pacify and civilise it.1116 The best guesses of military
historians suggest that about one in sixteen adult males in Britain was serving in
the armed forces during the War of Austrian Succession, one in eight during the
War of American Independence and no less than one in five during the French
Wars from 1793 to 1815.1117
We still have not exhausted the various ways in which Britain’s economy
profited from coerced labour. The number of people put away in workhouses or
poor houses amounted to 90,000 in 1776 and 123,000 in 1850. There can be no
doubt that by far the majority of them, were not, as originally had been intended,
able-bodied, full-time employed adults. But these places nevertheless housed a
substantial ‘coerced’ labour force. So did so-called Bridewells or houses of
correction.1118 In the first decades of industrialisation, thousands of orphans or
children from workhouses worked as pauper apprentices for mill owners who
practically owned them. They were bound by contract to work at their mills until
they became adults. By the late 1790s, for example, about a third of the workers in
the cotton industry were pauper apprentices.1119 The position of women on the
labour market, very prominent in domestic service, also was not free in the sense
we use that word now, although it definitely was a very important form of
contractual work experience in early modern British society, certainly the most
1113 For discipline see e. g. Frykman, ‘Seeleute auf den europäischen Kriegsschiffen des späten
18. Jahrhunderts’ and James, Warrior race, 292 – 317.
1114 See e. g. Fink, Sweatshops at sea.
1115 James, Warrior race, 300 – 301.
1116 See e. g. Bosma, ‘European colonial soldiers in the nineteenth century’ and Way, “Klas-
senkrieg: Die ursprüngliche Akkumulation, die militärische Revolution und der britische
Kriegsarbeiter’. For the many activities of the Royal Navy, see Angster, Erdbeeren und
Piraten.
1117 Emsley, British society and the French Wars, 1793 – 1815 and Conway, ‘Britain and the
impact of the American War, 1775 – 1783’.
1118 For the comment that many poor houses took care of the elderly and the young who were
not able to look after themselves, see Daunton, Progress and poverty, 454 – 455. In the 1770s
some 9,000 to 14,000 people were sent to such houses of correction every year. See Pa-
triquin, Agrarian capitalism, 109.
1119 See e. g. Humphries, Childhood and child labour in the British Industrial Revolution.
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important one for women.1120 The same goes for children, who together with
women provided the bulk of labour in the new factories or worked as appren-
tices. Over the period from 1835 to 1870, adult males never formed more than
roughly one third of the entire labour force in cotton and woollen factories.1121
Intervention in the labour market was rife in industrialising Britain. Let us
again refer to the situation around 1800. The so-called Combination Acts that
were in force till 1824, and then were only slightly relaxed, prohibited labour to
‘combine’ in order to raise its wages whereas in the words of Adam Smith “…
masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform
combination not to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate”.1122 There
also was intervention on behalf of labour: In 1802 – 1803, e. g. there were
1,041,000 people on relief in England and Wales; 735,000 on permanent and
306,000 on occasional relief. Thousands of labourers under the so-called
Speenhamland system received allowances to increase their wages to market
level or were paid by parishes with tax money to work on farms.1123 Even the
position of many so-called male ‘free’ labourers in Britain was much less free
than that of modern employees working under a contract and far more like that
of servants, as, amongst others, Robert Steinfeld has conclusively shown.1124
Wage earners were considered domestics and were supposed to provide a
service. It is no accident, that the category of servants often included not only
domestics in the strict meaning of the term, but also apprentices, journeymen
and wage earners. Their work was usually conceived as their master’s property
and they had to be at permanent disposal. Interestingly enough, on the whole,
work-related criminal sanctions were reinforced between 1720 and 1850 and not
loosened. In this respect, it is striking, considering the country’s cherished
image as a place of ‘laissez-faire’, that Lis and Soly in their overview of the
European situation in the pre-industrial era write “Nowhere else [than in Eng-
land] was national labour legislation enforced so consistently and for so
1120 See Steedman, Labours lost, chapter 2 for some estimates of their number, in particular
36 – 39. In the first decade of the nineteenth century some ten per cent of the population,
overwhelmingly women, may have been engaged in some sort of waged domestic labour in
England. Again, the situation in China at the time could not have been more different.
1121 See the table on page 423 in Evans, Forging of the modern state.
1122 Smith, Inquiry into the nature and Causes of the wealth of nations, 84.
1123 Patriquin, Agrarian capitalism, chapter 5. The figures are on page 121. No country in
Europe spent a higher share of its GDP on poor relief in the period discussed in this book
than Britain. See Lindert, ‘Poor relief before the welfare state: Britain versus the Conti-
nent’, 114.
1124 See Steinfeld, Invention of free labour ; idem, Coercion, contract, and free labour in the
nineteenth century and Deakin and Wilkinson, Law of the labour market. See also Lis and
Soly, Worthy Efforts, 494 – 509. For those criminal sanctions see e. g. Craven and Hay,
‘Criminalization of ‘free’ labour’.
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long.”1125 ‘Capitalist’ Britain thus profited directly or indirectly from an enor-
mous amount of un-free labour, at home, on sea and abroad. At the end of these
paragraphs I can do no better than to cite Seymour Drescher whose general
comments on capitalism fit the case of Britain in the very long eighteenth century
perfectly :
Capitalism was supremely agnostic and pluralistic in its ability to coexist, and to thrive,
with a whole range of labour systems right through the abolitionist century after 1780:
with slavery ; with indentured servitude; with sharecropping; with penal labour; with
seasonal contract labour and with day labour; with penally constrained or uncon-
strained free labour. In the longer run, we can see more clearly than Williams’s gen-
eration [i. e. Eric Williams] that the ‘rise of free labour’ during (the) conventional age of
industrialization was, in some respects, a myth…1126
Un-free labour in any case was far more important for the economy of capitalist
industrialising Britain than for China, where forms of un-free labour of course
existed but where their overall importance continued to be marginal. On a global
scale free labour was extremely rare. According to Arthur Young, in 1772, only
four per cent of the earth’s labour force was free. The remaining ninety-six per
cent, in his words, laboured as slaves, serves, indentured servants, or vassals.1127
25. The institution of institutions: The role of the state, in
particular that of Britain
Capitalism is supposed to have played a fundamental role in rise of the West
according to mainstream Eurocentric explanations. It implies the existence of a
state. Even the most outspoken proponents of economic laissez-faire would
endorse that claim and admit that no institution can better provide for pro-
tection of property, law and order, internal and external safety, and the creation
and maintenance of infrastructure, material as well as institutional. As Ace-
moglu and Robinson see it, in my view correctly, the existence of a centralised
state is a necessary precondition for any economic development to happen.1128
But that is as far as the consensus goes. We have seen that there is an enormous
array of not just very different but often even completely opposite suggestions as
to what a state conducive to growth would look like and do. They range from
1125 Lis and Soly, Worthy efforts, 444.
1126 Drescher, ‘The Williams thesis after fifty years’, 148. The fundamental importance of un-
free labour for the development of ‘capitalist’ economies is the main subject of the very
broad and interesting analysis of Moulier-Boutang, De l’esclavage au salariat. See also
Graeber, Debt, Chapter 11.
1127 Young, Political essays concerning the present state of the British Empire, 20 – 21.
1128 Acemoglu and Robinson, Why nations fail, passim. See the Index under ‘state’.
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complete laissez-faire to complete central planning and control, and everything
in between. Whatever thesis a historian would like to defend about the role of the
state in economic development, he can rest assured that he can refer to some
economist for support.
I personally, to put my cards on the table right away, endorse the inter-
pretation that is at the basis of Erik Reinert’s entire oeuvre and that he neatly
summarises in his article on the role of the state in economic growth. There, he
presents a long list of ways in which a government can support the economy and
help in generating wealth. He begins by distinguishing between three roles
central government can play, to wit acting as provider of institutions, acting itself
as an institution that takes care of income distribution and, thirdly, acting as
promoter of economic growth. He then becomes more specific with regard to
that third role by claiming that government might try to do the following: get the
nation into the right business, create a comparative advantage in the right
business, supply infrastructure, set standards, provide skilled labour and en-
trepreneurship, create demand (especially high-quality demand), place an em-
phasis on knowledge and education, provide a legal system, and finally act as an
entrepreneur and capitalist of the last resort.1129 He focuses on strategies to
create the right production and the right trade, i. e. activities with increasing
returns, high added values and profits. The ‘strategies’ referred to here were
almost all used by European ‘policy-makers’ in the early modern era that, sur-
prisingly enough, we would normally regard as mercantilists.
What historians in any case do agree upon is that until at least the 1830s,
Britain was a fiscal-military, mercantilist and imperialist state. No serious
scholar, in my view, can deny this any longer. There simply is overwhelming
empirical evidence for this claim. Britain’s tax level increased over the entire
eighteenth century and even more during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic
Wars between 1793 and 1815. Its taxes became the highest in the world. Its public
debts rose to levels that make those of countries like Greece or Spain at the
moment look small. A very substantial amount of government expenditure
simply had to consist of debt servicing. Between 1816 and 1850, debt servicing
almost without exception was more than fifty per cent of the annual budget. By
far the biggest part of government expenditure was for the military. The armies it
mobilised were large; its permanent navy was the largest in the world.1130 Per
1129 Erik Reinert, ‘The role of the state in economic growth’. Reinert also refers to the fact that
government would have to see to it that real wages are high. He is right in suggesting that
this particular goal appeared only quite late on the state’s agenda.
1130 I refer for further information and a large amount of available relevant literature to my ‘Die
Staatsfinanzen Chinas und Großbritanniens im langen 18. Jahrhundert’. For a recent
debate on British mercantilism, the findings of which I could not incorporate in this text,
see The William and Mary Quarterly 69, 1 (2012) 3 – 70.
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capita, the country had a surprisingly high number of bureaucrats. The country
was quite protectionist. It had high tariffs and even bans to keep unwanted
imports out, it subsidised certain exports and taxed certain exports heavily, for
example that of coal.1131 At home, the central government tried to create a free
and integrated domestic market – as all mercantilist governments did. It of
course had to heed local interests and be pragmatic but it to a large extent
succeeded. That does not mean it had a hands-off policy. Internally, there was
quite a lot of regulation too, although it definitely was far less comprehensive.1132
Table 51: Great Britain’s fiscal State, 1580s – 1815
1600 1650 1690 1730 1790 1815
Nom. GNP (£m) 46 57 130 320
National debt (£m) 3.1 51.4 244 745








Tax revenue (£m) 2.05 6 16 63
As % of GNP 3.4 7 10.7 12.3 18.2
Expenditure (£m) 4 5.5 16.8 112.9
As % of GNP 9 10 13 35
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Note: w = war, p = peace
Source: Forrest Capie, ‘The origins and development of stable fiscal and monetary in-
stitutions in England’ in: Michael D. Bordo and Roberto Cort¦s-Conde, eds. , Transferring
wealth and power from the Old to the New World. Monetary and fiscal institutions in the
17th through the 19th centuries (Cambridge 2001) 10 – 58, page 28.
1131 For tariffs and bans see Nye, War, wine, and taxes. For export bounties see Hoppit,
‘Bounties, the economy and the state in Britain’. Let me just give one example of taxes on
exports. While total output of all coalmines could even have doubled between 1790 and
1815 and its real prices in Britain, except London, were falling, taxes on coal exports could
reach seventy percent. See O’Brien, Contributions of Warfare, the LSE Working Paper
version, pages 53 – 54.
1132 See Gauci, Regulating the British economy. On the book flap it reads: “The book challenges
the general characterization of the period as a shift from a regulated economy to a more
laissez-faire system, highlighting the uncertain but significant relationship between the
state and economic interests across the long eighteenth century.”
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Let us again try and compare Great Britain and China to figure out what might
have been the impact of a specific factor, in this case the nature and role of the
state, in the explanation of the Great Divergence. That (Great) Britain was a
fiscal-military and mercantilist-imperialist state when it took off is a fact that
economists and economic historians have to deal with in their explanation of the
Great Divergence. Internally, China was at least as much, and I would think in
several respects even more, of a market economy with free and fair competition
than Britain. When it comes to foreign affairs, China’s government certainly did
not want to give too much power and leeway to its own or foreign traders and
therefore kept them in check. But overall, foreign trade was not more manipu-
lated and regulated than it was in Great Britain. It in any case was far less
important than it was for the British economy.
In my discussion of the state, I will focus almost exclusively on the role of the
British state because that simply was far greater (of course relatively speaking)
than its Chinese counterpart in terms of level and increase of taxation, gov-
ernment borrowing and debt servicing, number of civilian officials and military
personnel and also far more prominent in terms of trying to change the economy
and increase production to be able to increase its revenues and power. The
philosophy behind the policies of China’s rulers at the time can be best described
as ‘agrarian paternalist’.1133 Law and order and the military obviously were
important. But government was not engaged in an arms race. It did not bother
about building a strong navy. Up to the 1810s, the country imported more
bullion than it exported and the government saw no reason to worry about
exports as its European counterparts did. Agriculture was seen as the fundament
of economy and society. Rulers considered it their duty to care for ‘people’s
livelihood’, i. e. to provide for the security and wealth of their subjects. They had
to be restrained and interpret the state’s mandate as one of managing and
stabilising wealth rather than controlling and extracting it. They were supposed
to tax lightly and to not interfere at the local level. ‘Controlling from afar’ by
means of lean government was the motto.1134 The idea that Qing rule in China, at
least at the central level, would be a kind of oriental despotism is no longer
widely supported. Government was much less of a brake on economic in-
novation and private enterprise than has always been suggested in Eurocentric
literature. The point is that it did not do much to promote them either and that
1133 For agrarian paternalism see for example, in chronological order, Leonard und Watt, To
achieve security and wealth ; Will, ‘Chine moderne et sinologie’,; idem, ‘D¦veloppement
quantitatif et d¦veloppement qualitatif en Chine  la fin de l’¦poque imp¦riale’; Dunstan,
Conflicting counsels to confuse the age ; Wong, China transformed, and idem, ‘The political
economy of agrarian empires’; Deng, Premodern Chinese economy. Finally I want to refer
to Antony and Leonard, Dragons, tigers, and dogs and Dunstan, State or merchant?
1134 Leonard, Controlling from afar, chapter 2.
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over time it became weaker and more inefficient – and therewith indeed an
impediment to growth – as I will discuss in the chapter Why not China? I here
refer the reader to that chapter, to my comments earlier on in the text on the lack
of Chinese mercantilsm and periphery building, and to my publications in which
I very extensively discussed the role of Qing China’s state in the economic
development of its country.1135
Great Britain’s take-off provides a real challenge for scholarship: how could
this country become the first industrial nation and the first one having modern
economic growth when it, as a fiscal-military and mercantilist state, sinned
against so many of the prescriptions of mainstream economics? Even Joel
Mokyr, who is convinced that Britain acquired economic primacy because it
developed into a laissez-faire economy, admits that: “Before the end of the
eighteenth century, Britain remained on the whole committed to protectionist
and mercantilist doctrines, but a few kinks appeared in the armour of the pro-
tectionist Juggernaut.” But, as he continues, “after 1815 the new liberalism was
slowly gaining ground …”1136 On the eve of the Industrial Revolution, according
to him, Britain still in many ways was a protectionist and regulated economy, in
which growth took place “despite rather than because of the institutional pre-
conditions”. It nevertheless was “better situated and equipped by comparison”
than other European nations.1137 According to him, Britain’s economy in the very
long eighteenth century initially grew and developed notwithstanding mercan-
tilism, only to grow and develop much faster once mercantilism had dis-
appeared. If a scholar such as Mokyr thinks the new liberalism only slowly
gained ground after 1815, one may safely assume that Britain was still mer-
cantilist, and a fiscal-military state, when its economy began to take-off. I sup-
port Mokyr’s claim that it was better “situated and equipped” as long as that does
not imply it would have been less mercantilist than e. g. France or the Nether-
lands. Overall, that was not the case, rather the contrary. In my view, up until at
least the 1830s, Britain was too mercantilist in too many respects to accept the
traditional claim that mercantilism was simply and entirely bad for develop-
ment, even though many economists and some historians following Adam
Smith’s indictments still make that claim.
Another scholar who follows Mokyr’s line of reasoning and therefore thinks
that in the end Britain’s economy developed and grew notwithstanding mer-
cantilism and all it stands for, would be John Nye, who claims that for mer-
1135 See my publications under notes 760 and 962.
1136 Mokyr, Enlightened economy, 153.
1137 See for these two quotations Mokyr, Enlightened economy, 25 and 12. See also ibidem, 68:
“None of this is to suggest that Britain had a society perfectly designed for economic
growth and technological progress. Yet compared to the rest of Europe, its advantages
seem obvious.”
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cantilist Britain empire building – and all that this implied – was not cost-
effective. Here are some quotations, all from his book on the political economy of
Anglo-French trade:
…when one factors in deadweight inefficiencies of high taxation and large government
with the cost of administering and defending the colonial empire, it is likely on both
theoretical and empirical grounds that such large-scale expansion was on net, costly to
the nation…
Absent a theoretically sound economic argument about the ways in which empire
promoted overall economic development, accompanied by appropriate empirical
evidence, the economists’ presumption that such intervention is globally ineffective
should be seen as decisive. At best it might be argued that the nature of political
incentives was such that no more efficient policy was feasible. But that is simply an
observation about the ways in which politics constrained productive behaviour; in
which case it becomes even more interesting to ask how Britain developed despite
[italics in original] such inefficient interventions.
Ultimately, the best case to be made for mercantile policy is a weak one: The creation of
a large and fiscally voracious state bureaucracy did not impede Britain’s trans-
formation into the first modern industrial economy. But it still remains to be de-
termined whether Britain grew because of, or in spite of, mercantilist policy.1138
Jack Goldstone too wonders: “Might it be that modern economies emerged
despite [italics in original], rather than because of, the growth of modern
states?”1139 For Deirdre McCloskey the enormous investment in mercantilist
policies – of which she in particular focuses on those made in permanent warfare
and in maintaining an enormous navy – to a large extent was a waste of money as
in her view Britain could have bought what it needed on a world market without
incurring all those costs. She claims that economic considerations and economic
logic ultimately decide where things will be produced and bought most effi-
ciently, which strikes me as quite nave considering the fact that in the early
modern era real and trade wars were the rule, not the exception.1140
Ronald Findlay and Kevin O’Rourke hold a quite specific and quite outspoken
position that I will use as point of departure of my analysis. They are very much
aware of the role of power in the economic history of the world and in particular
of European economies. Their overview of the economic history of the last
millennium is full of references to force, coercion and strife. They are convinced
that force, mercantilism and imperialism were necessary preconditions and
ingredients of Britain’s industrialisation. As we already described, in their view,
Britain’s ever expanding trade was the key reason why its industrial revolution
1138 Nye, War, wine, and taxes, 24, 24 – 25, and 112.
1139 Goldstone, ‘A historical, not comparative method’, 270.
1140 McCloskey, Bourgeois dignity, chapters 24 – 29, in particular pages 222 – 225.
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was different from previous ‘efflorescences’. The link between trade and Britain’s
state policy is then made by claiming that trade expansion to a large extent was a
consequence of a successful government strategy of promoting British trade and
thwarting the trade of other countries, if need be by violent means. In their
perspective mercantilism, warfare and empire building all supported trade and
thus industry. There is no need to extensively repeat all their arguments. They
realise that those policies of forcefully extending markets involved such high
costs that it is not all obvious whether mercantilism, warfare and empire really
were ‘worthwhile’ when measured on a neat balance sheet in terms of direct
monetary gains. At various places in their work, they make clear that in the end,
in the best of all worlds, they regard the market mechanism as the most efficient
way to organise an economy and neoclassical economic theory as the best way to
explain its efficient functioning. They consequently assume that growth and
development would have fared better in world of laissez-faire, but, as they im-
mediately add, that would hardly have been a realistic alternative.1141 That of
course is correct. It is not much use to claim that Britain would have been more
efficient had it been a laissez-faire state as Mokyr does when he discusses
whether mercantilist policies spurred Britain’s economy and claims that “What
is at stake is whether this spur offset the obvious and high costs of these policies,
and whether it was more effective than a more liberal policy.”1142 In my view it
would have been rather suicidal for a state not to be mercantilist in early modern
Europe. All European states were (more or less) mercantilist and their ruling
classes, almost without exception, endorsed mercantilism. That means, to suc-
cinctly summarize their perspective in my terms, that there was no real alter-
native and that being a successful mercantilist was the best one could hope for.
Whether fiscal-militarism and mercantilism were avoidable or not, it of
course is easy to show their enormous costs. The staggering costs of war and
empire building are obvious. Those of protectionism and monopoly as implied
by mercantilism are less so but they too must have been far from negligible. Let
me give some examples of such extra costs. Wheat prices in Britain were amongst
the highest in Europe. Nevertheless, until the 1760s, substantial amounts of
wheat were exported, subsidized with export bounties.1143 After the Napoleonic
Wars, the famous or rather notorious Corn Laws were introduced that were
meant to keep ‘cheap’ foreign imports out. They were not repealed until 1846.
1141 Findlay and O’Rourke, Power and plenty, 351 – 352. Erik Reinert, I think rightly, in his
review describes their book as schizophrenic in its effort to “unite the cruel reality of the
historical record with utopian theories of market-made economic harmony.” See Journal
of Global History 4 (2009) 512 – 514, page 514.
1142 Mokyr, Enlightened economy, 159.
1143 Mokyr, Enlightened economy, 150. See for an analysis of the phenomenon of export
bounties under note 1131.
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Between 1768 and 1782, all imports from the British West Indies except ginger
were sold in Britain for prices that were above the world market price because of
preferential treatment for West Indian landlords.1144 In the 1820s and 1830s, the
fact that West Indian sugar planters and refiners received preferential treatment
over their East Indian colleagues still was cause for heated debates.1145 Pro-
tectionism also led to high prices for tea. In the 1770s, average tea prices – i. e.
sales prices of the East India Companies in England and the Dutch Republic –
were all but identical. In the 1820s, Dutch prices had decreased by two-thirds,
English prices by only one quarter. According to John Crawfurd, a famous
Scottish Orientalist, over the period from 1819 to 1829, British subjects had been
paying nearly twice as much for their tea as those who had purchased it on the
American market. In 1830, in a report of the Select Committee on the Affairs of
the East India Company and the trade between Great Britain, the East Indies and
China, experts claimed that the EIC monopoly on the tea trade with China led to
between one million to 2.6 million pounds sterling extra costs for the public.1146
The protection of British wool interests against competition of Indian cotton
textiles may well have enabled the rise of a domestic British cotton industry, but
it of course made life more expensive and choices more restricted for British
consumers. It lasted longer than is often thought. In 1830, for example, an excise
on printed calicoes was still in existence.1147 Between 1688 and 1759, to give one
last example, tariffs on iron increased fivefold.1148 Whatever may have been the
exact effect of such protecting of special interest groups for production in the
long term, it certainly was not positive for consumption in the short term. That it
was positive for the development of domestic industries as is so often suggested
or explicitly claimed for British cotton industry is anything but obvious. If that
industry had not become so innovative, mainstream economists would no doubt
have blamed ‘protectionism’ for its lacklustre development. Again: it apparently
is a matter of context how protectionism works out. Mercantilism in practice
very often implied monopolies. Those not only as a rule meant higher prices:
they too could be bad for innovation. Ralph Davis claims that its monopoly, for
example, discouraged the East India Company from adopting new technology
that would have allowed it to reduce freight rates.1149
The question of whether Britain’s empire ‘paid’ is very hard to settle definitely
1144 Thomas and McCloskey, ‘Overseas trade and empire, 1700 – 1860’, 98.
1145 Kumagai, Breaking into the monopoly, e. g. 207.
1146 For these data see Kumagai, Breaking into the monopoly, 208 – 209, 139 and 150 note 112.
For Crawfurd’s calculation see Crawfurd, Chinese monopoly examined, 87. Crawfurd was a
fierce opponent of the EIC. The information is on page XVII of the Report.
1147 Kumagai, Breaking into the monopoly, e. g. 256.
1148 Parthasarathi, Why Europe grew rich, 168 – 170.
1149 Davis, The rise of the English shipping industry, 265.
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but what has become patently clear is how enormously expensive it was for most
ordinary people footing the tax bill. For Britain’s economy as a whole, the costs
of ‘Empire’ probably were higher than the benefits, at least in direct monetary
terms. When it comes to costs and benefits of empire for the period 1846 – 1914,
Patrick O’Brien claims:
For not inconsiderable numbers of British people (outside and inside some very
powerful social groups) the empire paid. What has been argued above is that massive
public expenditure upon the apparatus of imperial rule and defence was neither suf-
ficient nor necessary for the growth of the economy from 1846 to 1914.1150
For other periods too there often is a tendency to overestimate the benefits and
underestimate the costs of ‘Empire’.1151 For a substantial, and increasing,
number of scholars including O’Brien, however, apparently the costs to the
consumer that were Adam Smith’s main reason to attack the mercantile system
so fiercely, and what we now call the fiscal-military state were outweighed by its
advantages one way or another. All their theoretical doubts notwithstanding,
Findlay and O’Rourke, for example, apparently think Britain’s policy of com-
bining power and profit in practice in the end worked out.
That clearly is the case for scholars like Braudel, Wallerstein and Arrighi, for
whom the rise of the West in the end equals the rise of a Western capitalist world-
system in which power and profit went hand-in-hand. Capitalism for them
means monopoly and manipulation, collusion and coercion. Reading their work
one cannot escape the conclusion that in their view its main advantage was that it
facilitated concentrated accumulation in the hands of a small group of capitalists
who in turn undergirded the strength of the state without, however, losing their
essential freedom to manoeuvre. They never try to make a general kind of cost
and benefits balance sheet but in particular Wallerstein does not hide that he
looks at the yields of the modern world-system in terms of social costs and
private gains: “Capitalism is based on the constant absorption of economic loss
by political entities, while economic gain is distributed to ‘private hands’.”1152
The essence of his capitalism and of the capitalism of all those who think like-
wise, resides in accumulation and the extension of markets.
We have already discussed and very substantially qualified the thesis that the
Great Divergence would have been directly connected to, that is ‘caused by’
1150 O’Brien, ‘Costs and benefits of British imperialism’, 200.
1151 For a European-wide analysis in which the British case is also extensively discussed, see
O’Brien and Prados de la Escosura, Costs and benefits of European imperialism.
1152 Wallerstein, Modern world-system. Volume I, 348. But even so, he, at least in the 1970s,
thought that capitalism created growth in the end. See Wallerstein, Modern world-system I,
357, where he claims about the modern world system, “… for all its cruelties it is better that
it was born than that it not had been.”
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increased accumulation or by a simple extension of the market, so we will not
repeat ourselves here. What can be added here is that the connection between
accumulation and international trade on the one hand and investment and
industry on the other, whatever its importance, in any case hardly ever was a
direct one in terms of people and invested capital. Braudel, who tends to define
capitalism explicitly as a phenomenon belonging to the sphere of exchange and
not that of production (which of course Wallerstein and Arrighi in fact also do)
actually denies the existence of such direct links for incipient industrialisation in
Britain. In his eyes, merchant capital and merchants played only a marginal role
in the beginning of Britain’s industrial take-off.1153
None of these three scholars in their ‘models’ actually have a separate ex-
planation for industrialisation or the emergence of modern economic growth as
such. In their view, these do not represent real breaks in the history of Western
capitalism. Science, technology, and innovation, whose role is fundamental in
the Great Divergence, function as exogenous variables in their analysis and are
not integral to their main story line. Braudel does discuss the technological
changes of the Industrial Revolution but strangely enough, considering his usual
emphasis on material life, ultimately very much relativises their importance. In
Wallerstein’s work, the role of technology as an autonomous or at least separate
driving force behind modern economic growth is all but denied. He system-
atically writes about the ‘so-called’ Industrial Revolution and the reader will find
no reference at all to the steam engine in the entire volume he dedicated to the
period of the 1730s to the 1840s, only one to steamboat and only three to coal. In
volume IVof his magnum opus, which was published in 2011, Wallerstein sticks
to his view. Incredible as it may seem, the entire debate about the Great Di-
vergence and the beginning of modern economic growth as it has now been
waged for some fifteen years still seems to elude him; or rather he simply ignores
it. Which means that in all the volumes devoted to the modern world-system he
does not pay any serious in-depth attention to what actually is the essence of
modern economies and modern economic growth.1154 In a fairly chaotic analysis
in Volume III he comes to the conclusion that there was nothing special to
industrialising Britain, that the concept of the first industrial revolution of Great
Britain is “profoundly mistaken” and that the real question to be dealt with
would be “why the world-economy as a whole developed in the way that it did …
and why … there resulted a greater concentration of the most profitable eco-
nomic activities within particular state boundaries …” He also indicates why
this would be the case: “It is the world-economy that develops over time and not
1153 See my analysis of Braudel’s ideas on capitalism and the Great Divergence in ‘Europe and
the rest: Braudel on capitalism’, in particular 126 – 127.
1154 See Wallerstein, Modern World-System, III, and IV under (first) ‘industrial revolution’.
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subunits within it.”1155 In my view, that is simply playing with words and
avoiding providing any concrete historical answers to a set of very concrete but
fundamental historical questions that are rightly central to debates about the
Great Divergence: how and why did modern economic growth first emerge in
Britain and the West?
Gunder Frank in the days when he still adhered to dependency theory also
focused on the options for accumulation that were provided by the existing
political economy of the West. In his ReOrient, the focus has shifted but we still
find clear traces of it in the importance he attributes to the Western appropri-
ation of gold and silver from the Americas.1156 For him too, accumulation (and
factor endowment) is decisive and science and technology at best responses to
economic challenges. Pomeranz, to give one last example of a scholar with a
major impact on the Great-Divergence debate, also focuses on accumulation in
his emphasis on the importance of non-consensual trade and the availability of
ghost acreage, very often in colonies, for the rise of the West. We need not discuss
his views again. The point is, in brief, that world-systems theory in its various
varieties, including the specific variety of Kenneth Pomeranz, does not tell us
much about the actual direct causes of the Great Divergence, although it defi-
nitely is quite important in the context of a general explanation of how the gap
between rich and poor could emerge and extend so much.
But one need not be adherent to a ‘world-systems approach’ to note in-
separable connections between fiscal-militarism, mercantilism, empire and
economic development. Robert Allen too notes potential advantages of mer-
cantilism and thinks it is arguable that British government expenditures pro-
moted economic growth. It would have been a good thing, as he writes, if Louis
XIV (1638 – 1715) had had more money to build a large French fleet. On various
occasions, he refers to a ‘standard’ development strategy for catching up that
would involve unifying the internal market, protecting it against competition
from abroad, creating a well-functioning banking sector, and then implementing
mass-education.1157 The first two policies, of course, were exactly what mer-
cantilists were up to. Prasannan Parthasarathi regards mercantilist policies with
their systematic support for domestic producers and merchants as fundamental
to any explanation of Britain’s industrialisation as well as India’s de-in-
dustrialisation.1158 In this context, one should in particular refer to publications
by Patrick O’Brien, still famous for his critique of world-system’s analysis, David
1155 Wallerstein, Modern World-System, III, 33.
1156 Frank, Reorient, 277.
1157 Allen, Global economic history, 29 and 41 – 42.
1158 See his Why Europe grew rich, and my ‘Challenges, (non) responses and politics’.
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Ormrod, or William Ashworth.1159 The focus in their work is not so much on
accumulation per se as on the protection and support of production and trade
and on the (artificial) enlargement of markets. Their position boils down to the
claim that even if – and this seems obvious – many Britons in the short run and as
private consumers lost more than they gained, for the development of the
economy as a whole and in the longer run, in particular when it comes to
production, Britain’s political economy may very well have had positive effects.
This is a striking and very recent quote by O’Brien:
Our rhetorical and debateable speculation is that in significant respects the First In-
dustrial Revolution can be plausibly represented as a paradigm example of successful
mercantilism and that the unintended consequences of the revolution in France
(massive long lasting wars won by Britain PV) contributed positively and perhaps
“substantially” to its ultimate consolidation and progression.1160
Ashworth is very explicit about what he considers to be the positive effects of
Britain’s economic policies till the 1840s:
If there was a unique English/ British pathway of industrialization, it was less a distinct
entrepreneurial and technocentric culture than one predominantly defined within an
institutional framework spearheaded by the excise and a wall of tariffs.
An industrial policy revolving upon protection and the excise, coupled with the ex-
traordinary rise of lightly taxed or untaxed goods of cotton, iron and pottery, and with
rich resources of coal, had put Britain into a seemingly invincible industrial and
commercial position.1161
Elsewhere we find this quotation, in which he describes Britain’s industrial
development as:
…less the result of a distinctive indigenous mentality and the gift of mutating ‘natural
inquiry’ into mastering nature; instead it can be argued that it owed more to a policy of
nurturing domestic industry behind a wall of tariffs, skill in imitating and subsequently
transforming foreign (especially Asian) products, unparalleled exploitation of African
slave labour, rich resources of coal, a monopoly of trade with British North America
and aggressive military prowess. In many ways, the backbone of Britain’s global might
was luck and a stunningly successful fiscal system as compared to the rest of Europe.1162
As Friedrich List already claimed, a country, or rather its consumers, in the short
term may have to pay a price for protectionism. But that can be a perfectly
1159 See for O’Brien’s ideas his ‘Contributions of warfare with Revolutionary and Napoleonic
France’; for Ormrod’s his Rise of commercial empires and for Ashworth’s his Customs and
excise.
1160 O’Brien, ‘Contribution of warfare with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France’, ‘Conclu-
sion’.
1161 See for these quotes Ashworth, Customs and excise, 382 and 379.
1162 William J. Ashworth, ‘The intersection of industry and the state the state in eighteenth-
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rational choice when it creates long-term advantages in terms of increasing its
‘productive capacity’ and thus its potential for growth.1163 Building up skills and
‘productive capacity’ always takes time and resources and it always has its op-
portunity costs, but it mostly in the end pays. The alternative, to simply always
opt for short-term gains tends to lead to a dead-end street and a permanently low
income.
What is striking and simply cannot be ignored is that up until a couple of
decades into the nineteenth century, most people in Britain were ‘mercantilists’
and convinced that government should support the national economy. If mer-
cantilism is defined as a form of economic nationalism that connects the power
of the nation with the economic strength of the state, Britain’s government
policies almost without exception were mercantilist. It was obvious to anyone
that prosperity came with power and the other way around. Daniel Baugh cor-
rectly claims that between 1650 and 1750:
Everyone then responsible for public policy thought that English wealth could not long
be sustained without power to defend both trade and the realm, and also thought that
England’s power to defend could not be long sustained without trade and wealth. The
evidence is ubiquitous and consistent. The first place to look is to the opening words of
the 1651 and 1660 Navigation Acts. Moreover, in the decades after The wealth of nations
was published, no one shared Smith’s outlook on this question. Power and prosperity
could not be separated.1164
Not even Adam Smith himself endorsed the ideas that Baugh subsumes under
“Smith’s outlook”. Smith also thought that political economy was about wealth
and power of the state and he was in favour of the Navigation Acts.1165 Things
certainly did not simply change in the decades after he wrote his magnum opus.
In a Memorandum for the consideration of his Majesty’s ministers, of 31 March
1800, it reads:
century Britain’ http://www.knaw.nl/Content/Internet_KNAW/publicaties/pdf/20041102_
18.pdf, 349 – 378, page 350. An almost identical quotation is in Ashworth, ‘Revenue,
production and the early modern English/British fiscal-state’.
1163 For the ideas of List in this respect I refer to Bachinger and Matis, Entwicklungsdimen-
sionen des Kapitalismus, chapter 3.1.
1164 Baugh, ‘Maritime strength and Atlantic commerce, 188.
1165 He thinks they were “… not favourable to foreign commerce, or to the growth of that
opulence which can arise from it.” But he nevertheless calls the regulations “… as wise …
as if they had all been dictated by the most deliberate wisdom” and explicitly indicates
why : “As defence, however, is of much more importance than opulence, the act of navi-
gation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England.” See Smith,
Inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, 464 – 465. Please note that Smith
explicitly refers to ‘nations’ in the title of his book and claims that “… the great object of
the political oeconomy of every country, is to increase the riches and power [sic] of that
country”. Ibidem, 372.
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It is obvious that the present strength and pre-eminence of this country is owing to the
extent of its resources arising from its commerce and its naval power which are in-
separably connected.1166
Just about everyone who was important in foreign and economic policy would
have endorsed this claim. The empire at least in principle was meant to be a
commercial rather than a territorial enterprise. In practice it had a tendency to
territorially expand because of decisions taken at its margins.
The ‘empire’ that was designed to serve these purposes is best thought of as a ‘maritime
imperial system’ because its value was seen to derive from maritime commerce rather
than territory and dominion. From the perspective of ‘blue-water policy’ the positive
benefits from possessing colonies were that they stimulated commerce by producing
commodities for exports and markets for English goods; they protected and sustained
overseas naval bases; they served to enlarge the pool of English-controlled shipping
and seamen. Otherwise, from a policy standpoint colonies had to be regarded as a
potential burden.1167
The costs of wars and protectionism may have been enormous, but Parliament
apparently considered them worthwhile. While it had a constitutional right to
refuse funds for war, it never did.1168 Political commentator David Robinson in
1825 voiced the following warning about the dangers (!) of free trade policies
that in his view would be a disaster for Britain.1169
The greatest improvements have been made in our manufactures when they have been
the most free from such (foreign) competition. Our cotton manufacturers have made
the greatest varieties in their articles, and the greatest reductions in their prices, when it
has been perfectly unknown. Our iron and several other articles, which a few years
since were greatly inferior to those provided in other countries, have been brought to
equal, and in some cases to surpass those of all other parts, entirely without such
competition. Under a system which studiously prevented such competition, which
jealously excluded the foreigner from our home market, we have far outstripped all
other nations in manufactures … we have rendered ourselves the first manufacturing
nation in the universe.
The quotations above already show that when I here refer to mercantilism, I do
not mean a simple obsession with bullion and balances of trade but a much
broader set of measures that basically had in common that they were meant to
support the national economy, primarily on behalf of the state.1170
1166 I found this in O’Brien and Engerman, ‘Exports and the growth of the British economy’,
177. The memorandum was written by Henry Dundas, president of the Board of Control of
the East India Company.
1167 Baugh, ‘Maritime strength and Atlantic commerce’, 186.
1168 Allen, Global economic history, 28.
1169 I found this in Ashworth, Customs and excise, 374 – 375.
1170 For some general literature discussing the concept of mercantilism in which its attention to
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How exactly the advantages of state competition and the specific way in which
it was implemented in Europe can be set off against its disadvantages to me looks
insoluble in the sense that state competition was a driving force of economic
development and innovation in the world as it was that simply can not be
compared to alternatives in a peaceful world of free and fair competition. Some
scholars have been so fascinated by the role of massive violence and coercion in
European history that they try and positively connect them to economic de-
velopment. Just think of Werner Sombart (1863 – 194), who extensively wrote on
the tight connection between war and capitalism, or John Nef (1899 – 1988), who
wrote on war and human progress, or Frederic Lane (1900 – 1984), who dis-
cussed the connection between war, organized violence, protection and eco-
nomic development.1171 The role of the military in economic development and
industrialisation also attracted the attention of the father of world history,
William H. McNeill, in his The pursuit of power1172 and later that of Linda Weiss
and John Hobson who claim that whereas Europe was propelled forward by
permanent competition, including war, the very absence of warfare was the
essence of the lack of a “will to develop” in China.1173 Spanish historian Rafael
Torres Snchez, in a recent volume that he edited, takes it as a fact that “Euro-
peans managed to grow not so much by accreting years of peace and despite war
but rather with war.”1174 That is an interesting or rather very challenging thesis, if
for the sake of argument we consider it true. But this is not obvious: the nine-
teenth century at least was a period in which relatively few wars were waged in
Europe. It is easy to imagine all sorts of income generated by war – booty,
reparations or conquest – or to think of an improvement of one’s competitive
advantage by the destruction of the economic power or economic viability of
one’s opponent, just as it is easy to imagine how war pushes an economy to the
very limits of its potential. However, it is also only all too easy to come up with
disadvantages and costs. A detailed systematic analysis of the effects of actual
warfare, the preparation for war and its consequences in my view is definitely is
of the highest desiderata for global economic history. Patrick O’Brien’s analysis
production and competition clearly comes to the fore, and for references to a huge amount
of literature, see Magnusson, Mercantilism: the shaping of an economic language idem,
Mercantilism, critical concepts in the history of economics and several publications by Erik
Reinert. See under notes 232, 1129 and 1187. For Britain that, as I want to emphasize again,
was a very mercantilist country, I refer to the publications under notes 1159 plus The
William and Mary Quarterly 69, 1 (2012) 3 – 70.
1171 Sombart, Krieg und Kapitalismus; Nef, War and human progress and Lane, Venice in
history.
1172 William McNeill, The pursuit of power. See under ‘Industrial Revolution’.
1173 Weiss and Hobson, States and economic development, chapters two and three. See in
particular 60 – 61, and 83 – 87. They here build upon ideas developed in Crone, Pre-in-
dustrial societies, Part Two.
1174 Torres Snchez, War, state and development, the back flap.
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of the contributions of warfare with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France to the
consolidation and progress of the British Industrial Revolution show us what
such an analysis might look like.1175 The positive effects warfare can have on an
economy, in particular if the fighting takes place elsewhere and the war is won,
can be seen in the striking fact that the US economy grew almost ten per cent per
year during World War II.1176
But as far as I can see, many questions here are still open and very probably
will never be really settled. In the specific context of pointing at the salutary
effects of massive military spending, Giovanni Arrighi has introduced the
concept of ‘military Keynesianism’. He defines it as: “…the practice through
which military expenditures boost the incomes of the citizens of the state that
has made the expenditures, thereby increasing tax revenues and the capacity to
finance new rounds of military expenditures.”1177 Personally, I am not convinced
that this has been a felicitous choice. The term ‘Keynesianism’ suggests ‘deficit
spending’. In that respect it would have been helpful if Arrighi had also explicitly
and systematically referred to government borrowing. As I see it, Keynesianism
is a way of combating under-consumption and underinvestment. The question
then becomes how effective military expenditures of Britain’s government have
been in that respect. To be able to judge, one has to differentiate between various
sources out of which these expenditures were paid. The bulk of regular revenue
came from taxes. Over the entire very long eighteenth century, the bulk of
Britain’s taxes were collected as excises and customs on fairly ordinary con-
sumer goods. I fail to see how taking money from ordinary consumers and
transferring it to the military can create a substantial amount of extra income. If
those consumers hadn’t had to pay those taxes, they, or at least most of them for
most of the time, would have had no problem in finding other ways to spend it.
Taxes paid by rather wealthy people may indeed have given some boost to the
economy – and in the end to tax revenue – when they were transferred to the
military. The reason is that we are talking about money here that otherwise may
not have been spent. The effect is optimal when the military ploughs all this
money back into Britain’s economy. In such a scenario, taxes can contribute to
combating under-consumption and under-investment.
This effect of mobilising money that otherwise might have been lying idle will
in all probability have been bigger in case of government borrowing or direct and
massive use of the money printing press. Government bonds were tradable and
thereby as such increased the money supply. In my view, it is only in this case that
1175 O’Brien, ‘Contributions of warfare with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France’.
1176 Milanovic, The haves and the have-nots, 144.
1177 See for this definition Arrighi, Adam Smith in Beijing, 266. See further idem, Long
twentieth century, the Index under ‘military Keynesianism’.
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one might really speak of a ‘Keynesian’ effect. Such a policy might ‘create’ money
and boost investment and consumption. One might, however, have serious
doubts whether we actually are discussing a serious Keynesian impulse here. The
people who lent money to government did not do so for free. They wanted their
money back, with a bonus. A quite substantial part of government expenditure
therefore always consisted of debt servicing. That was done with tax money that
to a large extent was collected on consumption of ordinary goods and in that way
actually diminished consumption. This means such loans basically boil down to
a sort of deferred taxes with dubious effects on consumption and as a rule can
only be repaid in a growing economy.1178 One may of course also wonder whether
there is not a limit to the ‘healthy’, ‘Keynesian effects’ of public debts. In current
debates several experts claim that when they amount to some eighty to ninety
per cent of GDP they become a brake on economic growth.1179 In (Great) Britain
public debt in the period discussed here was over 100 per cent for many decades;
between 1780 and 1845 it was never lower than 150 per cent!1180
Whatever the actual effect of public debt may have been on various early
modern economies at large, it is in any case striking that people defending a
‘Keynesian’, positive interpretation of public debt as a means to combat under-
investment and under-consumption were very exceptional at the time. In Brit-
ain, most people regarded public debts as a necessary evil. Adam Smith, for
example, spoke of a “pernicious system”. David Hume claimed: “either a nation
must destroy public credit, or public credit will destroy the nation”. They were
both convinced that national debt was not a good thing, especially not when it
was as large as it was in Britain.1181 Isaac de Pinto (1717 – 1787), a Dutch Jewish
scholar and investor in the Dutch East India Company, in that respect was clearly
an exception with his claim that “…the internal expenses of a monarch, or of the
state, return into the nation, encourage and improve it. The nation in a body pays
1178 See for this point of view and some references, Bonney, ‘Introduction’, 14 – 15. A large
amount of the money that the state borrowed, however, was never itself paid back and the
amount of money in circulation thus continued to be ‘enlarged’.
1179 See e. g. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/
rogoff/files/growth_in_time_debt_aer.pdf American Economic Review: Papers & Pro-
ceedings 100 (May 2010) 573 – 578 and S. G. Cecchitti, M.S. Mohanty and F. Zampolli, ‘The
real effects of debt’, Bank for International Settlements Working Papers No 352, September
2011, http://www.bis.org/publ/work352.pdf. For the critique see: T. Herndom, M.I. Ash
and R. Pollin, ‘Does high public debt consistently stifle economic growth? A critique of
Reinhart and Rogoff ’. This text can be found on the website of the Political Economy
Research Institute of the University of Massachusetts. I consulted it 28 – 05, 2013.
1180 See Macdonald, Free nation deep in debt, 355.
1181 See for these quotes by Smith and Hume and some by other commentators, Hoppit,
‘Checking the Leviathan, 1688 – 1832’, 286, and Rothschild, ‘English Kopf ’, 39. For debates
on national debt in eighteenth-century Britain and Hume’s ideas in particular see Hont,
Jealousy of trade, chapter four.
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these expenses, or rather lends the money for its own advantage” to which he
added, that loans can make “the numerary wealth and circulation increase with
the debt”.1182 The writer Samuel Taylor Coleridge, (1772 – 1834), in his essay of
1809 ‘On the vulgar errors respecting taxes and taxation’ regarded national debt
as an engine of national growth.1183 The first major economist, though, who
explicitly sang a long song of praise of national debt, would be Friedrich List who
wrote in 1858: “The system of public debt is one of the finest creations of modern
politics and a blessing for the nations.”1184 Marx thought it was extremely im-
portant for the development of capital :
The public debt becomes one of the most powerful levers of primitive accumulation. As
with the stroke of an enchanter’s wand, it endows unproductive money with the power
of creation and that turns it into capital … The state’s creditors actually give nothing
away, for the sum lent is transformed into public bonds, easily negotiable, which go on
functioning in their hands just as so much hard cash would.1185
All in all, I think the concept of military Keynesianism with its supposedly ‘self-
enforcing’ virtuous circle in any case for the early modern pre-modern growth
context we are discussing here is rather underspecified. If, as Arrighi sometimes
seems to suggest, the real Keynesianism and the real virtuous circle resides in the
fact that investments in the military could be an excellent investment as they
could support trade and empire-building, that of course may very well be true, or
not, but there is nothing much ‘Keynesian’ about it. To the extent that a thing like
‘military Keynesianism’ actually existed, the chances of finding examples of it in
Western Europe must have been substantial. In China, that lacked all charac-
teristics of a fiscal-military state  la Britain, they definitely were absent.
The debate about what government ideally should do and what a state should
ideally look like to promote growth is still open. But arguments that governments
should in any case do much more than just provide incentives and a level playing
field for economic agents and, in particular, that in the past in economically
1182 De Pinto, An essay on circulation and credit in four parts and a letter on the jealousy of
commerce, 20 – 21.
1183 This essay is now available as a chapter in Samuel Taylor Coleridge Google eBook The
friend: a series of essays (London 1812). I found this reference in The Economist May 19th
2012, page 19: ‘A debt to Coleridge’.
1184 List, Nationale System der politischen Ökonomie, 265. In German: “Das Staatskreditsystem
ist eine der schönsten Schöpfungen der neueren Staatskunst und ein Segen für die Na-
tionen.”
1185 MEW, 23, pages 782 – 783. In German: „Die öffentliche Schuld wird einer der energischsten
Hebel der ursprünglichen Akkumulation. Wie mit dem Schlag der Wünschelrute begabt
sie das unproduktive Geld mit Zeugungskraft und verwandelt es so in Kapital … Die
Staatsgläubiger geben in Wirklichkeit nichts, den die geliehene Summe wird in öffentlich
leicht übertragbare Schuldscheine verwandelt, die in ihren Händen fortfungieren, ganz als
wären sie ebenso viel Bargeld.“
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successful states they always have done much more than just that, are increas-
ingly gaining ground. When it comes to my personal conviction I can do no
better than quote what Sophus Reinert says in his book about the political
economy of early modern Western Europe:
This book maintains that the historical evidence now is so heavily in favor of industrial
and military policies successfully encouraging long-term economic development in
England, admittedly through far more complex means than simply setting tariffs to
encourage domestic manufactures, that the burden of proof falls on neoclassical eco-
nomics, not on the historic record.1186
26. Was industrialising Britain a developmental state?
Amongst economic historians and economists who have seriously studied
economic development over a longer period of time, the concept of the state as a
pro-active development agent and a more positive view on many mercantilist
strategies is gaining ground. Many classic economists and neo-institutionalists
surprisingly enough – ignoring massive historical counterevidence – insist on
the notion that the state ideally should confine itself to promoting and facili-
tating the market. Two theoreticians of the ‘developmental state’ with, in my
opinion, an excellent knowledge of economic history stick out and indicate the
direction for future research: Erik Reinert from Norway and Ha-joon Chang
from South Korea. For Reinert, the foundation of the rise of the West consists of
its diversity and permanent competition and emulation between states that led
to its mercantilist forms of competition. In his view, that had positive effects. He
considers mercantilism to have been at the root of all successful capitalism1187
and fully endorses Herbert Norman’s argument about it: “… the mercantile
system … was the crutch with which capitalism learned to walk.1188 Producing
primary products is for the most part a dead-end street for development and it
does not make countries rich because such products have diminishing returns.
Mercantilists with their emphasis on producing and exporting the ‘right’ goods,
i. e. goods with high added value and not simple commodities understood that.
Even without using modern jargon they already knew that countries should try
to focus on producing and exporting products with increasing returns and leave
the equality assumption behind, as not all economic activities are qualitatively
alike. For an economy to develop its production, it has to permanently be up-
1186 Sophus Reinert, Translating empire, 7.
1187 Erik Reinert, How rich nations got rich. Essays in the history of economic policy. Working
Paper 2004/01 Sum Centre for Development and Environment, University of Oslo 2004,
page 13.
1188 Norman, Japan’s emergence as a modern state, 110.
Part two: Actual explanations of the Great Divergence376
graded and diversified. If that means you have to protect infant industries, then
that is perfectly rational. Just relying on comparative advantage, as is suggested
by classical economists and free traders, can easily become a trap. If it means
producing primary products it can easily lead to decreasing returns and it does
not provide many backward and forward linkages and learning effects. Again,
mercantilists did not use these terms, but they looked around and compared rich
countries with poor countries to find out what apparently increased the wealth of
nations. They also knew that one normally can not earn much money – and thus
not accumulate much – in a setting of perfect competition so that monopolies
need not necessarily be bad for development.
South Korean economist Ha-joon Chang, although with at times differing
areas of emphasis and with less virulence overall, has set out to show that what
mainstream economics and the Washington Consensus try to tell us about
economic growth and the role of the state in promoting it, simply does and can
not correspond with the historical record. In his Kicking away the ladder, his
most influential and in this context most relevant publication, he convincingly
shows how countries became rich whose governments did not confine them-
selves to creating a level playing field and providing incentives but actively
intervened in the economy to steer it in a certain direction. Actually, so one can
conclude from his many examples, no major country ever became rich by fol-
lowing the advice of Adam Smith, mainstream (neo-)classical economists or
institutionalist economists like Douglass North or Daron Acemoglu and their
colleagues. All wealthy industrialised countries, for example, developed their
economies behind tariff walls and practised infant industry protection and it
therefore would be unfair to not allow other countries ‘the ladder’ of pro-
tectionism that they themselves as a rule only threw away once they had reached
a certain level of wealth. Virtually all developed countries now, as Chang writes,
“used infant industry promotion measures” to later on the same page of his book
add: “Interestingly, it was the UK and the USA, the supposed homes of free trade
policy, which used tariff protection most aggressively.”1189 No major county ever
became rich by simply confiding in the market, comparative advantage or ex-
port-led growth. Smith’s ideas may have made sense in a highly productive and
developed economy as Britain was at his time, and even there they were only fully
implemented many decades after they had been written down: in a poor country
they do more harm than good. Many institutions, moreover, which in main-
stream institutional economics are regarded as necessary preconditions for
growth actually only emerged when the economy already was growing and a
1189 Ha-joon Chang, Kicking away the ladder, 59.
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certain wealth already existed: they, in brief, often were effect or symptom rather
than cause.1190
An analysis of mercantilist Britain as a developmental state would certainly be
helpful and would to my mind show striking resemblances alongside certain big
differences, of course. Britain, for example, almost up until the end of the long
eighteenth century clearly was not a developmental state in the sense that gov-
ernment itself actually spent money in order to ‘develop’ something. Here the
comment by Patrick O’Brien leaves not much doubt: “Patrick Colquhoun’s es-
timates (1814) imply that only 0.5 per cent of total public revenues collected
during the long reign of George III was devoted to objectives that might
nowadays be defined as developmental.”1191 Nor was there some kind of master
plan created by some kind of British MITI.1192 There was, as we might expect, a
lot of improvisation and luck and most of what government did was primarily to
strengthen the state rather than to develop the economy. But as it turns out,
having a strong state is a necessary precondition for government to be able to
implement any effective economic policy and for an economy to be able to
develop. This claim is often misunderstood in the sense that a strong state would
by definition imply ‘weak’ subjects. It might be helpful to differentiate between
various dimensions of state power and in that respect follow Linda Weiss and
John Hobson.1193 The main distinction they make is that between ‘despotic
power’ on the one hand and ‘infrastructural’ or ‘organic power’ on the other.
These distinctions are not theirs. They were introduced by Michael Mann, who
uses the concepts ‘infrastructural’ and ‘despotic’ power, and by John Hall, who
writes about ‘organic’ state power.1194 Despotic power concerns the range of
actions that rulers can undertake without resorting to routine, institutionalised
negotiation with civil society groups. It basically concerns the extent to which
rulers can do as they please with their subjects. This should be distinguished
from ‘infrastructural’ or ‘organic power’, which can be defined as the capacity of
rulers to actually penetrate civil society and to implement political decisions
logistically throughout the realm, which, of course, always implies that the state
disposes of a great amount of knowledge.
We are talking about two quite different kinds of power that tend to stand in
an inverse relationship to each other : as a rule, states with strong despotic
powers have been infrastructurally weak and vice versa.1195 Only a state that is
1190 Ha-joon Chang, Kicking away the ladder, chapter 3.
1191 O’Brien, ‘Political preconditions for the Industrial Revolution’, 128.
1192 MITI stands for Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry.
1193 See their States and economic development, 6 – 8.
1194 Mann, ‘Autonomous power of the state’ and Sources of social power, passim, and Hall,
Powers & liberties, 133 – 144.
1195 Mann, ‘Autonomous power of the state’. The definitions are on page 113. Mann’s theory of
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infrastructurally or organically strong will be able to implement its policies and
thus (help to) change an economy. That was the case in Britain where the state
was not a force separated from and so to say confronting society but where it
clearly was embedded in society and where state and society bargained with each
other. In that respect, the existence of Parliament in particular, where all those
with a certain clout in the country could bargain in an institutionalised setting
and with results that were regarded by all as binding, at least in principle, must
have been of enormous importance. It was an enormous advantage as compared
with the situation in China, where the state even when it was functioning well
according to its standards – which it mostly did not after 1780 – was not em-
bedded and measures announced by the rulers might lack wide support. In-
stitutions in infrastructurally strong states are not only legitimate but also
flexible and adaptable. For Britain, one might prove this by referring to the fact
that its state did not collapse under the enormous stress of war and in-
dustrialisation, thanks to a combination of repression but also flexibility. This
flexibility, which proved itself very important during the process of in-
dustrialisation and economic modernisation, however, never was such that
government wanted to stop that process or rejected it. How important the state
actually became for wealth and that what it does is not confined to promoting the
market shows in table 23. The countries referred to in the table are all amongst
the richest of the world and have been so for decades on a row. In all of them, the
share of the state in GDP is very high in contrast to what classical economists like
to suggest, indicating that a big state and wealth can go together and that ap-
parently in wealthy economies the state does far more than just promoting the
market.
27. The European state system and the development of civil
society: the non-monopolisation of the sources of social
power
In the previous paragraphs we have been discussing the state as the institution of
institutions and its (possible) role in economic development. When it comes to
states in Europe, however, their set-up and development simply cannot be dis-
cussed in isolation. More than anywhere else in the world, states in Europe
interacted systematically with one another. Time and again, so often that it has
almost become a truism, Europe’s dynamism ever since the High Middle Ages
has been explained by the fact that Europe was not an empire but a highly
power has not convinced everyone. See, for a critical analysis of his ideas in which he
himself participates, Hall and Schroeder, Anatomy of power.
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competitive state-system or in Michael Mann’s terms an “acephalous feder-
ation”.1196 References to this are too numerous to even try to discuss them all.1197
According to David Landes “…Europe’s great good fortune lay in the fall of
Rome and the weakness and division that ensued.”1198 Much of the behaviour of
the member states in that acephalous federation can be explained by the com-
petition that developed between them and that in its most violent and radical
form in particular, i. e. war, had an enormous impact on state-formation.1199 In
Europe, competition between states, whatever its precise importance for eco-
nomic growth, definitely became a major driving force for development. I dis-
cussed that importance and the debates about it earlier on in this text and in
several publications to which I refer the reader.1200 Not since the Imperium
Romanum did Europe’s core become one empire again. The continent continued
to be an extremely competitive system. But it was not only characterised by
competition between states. The ‘parcellisation’ of sovereignty not only existed
at the highest level. As Michael Mann nicely puts it, in Western Europe in those
regions with a legacy of feudalism, none of the sources of social power (political,
ideological, economical and militarily) was ever again monopolised by a state
that was not in some way ‘institutionally’ checked during the Middle Ages and
the early modern period.1201 Rulers in Western Europe always had to bargain
with subjects. All this bargaining ultimately led to the emergence of Western
nations, in which “all four sources of social power [were] entwined”, a cir-
cumstance that provided them with their enormous power.1202 Competition
existed not only between states but also within states. This allowed subjects to
have exit and voice and obtain all sorts of liberties, privileges and thus protection
that in the end also depended from the state.1203 The permanent interplay be-
tween (civil) society and government is supposed to have contributed to the
infrastructural strength of Western states and nations. The importance of ‘in-
clusive institutions’ and ‘trust’ has been emphasised so often in analyses of the
origins of growth and development, in particular in publications by Acemoglu,
Robinson and Putnam, that it does not need not be discussed here again. The
same goes for their possible disadvantages.
In many texts about European exceptionalism, authors emphasise that Eu-
1196 Mann, Sources of social power, I, 397.
1197 See for a small selection note 2 of my article ‘Governing growth’.
1198 Landes, Wealth and poverty, 37.
1199 For that logic see Tilly, Coercion, capital, and European states. A very interesting study
pushing Tilly’s logic to its limits is Porter, War and the rise of the state.
1200 See my ‘Governing growth’.
1201 Mann, Sources of social power, I and II.
1202 Mann, Sources of social power, II, 250
1203 For the concepts ‘exit’ and ‘voice’ see Hirschman, Exit, voice, and loyalty.
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rope not only had a particularly strong ‘civil society’ but that its society on top of
that was quite ‘open’ and ‘socially mobile’. That claim, in my view correctly, has
not been left undisputed. It is rather one-sided and optimistic.1204 I fully endorse
Braudel’s thesis that in any case Western capitalism – usually regarded as the
main motor behind Western growth – could flourish because Western society in
a certain sense was less open and less socially mobile than various other civi-
lisations, including that of China. In studies on the ‘uniqueness’ of Western
society, all too often the focus is entirely on concepts such as ‘rights’ and ‘pro-
tection’. What tends to be ignored is that, in practice, the rights and the pro-
tection that were claimed for certain individuals or groups could easily have
negative implications for other individuals or groups. This is evidently so in the
case of privileges of all kinds, which by their very nature withheld rights and
protection from the non-privileged. All this surely also applies to early modern
Britain, that provided an environment where capitalists were not only allowed to
ceaselessly accumulate but often protected, encouraged and helped to do so.
There was a lot of collusion between the rich and the powerful. We would be well
advised to pay more attention to the role of privilege, protection, exclusion,
hierarchy and manipulation in ‘the rise of the West’ and be less enchanted by the
ideology that this rise was caused by equality and equal rights, protection and
social mobility for all, and by freedom and fair competition.1205 Here, again, one
must be very careful with broad generalisations that ignore context and ‘orders
of magnitude’. This specific position of Western European subjects combined
with the general climate of competition clearly fostered dynamism. The infra-
structural power and economic activism of Western states would be unthinkable
without the exiting inter- and intra-state competition, just like the rise of the
West in terms of power as well as in terms of wealth would in my view have been
impossible without the presence of such strong states. Considering the fact that
many instances of institutional, organisational, technological and scientific
progress can directly or indirectly be related to Europe’s competitive structure
that for me too – with the rise of science and technology as far as that was
autonomous – would be ‘the ultimate’ explanation of the rise of the West. If it
would make sense to speak in such terms, which can be severely doubted.
That Europe was a competitive state-system that in its Western part lacked
despotic emperors or even despotic rulers, of course, as has already been pointed
out, also had enormous costs and disadvantages. Those were evident to all who
want to see them. Whatever effects political competition may have had in terms
1204 See for that tendency e. g. the various publications of Gellner, Hall, Macfarlane and Mann
dealing with the rise of the West.
1205 See Braudel, ‘õ propos des origines sociales du capitalisme’ and idem, La dynamique du
capitalisme, 75 – 79.
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of stimulating certain production, consumption, and innovation, and in terms of
mobilising societies to their limits – and thereby showing them were those limits
were –, I suppose no economist in his right mind would consider the specific
forms European competition took, to wit mercantilism and war, as overall
economically rational behaviour. I think that in the end they did stimulate de-
velopment and growth and we will never know whether economic development
would have been faster without them. What we do know is that to the extent that
societies lacked the kind of institutionalised co-ordinated mix of visible- and
invisible-hand competition that characterised the West, they had more problems
with taking off. Competition and the way in which it was institutionalised in all
its varieties in the end, in my view, were fundamental to the rise of the West, but
much of their overall economic spin-off that impacted on all competing parties
was indirect and almost an unintended side-effect. I agree with Wong and
Rosenthal when they write that that the benefits of warfare – and I would add of
mercantilism that was the normal mode of international economic competition
– were indeed “indirect, contingent, and secured at tremendous cost” and that
even the advantages from fragmentation were “unintended and, indeed, un-
anticipated.”1206
28. Culture and growth: Western cultural exceptionalism and
how to measure it
In the literature on economic growth, one generally comes across two varieties of
cultural explanations for differences in wealth, one in which reference is made to
very general, all-encompassing traits that would typify a culture as a whole and
one in which explanations are offered via references to very specific cultural
traits and very specific, concrete behaviour. This same dichotomy can be found
in literature dealing more explicitly with the Great Divergence. I already referred
to the problematic nature of the second strategy in chapter X of this book. So I
will start here with some comments with regard to the first one in the context of
the Great Divergence debate and also mainly focus on them. What immediately
strikes any critical reader when he looks at examples of ‘deep’ cultural ex-
planations is that they may indeed provide the ‘ultimate’ clues to what one wants
to explain but that the ‘depth’ they provide comes at the price of a big loss in
concrete explanatory power. They may be ‘fundamental’ but at the same time
they for that very same reason as a rule leave a lot to be desired when it comes to
showing what precisely caused the Great Divergence as it occurred at a certain
1206 See for these quotes Rosenthal and Wong, Before and beyond the divergence, 126 and 5.
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place at a certain moment in time. Let us again take the comparison of China with
Great Britain, or in this case more broadly the West, as an example and illus-
tration.
Joseph Needham, in all probability the scholar who has done more than any
scholar to try to convince his readers of “the genius that was China”, always liked
to picture its culture as a kind of antithesis to that of Europe. For him, the West
was inherently and permanently instable, subject to a schizophrenic, creative
tension, whereas China always tended towards a homeostatic equilibrium. He
regarded the West as characterized by a psychology of dominance, what one
might call a Faustian soul, expressing itself in exploitation of nature, assump-
tions of cultural superiority, and political confrontation with others and an in-
built penchant for warfare whereas China preferred cooperation. In his view,
Western thinking was more ‘masculine’ i. e. rigid and looking for certainty,
whereas China exemplified more feminine characteristics like equity and flex-
ibility. He also characterised Western thinking as more ‘mechanical’ and Chinese
thinking as more ‘organic’. For him, the contrast between what motivated Zheng
He to make his voyages and what motivated Vasco Da Gama was striking. He
considered Zheng He and his men to have been driven by curiosity and to have
remained calm and peaceful, whereas Vasco Da Gama and his men were violent,
looking for land, bullion and honour.1207 With several Chinese scholars, he liked
to claim that Chinese ‘science’ was primarily ‘practical’ and Western science
primarily ‘theoretical’.1208 Maybe Needham was correct in all these contrasting
characterisations that fascinatingly enough indicate that the defender of Chinese
culture par excellence in the end came up with exactly the same contrast as Max
Weber, supposedly the Eurocentric par excellence who claimed: “Confucian
rationalism meant rational adjustment to the world; Puritan rationalism meant
rational mastery of the world.”1209 This rational mastery of the world was a result
of the invention of modern science and its manifold applications in technology
that too might be connected to a certain Western restlessness as thinking in the
West was founded on a basis of Judeo-Christian and Classical ideas and modes of
arguing that in many respects were incompatible with one another and that with
increasing contacts with other ‘worlds’ and other world views became increas-
ingly hard to uphold. This led to a situation of principled scepticism and a search
for new foundations for certain knowledge. What made Europe in the end dif-
1207 For a brief summary of Needham’s views in this respect see Finlay, ‘China, the West, and
world history’. For an analysis of Needham’s views on Western and Chinese ‘science’ see
Cohen, Scientific Revolution, 418 – 488. Avery succinct comparison of the Western and the
Chinese mind and of the causes for the existing contrasts can be found in Needham, Grand
titration, 119 – 120.
1208 See e. g. Cohen, Scientific Revolution, 428, 439 and 442, and Yifu Lin, ‘Needham Puzzle’.
1209 Weber, Religion of China, 248.
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ferent in this respect was the fact that it faced permanent epistemic instability
and sustained epistemic challenges. In this respect too, it was never at ease.1210
The ‘restlessness’ of Europe that is so emphasised by Needham has always been a
‘topos’. William McNeill, father of modern world history, regards it as Europe’s
essence and its “true uniqueness”.1211 Ricardo Duchesne in his book with the
telling tittle The uniqueness of Western civilization dedicates an entire chapter to
references to and discussions of the “restlessness of the Western spirit” and
another one to “the continuous creativity of the Western mind.”1212 But the point
here, as with all big and encompassing cultural contrasts and explanations, is:
what exactly does all this mean for a concrete i. e. a historical explanation of the
Great Divergence? Even if Charles Murray were right when he claims in his
highly controversial but quite fascinating and challenging book on human ac-
complishment that there are a concentration of excellence in the arts and sci-
ences in the West, what then are its exact causes and what its exact effects?1213
Hardly any publication on the rise of the West omits a reference to the fact that
Western Europe was not an empire but a dynamic, competitive state-system with
a dynamic culture. A ‘cultural’ factor that is often referred to and that certainly
would have played a role in the specific economic development of Western
Europe as compared to other parts of the world was its relative openness to
external influences in the sense of its willingness to look for and adopt ideas and
practices encountered in other civilisations. As many scholars have pointed out,
such openness fosters innovation.1214 I, of course, am not referring to a general
attitude of what we would nowadays call ‘tolerance’ and ‘appreciation’ of ‘the
Other’, but to a very pragmatic attitude in which information, knowledge and
power were increasingly intertwined regarding the adoption of what was con-
sidered ‘useful’. There was no place in the world where intercontinental ex-
changes of whatever kind were so important as in Western Europe, just like there
was no place in the world where so much information was collected and dis-
cussed about so many other parts of the world or where so many people were
convinced that this knowledge was power. The Italian writer Tommaso Cam-
panella (1568 – 1639) as early as 1599 wrote in his La monarchia di Spagna:
“Knowing the world is already half possessing it”.1215 What Headrick claims for
the nineteenth century, was already true for previous centuries: “In every part of
1210 See for this thesis Dengjian Jing in his forthcoming book with Princeton University Press.
1211 See e. g. McNeill, Rise of the West, 539.
1212 Duchesne, Uniqueness of Western civilization chapters 6 and 4. In this book, the author
shows a real passion for making me say things I do not say about Weber and Western
society.
1213 Murray, Human accomplishment.
1214 See e. g. notes 145 – 146.
1215 I found this quotation in Gruzinski, Quatre parties du monde,157.
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the world, Europeans were more knowledgeable about events on other con-
tinents than indigenous people about their neighbours.”1216
In Western dealings with people in its colonies in particular but also with
other foreigners there was a – I would think uniquely – intense and combined
effort to ‘explore, control and utilise’ that, for better and for worse, was almost
entirely lacking in, for example, the Middle Kingdom.1217 There were quite close
links between intercontinental trade and empire on the one hand and the rise of
‘science’, or, if that is too expansive a word, the accumulation of useful and
reliable knowledge on the other.1218 In Western countries, such information was
of the utmost importance, economically and otherwise, and governments as well
as private persons were extremely interested in collecting it.1219 Here, again, the
fact that Europe was a unity in diversity had relevant implications. It consisted of
a large number of independent but competing ‘laboratories’ in each of which
ideas could emerge, be borrowed and tested.1220 That definitely was an advant-
age. According to Joel Mokyr “… Europe differed in that the seeds of innovation
sprouted and flourished”, as an effect of political competition.1221 People prop-
agating new ideas in his view “…were able to play different political units, as well
as spiritual and temporal authorities against each other. Multicentrism made it
possible for original thinkers to move between different regions and spheres of
influence, to seek and change protectors. When some centres were destroyed by
political events, the centre of gravity shifted elsewhere.”1222 Admittedly, China
consisted of millions of competing individuals and many different regions. So
there is no reason to believe that as such it would generate less dynamism. But
even those millions of people in China did not cover ‘all under heaven’. The
overwhelming majority of them, as Han, shared many ideas and interests. People
living in the Qing Empire were not living in a world that was as ‘diverse’ as that of
many Western Europeans living in their parcellised small continent with its
many overseas connections and colonies. What matters here is not so much the
absolute size of societies in terms of numbers of people, but their diversity and
1216 Headrick, Tools of empire, 208. Here again the difference between early modern north-
western Europe and Qing China is immense.
1217 See, for that combined effort Abernethy, Dynamics of global dominance, passim, e. g. page
39.
1218 For the connection between knowledge and empire in early modern Britain see e. g.
Drayton, Nature’s government: science, imperial Britain, and the ‘improvement’ of the
world and his ‘Knowledge and empire’. For the situation in the Dutch Republic, see, for
example, Cook, Matters of exchange.
1219 See under note 947.
1220 I refer back to notes 320 – 323.
1221 Mokyr, ‘Intellectual origins of modern economic growth’, 340.
1222 Mokyr, ‘Intellectual origins of modern economic growth’, 342.
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the nature and ease of interaction in expanding networks as Dudley empha-
sises.1223
Reference to permanent or at least quite static cultural or systemic traits can
certainly contribute to explaining differences in wealth that emerge steadily over
time but in my view it can never suffice to explain the relatively sudden and
substantial historical change we refer to as the Great Divergence. In that respect,
an approach like that of Jack Goldstone looks more helpful; he points out that
several Eastern and Western societies reacted differently to their great revolu-
tionary upheavals in the early modern era, which in the East tended to lead to
conservative reactions, whereas in Great Britain they created a climate in favour
of progress and change from 1688 onwards.1224
What I am saying is that despite these similarities, which were evident up to 1850, there
was one significant difference that separated western and northern Europe from all
other parts of Eurasia, and that was an intellectual shift that began around 1500, which
then had a very shifting and uncertain trajectory, limited for centuries to a small circle
of scholars and theologians, but nonetheless by 1660 started producing significant
changes in the way elites acquired and validated knowledge. Over the next century and
a half, roughly by 1830, the new empirical and sometimes theoretical knowledge
gathered by these new methods led to the wide application of steam power in Great
Britain, and a host of other technical and industrial innovations, that transformed the
economies and then the societies of north-western European countries over the course
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.1225
The problem of how to explain change by referring to something ‘permanent’
also appears with references to Christendom or rather Western Christendom as a
fundamental trait of the West and as a source of its exceptional history, also in
economic respects. Such references have always been popular and still have not
disappeared, even though they have become less straightforward. Joseph
Needham, to again refer to that fascinating scholar, claims that the idea that
nature functions like a machine and according to laws is fundamental for the
emergence of Western scientific thinking. That idea, in his view, is Western or
rather Christian as Christianity has a celestial Lawgiver, i. e. a God that ‘fixed’
laws to which all nature ‘obeys’. Chinese thought lacks a personal Creator God
and therefore lacks confidence that the code of nature’s laws could be un-
veiled.1226 According to Deepak Lal, it was “a ‘package’ of cosmological beliefs,
1223 Dudley, Mothers of innovation. See also his Information revolutions in the history of the
West.
1224 Goldstone, Revolution and rebellion in the early modern world, chapter 5.
1225 Jack A. Goldstone, The divergence of cultures: enlightenments and conservatism in Eu-
rope and the Old World. Working Paper N10 – 73 December 2010 Mercatus Center, George
Mason University, page 9.
1226 I take this from Cohen, Scientific Revolution, 453 – 455. See there for further references and
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political decentralisation, and the application of the ‘inquisitive Greek spirit’
that led to Promethean growth in the West and to its ascendancy. He becomes
even more explicit and writes: “The midwife in delivering the package that led to
Promethean growth in the West was the Christian church. The individualism it
inadvertently promoted is the unique cosmological belief of the West. … an
unintended consequence of the Church’s acquisitive hunger. … [that led to
individualism and a legal revolution] … That merely technological and scientific
developments were insufficient to deliver the Industrial Revolution is borne out
by the failure of Song China to do so, although it had these ingredients.”1227 The
existence of a specific Western European marriage and family pattern with
characteristics that are considered supportive of individualist and market-ori-
ented behaviour has also been regarded as an effect of Christianity or rather of
the influence of the Catholic Church that in the twelfth century codified in
canonical law that a marriage had to be based on mutual and voluntary consent
of both partners. This, in combination with the fact that people married rela-
tively late, often after having worked outside their parental house for several
years and set up independent household led to a relatively egalitarian position
for both partners.1228 In essence these characteristics continued to exist also
when circumstances e. g. with the Reformation changed. The importance of
developments in the field of law can hardly be overestimated, but it of course is
very hard to pin down to what extent they are cause and to what extent they are
effect.
What makes the many references to Christianity and Christendom even more
problematic is that so much in Western society is ‘Christian’ in one way or
another and that Christianity has meant so many different things in so many
different places and at so many different times – just think of the differences or
even stark contrasts between Catholicism and Protestantism – that such claims
can easily become devoid of any concrete content. Jack Goody fiercely opposes
the idea of European exceptionalism, but nevertheless points at the exceptional
fact, as he sees it, that the Italian Renaissance institutionalised a switch to the
secular that became a permanent feature of the intellectual landscape in Europe.
In explaining why this institutionalisation happened in the West rather than the
East, he tends to accord a prominent role to merchants and their interest in
explanation. Needham, by the way, also claimed the Chinese too could have had science
and technology, had they lived in favourable conditions. See Needham, Clerks and
craftsmen, 82.
1227 Lal, Unintended consequences, 174 and 173.
1228 Moor and Van Zanden, ‘Girl power’. Western Europe already in Middle Ages had ‘weak’
family structures. See e. g. Lynch, Individuals, families and communities in Western Eu-
rope. For the positive effects of such family structures on the development of a market
economy, see De Vries, Industrious revolution, 10 – 18.
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literacy and numeracy.1229 This, in a nutshell, would mean that for as far as he
accepts any long-term explanation for the rise of the West it would not be
Christianity but its forced ‘retreat’. Many scholars have claimed that modernity
began with the Renaissance or the Reformation and was opposed by Catholi-
cism. This is exactly the opposite of the thesis defended by Thomas Woods, How
the Catholic Church built Western Civilization.1230 The claim by Rodney Stark
that Christianity was the embodiment of reason and the origin of freedom,
capitalism and Western success, will certainly not convince everyone, in par-
ticular not the many scholars who think the Enlightenment is the essence of
Western exceptionalism and modernity.1231 Historical sociologists such as Mi-
chael Mann and John Hall take a more sociological angle: in their view, Chris-
tianity provided normative pacification and consensus and kept medieval Eu-
rope, not only its elites, together via an ideological network of power and trust.
Mann even goes as far as to claim it was the necessary basis for all what followed
in European history after the Early Middle Ages.1232 Reading Victor Hanson’s
Why the West has won one tends to become somewhat less optimistic about
Western individualism, rationalism and about normative pacification. Hanson
points at the “singular lethality of Western culture at war in comparison to other
traditions that grew up in Asia, Africa, and the Americas” and claims the ex-
istence of a specific Western way of war that can explain how the West became so
powerful, which of course contributes to explaining how it became so rich.1233 I
can only say here that to me an approach looks more promising, in which not so
much the content of Christian beliefs but rather their functions and effects and
the impact of the Western Churches as institutions hold pride of place. A recent,
very interesting and helpful example would be the analysis by Karel Davids.1234
The list of exceptional traits that have been attributed to Europe’s culture could
easily be extended. For me, the point is not so much whether one would be
willing to accept European exceptionalism in any or all of these respects. Neither
is the point whether it would be possible to prove its existence, which I think in
several respects can be done fairly easily. The point is that all those ‘unique’
1229 Goody, Eurasian miracle, 94 – 105.
1230 Woods, How the Catholic Church built Western Civilization.
1231 Stark, Victory of reason. The number of studies looking at the Enlightenment as the essence
and apogee of Western modernity is innumerable.
1232 See for these claims Mann, Sources of social power, I, e. g. chapter 15, ‘European conclu-
sions’, and for pregnant phrases e. g. pages 337 – 338 and 381 – 390. For John Hall’s view,
that is less outspoken, see e. g. Hall, Powers and liberties, 123.
1233 Hanson, Why the West has won. The quote is on page XV. For an opposing view see Lynn,
Battle. For an interesting and in the context of this book quite relevant article see
Thompson, ‘The military superiority thesis and the ascendancy of Western Eurasia in the
world system’.
1234 Davids, Religion, technology, and the Great and Little Divergences.
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features share the problem of how to exactly connect it to the emergence of
modern economic growth.
For many if not most global historians dealing with the Great Divergence, in
particular those who are devoted anti-Eurocentrists, any reference to culture –
and, for that matter, institutions – as an explanation for differences in wealth
between ‘the West’ and ‘the Rest’ apparently counts as Eurocentric arrogance if
not blatant racism. The idea that there might have been something in Western
culture that might have been more conducive to growth clearly is unacceptable
to them. Ian Morris explicitly opts for an almost exclusively materialist approach
in his analysis why the West rules or rather ruled. What he, in his own words, is
up to is “… to say that culture, values, and believes were unimportant and to seek
the reason why the West rules entirely in brute material forces.”1235 Considering
his rather curious claim that “… the histories of Eastern and Western thought
have been broadly similar across the last five thousand years”, that is less sur-
prising than it may sound.1236 According to him people are “clever chimps” that
are curious and extract energy from the environment. What is crucial in his
perception is that in large groups they, “as opposed to individuals, are all much
the same.”1237 If other people had been located and challenged like the in-
habitants of Western Europe, they would have developed likewise: “Given
enough time, Easterners would probably have made the same discoveries and
had their own industrial revolution, but geography made it much easier for
Westerners …”1238 Wong and Rosenthal also argue along these lines.1239 Basically
Prasannan Parthasarathi does so as well when he explicitly claims that the Great
Divergence was caused by the fact that different regions in the world were
confronted with different problems and therefore took different trajectories, not
by different institutions or cultures.1240 Robert Marks is yet another scholar
arguing along these lines: other countries could also have been the first to
industrialize if only they would have had colonies and coal.1241 For Jared Dia-
mond, claiming that Europeans are something peculiar amounts to indefensible
1235 Morris, Why the West, 29. On page 571 it reads: “… culture and free will never trump
biology, sociology, and geography for long” and on page 620: “Even if everything in this
phase [the period between the Ice Age and about 2100 CE] had gone as differently as could
be imagined … the deep forces of biology, sociology and geography would still have
pushed history in much the same direction.”
1236 Morris, Why the West rules, 569.
1237 Morris, Why the West rules, 26 and 27. See also pages 29 and 559.
1238 Morris, Why the West rules, 565. See also page 500, where Morris writes that Newton, Watt
and their colleagues “were probably no more brilliant than Cicero, Shen Kuo and theirs;
they just thought about different things.”
1239 See their comments on page 322.
1240 Parthasarathi, Why Europe grew rich, ‘Introduction’, e. g. pages, 1 – 3.
1241 See the quotation under note 476.
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racism. Reacting in the New York Review of Books to a comment on his highly
successful book Guns, germs and steel he writes: “That prevalence of racist
theories, as loathsome as they are unsupported, is the strongest reason for
studying the long-term factors behind human history.”1242 In that book itself it
reads: “Probably the commonest explanation [of major differences in wealth
between various parts of the world] involves implicitly or explicitly assuming
biological differences among peoples” and “Today, segments of Western society
publicly repudiate racism. Yet many (perhaps most!) Westerners continue to
accept racist explanations privately or subconsciously.”1243 Not entirely con-
sistent, he even sets out to find out why New Guineans (did) wind up techno-
logically primitive, despite “their superior intelligence.”1244
As always, Andre Gunder Frank is very explicit “… Europe did not pull itself
up by its own economic bootstraps, and certainly not thanks to any kind of
European ‘exceptionalism’ of rationality, institutions, entrepreneurship, tech-
nology, geniality, in a word – of race.”1245 Jack Goody over the last couple of years
wrote no less than four books to show that the West up until the Industrial
Revolution basically was nothing special and to combat what he sees as “the
pervasive Eurocentric or Occidentalist biases of so much Western historical
writing, and the consequent ‘theft’ by the West of the achievements of other
cultures in the invention of (notably) democracy, capitalism, individualism, and
love.”1246 I could easily go on for a while and refer to, for example, publications by
James Blaut or John Hobson.1247 David Landes definitely has a point when he
writes that referring to culture as an explanatory variable in discussing wealth
and poverty, is not very popular : “It has a sulphuric odour of race and in-
heritance, an air of immutability.”1248 In the first chapter of his The uniqueness of
Western civilisation Ricardo Duchesne provides many striking examples of how
the West and its culture are now disparaged by many global historians.1249
It is fascinating to see how far many Western intellectuals want to go to deny
1242 http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1997/jun/26/guns-germs-and-steel/, consul-
ted on 18 – 8-2011.
1243 The two quotations are from Diamond, Guns, germs and steel, 8 and 9. The last claim is
irrefutable: if one publicly denies being racist Professor Diamond will claim one probably
is one in private and if one explicitly denies being one he will say one subconsciously is one
anyhow.
1244 Diamond, Guns, germs and steel, 22. See also page 14: “…New Guineans are on the average
at least as smart as Europeans.”
1245 Frank, ReOrient, 4.
1246 See his Capitalism and modernity ; Theft of history ; Eurasian Miracle and Renaissances:
the one or the many? The quotation is from the back-flap of The theft of history.
1247 See Blaut, Coloniser’s model of the world and idem, Eight Eurocentric historians, the Index
under ‘racism’, and Hobson, Eastern origins of Western civilisation, chapter 1.
1248 Landes, Wealth and poverty, 516.
1249 Duchesne, Uniqueness of Western civilisation, chapter 1.
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any specific positive traits to their own culture. But there are and have always
been exceptions. I present some recent examples, without any pretence of
completeness, and in chronological order. In the 1990s three books were pub-
lished dealing with the wealth and poverty of nations and with a strong emphasis
on culture, in particular the role of trust. Two of them were written by Alain
Peyrefitte and one by Francis Fukuyama.1250 These books had hardly any, not to
say no, impact at all on the Great Divergence debate as such. With the latest book
by Leonard Dudley, Mothers of innovation, the topic looks to be back on the
agenda. A very explicit exception, of course, is David Landes, who in a book that
sold more copies than all of the Californians ever sold together, made this
famous – or notorious – statement: “If we learn anything from the history of
economic development, it is that culture makes all the difference.”1251 The book
received wide public acclaim, but amongst historians and social scientists the
idea prevailed that the author, when it comes to his strong emphasis on work
ethic did not really prove his case, as far as anyone ever might be able to do that.
Thomas Sowell, in his 1999 book Conquests and cultures, time and again em-
phasised the central role of culture that he regarded as a kind of human capital :
“The particular culture or ‘human capital’ available to a people has often had
more influence on their economic level than their existing material wealth,
natural resources, or individual geniuses.”1252 In his words, “The receptivity of a
given culture to ideas and innovations, and the ability of that culture to take these
advances and carry them further, has been crucial.”1253 On the debate about the
Great Divergence his impact, however, has been negligible.
That certainly was not the case with Gregory Clark’s views on the role of
culture in the Great Divergence. In 2007 he published his controversial A farewell
to alms in which he attributed a crucial role to culture in explaining the Great
Divergence, although he explicitly emphasised that he regarded it as a dependent
variable. Clark is an established economic historian and with his book he quite
explicitly took position in the Great Divergence debate when it was already going
on for several years. Therefore some extra comments are in order. As early as
1988, Clark had admitted, “albeit reluctantly”, that culture must have played a
1250 Peyrefitte, Du “miracle” en ¦conomie ; idem, La soci¦t¦ de confiance and Fukuyama, Trust:
the social virtues and the creation of prosperity. Fukuyama, as usual, was quite outspoken:
“… a nation’s well-being, as well as its ability to compete, is conditioned by a single,
pervasive cultural characteristic: the level of trust inherent in the society.” Fukuyama,
Trust, 7.
1251 Landes, Wealth and poverty, 516. Six pages further in the book, on page 522, it reads
“…culture can make all the difference.”
1252 Sowell, Conquests and cultures, 334 – 335. See for many similar claims his chapter 6
‘Overview’.
1253 Sowell, Conquests and cultures, 361.
Culture and growth 391
part in economic development.1254 In A farewell to alms that reluctance seems to
have disappeared entirely and he writes: “David Landes is correct in observing
that the Europeans had a culture more conducive to economic growth.”1255 But
he is against using culture as an explanatory force per se, that is against “…
invocations of movers from outside the economic realm” as they “…merely push
the problem back one step.” In his view, ideologies “may transform the eco-
nomic attitudes of societies. But ideologies are themselves also the expression of
fundamental attitudes in part derived from the economic sphere.”1256 With that
proviso, he claims that Britain became the first industrial nation because
‘bourgeois’ or ‘middle class’ values were more prominent and more widely
spread over society there than anywhere else. The values he has in mind are:
patience, hard work, ingenuity, innovativeness, honesty, rationality, curiosity
and learning, thrift, prudence, negotiation. Comparatively speaking, in his view,
they turned Britain into a peaceful, thoughtful, literate and educated nation.1257
His explanation for the spread of these values – an explanation inspired by
publications of Oded Galor and Omer Moav – is a mechanism of natural se-
lection.1258 A couple of quotations will suffice to give a flavour of his distinct way
of thinking. According to him, a society emerged in England that “… rewarded
middle-class values with reproductive success, generation after generation.” He
thinks one might therefore “… speculate that England’s advantage lay in the
rapid cultural, and potentially also genetic, diffusion of the values of the eco-
nomically successful throughout society in the years 1200 – 1800.”1259 For those
who did not get the point, he succinctly claims, in another publication, that the
British, and others, became genetically (sic!) capitalist : “The triumph of capi-
talism in the modern world thus may lie as much in our genes as in ideology or
rationality” or as he puts it elsewhere in “a survival of the richest.”1260
Robert Allen, best known for his emphasis on relative factor costs, in his book
on the British Industrial Revolution from a global perspective, does not ignore
the importance of culture, far from it. I already quoted him writing: “The cul-
tural changes between 1400 and 1800 were immense and in the direction of
promoting invention.”1261 But he does not focus on them. Joel Mokyr, who can be
a hard-nosed economist, nevertheless, in a book published in 2009, holds the
1254 Clark, ‘Economists in search of culture’, page 161.
1255 Clark, Farewell to alms, 11.
1256 Clark, Farewell to alms, 183.
1257 Clark, Farewell to alms, 8, 11, 166, 183 – 184.
1258 See, for example, their ‘Natural selection and the origin of economic growth’. See also
Galor, Unified growth theory, chapter 7.
1259 Clark, Farewell to alms, 8 and 271.
1260 See Gregory Clark, http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/gclark/papers/Capitalism%20-
Genes.pdf and Clark and Hamilton, ‘Survival of the richest’.
1261 Allen, British Industrial Revolution, 269.
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view that the Industrial Revolution basically was: “…the outgrowth of the social
and intellectual foundations laid by the Enlightenment and the Scientific Rev-
olution.” He thinks that the answers to both the questions why Britain in-
dustrialised first and why large parts of Europe followed suit in the end “need to
be sought in the realms of knowledge and institutions, not geography.”1262 In his
view, “…an enlightened age was what was necessary to create the modern age of
industrialism and opulence” and “The Enlightenment was what set Europe on a
different track toward economic modernity.”1263 We have repeatedly seen that
Jack Goldstone holds quite similar views. Deirdre McCloskey is convinced that
material economic forces cannot explain the rising tide of modern economic
growth that has made the wealthy countries in our world so much wealthier than
they were only two centuries ago. According to her “…innovation (not invest-
ment or exploitation) caused the Industrial Revolution” and that innovation was
caused by “talk and ethics and ideas”. It took a change in ideology, i. e. “changing
forms of speech about markets and enterprise and innovation” as “economics is
something that happens between people’s ears.”1264 She sings a song of praise of
the ‘bourgeois’ virtues like love, faith, hope, courage, temperance, prudence and
justice. What caused industrialisation in England was a change “in what England
wanted, what England paid, what England valued”.1265
In the last couple of years culture has been put back on the agenda of his-
torians dealing with economic development. Let me just give three examples.
Joyce Appleby published a book on capitalism in 2010 called The relentless (sic
PV) revolution in which she clearly regards it as uniquely western and ap-
proaches it ‘“as a culture’, that it is “as much a matter of values and ideas as of
supply, demand and balance sheets.”1266 The role of culture in Niall Fergusons’
1262 See for these two quotations Mokyr, Enlightened economy, 11 – 12.
1263 Mokyr, Enlightened economy, 487 and 489. He in this respect tends to emphasize the
importance of informal institutions and cultural beliefs: … the traditional emphasis on
formal institutions has been over-emphasized, and … the enforcement of property rights
by the state was less crucial than the Northian interpretation has suggested. The impor-
tance of institutions extended beyond politics and formal institutions. We need to take into
account “cultural beliefs”…, which created an environment in which inventors and ent-
repreneurs could operate and cooperate freely. Equally important, we need to pay attention
to those institutions that stimulated and encouraged technological progress and not just
the growth that depends on well-functioning markets. Formal institutions such as state-
enforced patent rights may have been overestimated at the expense of informal private
order institutions. Mokyr, ‘Institutional origins of the Industrial Revolution’, the web-
version, page 3. The two publications referred to in this note provide excellent examples of
what such a cultural-institutional approach might look like.
1264 McCloskey, Bourgeois dignity. For the quotes see pages 6 and 8.
1265 For these virtues see her Bourgeois virtues. For the quote see her review of Clark, Farewell
to alms in European Review of Economic History 12, 2 (2008) 138 – 148, page 148.
1266 Appleby, Relentless revolution. See the interior flap and the advance praise on the back flap
by Sean Wilentz.
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Civilization (sic!) is central as shows in his six Western killer apps: competition,
science, property rights, medicine, the consumer society and work ethic. The
title of Ricardo Duchesne’s book, also from 2011, needs no further comment:
The uniqueness of Western civilization. It is a fierce attack, to large extent jus-
tified, on those who simply ignore the importance of culture and deny that
European culture would in any relevant respect have been unique.
As indicated, the problem with all those references to culture and whether one
points at general characteristics or specific traits, continues to be the vagueness
of the concept. How can one operationalise the cultural concepts that are central
in these books? How can one measure them and convincingly show they were
more present in some regions, states, or civilisations than in others? How can
one convincingly show that they actually had a relevant and concrete impact on
the emergence of modern economic growth? The most important direct driving
force behind that type of growth has been innovation. As I already indicated, the
values that scholars such as Clark, Landes, McCloskey, Weber, but even Adam
Smith already refer to, strikingly enough, almost without exception are ‘con-
formist’ rather than ‘innovating’.1267 The same could be said with regard to ‘trust’
that is often regarded as so important for development. In that respect, ap-
proaches like those of Joel Mokyr and Leonard Dudley, who in their analyses
always try to look for direct links between culture, institutions and innovation,
seem the most promising and the most adequate.
Each of the separate ‘values’, referred to in previous paragraphs, as indicated
earlier on1268, need not necessarily promote growth, let alone modern growth.
Their impact is very much context-dependent. The way in which they are often
bundled together e. g. in the work of Clark who praises the innovativeness,
rationality, thrift and prudence of the British bourgeois, moreover often does not
add up to a consistent argument. When Ferguson claims that the West was
characterised by the fact that it became a consumer society and developed “a
mode of material living in which the production and purchasing of clothing and
other consumer goods play a central role, and without which the Industrial
Revolution would have been unsustainable”, that is not easy to square with
another Western killer app he refers to, its specific work ethic, i. e. “a moral
framework and mode of activity, derivable from (among other sources) Prot-
estant Christianity, which provides the glue for the dynamic and potentially
unstable society created by apps 1 to 5.”1269 He also, and that is a common
problem with many claims arguing the importance of culture, is not exactly
concrete when it comes to time and place. Take, for example, the claims of
1267 See for Smith under note 438.
1268 See pages 145 – 151.
1269 See for both definitions Ferguson, Civilization, 13.
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Deirdre McCloskey for her ‘bourgeois values’: how exactly can those values be
connected to economic growth and more importantly in the context of my
analysis, to the emergence of modern economic growth? Why, if they are so
fundamental, did they have so little economic impact in other parts of the world
and other periods of time than those McCloskey focuses upon? Ricardo Duch-
esne does a good job in presenting a counterpoise to a lot of exaggerated and
above all scientifically not very helpful anti-Eurocentric self-flagellation. But in
all his bashing of anti-Eurocentrists, he is not able to show concretely anywhere
how he thinks the Great Divergence can be concretely connected to Europe’s
culture. Ultimately, so it seems, that is not what he is really up to, but then why
does he devote two chapters, almost hundred pages, of in total some 520 in his
book to current debates on the Great Divergence?
Even in the work of Gregory Clark, a methodologically quite sophisticated
economist, references to culture as explanatory factor in the end leave much to
be desired. His claim that certain behavioural patterns are transmitted genet-
ically and that culture can be reduced to a kind of epiphenomenon of demo-
graphic and economic trends is extremely improbable and I have never come
across any data that would make it probable. Besides, are Britain and countries
that did not – or much later – have modern economic growth really that different
when it comes to the spread of certain ‘middle-class’ genes over society? Clark’s
anecdotic references can hardly count as proof. Moreover and very importantly,
did the richest and ‘fittest’ in pre-industrial Britain really overwhelmingly have a
‘bourgeois’ mind-set? The answer of course is: “No”. In all probability it took
quite a different disposition (if any!) to become and be rich during the sixteenth
century than in an industrialising, let alone an industrial world. War and
‘warriors’ have placed a big stamp on the development of British society.
Whatever else the inhabitants of (Great) Britain may have been, they were also a
‘warrior race’. The independent existence of the realm and its empire definitely
were not primarily built on bourgeois values like honesty, curiosity, learning,
thrift, prudence or negotiation, but determined to a far higher degree by gen-
tlemen who considered themselves natural leaders and thought in terms of
courage, honour, self respect and indifference to danger.1270 Gentlemen and their
values also played a fundamental role in Britain’s so-called ‘gentlemanly capi-
talism’. Its main actors certainly were not sober, hardworking middle-class men,
obsessed by time, as Weber likes to portray them. Even the new gentry of wealth
in the service sector with their characteristic mixture of amateurishness and
efficiency had an ethos that was much closer to that of aristocrats. They certainly
were not indolent but enjoyed their freedom from continuous work, resented any
‘tyranny of the clock’ that would have indicated they were not gentlemen, and
1270 See James, Warrior race. I took the characteristics of the leaders of this race from page XIV.
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operated in a world where leisure often was difficult to distinguish from work.1271
All in all, Clark is very vague about the mechanisms by which his values spread,
what values actually were dominant in Britain and how they would relate to the
emergence of modern economic growth. His emphasis on discipline, especially
when it is broadened to the importance of human capital in general, for eco-
nomic growth and for different growth rates between countries, definitely
presents an interesting hypothesis that would deserve more systematic testing.
Cultural explanations in this context always tend to be associated with Max
Weber, even though Weber was much less of a ‘culturalist’ than is suggested by
the never-ending references to his ‘thesis’, that actually was only a fairly minor
part of his work.1272 Weber’s work continues to be very influential amongst
people who write about the economic rise of the West as is quite obvious in the
publications by Appleby, Duchesne, Ferguson or Landes. Interestingly enough,
Appleby is more impressed by Weber than by Smith or Marx because of Weber’s
“emphasis on contingency and unintended consequences in the formation of
capitalism”.1273 Next to scholars who still focus on the very specific claims Weber
made about Calvinism and capitalism and think the German sociologist has a
point with ‘his thesis’1274, there currently is an increasing number of scholars
who, whether inspired by Weber or not, study topics like ‘work ethic’, ‘discipline’
and their connection to economic growth. We have just referred to Gregory
Clark who quite explicitly does so. It has become commonplace to describe
Europe in the early modern era, if not already earlier on, as a ‘disciplining’
society. Calvinists and other Protestants played a prominent role in this dis-
ciplining offensive. In Protestant countries, but not only there, the number of
holidays tended to be reduced, which was positive for total production. The rise
1271 I strongly paraphrase here from Cain and Hopkins, British imperialism, chapter three.
1272 See, for example, the silly attack on Weber by Blaut, who sees two basic reasons why
Weber’s theories about European exceptionalism would be wrong: Europeans did not have
special qualities and “… the history of society in general is much more than the history of
ideas.” Blaut, Eight Eurocentric historians, 29. A clear example of this ‘scaling down’ of his
oeuvre, to just give one extra example, can be found in the way in which Prasannan
Parthasarathi in his last book thinks he refutes Weber’s ideas whereas he only talks about
Weber and culture. See Parthasarathi, Why Europe grew rich, under ‘Weber, Max’. Even
that refutation has not entirely succeeded.
1273 Appleby, Relentless revolution 18. Appleby thus claims exactly the opposite of Hobson with
regard to Weber’s approach. See the comments by Hobson on page 52.
1274 For that specific thesis see Max Weber, ‘Die protestantische Ethik und der „Geist“ des
Kapitalismus’, Archiv für Sozial-wissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 20,1 (1905) 1 – 54; 21, 1
(1905) 1 – 110. For Weber’s broader ideas about “the development of a capitalist ethos”, see
e. g. his Wirtschaftsgeschichte, chapter 4, 9. See for a recent ‘application’ Jacob and Kadane,
‘Missing, now found in the eighteenth century’. For a critical test, finding little empirical
support for the Weber-thesis, see Delacroix and Nielsen, ‘The beloved myth’. Öst-
erreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften 23, 3 (2012) is entirely dedicated to
new interpretations and critiques of Max Weber’s ideas on Protestantism and capitalism.
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of Protestantism also had other, quite concrete and direct economic con-
sequences.1275 Protestants were kicked or pushed out of several non-protestant
countries. By emigrating and taking their money, skills and networks with them,
they strengthened the economies of the (protestant) countries receiving them.
Protestantism, moreover, broke the back of the economic power of the Catholic
Church – in particular when it comes to landholding and the collecting of ‘taxes’
– and strengthened (central) government those who bought expropriated goods
and land from it. In that sense, it played a major part in ‘primitive accumulation’
as it occurred e. g. in Britain, the Netherlands or Prussia. It, moreover, was
essential for the emergence of more bureaucratic, ‘rational’ and representative
states.
One can also find a Weberian inspiration behind several analyses that focus
on institutional or juridical peculiarities of the West. Randall Collins ‘re-
constructed’ Weber’s last theory of capitalism and interestingly focuses on the
medieval church, claiming that according to Weber, “…the institutional pre-
conditions for capitalism were developed in medieval Europe, in one specialized
part of it, the Church” and that “… the bourgeois capitalism that we take as its
‘pure’ form emerged upon the ruins of medieval religious capitalism.” For
Weber, cloisters were proto-factories with a disciplined labour force. The Cis-
tercians even had “the Protestant ethic without Protestantism.”1276 Weber re-
putedly accorded a fundamental role to law in development. He inspired several
scholars in this respect, for example Harold Berman – even though this scholar
correctly claims he wants to and should go beyond Weber and Marx – and Toby
Huff. Berman sees what he calls the ‘Papal Revolution’ of the High Middle Ages
as the great turning point in modern European legal history as it gave birth to the
modern Western legal tradition with its various legal systems, the first of which
happened to be canon law that then separated itself from secular law and as-
serted its own kind of jurisdiction. Next to canon law, he refers to several va-
rieties of secular law: feudal law, manorial law, mercantile law, urban law and
royal law. The striking thing, in Berman’s view, is that these legal traditions
transcended ‘national borders’ and that in Europe law developed into a “legal
science” that he even refers to as a “prototype of science”. Law was fundamental
for the emergence of the modern state in Europe, and a fundamental pre-
condition for capitalism as it developed there. According to Berman, the Eu-
ropean tradition of law was almost entirely European in its origins and unique in
1275 For these connections between Protestantism and economic development see Gorski,
Disciplinary revolution and idem, ‘The Little Divergence’.
1276 For these claims see Randall Collins, Weberian sociological theory (Cambridge 1986)
chapters 2 and 3.
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the world.1277 Toby Huff has a less broad legal-historical perspective and almost
exclusively focuses on specific links between law, corporations – in particular
universities –, and the development of knowledge.1278 But whatever the exact
focus or goal, every historian will be struck by the importance in the history of
Europe of law and legal science and by the omnipresence of people who had
studied them and made a living as ‘lawyers’. In no civilisation in the world was
their importance as great as in Europe. In my view, understanding and com-
paring law is extremely important for global economic history and as yet under-
developed as a field of study. We can only hope that the boom in global history
will soon extend to global legal history.1279
29. Culture does make a difference. But how can one
convincingly prove that?
The problem of cultural explanations is not so much that they do not make sense.
I am convinced they do because there is often a close connection between the
culture(s) and the institutions of a country and the importance of institutions for
economic development is undeniable. If culture were so irrelevant, then why did
it require so much cultural change for countries to catch up? The problem is that
it is so extremely hard to make cultural explanations empirically valid and show
how exactly certain cultural traits would promote or hamper (modern) eco-
nomic growth. Culture clearly can have effects on wealth. One could give nu-
merous examples. Let me, with no other further-reaching goal than to show in
how many respects culture might make a direct difference for an economy, refer
to cultural traits that to my mind were present in Qing China and not or to a far
lesser extent in Great Britain and that must have made an economic difference.
At the level of the central state, the preference for small, lean, and cheap gov-
ernment certainly must have had an impact on the economy, just like the con-
nected, preference for low taxes, the refusal to incur public debts – until far into
the nineteenth century – and the policy to interfere little in the domestic
1277 Harold Berman, Law and revolution: The formation of the Western legal tradition and
idem, Law and revolution, II: The impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western
legal tradition. The reference to law as a prototype of Western science is in his Law and
revolution I, 151 and the admonition to go beyond Marx and Weber in that same volume,
538 – 560.
1278 For Huff ’s ideas and the way in which he uses Weber’s ideas see e. g. his Intellectual
curiosity under ‘Weber, Max’.
1279 See for some literature Cooker and Schäfer, Solomon’s Knot and Ma and Van Zanden, Law
and long-term economic change. See for very interesting efforts to write global legal
history, the oeuvre of Lauren Benton http://history.as.nyu.edu/object/laurenbenton.html
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economy, including in monetary affairs which was visible in the circumstance
that there was no central bank and the government did not coin silver. There
definitely was a certain arrogance regarding the outside world as one considered
oneself ‘all under heaven’ and therefore was not always open to foreign ideas or
in favour of going abroad when that might have been helpful. One simply was less
curious about the outside world and thus less challenged by it. Because of this
attitude, there was also nothing like what Europeans at the time would consider a
foreign policy. There was no economic nationalism, no emulation of other
countries, no mercantilism and no empire building like in Britain. Of course, all
this was not solely a matter of cultural differences but culture surely played a
role.
Qing China’s ruling elites were predominantly conservative in the sense that
they were in favour of keeping the status quo and were inspired by the past far
more than by some unknown ‘better’ future. Ideas of change, progress, im-
provement or enlightenment were much less popular in China than they became
in Britain. In the eyes of the elites ruling China, farming was the essential
economic activity and agriculture the backbone of society. They idealised tra-
ditional country life and the traditional peasant household with its clear division
of labour in which men plough and women weave.1280 Central government was
fairly successful in its efforts to prevent the emergence of a class of landlords
running large farms where landless labour was employed. It implemented pol-
icies to prevent people from becoming landless. Partible inheritance was almost
universal and endorsed if not enforced by law. The family – in whatever exact
extension and definition – with its very powerful male head was the cornerstone
of society and it was recognized as such. The bulk of production took place in the
household and it was often frowned upon women who worked with or for
strangers. Social arrangements were less formalistic and legalistic than they were
in Britain where law and lawyers were facts of ordinary life. There was a tendency
to keep things informal and personal and to live in a world of general norms
rather than specified, written laws. Family and firm were not normally sepa-
rated. When it comes to status, literati outshone people in the military or in the
professions.
I could go on to refer to several other cultural differences between Britain and
China that must have mattered but whose importance for the Great Divergences
is very hard to pinpoint exactly. Let me, just for this matter of valuing certain
activities and occupations, present some concrete information to show that
1280 It is striking in this respect, that in Britain there was such a broad, state-supported effort to
‘improve’ agriculture and that this was considered only possible when peasants and cot-
tagers and their ‘irrational’ lifestyle gave way to ‘rational’, improving, capitalist farmers.
See Lis and Soly, Worthy efforts, 200 – 214.
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‘values’ are anything but irrelevant. What is considered an honourable occu-
pation and what is not can have a huge impact on economic life.1281 In Qing
China, there were an absolutely stunning number of people who prepared for
and did examinations to be able to become government officials, or at least
member of the so-called ‘gentry’.1282 At the macro-level of the entire economy,
this must have been quite inefficient even if at the level of those involved it may
have been rational in the sense that if they got some kind of a (semi-official) job –
which increasingly they did not – it might clearly pay, whereas it of course also
might be the case that they actually could not conceive of something better to do
anyhow.1283 The bulk of talented men in Qing China continued to try to improve
their status via the official exams, which meant many years of very intense study.
In 1800, there were only around 20,000 official posts in the empire, drawing on a
talent pool of no less than 1,400,000 upper and lower degree holders!1284 After the
Great Taiping Rebellion, 1851 – 1864, there were some 1.5 million literati with a
degree and about three million candidates for the biennial qualifying exami-
nations.1285 People who did not pass the exams could increasingly buy jobs or at
least degrees and titles. By 1800 there were an estimated 350,000 holders of
purchased degrees in the empire, and that number would spiral upward as the
government became more fiscally strapped in the nineteenth century.1286
1281 See for some general comments: Baumol, ‘Entrepreneurship, productive, unproductive
and destructive’, and Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, ‘The allocation of talent: implications
for growth’.
1282 For the characteristics of this social status group of landlords-literati see Chang, ‘Chinese
gentry’; Ch’ü, Local government in China under the Qing ; Elman, Cultural history ; Ost-
erhammel, ‘Gesellschaftliche Parameter’ and Smith, China’s cultural heritage, chapters 6
and 7.
1283 For an analysis trying to figure out the rate of return of education in Qing China at a
societal i. e. macro level and at the individual level see Xuyi, P¦ter Földvri and Bas van
Leeuwen, ‘Human capital in Qing China: economic determinism or a history of failed
opportunities?,’ Paper presented at the Asian Historical Economics Conference, Japan,
September 2012. I consulted it at the website of Bas van Leeuwen at the University of
Utrecht. The authors find no trace of aggregate productivity-improving effects of edu-
cation. Looking at the rate of return of education at the individual level – corrected for
foregone wages, life expectancy and the probability of successful examination – they claim
“… for a rational decision maker it was not profitable to take any exams” and “The lack of
financial incentives acted hence as an efficient deterrent for the majority of the population,
helping to preserve the elite’s positions”(17). Actually, there were millions of Chinese who
during Qing rule did prepare and take exams. Apparently they were irrational and
‘undeterred’. Might not the fact that, in contrast to the authors, they not only looked at
official incomes of educated ‘officials’, but knew that actual incomes often were a manifold
of them, make their behavior somewhat more ‘rational’ after all?
1284 Rowe, China’s last empire, 52.
1285 Elman, Cultural history of civil examinations in late imperial China, 584.
1286 Rowe, China’s last empire, 114.
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Why not China?
A world of striking differences
In this book, a lot has been said about ‘why Britain’ and ‘why the West’. There
would, however, not have been a Great Divergence as we know it if modern
economic growth had emerged somewhere else in the world or if the rest of the
world had soon caught up with the West. The Great Divergence debate is about
why Britain and then the West took off but also about why so many countries did
not and fell behind. As indicated at the very beginning of this book, one of the
reasons why the question of why Britain was first while the rest of the West
followed suit and the rest of the world was left behind for so long has again
become a major and burning issue in economic and global history is the fact that
several scholars have begun to claim emphatically that the West had not been so
special after all. Several highly advanced economies, especially in East Asia,
would, according to those scholars, have resembled Britain on the eve of its
Industrial Revolution so much and would have been so advanced, that Britain’s
industrialisation basically could only be explained via a kind of deus ex machina
called ‘contingency’. Such claims have in particular been made for China. They
kindled a new debate and had a major impact on the way in which ‘the rise of the
West’, in economic terms at least, came to be perceived. That was very salutary,
but I think there are good reasons to claim that revisionism went too far. In my
view, at least it has now been fairly effectively shown that actually China’s
economy – to again focus on this country – not only functioned quite differently
from that of Western Europe, in particular Great Britain, but also was less ad-
vanced than revisionists assume and that chances that it would industrialise
were only a fraction of the chances that Britain’s economy would. I hope to have
shown in the text that the chance that Qing China might have become the world’s
first industrial nation for several reasons was about nil. I even think its potential
to quickly catch up in the nineteenth century – even had it been left to its own
devices – were tiny. At the end of the text, I would like to wrap up several
comments already made with regard to the general situation in China and to add
some specific comments with regard to the actual situation there at the very
moment that Britain took off.
My ultimately rather negative assessment of China’s economic potential – at
least as compared to the West – starts from the conviction that the Californian
claim that Britain’s economy and that of China on the eve of Britain’s in-
dustrialisation would have been surprisingly similar, is, to put it rather bluntly,
quite weird.1287 Granted, both economies were pre-industrial and therefore
subject to Malthusian constraints, and both were quite advanced pre-industrial
economies in the sense that in their own way they both had made the best, so to
speak, of what was available to them. But, it should be emphasised here, they did
that very much in their own way. Apart from the very basic overall resemblances
just referred to, they were almost as different as can be. Let us begin with
agriculture, the biggest sector in all pre-industrial economies. We see funda-
mental differences with regard to average farm size and whether that increased
or decreased; with regard to the importance of scale effects, the use of animals,
non-family and wage labour, and with regard to the sources of energy used. In
Britain, non-human energy sources, i. e. animals, water and wind and, quite early
on, coal played a far more important role. We also see fundamental differences in
the organisation of domestic industry : whereas in Britain putting out was more
prominent, a system of individual buying and selling was predominant in China.
Urbanisation reached different levels in both countries and decreased in China,
whereas it increased in Britain. The nature and function of towns differed in both
countries. Labour was more expensive and less abundant in Britain where wage
labour was far more normal. Britain’s labour force had higher literacy and
numeracy rates. Skills premiums were lower there. The country had more me-
chanics. Entrepreneurs, scientists, engineers, artisans and tinkerers were in
closer contact to each other. There were substantial changes in China’s consumer
demand, but foreign goods played a less prominent role in those changes and in
any case had less impact on production.
As regards accumulated surplus, both countries in principle had enough
means at its disposal to pay for a take-off. In Britain, however, the purchasing
power and market-orientation of the broad masses were higher. Britain’s
economy and society were far more open in terms of the exchange of goods,
people and ideas with societies all over the globe. Collusion between economic
and political power was far more normal there. Britain was a fiscal-military
mercantilist state until the 1820s at least, while Qing China was not. Britain’s
government had far more tax income and far more other income because British
people were willing to support government and lend money to it. The country’s
1287 For those who read French: I presented the argument that I synthesise here more exten-
sively in my ‘Monde de ressemblances surprenantes?’
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tax system was more efficient. The same goes for its monetary and financial
system. It, in contrast to China, had a system of funded debt, a national bank and
state–supported paper money. Its bureaucracy was more efficient and less cor-
rupt than China’s. It had a strong army and the strongest navy in the world. Its
government endorsed most economic innovations. The country had a strong
sense of national identity, unity and commitment, and relatively inclusive in-
stitutions to put it in Acemoglu’s and Robinson’s terms. In brief: Britain and
China during the very long eighteenth century were completely different soci-
eties with completely different economies. To regard them as surprisingly
similar because their economies both were organic might be helpful as an eye-
opener at the beginning of a debate. But it is not very helpful in progressing it any
further. There were not only quite substantial structural differences them, the
countries and their economies were also clearly heading in different directions,
with Britain’s economy showing many more indications of change and im-
provement, whereas China’s economy was heading for involution.
The revisionist view of China’s economy over the very long eighteenth cen-
tury in any case has turned out to be far too optimistic. China at the time not only
was quite different from Britain, but also poorer and it had less potential for
development. The revisionist claim that the wealthiest parts of China were as
wealthy as the wealthiest parts of Western Europe on the eve of Britain’s in-
dustrialisation now seems to be refuted. Claims that China was the world’s silver
sink also had to be substantially qualified. The claim that China was a highly
advanced economy at the time – in the eighteenth century – “flooding [sic!] the
world market with Chinese manufactures” simply cannot be upheld.1288 In the
last decades of the eighteenth century, the country’s export had already acquired
‘peripheral’ traits; that is before industry took off in Britain and before the
country became politically ‘colonised’. Exports of porcelains had diminished
substantially because of European import substitution, as Europeans started to
produce their own porcelains or substitutes. The same goes for silk textiles.
Their export became less important. Exports of silk increasingly referred to raw
silk instead of textiles. China’s cotton fabrics, the so-called nankeens, in the end
could not compete with those made in Britain. China had already become an
exporter of tea, by far the bulk of its exports, other semi-manufactured goods
and raw materials, decades before the First Opium War.1289 The imports of
opium, that were the immediate cause of that war, clearly became a big problem.
Opium actually became China’s main import. As already indicated, its price
tended to go up whereas the prices of the country’s main export products tended
1288 Marks, Origins of the modern world, 16.
1289 See for this thesis Gang Deng, Chinese maritime activities & socioeconomic development,
the chapter ‘Markets and trade patterns’.
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to go down. This was a quite exceptional, unfortunate combination for a pe-
ripheral country during the nineteenth-century trade boom.1290
It those opium imports were so obnoxious, why weren’t they stopped?
Imagine Chinese junks with Chinese crews trying to sell opium in Newcastle.
Those increasing imports are not only a clear proof of British greed and un-
scrupulousness. But who needs that proof ? They also are proof of the weakness
of China’s state and, lest we forget, of the enormous collusion with the British by
many Chinese.1291 One, moreover, may also wonder why, if China’s economy
indeed was as highly developed as Californians like to claim, it did not manage to
come up with other new products to make up for the famous silver drain that
started to hit the country, in particular during the second quarter of the nine-
teenth century. That drain that is referred to in every text discussing China’s
predicaments indeed caused big problems. That is also surprising: in terms of
value, it was quite small as compared to GDP.1292 The fact that so much silver left
the country and therewith depleted China’s ‘monetary’ stock could have been
dealt with more effectively. A drain like the one China was confronted with need
not have been a problem if the country had had a well-organised efficient state.
Britain dealt with far bigger export deficits in its commodity trade. The same
goes for the costs of war, including the reparations that had to be paid. Over the
entire period between 1843 and 1899, China’s war reparations totalled 713
million taels. On average that boils down to some twelve million taels or one to
one and a half grams of silver per capita per year.1293 Government’s foreign debts
at the time, also a topic that has elicited huge debates and has often been con-
sidered a major problem at the time and in historiography, in the period from
1861 to 1898 increased to some 270 million taels in total. That is considerably less
than a tael, i. e. considerably less than thirty-seven gram of silver per capita.1294
As compared to what had become ’normal’ in the West, the sums of money
involved are absolutely tiny.1295 Relatively minor financial claims and losses,
1290 Williamson, Trade and poverty, 33 – 34.
1291 Lovell, Opium War, chapter 1.
1292 See Man-houng Lin, China upside down.
1293 I here refer for these data to a paper by Kent Deng, Miracle or mirage? Foreign silver,
China’s economy and globalisation from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries http://
www.lse.ac.uk/collections/economicHistory/GEHN/GEHNPDF/KentDengSILVER.pdf.
Deng claims to have taken them from Dictionary of Chinese History by Zhao Dexin from
1990, pages 874 – 880. The value of the tael fluctuated during this period. Those fluctua-
tions have been considered in this calculation.
1294 For these data, I refer to the paper by Kent Deng, Sweet and sour Confucianism, presented
at the Tenth Global Economic History Conference, September 2006 in Washington, pages
36 – 37.
1295 France after Waterloo had to pay reparations that, including additional payments and
interest, amounted to some twenty per cent of its GDP i. e. some 300 grams of silver per
capita. See White, ‘Making the French pay’. Another example would be the payments of
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however, in Qing China led to huge problems because of inadequate institutions.
What was really disastrous for China’s economy was the Taiping Rebellion,
which would have been a major disaster for every economy and society.1296 We
will not even discuss the fact that the Qing, ruling over an empire with some 400
million people, could not simply kick out the British attacking them with a
couple of thousand people over a distance of a couple of thousand miles during
the First Opium War.
China’s economy and in particular its state apparently were not so highly
developed, healthy and strong after all. They, in any case, could not resist what
effectively was a fairly minor threat. The state apparatus over time became even
weaker and government in the nineteenth century often was not even able to
fulfil the absolute minimum of what one might expect from any government.
Many of the emerging problems were connected to the extremely weak financial
basis government had.1297 The country’s bureaucracy was very seriously under-
staffed and under-paid, and often under-qualified for the more technical parts of
their job. The bulk of routine work, because of that under-staffing and under-
funding, had to be left to clerks and runners, who officially were not in gov-
ernment service and were not paid from government funds but by their direct
employer or more often by the populace. The number of soldiers who were
actually fit for war was surprisingly small ; their payment, training and discipline
were bad and getting worse. In the end, for the ordinary populace, China’s state
began to present the worst of all worlds. Officially, its subjects were lightly taxed.
In reality they had to pay very substantial amounts of money to a state – or rather
to its official and semi-official representatives – that increasingly was unable to
deliver public goods like maintaining the granary system, supporting its land-
less peasants, taking care of infrastructure and providing security. The tax
system differentiated between regions. As such, this does not have to be prob-
lematic, although it complicated matters and to some extent punished the
wealthy and developing regions. It also differentiated between social groups,
with many exemptions for wealthy people, whereas many ordinary people were
made to pay far more than the official rates. A substantial part of taxes was still
collected in kind, which was enormously costly and very vulnerable to fraud. By
far the most important tax was that on land, which made the tax system quite
inflexible. A lot of land was not taxed at all. Total tax income was far too low to
Prussia to Napoleon. There are varying estimates of the total amount of money that
Napoleon ‘collected’ in Prussia between 1806 and 1812. But it was at the very least half a
billion francs. That boils down to at the very least 225 grams of silver per inhabitant of
Prussia. See for this estimate Macdonald, A free nation deep in debt, 333. In Great Britain,
just after the Napoleonic Wars, public debt amounted to over 800 million pound sterling.
Per inhabitant of England Wales, Scotland and Ireland that was some 4400 grams of silver.
1296 Deng, China’s political economy in modern times, chapter 4.
1297 See my ‘Staatsfinanzen Chinas und Großbritanniens im langen 18. Jahrhundert’.
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give government the means to effectively steer the country in a certain direction,
if it had wanted to, which does not seem to have been the case. Taxes were not
increased and no money was borrowed. Government therefore had to improvise.
It lacked institutional arrangements to quickly and effectively react to emer-
gencies. Illegal and a-legal practices abounded. Complaints about corruption
and fraud were legion, which means that in the end property rights were often
not well respected and infringed upon. From the 1780s the situation worsened.
The Californians manage – which is quite amazing – to completely avoid re-
ferring to the enormous problem of corruption, already endemic over the entire
eighteenth century and only increasing from the end of the rule of the Qianlong
Emperor.1298 One never reads anything about that very well documented phe-
nomenon in their books. Qing Government indeed became part of the problem
and not the solution.
Government, of course, was not the only problem. As compared to Great
Britain, with its wave of inventions and innovations in science and technology as
well as in institutions and organisations, Qing China from the beginning of the
long eighteenth century onwards simply was quite static. The country un-
deniably had an excellent track record in the field of science and in particular
technology. But under the Qing, change and development clearly were not
normal and increasingly institutionalised as they were in the West. The country
may indeed have invented the printing press, the compass, gunpowder, paper
money and many other things, but the 250 years of Qing rule did not see much
real innovation. No breakthroughs occurred in mining (neither in drainage nor
in ventilation), in iron production, in the enormously labour-intensive irrigation
or in the husking of rice. What is also very striking is the almost entire lack of
major institutional innovations as compared to Britain with its financial, po-
litical and military ‘revolutions’. Even if China may still have been extremely
good in incrementally improving the efficiency of what it was already doing –
which I think was less and less the case – we see no major innovations that put it
on a new trajectory : it just was not heading anywhere new. Even if we take the
broad ‘Schumpeterian’ definition of innovation, and look at its various elements,
Qing China simply was not very innovative as compared to Great Britain.
After the conquests of the Qianlong emperor (r. 1736 – 1795) the realm was
also confronted with problems of overstretch. It had become too big to be
efficiently ruled along the same lines, with the same resources and with the same
number of personnel as it had been in the past. In several regions, tensions arose
between Han settlers and the original population, in particular along the borders
1298 See e. g. Park, ‘Corruption in eighteenth-century China’; Shawn Ni and Pham Hoang Van,
‘High corruption income in Ming and Qing China’; Qian Chen, ‘Needham puzzle re-
considered’, and Tuan-Hwee Sng, ‘Size and dynastic decline’.
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of China Proper and in China’s newly acquired ‘periphery’. Finally, there were
problems of over-population. Even if there may have been a tendency to picture
China’s situation under the late Qing in terms that were too gloomy and too
‘Malthusian’, population increase did cause serious problems: many farms
simply became too small, many tracts of soil became exhausted and grave
ecological degradation occurred. But all those things referred to in standard
textbooks as bringing China down in the nineteenth century could only do so
because China was too weak to begin with. I agree with William Rowe when he
writes in his recent book on the Qing Dynasty :
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that systemic failures within the Qing empire itself be-
came manifest around the turn of the nineteenth century (Qing rulers and subjects
themselves noticed these developments with alarm) which made the nineteenth-cen-
tury divergence not merely a matter of being left behind by Europe in relative terms but
also of an intrinsic and absolute loss of capacity.1299
In the area of bureaucratic initiative and morale, so he writes “troubling signs
appeared well before this date (1795 PV).”1300
The message that Qing China was a country of good governance, a message
that Roy Bin Wong systematically spreads, again in his 2011 book with Jean-
Laurent Rosenthal, in that respect is far too optimistic. According to them, it was
only in the nineteenth century with foreign intervention and in particular when
the country had to pay war reparations – especially those after the war with
Japan – that things began to go wrong. At a time when the West became less
bellicose and its costs and damages of war decreased, so they claim, China in
contrast had to invest more in, and suffered more from, war. That is a quite
idiosyncratic perspective. To begin with, the many military campaigns of the
Qianlong Emperor were more expensive than the First Opium War and in any
case military conflict and its costs in China were miniscule compared to those of,
for example, the Napoleonic Wars for the European states involved. As indicated,
by far the most devastating conflict China was involved in during the nineteenth
century was the Taiping Rebellion for which one cannot primarily blame the
Westerners, although Western powers did interfere after it had broken out … to
save the Qing regime. When it comes to the war reparations that so often are
referred to as a major cause of Chinas predicament, we already indicated that on
a per capita basis they were tiny compared to what countries losing wars in
Europe had to pay.1301 The take-off in Britain and later the rest of the West indeed,
1299 Rowe, China’s last empire, 149 – 150.
1300 Rowe, China’s last empire, 88. Deng, China’s political economy in modern times. chapter 3
with the telling title: ‘The withering state and its consequences’ paints an even more
negative picture.
1301 See note 1295.
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as Gunder Frank wrote, was preceded by a ‘decline of the East’, be it for different
reasons for different regions and with different chronologies.1302 When we
confine ourselves to its economy we can see that, as already briefly discussed,
India had already lost a significant share of the world’s textiles markets to Britain
before that country had a clear technological advantage in producing them, i. e.
at least before 1800. Indian competitiveness suffered because of developments in
India itself that drove up wages and prices. For China, we indicated that its
exports of porcelains and silk textiles shrunk already in the last decades of the
eighteenth century. In the Ottoman Empire, de-industrialisation set in later ; only
after the 1820’s. But there we see a striking loss of political and military power.1303
The Iranian Empire of the Safavids basically already collapsed in 1722.
1302 Frank, ReOrient, 264 – 276.
1303 For more details about Asian de-industrialisation I again refer to Williamson, Trade and
poverty, chapters 5, 6 and 7.
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Concluding comments
This book contains a comparison between what economists in their more the-
oretical reflections have recently contended about modern economic growth as
well as its causes on the one hand and the explanations provided by global
(economic) historians about the Great Divergence, which is generally consid-
ered to be the result of the first manifestation of that growth, on the other.
Drawing upon those theoretical insights and upon my reading in the field of
economic history, I also presented my personal assessment of the current ex-
planations of the Great Divergence. The text did more than just take stock. To be
able to structure my analysis and my assessment I first had to define as precisely
as possible what to my view was the ‘essence’ of that Great Divergence. I did so in
an extended introduction. When there is no clarity about the thing to be ex-
plained, there, of course, can never be clarity about the explanation. The Great
Divergence was defined as the beginning of the great divide between rich
countries and poor countries in global economic history. For Great Britain and
China, the countries that function as case studies in this text, it was dated to the
period between roughly 1680 and 1850. The explanandum of the text consisted of
the take-off into modern economic growth that caused this gap to emerge.
The point of departure of my brief overview of current thinking about growth
in economics was the usual distinction between ‘proximate causes’ and ‘ultimate
causes’. Those proximate causes were discussed in terms of the factors of pro-
duction, i. e. land (or as it was described here more broadly ‘geography’ or
‘natural resources’) ; labour (in terms of its quantity, quality and costs, and
somewhat more unusual in terms of mass consumption) and capital (in par-
ticular discussed in terms of its required accumulation) and their allocation (in
terms of division of labour, specialisation and exchange). Ideas about the im-
portance of innovation, which according to most modern economists are the
essence of modern economic growth and its most important proximate cause,
were also separately discussed. Then the attention switched to ‘ultimate causes’,
with a focus on the assumed importance of institutions and culture.
The ideas of economists were then confronted with the explanations one
comes across in the publications of (global) historians dealing with the Great
Divergence. I focused on the assumptions, lines of reasoning and claims found in
analyses and debates over roughly the last two decades. The reason for that time
frame is the fact that since the second half of the 1990s, the old debate about ‘the
rise of the West’ has been fundamentally reconfigured. The text presented an
analysis, confrontation and evaluation of the validity of all those assumptions,
lines of reasoning and claims, not an exhaustive chronological overview or a
reproduction of the debates as they have actually been waged. My goal was to
provide a general thematic analysis of the explanations that have been suggested
for the Great Divergence as it was caused by the take-off into modern economic
growth in parts of the world.
In the examples and the more in depth-analyses in the text, I focused, ob-
viously, on Great Britain, as the first industrial nation and the nation were
modern economic growth first emerged, and, for those regions where it did not
emerge, on (Qing) China. The reason for choosing Qing China as a contrasting
case is that China under the Qing happens to be the country that up until now –
for better or for worse – with Great Britain and the rest of Western Europe has
held centre stage in the Great-Divergence debate. Reference was also made to the
situation in other parts of the world because what we know about those regions
might be useful in assessing the validity and range of the assumptions, ap-
proaches and claims that one encounters in debates about Western Europe and
Qing China.
1. Geography
Insofar as ‘growth-economics’ has dealt with geography, the emphasis has long
been on ‘the geography of poverty’, i. e. on the limits to growth set by geography.
It focused on the various ways in which geography can explain that a country is
not rich. A clear example would be the work by Jeffrey Sachs and colleagues in
which the importance of geographical disadvantages in terms of, for example,
climate, disease or location is discussed. Global historians have always been
sensitive to potential negative effects of geography on growth, most clearly in the
sense that, almost without exception, they were heavily influenced by Malthus
and his ideas about the limits to growth. Amongst contemporary economists, a
specific variety of this emphasis on the potentially negative effects of geography
on economic development prevails in their focus on the so-called ‘resource
curse’ and on ‘Dutch disease-effects’, two concepts that surprisingly enough
indicate a negative correlation between good resource-endowments and eco-
nomic development. These concepts, too, have certainly had their impact
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amongst (other) social scientists and historians dealing with development and
growth. To a much larger extent, that was also the case with dependency theory
and world-systems analysis, which, from the very beginning, were just as
‘popular’ if not more so amongst historians and other social scientists than
amongst economists. According to proponents of these approaches, poor ‘pe-
ripheral’ countries, whatever else their features may be, characteristically spe-
cialise in the production of raw materials that are supposed to suffer from
structurally deteriorating terms of trade. This would then make them poor
compared to ‘core’ countries of the global economy that specialise in manu-
factured goods and services. Dependency and world-systems analysis are not
narrowly geographical: international and domestic power relations also play an
even fundamental role in them. Without them, geography, in the sense of re-
source endowment, need not have had its negative effects. Reference to resource-
endowment and different specialisations in these approaches, moreover, are not
so much integrated in an explanation of why the rich took off: they primarily
function in an explanation why the poor did not catch up, i. e. at least most of
them. Many (global) historians, as well as many social scientists, still endorse
core-periphery thinking in which the specific relations between regions in
various parts of the world and their differing specialisations explain the gaps in
wealth between them. Thinking in terms of the ‘development of under-devel-
opment’ is still very much alive in their circles.
The specific claim that primary products would always suffer from deterio-
rating terms of trade no longer finds serious support. This, however, does not
mean that economists would deny potentially negative consequences of spe-
cialising in the production of primary goods, far from it. There is an increasing
awareness that even if in the short term there might be good reasons for such a
specialisation in terms of comparative advantage, specialising in producing and
exporting resources can indeed be very bad for long-term development. In
several resource-rich regions, wealthy and developed economies emerged, but in
many more of them that was not the case. Jeffrey Williamson definitely has a
point with his claim that (one of) the disadvantage(s) of producing primary
goods resides not such much in their problematic terms of trade but in their
price-volatility. That can certainly explain some of the problems incurred by
countries exporting primary products. In current economic theory, however,
most scholars including Williamson, who connect meagre development and
growth with specialisation in the production and export of primary goods, do so
by pointing at the decreasing returns that characterise such specialisation. It
generally involves little adding of value, little human capital, only few backward
and forward linkages and hardly any spin-off. This means you cannot base a
developed economy on them. A country that wants to become rich has to spe-
cialise in products that have a high added value, many backward and forward
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linkages, and many spin-offs, and thus require much human capital. On top of
that they have to have a fairly strong market position. When it still is in an initial
stage of development, a certain emphasis on producing and exporting primary
resources in which it has a comparative advantage does not necessarily need to
be a disadvantage for a country, far from it. It can yield the necessary funds for
supporting growth if those funds can be and are used in a general strategy of
diversifying and upgrading production, in which export sectors are connected
with the rest of the economy and too big a dependency on foreign capital and
knowledge is avoided. At any rate, whether such a strategy is possible and
whether it can and will be turned into part of a broader policy also depends on
existing institutions, although the impact of factor endowments certainly is not
negligible, even with good institutions. A strong resource-dependency in com-
bination with specific, ‘extractive’ institutions is bound to have a negative im-
pact on long-term growth and development. Although most economists would
thus admit that geography matters and in some cases can be a fundamental
hindrance to growth, the bulk of them would agree that growth does not depend
on geography.
Amongst global historians, the situation is strikingly and surprisingly dif-
ferent. In many of their publications, the focus is primarily on what one may call
‘the geography of wealth’, i. e. how geography one way or another made the West
rich. Eric Jones already paid a lot of attention to Europe’s specific environment in
his explanation of the European miracle. In the work of some members of the
California School, that emphasis has become even stronger, e. g. in the influential
work of Kenneth Pomeranz with his emphasis on the “geographic good luck”,
“fortunate geographic accidents”, “crucial accidents of geography” and “mas-
sive windfalls of fuel, fibre and perhaps even food” and his many references to
the “fortunate location of coal” and ghost acreage. Jared Diamond and Ian
Morris are even more explicit. In Diamond’s case, geography made Eurasia
richer than the rest of the world whereas for Ian Morris the exceptional wealth of
the West in the end also is clearly due to geography. In the work of all the scholars
referred to geography is regarded as at least a very important (contributory)
cause of the Great Divergence.
Several economists and economic historians to whose work we have referred,
such as Stanley Engerman, Kenneth Sokoloff, Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson
and James Robinson in their analyses of economic (non-)development focus on
somewhat more indirect connections: to wit the presumed connections between
resource endowment in the widest sense of the word, the coming into being of
certain institutions and the subsequent emergence of certain path-dependent
virtuous or vicious circles of development. Their approach as such looks much
more promising than the fairly simplistic examples of geographical determinism
of in particular Diamond and Morris. They explicitly oppose geographical de-
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terminism and defend the position that institutions ultimately ‘rule’. Their
modus operandi has not been not without problems so far. Their actual work is
not always free of the geographical determinism they reject and not always
sensitive enough to contingency. Their analyses, moreover, depart from as-
sumptions about wealth, poverty, inequality and social structures in the regions
they discuss rather than from ascertained facts and thus might turn out to be
castles built on quicksand. This might in particular apply to the case of Latin
America. As yet their analyses also were somewhat superficial in their general-
isations and focused too much on static, either-or comparisons between sepa-
rated slices of history, which means they tend to compress it and often eliminate
agency. But such shortcomings probably are inherent to great theses. The point
is whether one can improve on them.
Their strategy of focusing on the interaction between geography and in-
stitutions certainly has its value and fertility. A more confined but more concrete
way of showing connections between geography and economic development and
an approach that I personally consider quite fertile – as I hope I have shown in
comparing Britain’s wheat economy with China’s rice economy – is that of
focusing on the potential of specific staples to become the core of a specific mode
of production that in turn might facilitate certain paths of development and
hamper others. Again, we are dealing with possibilities, probabilities, depend-
encies, or ‘logics’ at best, not necessities. In history, by definition, context always
matters. Rice regions do not necessarily develop like the Lower Yangtze regions
did; wheat regions not necessarily like Southern England.
In my view, geography in the widest sense of the word, including location and
the local availability of resources, definitely can be an important factor in ex-
plaining wealth and poverty. But no one has been – nor will anyone ever be – able
to come up with general i. e. ‘universal’ and unequivocal causal connections
between specific geographical factors and wealth or growth, let alone modern
growth. When it comes to sustained and substantial economic growth, geog-
raphy can at best be a necessary precondition but never a full or even major
explanation. It simply is too static for that. Even it if provides challenges or
possibilities and contributes to the emergence of growth, it per se does not
suffice to explain its continuation. When it comes to the central question of why
Great Britain and then Western Europe took off whereas China and other parts of
the world did not, the literature does not, in my view, provide convincing in-
dications that geographical factors per se were in any way decisive. Britain
clearly had some advantages. As an island it was relatively protected from dis-
ease and it was hard to conquer. It only needed a small standing army – but on the
other hand built an enormous fleet that was far bigger than necessary for sheer
defence. Transport and communication domestically as well as with the rest of
the world were relatively easy. It was fairly close to the New World. It had lots of
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coal, was not scourged by major natural disasters and its climate was not un-
favourable to economic activities. All of this, of course, is not irrelevant and in
the right conditions and when efficiently exploited even very helpful, but it does
not suffice to explain the island’s take-off. The same goes for geography in the
rest of Western Europe. To reduce the fact that China did not industrialise to
geography would also be very far-fetched. Its geography was quite different from
that of Britain, but one simply cannot defend the claim that overall geography
would have favoured Britain more than it did China. It seems that the role of
geography for the take-off that took place in the West is quite exaggerated by
many scholars studying the Great Divergence.
2. Labour and consumption
When it comes to the role of labour in the (emergence of) modern economic
growth, there is no clear consensus amongst economists at least in terms of the
impact of its quantity and costs. One can read about the advantages of large and
increasing populations and labour supplies as well as about their disadvantages.
Some scholars write about the advantages of low wages as a consequence of large
and increasing populations and labour supplies, others emphasise their dis-
advantages. In debates on economic development, scholars arguing along the
lines of Ester Boserup confront scholars who are more impressed by Malthus’s
ideas. Claims that population increase would be positive for innovation, popular
amongst new growth theorists, face claims in which its impact is regarded as
negative as it would tend to lower wages, which would then remove the incentive
to innovate. Whereas some economists have pointed at the potentially positive
effects of high wages on economic development in terms of the incentives they
give to innovation, the possibility they provide for improving human capital and
the high domestic consumer power they imply, others in contrast – I here need
only refer to Arthur Lewis, Kaname Akamatsu or Kaoru Sugihara – focus on the
advantages of low wages and an abundant supply of labour in terms of the
possibility to make higher profits.
Amongst historians dealing with the Great Divergence, opinions seem just as
divided, although those who primarily look at the pre-industrial world in Mal-
thusian terms of limits to growth in all probability still are in the majority.
Historians like Gregory Clark who do see possible advantages of rising pop-
ulation tend to do so under the influence of unified growth theory, pointing out
that more people would mean more clever brains and thus increasing chances
and an increasing necessity that someone might come up with an invention or
innovation. Overall high and sustained population growth more often seems to
have been the consequence of growth than its cause. In empirical studies, the
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connection between population increase and increasing innovation looks ten-
uous, if not absent. There, on the other hand, are quite a few counterexamples in
which a decreasing population or a decreasing labour supply are accompanied
by high levels of innovation. All in all, there does not seem to be general relation
with clearly described ceteris paribus conditions between demographic devel-
opment and economic development. Population and labour supply are vague
categories.
Probably it is better to, at least as a point of departure for an analysis, focus on
wage- and income-levels as more concrete indicators of labour scarcity. The
most explicit thesis that has recently been defended about the connection be-
tween the height of wages and innovation, in this case explicitly referring to the
emergence of the Great Divergence, is that of Robert Allen, who explains Brit-
ain’s take-off in terms of a mix of relatively high wages, relatively cheap energy in
the form of coal, and relatively low interest rates. Britain’s unique set of factor
endowments would have put the country on a capital- and energy-intensive
route that was easier to pursue for Western European countries trying to catch
up than for countries elsewhere. This approach definitely is promising and
overall I think the differences in factor-endowments and factor costs between
Britain and China – and many other countries – definitely go a long way in
explaining their differing economic histories. In the specific setting of Britain in
the eighteenth century, factor-endowments and factor-costs may indeed have
provided incentives for mechanisation, but even for that case there are some
caveats. Britain’s mechanisation did not take place in the regions with the
highest wages nor was the mix of factor costs that Allen refers to in itself suf-
ficient to explain Britain’s take-off. Location, for example, was also quite im-
portant, for various reasons. Allen’s thesis about factor costs and in particular
his emphasis on the importance of high wages, cannot be – and as far as I see is
not meant to be – turned into a general thesis connecting high wages and the
emergence of modern capital-intensive growth. His analyses, however, do at the
very least strongly qualify Mokyr’s contrasting claim – which we already referred
to – that “…successful economies relied on a reservoir of cheap, elastically
supplied labour” and that “The lesson to be learned from the experience of
European countries during the Industrial Revolution is that low wages, all other
things being equal [sic!] facilitated the accumulation of the capital necessary for
the diffusion of the new technologies …”1304 The economic history of the USA in
the nineteenth century, in my view, would also disprove that. Allen, on the other
hand, seems to exaggerate in his general suggestion that low wages would always
keep nations off the path to industrialisation. Let us therefore now briefly discuss
that possible connection.
1304 Mokyr, ‘Dear labor, cheap labor and the Industrial Revolution’, 195.
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I would agree though with Allen that, in the British context, relatively high
wages – i. e. relatively high from a European and global perspective but relatively
low from a British perspective – combined with relatively low cost of energy and
money – and a good location – go a long way in explaining the trajectory of
Britain’s economy to industrialisation. It would not require a major effort,
though, to point out several important industrial regions in Western Europe that
were characterised by wages, that compared to wages in the rest of the country or
other Western countries were low. A ‘low-wages route’ to industrialisation def-
initely is possible. That has recently been emphasised in particular by Kaoru
Sugihara, who basically argues along the same lines as Kaname Akamatsu, al-
though his emphasis on the role of labour is more explicit, and, in a different
broader context, Arthur Lewis already some decades ago. The analysis in this
text focused on the ideas of Sugihara and his claim that there has existed a
specific labour-intensive, industrious and low-wage East-Asian route to modern
economic growth. A detailed analysis of this claim and its implications for the
Great Divergence-debate led to several conclusions; to begin with, it exaggerates
the contrast with early industrialisation in Britain. Labour intensification, now
often referred to as an ‘industrious revolution’, actually was a phenomenon that
occurred in many regions of Eurasia before and during the early phases of their
industrialisation. It may have been pushed further in East Asia but that as such
did not make its industrialisation more probable. Parts of north-western Europe,
first and foremost Britain in the decades before industrialisation started, also
witnessed a process of labour-intensification but here this occurred in a context
of increasing division of labour that was based on individuals rather than on
households, as was the case in East Asia. This could lead to relatively higher
productivity increases as it made possible a more efficient allocation of labour
and, overall, a more efficient integration of individuals in the market. That in
principle may have made it easier for Britain to take its road to industrialisation
than for East Asia.
The first country taking the East-Asian road to industrialisation was Japan. It
did so after the Meiji Restoration of 1868. To my view it is quite clear that this
road, not just in the case of Japan but in all known cases, could only exist as a
supplemental accompaniment to more capital-intensive, high-wage varieties of
economic modernisation elsewhere, from which it borrows and with which it
interacts. Akamatsu’s flying geese-model is explicitly built on that assumption.
Essential, though, to my view is the fact that even though labour-intense routes
to industrialisation, including Lewis’s industrialisation on the basis of “un-
limited supplies of labour”, indeed may enable a country to catch up, it is
extremely unlikely that labour-intensification as such could autonomously and
independently lead to a take-off into modern growth. And that is what we want to
explain in this book. Finally, and that would be my last comment, the specific
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labour-intensive industrialisation that many economists perceive in East Asia, or
for that matter in other parts of the world, can never be more than a transitory
phase in the emergence of really substantial and sustained growth and high
wealth. The wealth in ‘mature’, developed economies is based on a level of
productivity that is so high that no amount of industriousness could ever suffice
to reach it. Such mature economies by definition have to use a relatively large
amount of capital goods and energy per capita. All in all the (presumed) ex-
istence of an Asian route of industrialisation, or indeed of any other labour-
intense ‘industrious’ road to industrialisation, whatever their importance, which
of course as such is huge, has no implications for our explanation of the take-off
in the West and provides at best a partial explanation for some regions’ ability to
catch up with a large supply of labour.
In literature dealing with the ‘industrious revolution’ in early modern global
economic history, two other elements, apart from the increased labour input, are
often referred to: the availability and development of skills in the labour force,
something that in particular Kaoru Sugihara likes to point at for the Asian case,
and changes in patterns of consumption, that according to Jan de Vries at least in
the case of north-western Europe and its north Atlantic offshoots were in-
trinsically connected to those changes in labour input. Obviously it is not only
costs and quantity of labour that might matter for economic growth, but also its
skills. Many economists at the moment think the importance to modern eco-
nomic growth of what they call ‘human capital’ and thus of education and skill-
formation can hardly be overestimated. Most global (economic) historians,
strikingly enough at the moment, hardly seem interested in labour. In pub-
lications by Californians, one in any case looks in vain for comments on its
quality in terms of skills or its availability for a labour market. Overall, studying
production as it actually takes place and its requirements and organisation i. e.
studying what used to be called ‘modes of production’ no longer seems fash-
ionable. The focus has clearly switched from (the organisation of) ‘production’
to (the gains reaped in) ‘exchange’. That is quite surprising and not exactly
helpful: how can one study the emergence of modern economic growth – that is
characterised by huge changes in methods and organisation of production –
without actually discussing the sphere of production? Without certain skills and
knowledge, those huge changes would have been simply unthinkable.
Notwithstanding Sugihara’s references to the skills of the Asian labour force, I
can only, looking at the available literature, conclude that when it comes to the
specific human capital needed for the specific breakthrough that we refer to as
the ‘Industrial Revolution’, the situation in Western Europe, first and foremost
Britain, simply was more favourable than in the rest of the world. All indicators I
found with regard to available skills point in that direction, as does all the
circumstantial evidence. It would be interesting to try to find out whether and to
Labour and consumption 417
what extent this might be attributed to the fact that Western Europe and in
particular Britain and the Netherlands were the wealthiest parts of the world.
Besides, but that basically is an institutional matter, in Western Europe and again
in particular in Britain, there was more labour available to work for wages on a
labour market than in other parts of the world. That made a more efficient
specialisation and allocation of labour possible than in a setting where most
labour continued to be employed in a system of household production and it
facilitated – and was facilitated by – accumulation of capital and capital goods.
The existence of an extended labour market in principle also made it easier to
concentrate labour (and thus production); to profit from scale effects and to
systematically discipline labour to perform tasks in a more anonymous formal
setting. It also implied that more people had to buy goods and services to be able
to satisfy their wants, which in turn increased the chance that profitable large-
scale productive units could emerge.
Successful industrialisation and modern economic growth require the ex-
istence of a growing mass market for (manufactured) goods. The specific way in
which Jan de Vries interprets the concept of an industrious revolution, as a
transitional phase to modern economic growth via a reallocation of labour that
was a response to changing consumer demand, seems to provide a fertile hy-
pothesis, which systematically tries to integrate the demand-side in the analysis
of the emergence of modern growth, which was long overdue. Modern economic
growth can only persist in what is nowadays called a ‘consumer society’. Con-
sumption in modern economies less than ever is just a matter of passively
absorbing what happens to have been produced. It also and increasingly has
become an active force in stimulating and steering production.
The changes in consumer behaviour in North-western Europe in particular
(especially Great Britain and the Netherlands) in the early modern era were such
that they have been characterised as a ‘consumer revolution’. For our analysis,
the interesting question again is whether they were something uniquely Western
that might have contributed to the fact that modern economic growth emerged
first in Britain and spread with relative ease over other Western European
countries. As it turns out, substantial changes in consumer behaviour, just like
‘industrious revolutions’, were not uniquely European phenomena. They oc-
curred in several highly developed economies during the early modern period.
But in my view, what happened in the West, in any case in Great Britain, again did
have some specific traits that had major consequences for economic develop-
ment and increased the possibility that Great Britain might industrialise. In
Britain’s consumer revolution imported (semi-)luxurious consumer goods,
initially primarily consumed by a relatively large – i. e. relatively larger at least
than in non-Western European societies – middle income segment of the pop-
ulation, played a major role. Those goods triggered a process of import sub-
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stitution, which is highly relevant for an explanation of the Great Divergence and
without which the industrial revolution as it actually occurred in Great Britain
would have been unthinkable. Outside the West, as we again in particular showed
for China, there was no such response, and there was no need for it, as most
‘new’, semi-luxurious consumption goods were not imported from abroad. In
the Western context of prevailing mercantilism, rapidly rising demand for for-
eign manufactured goods was bound to lead to efforts to try to produce goods
like silk or cotton textiles or porcelain domestically, and to stop the drain of
bullion used in paying for them in doing so. The fact that the economies of
Western Europe were so open in terms of the relative size of their imports and
exports as compared to their entire economy clearly also played a role. For them,
imports provided more of a challenge. Import substitution also played a part in
other regions, but that was once industrialisation had taken off in the West and in
a context where one had to react to Western imports. It, for example, clearly was
important in Japan’s industrialisation. The chances that China would have
started a process of industrialisation over import substitution before its opening
in the second half of the nineteenth century are very slim.
3. Accumulation
Accumulation has always been a very important – for quite some time even the
dominant – issue in studies of economic growth. It is obvious that growth
requires investment in more and preferably better capital goods and that this
requires money and resources. Overall, amongst economists dealing with
modern economic growth, accumulation, however, has increasingly lost its
central place. Of course, one needs substantial amounts of capital for investment.
But, as a rule, in our current global economy, finding capital, in particular when
the prospects of profit are not too bleak, does not have to be a bottleneck. For
many scholars dealing with the Great Divergence, though, capital accumulation
and existing levels of wealth still hold a very central position. Many of them are
still primarily fascinated by the question of how the West managed to find the
means to take-off in terms of money, resources and labour power as shows in the
many comparisons of the wealth or rather the income of nations just before take-
off. Many global historians focusing on the Great Divergence question still de-
vote particular attention to ‘the contribution of the periphery’; this is first and
foremost true of all those working in the tradition of dependency-theory and
world-systems analysis and, more recently, also many scholars who endorse the
emphasis of the California School on the importance of ‘ghost acreage’.
When it comes to accumulation as such, that is, to the amount of capital Great
Britain needed for the first take-off and the amount of capital it would have taken
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other countries that did not take-off, the conclusion can only be that the capital
requirements of the first take-off into modern economic growth that is at the
heart of our analysis relatively speaking were so small that in principle they must
have been less of an issue than they often seem to be in older literature. They
definitely could have been met by several societies. Admittedly, after 1850, with
the coming of the so-called Second Industrial Revolution, but in essence already
with the coming of the railways, capital requirements clearly became higher and
catching up more ‘expensive’. But then Britain had already taken off. Looking at
the huge amounts of resources that were available in all of the advanced organic
economies in the world as well as at the low capital requirements of the take-off
as it actually took place in Great Britain, I am convinced that those capital
requirements as such in terms of sheer amounts of money, resources or people
were not an insurmountable problem in several societies, far from it. In this
book, I defend the claim that finding the wherewithal to take off as Britain did
was not at all a major bottleneck. The necessary means could and in the end were
fairly easily mobilised in Britain and might have been fairly easily mobilised in
China and other advanced organic economies. The first take-off actually was
quite cheap. A wide array of arguments in the text showed not only that accu-
mulation was not the real problem, but also that it was not necessarily the real
solution. Many of the wealthiest countries of the pre-industrial world including
(parts of) countries like China, Japan or India were not as poor as to be stuck in a
poverty trap. Several countries that had accumulated a lot, such as Spain or
Portugal, continued to be quite poor and industrialised quite late. The Nether-
lands, up until the 1820s, very probably were just as rich as Great Britain and
continued to be quite rich. But they took off quite late. On top of that, as already
pointed out repeatedly, the essence of the Great Divergence was the emergence of
growth that was sustained and substantial. Such growth by definition cannot be a
matter of simply adding capital, even though an increased capital-input certainly
played a role. The motor of modern economic growth does not reside in the
quantity of accumulated resources but in the quality of capital used in pro-
duction. That quality as far as it is embodied in physical capital, of course, is not
a free lunch but not necessarily beyond reach. The costs of human capital are far
higher in the end.
Simply put, there are two methods to accumulate: via rents – that via of the
use of power, whether political, economical or both – and via profits – that is by
earning income in free and fair competition on a market. This neat distinction is
anything but neat in reality but it certainly is helpful as a first approximation. A
further helpful distinction then would be that between rents or profits acquired
abroad or at home. Amongst (global) historians, there is a tendency to pay more
attention to collecting rents abroad than to collecting them domestically. There
is some logic to this focus as one might claim that internal accumulation in the
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West is ultimately only a kind of internal re-allocation and not a way to actually
on an aggregate level become richer than the rest of the world, although this
argumentation certainly would underestimate the necessity of (domestic)
‘primitive accumulation’ as Marx called it to find the investment needed to
increase production. Rent collecting abroad has its limits and as such can never
guarantee sustained growth like the growth the rich world has now known over
many decades. The contribution of the periphery in terms of rents was not
necessary for the West to take off, even in cases where it was substantial – which
as compared to total GDP it never was – and it as such can never explain the
enormous economical changes and the enormous increases in wealth in the
Western economies that took off. It was too small as a percentage of GDP to be
regarded as the necessary or sufficient condition for the growth that caused the
Great Divergence. Modern growth is simply not a matter of primitive accumu-
lation, even if of course it will clearly have helped at certain times and places. The
West in any case did not simply become developed, industrial and rich thanks to
coercive external extraction like trading slaves and exploiting their labour or
appropriating bullion from Latin America. The correlations between external
rents and economic development do not fit such a thesis in terms of the countries
involved, the amounts accumulated and chronology. The same goes for profits
made by Western developed countries in their trade with less develop countries.
In discussions on the levels of accumulation as they existed in various
countries, foreign trade usually receives ample attention. Domestic income,
though, tends to be much larger than foreign income, regardless of whether it
comes from ‘coercion’ or ‘profit’. In the most advanced economies of Western
Europe, the bulk of income that could be used for accumulation came from
‘profits’ simply defined here as the difference between total costs and total
income. On markets with free and fair competition, those profits usually tend to
decrease with increasing competition, which, of course, is something of a
problem for those who like to identify the rise of the West with the rise of exactly
such markets. They provide permanent challenges and as such require dyna-
mism and change, to which we will turn soon, but on the other hand hamper
large-scale accumulation. Old-style Marxists, in my opinion with good reason,
emphasise the specific nature of what for them still is a uniquely Western type of
capitalist accumulation. For them it is not so much the amounts accumulated as
well as the logic and dynamics of accumulation that count. There are more than
enough examples of enormous accumulation in non-capitalist settings. You do
not need capitalism to accumulate, far from: in capitalism it often is harder. They
do pay serious attention to primitive accumulation, which basically is a form of
rent seeking, but focus on the workings of the capitalist mode of production.
Essential to the logic and dynamics of accumulation in capitalist market
economies as classical Marxists see them and a conditio sine qua non for it are
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the proletarianisation of the labour force in which ordinary producers lose their
means of subsistence and the process of permanent competition in which profits
are generated by lowering labour costs and increasing and improving invest-
ment in capital goods. This means that for them, too, markets, domestic as well
as foreign, in several respects are fundamental much more than just any kind of
accumulation. But as Marxists and followers of Schumpeter emphasise, most
competition on markets in so-called capitalist economies actually is not entirely
free and fair, but is characterised by all sorts of monopolisation without which
profits would be too low and too uncertain.
4. Specialisation and exchange
Development of trade and foreign trade in particular is often regarded as es-
sential for the economic development of countries. For mercantilists it was the
basis of almost all their policies. No one would want to deny this importance.
Sustained growth cannot exist without an outlet for extra production. Optimal
use of scale effects as a rule requires growing markets. Specialisation in sectors
with high productivity and added value requires a supply of raw material. The
rise of the West has time and again been interpreted as the rise of the market,
which means the rise of exchange with reference to the logic of a growth model
basically developed by Adam Smith, in which division of labour and special-
isation in a setting of (ideally) perfect competition would increase production.
When it comes to explaining the Great Divergence, the standard claim that
‘the West’ would have had bigger or better functioning exchange networks or
markets, which would have then triggered its unique development, has lost much
of its credibility. As compared to Qing China, to stick to our favourite ‘test-case’,
Western countries were quite small. Their markets, moreover, often were badly
integrated. Early modern Britain was something of an exception. No domestic
market in Europe was better integrated but as compared to China, and even as
compared to several Chinese regions, the number of its inhabitants was anything
but impressive. Even if we include all its colonies or even broader all its main
trade partners, it still was fairly small. When we focus on the market for con-
sumer commodities, the place, so to speak, where the first industrial revolution
was decided, absolute size does not seem to have been what really mattered or
made a major difference for beginning industrialisation. Comparing Great
Britain and China, Great Britain simply did not have an advantage here. Major
differences in this respect did exist when it comes to foreign trade, its relative
size, its growth and the character of goods exchanged. Those differences may not
as such provide an explanation of Great Britain’s take-off, but they do show some
clear differences with almost all countries in the world and especially with the
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globe’s big empires. Of course the tempo in which exchange grows and whether
this leads to bottlenecks and the characteristics of the commodities that are
exchanged do matter. In these respects Great Britain may have been in a more
favourable, i. e. much more challenging position than China, as its exchange was
more diverse and caused more bottlenecks than in China with is more uniform
and very smoothly operating market systems. But once again, we have to realise
that exchanging commodities of whatever kind i. e. including services, money
and labour, is an economic activity. Persons, firms or countries that profit more
from it apparently – for whatever reason – are more efficient and productive, so
the gains from trade to confine us to the case of countries, apart from exceptional
and mostly not very long-lasting windfall situations, are more part of the ex-
planandum than of the explanation.
It has often been claimed that Great Britain had a quite open economy and
profited from that fact. The term ‘openness’ in this context can have quite
different meanings and connotations. So some specification and differentiation
is in order here. Great Britain over the eighteenth century indeed developed
quite an open economy in the sense that imports and exports as a percentage of
its GDP were substantial and the absolute amounts involved were growing
quickly. It did not just import many products, but also knowledge, technologies,
skills and people. It was not unique in this respect, but this openness clearly
provided stimuli to a far higher extent than was the case in big empires such as
Qing China, or for that matter a county like France. Initially, manufactured
goods figured prominently amongst its imports, which challenged domestic
production, triggered import-substitution and did this so successfully that Great
Britain even started to massively export some products it had formerly im-
ported. What we now call Britain’s ‘Industrial Revolution’ would not have been
possible without a high level of imports and exports. It is not hard to understand
how in general such a kind of openness can have quite positive effects on an
economy. The concept of openness, however, in this context is often also in-
terpreted as ‘having low barriers to trade’. In this respect, calling Great Britain
‘open’ would be quite ‘optimistic’, at least up until the 1830s. Considering the
firm conviction of many economists that free trade is good for growth and
protectionism bad, that is certainly a very interesting observation that obliges us
to confront the ideas about the growth-enhancing potential of foreign trade that
long have been mainstream and still find many defendants with what economic
history suggests us.
Trade theory long taught that countries should specialise according to their
comparative advantage and do so in a setting of a minimum of barriers to free
exchange. Choosing the right specialisation in a context of free and fair com-
petition would increase efficiency and income for all countries involved. When
Great Britain took off, it had a comparative advantage in manufactured products
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and it was a rational choice to focus on producing them for export and importing
those raw materials and foodstuffs in the production of which it was relatively
less efficient. That strategy, in contrast to what Pomeranz is claiming, does not
explain why Great Britain took off, nor it can it explain why it could continue to
pursue it for so long. That again is a matter of its efficiency in manufacturing and
in the service sector. As I put it earlier on in the text: Great Britain had so much
ghost acreage because it had modern economic growth, not the other way
around. That without those massive imports growth would have fairly soon
petered out or at least decreased is extremely important but another matter.
For Great Britain, after a long mercantilist and protectionist run up, this
strategy worked out very well. But that was not the case for all countries at the
time. From the 1820s onwards, overall, up to the First World War, global trade
boomed for several reasons. This era of globalisation, however, also was the era
of the Great Divergence. For countries that were not (yet?) industrialised, the
right thing to do according to mainstream economics would have been to spe-
cialise corresponding to their comparative advantage in producing primary
goods, and use the money earned that way to ‘lift up’ their economy. Whatever
exactly was the ‘strategy’ they followed, there are clear examples of countries that
did profit from their increased integration in the global economy such as the
USA, Canada, Australia or New Zealand, and, with quite different factor en-
dowments and a quite different institutional setting, the first East Asian in-
dustrialiser, Japan. In many countries that turned out to become ‘Third World’,
things worked out differently and badly. They specialised according to their
comparative advantage but fell behind. Apparently, the increase of global trade
and global trade integration could work out differently for differing regions. We
already hinted at this in our comments on geography : if we are to believe recent
analyses of economic history, countries that fell behind did not do so primarily
because of deteriorating terms of trade. They may have suffered from the price
volatility of their primary produce exports but the essence of their predicament
resided in the fact that they did not upgrade their production from primary
products to products with a higher and increasing added value and a higher
knowledge content but voluntarily or involuntarily continued producing simple
products with a low added value.
In the longer run, there indeed are good and bad forms of specialisation, but
economies do not have to be stuck with the bad ones just because they initially
choose them. The reasons why primary-producing countries do upgrade pro-
duction and develop or don’t certainly can vary. But politics and institutions and
their exact factor endowments play a large role here. It certainly is not just a
matter of trade-relations and initial specialisation. For an economy to upgrade
production, it needs co-ordination of production strategies and even then it is
far from easy in an open, internationally competitive environment. It therefore
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will not come as a surprise that there have always been economists who favoured
protection of certain sectors of the economy, in particular industry, at least until
they were able to hold their own in international competition, the famous plea
for protecting infant industries. The strategy would then be to first protect an
economy against imports, then produce the imported goods oneself, then if
possible begin to export them and with the money earned upgrade domestic
production to goods with more added value and embodying more knowledge.
This strategy has often been considered a way of catching up for late-comers, but
actually it boils down to doing exactly what Great Britain, the first industrial
nation, itself did, e. g. in much of its textiles production and to what almost all
major wealthy countries appear to have done during their take-off. Meiji Japan in
so far is exceptional here that it went through the stages just described without
substantial protection of its own upcoming industries as international treaties
made that impossible.
The traditional claim of mainstream economists that an economy should
open up in terms of lowering its barriers to trade as much as possible in order to
start a trajectory of growth is currently challenged by an increasing number of
economists and looks to have been refuted by economic historians. There are
many examples of open economies that continued to be underdeveloped and
protected, more closed economies in which the economic situation clearly im-
proved and growth set in. An open, low-barrier economy might in several ways
benefit from trade and develop, but there are numerous and in the case of
developing and developed economies more examples of economies that first
went through an initial phase of protectionism before they opened up and
successfully competed on a global market. That does mean that protectionism
would guarantee success? Far from it. In many countries, it only served non-
competitive, rent-seeking producers at the expense of the consumers and other
producers. Whether protectionism helps or hurts to a large extent depends on
the context, the kind and length of protectionist policy, the strength of the state
and the kind of overall economic policies it supports.
This is not all, one might say, about openness and growth. Competition on
markets, domestic as well as international, can infuse dynamism into an econ-
omy. The challenges it presents in the end must provoke some response. Modern,
highly integrated economies are characterised by institutionalised systematic
research and devote staggering amounts of money, people and resources to
further developing education, science and technology. In such a setting, Smi-
thian dynamics of competition are almost bound to bring Schumpeterian in-
novation. Unsurprisingly, later adaptions of Smith’s original logic began to
claim that competition would turn innovation into an almost ‘natural’ outcome.
In the days before the emergence of modern science and modern research and
development, a transition from Smithian growth to Schumpeterian growth,
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however, was anything but obvious. It did not occur in Qing China or the Dutch
Republic in the long eighteenth century, although we have to realise that, as we
will briefly explain later on, much of pre-industrial growth in Europe was in any
case not really Smithian to begin with, as much of the growing trade was neither
free nor fair. The pressure of competition, moreover, need not necessarily have
an identical impact on production. Much depends on the way in which pro-
duction is organised. In that respect it is not unimportant for an explanation of
its take-off that wage labour and non-family labour was so important in Great
Britain as compared to other economies. Production to a large extent depended
on wage labour that in its turn to a large extent depended on a labour market. The
level of ‘proletarianisation’, to which we will briefly return later on, provided
Western and in particular British capitalism with a unique logic that again made
Britain – because of the high wages of its proletarians, their permanent avail-
ability for and dependency on the labour market and the fact that they also
depended on a market for their consumption – a far more likely candidate for
innovation in production and for industrialisation than China or any other
country in the world. The chance that labour-saving innovations will be in-
troduced in the actual process of production increases to the extent that the
‘maintenance costs’ of labour have to be covered by the employer and actual
wages tend to be higher. Classical Marxism in this respect still provides valuable
insights into the workings of capitalism as against other modes of production.
The pressure to do something about labour costs will as a rule be less acute in
situations where labour also has other means to provide for subsistence than its
wages. One might also expect that it usually is easier to no longer employ
external hired labour than to ask a family member to go work somewhere else on
her or his own account.
No one will deny that specialisation and exchange can be sources of growth.
But that does not turn trade into the motor of modern, sustained growth. Trade
without innovation reaches its limits as it exchanges products that are produced
within the limits of the existing production functions and does not move the
entire economy to a higher level. Ceteris paribus, the limits of Smithian growth
are determined by the extension of the market. That determines how far spe-
cialisation can go. This extension of the market in turn is determined by existing
technology, in terms of transport and communication, by institutional ar-
rangements, in particular the level of trade barriers, and by income, and it
normally is influenced by the factor endowment and size of the countries in-
volved. Markets have extended enormously over the last centuries of increasing
globalisation, thanks to all sorts of innovations, but even now distance has not




Modern economic growth as sustained and substantial growth exists because of
sustained innovation. At the moment, that seems to be the comunis opinio
amongst economists, even amongst institutionalists who do not pay much at-
tention to innovation as such but emphasise that sustained innovation is only
possible in the right institutional setting. Economists who believe in the over-
whelming power of the market regard it as an ‘innovation machine’ in which
competition ‘naturally’ generates innovation in an evolutionary process with
‘selection’ and ‘survival of the fittest’. Proponents of unified growth theory
consider the increase of knowledge as something directly linked to the increase
of population and thus also as fairly ‘natural’. Several proponents of the so-called
new growth theory are less convinced of the direct connection between market
competition and the growth of (applied) knowledge and emphasise the fact that
knowledge in the end is a non-excludable good. The returns on investments in it
therefore cannot easily be fully appropriated, which means that individual
economic actors or firms can be expected to be hesitant to pay the high costs of
producing and distributing knowledge in education, research and development.
For them it thus is not at all certain that the market mechanism as such will
generate sufficient human capital, invention and innovation so they see a fun-
damental role for the state in this respect. But one way or another, all modern
growth economists end up emphasising the essential role of innovation.
Some scholars writing on the Industrial Revolution from a global perspective,
such as Joel Mokyr and Jack Goldstone, full well realise the fundamental im-
portance of innovation and all it takes and pay ample attention to it. But very
influential scholars in the field of global history like Andre Gunder Frank,
Kenneth Pomeranz, Roy Bin Wong, and quite recently also Ian Morris, in their
analyses all but completely ignore the role of innovation as a continuing process
and rather casually present inventions and innovations as fairly isolated and
obvious responses to obvious challenges in terms of necessity being the ‘mother
of invention’ or even as a matter of contingency. All this is simply not borne out
by the historical record of countries that took off: the essence of innovation in
modern economies is the fact that it is a sustained and broad process, too
sustained and too broad to be just a response to a challenge or just an accident. It
would be wrong anyhow to reduce innovations, let alone inventions, to simple
reactions to economic stimuli driven by an economic logic. Many inventions or
innovations were the result of, for example, sheer curiosity. Many necessities, by
the way, never led to the ‘necessary’ inventions. This relative neglect and these
rather casual explanations by many global historians again form a striking and
perplexing contrast to what is going on in economic theory where innovation is
increasingly studied as what it actually is: a very complex phenomenon.
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The Great Divergence would have been unthinkable without sustained in-
novation, i. e. without sustained technological and scientific development. There
obviously is more to modern economic growth than just innovation but there
can be no doubt that without steady innovation it would soon have dwindled to
nothing. Overwhelming evidence has been collected to warrant the claim that the
‘West’ in the eighteenth century was quite different and in a far better position to
take off than ‘the Rest’ when it comes to the availability and development of those
types of useful and reliable knowledge that may engender modern growth. All
efforts at revisionism over the last decades in this respect to my view have been
futile. Considering the discussions in particular amongst new growth econo-
mists, it is striking that the British state did not do much itself to create human
capital and was not itself actively involved in the development of new useful and
reliable knowledge. It, however, did not oppose it either and created a very
favourable climate for its development and application, which was already much
more than states outside the West did.
When it comes to the nature of innovation, two comments should be made
regarding its role in modern economic growth in general and in the Great
Divergence more in particular. The first one is that it would be a serious mistake
to reduce innovation to changes in technology. Institutional innovation in the
broadest sense of the word, although often interconnected with technological
change and therefore with an impact that is not easy to determine separately,
also plays a major part in improving productivity, something that historians and
economists are only beginning to discuss. Institutionally, the West over the very
long eighteenth century – and in my view already from much earlier onwards –
was far more innovative than ‘the Rest’. Anyone comparing the two countries
over this period can only conclude that in this respect Qing China was institu-
tionally fairly immobile and Great Britain quite dynamic. The second comment
would be that permanent innovation in science, technology and institutions in
turn requires a specific institutional set-up itself : it can only flourish in a societal
structure in which change is a normal state of affairs and society has become, as
Erik Ringmar calls it, a “self-transforming machine”.1305 In all probability, it
matters less what exact characteristics institutions have as long as they are
flexible. In this respect, too, Britain had an advantage over China.
1305 Ringmar, Why Europe was first, chapter 3.
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6. Institutions: markets, property rights and states
The claim in the previous paragraph that historians and economists are only just
beginning to appreciate the role of institutional innovation in the emergence of
modern economic growth will certainly strike many readers as odd. When it
comes to explaining long-term macro-economic development, in all probability
(new-) institutionalist economics has become dominant and mainstream. Many
economists – I would guess the broad majority of them – as well as many
historians explicitly claim nowadays that institutional differences provide the
main explanation for wealth and poverty of nations. It can hardly be otherwise.
How could “durable systems of established and embedded social rules that
structure social interactions” not be fundamental for economic development?
What else could determine how an economy develops than the way in which it
and societal life are organised over the long run? Obviously, the problem is to
determine what kind of institutions would promote growth in what kind of
conditions and, very importantly, to find ways to exactly measure or at least
appraise their impact. There are numerous institutions that may have at least
some impact on the economy. But most economists and quite a few historians in
their explanations of macro-economic long-term change focus on just a small
number of them. In circles of mainstream economists, including (neo-)in-
stitutionalist economists, it is considered fairly obvious what growth-promoting
institutions would look like. The focus still is on the market, that I, with in-
stitutionalist economists, interpret as a system of organising production and
exchange that is not something natural as some economists would have it have
but socially constructed, and on all those societal arrangements that enable it to
function. This means the focus is actually on institutional pre-conditions of the
productive sector, and not on institutional arrangements that are integral to the
process of producing goods or services themselves. As most ‘institutionalists’
only refer to ‘enabling’ and ‘constraining’ i. e. pre-conditioning institutions, this
overview of current debates also mainly had to confine itself to such institutions.
In this text, the focus was on those that, rightly to my view, are still considered the
two most important ones, the market and the state. Discussing the ideal context
for growth to emerge, most institutionalists time and again refer to markets with
free and fair competition and a state that via ‘good governance’ creates the
environment in which those markets can function without any undue dis-
turbance. The importance of the rule of law, monopolisation of violence and
some centralisation of public power is, to me, so obvious that they do not need
separate discussion. They do so with a heavy emphasis on the importance of
well-secured and well-described property rights that in their view only the state
can guarantee. Although the word is increasingly avoided, they basically claim
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that what one needed and needs for modern economic growth is a market-
economy or what used to be called capitalism  la Adam Smith.
Many recent and bestselling ‘rise-of-the-West stories’, e. g. those by Acemo-
glu, Johnson and Robinson, Ferguson, Jones, Landes, or Macfarlane, and to high
degree also of Mokyr, still start from such assumptions. Considering the findings
of recent empirical research into the economic history of several parts of the
world in the early modern era and in the nineteenth century, that is quite sur-
prising. The importance attached to property rights, including intellectual
property rights – to begin with the core concept in institutional economics – as
an explanation for the Great Divergence seems quite exaggerated. Many societies
protected property and many already did so long before Great Britain took off.
Even there, the temporal and spatial links with modern growth do not appear to
have been very strong. I would personally be willing to endorse the thesis that
property rights are a necessary condition for sustained, substantial growth. But
they definitely are not sufficient. It, moreover, is far from clear that after the
highly acclaimed Glorious Revolution, a turning point in global economic his-
tory according to many institutionalist economists, they actually were better
protected than before. When it comes to the importance of markets in explaining
modern economic growth, or rather of markets as mainstream economics like to
describe them (i. e. systems of free and fair exchange), the situation seems far
more complex and in several respects actually quite different from what main-
stream economists have always suggested.
To adequately show this difference between theory and reality, it is helpful to
make some distinctions and differentiate between different kinds of markets in
terms of what is exchanged, the reason why exchange takes place and the con-
ditions under which it takes place. Looking at what is exchanged, one can dif-
ferentiate between commodities, services, capital in the sense of capital goods
and capital in the sense of money for investment, and labour. Looking at the
reasons for participating in market exchange, there is the fundamental differ-
ence between producers who are basically focusing on production for sub-
sistence and sell surpluses on the market to get some money to buy certain
necessities and pay taxes, producers who (to a certain extent) orient their
production on what is happening on the market and finally producers who, no
longer having their own means of subsistence, are fully dependent on it and are
fully subjected to its competition. In terms of the conditions under which ex-
change takes place, most scholars distinguish between markets where exchange
is free and fair and all parties involved are price-takers and markets where all
sorts of extra-economic coercion or economic power influence behaviour, full
well-realising that this distinction is far too neat and sometimes even somewhat
misleading.
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For consumer goods and services, so it appears, over time, ‘abstract’ markets
not only emerged in the West but also in Qing China, for example. According to
some scholars, they were even more developed or in any case bigger there, when
we simply look at the total amount of goods and services involved. Markets for
capital goods also were not uniquely European. It of course is very hard to
actually prove this claim but overall I would say that when it comes to the market
exchange of commodities, services and capital goods, there unmistakably are
several differences between Britain and China. These, however, are too small to
be able to explain why Britain took off and China did not. When it comes to
labour markets, differences are striking. Overall, as far as we know now, there
was much more wage labour in the West than anywhere else in the world and
nowhere so it seems was wage labour more normal, and expensive, than in
Britain. When it comes to money markets, to conclude, judging by the interest
rates, more money was available and they worked much better in Great Britain
than in China. Judging by the criterion of how much economic life took place on
a market, Great Britain, all-in-all, was therefore a more developed market
economy.
The fundamental underlying question here of course is that of the connection
between markets and modern economic growth. There certainly is a tight
connection between the emergence of modern economic growth and increasing
exchange of commodities in the widest sense of the word (consumer and capital
goods, labour and money). Extending markets for consumer goods can provide
a stimulus to (industrial) innovation and the necessary outlet for the increased
production. Economies with modern growth tend to import increasing amounts
of food and raw materials. But these extensions cannot be simply described as
causing modern economic growth as we hope to have shown for Britain’s in-
dustrialisation. Many other countries had markets that were just as big, if not
even much bigger than Britain. Increasing outlet, moreover, to a large extend was
caused by sinking prices because of innovation and often paid for increasing
imports. When it comes to capital goods, it would be hard if not impossible to
decide whether Britain’s economy overall was more capital-intensive than
China’s but in terms of certain fixed capital goods such as animals, implements
and land per farm it clearly was. In that respect it is not irrelevant to point out
that whereas in Britain there was an increasing tendency to try and profit from
scale effects, such a tendency was lacking in China. Differences in labour mar-
kets and money markets were substantial and they too were such that it is easier
to imagine industrialisation in Britain than in China.
Claims about markets easily turn into claims about capitalism. It has long
been considered an indisputable fact that capitalism was a Western invention
that first matured in the West. That no longer is the case. Most Californians, for
example, would explicitly claim that Qing China too was capitalist, basically
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because it clearly was a commercial society. To do so is to ignore that capitalism,
at least in the perspective of just about everyone who ever discussed the concept,
includes far more than the buying and selling of consumer goods on a market.
Whatever else the concept may mean, it in any case refers to a mode of pro-
duction and exchange that is characterised by (1) exchange on markets of not
just consumer goods but also capital goods, labour and money, (2) a specific
organisation of production with a focus on accumulation of profits on those
markets and (3) permanent investment of those accumulated profits in capital
goods. Using this definition eighteenth-century Britain and the Dutch Republic
– and admittedly to a lesser extent most of the rest of Western Europe – were so
much more capitalist than the rest of the world that one basically has to conclude
they, with all the differences between them, were the only capitalist regions in the
world. No part of the world had such a large labour market – and so many
medium and large-scale enterprises and firms – and such low interest rates. The
comparison with China in these respects provided striking results. In that
country, there were hardly any fulltime wage labourers whereas interest rates
were very high. The bulk of production took place in households which still had
means of subsistence and there was not much large scale, productive (re-)in-
vestment. Considering its mode of production, it was far more improbable that
China’s economy would take the road to industry than Britain’s.
What is very important in this context is that Great Britain not only had a
market economy that was capitalist in the sense just described but on top of that
also, as a kind of super-structure, a layer of economic life that was capitalist in
the sense in which Braudel and Wallerstein use that term. At the commanding
heights of Britain’s economy, in particular in finance and long-distance trade,
and there where the state had its interests, the ordinary rules of the market
hardly applied. At that level, monopoly, lack of transparency, collusion between
economic and political interests and interest groups and regulation were the
rule. The capitalism of this anti-market was not a simple extension of the cap-
italism of the market: it had its own rules and logic. The way this top level
functioned as well as the fact that it existed next to an ‘ordinary’ market economy
again was unique for Western Europe and simply must have had wide-ranging
economic effects. This may not have caused the emergence of modern economic
growth but it is hard to imagine its permanence without the institutional ar-
rangements and innovations that originated there. As indicated in the text, this
combination of freedom and regulation and even coercion also characterised
parts of Britain’s labour market, inside Britain itself and even more in the Em-
pire.
Many global historians, unsurprisingly enough anti-Eurocentrists who reject
the idea that European society would be something peculiar, never refer to any
institutions. Those who do, as a rule considered Eurocentrists, mostly argue
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quite similarly to neoclassical and institutional economists and refer to the
utmost importance of property rights, markets and good governance by which
the state provides the right free market setting and incentives. This brings us to
some concluding comments with regard to the state. The striking conclusion of
our comparative empirical analysis must be that Britain, the first industrial
nation, during its take-off until at least the 1830s, and in several respects even
longer, was a fiscal-military, mercantilist and imperialist state that did almost
everything that mainstream economists think a country wanting to grow should
not do. Taxes were very high, as was public debt. There was an extensive bu-
reaucracy and a government that intervened quite often in economic affairs.
Expenditures for the army and navy were staggering. The country was very
protectionist and not exactly democratic. It is still open to debate how exactly all
these things might have been helpful to get modern economic growth going or in
any case not so unhelpful as to block it. Whatever the outcome of that debate, it
simply is a myth that the economic history of early modern Europe would be the
history of the rise of the Smithian market. When Britain took off, in many
respects, it was as unlike a night-watchman state as a state can be. This also
applies to the other Western countries that took off in the nineteenth century.
Actually it goes for all major countries that ever took off. Developing countries,
i. e. countries in the process of taking off, all had states that can be called
‘developmental’, if one does not take the term to literally and with its twentieth-
century connotations. All those states were economically very active, inter-
ventionist and intent on promoting growth. How exactly such states function,
what kind of active intervention by them works and what kind doesn’t, how
exactly effective growth-promoting policies have their effects and in what cir-
cumstances, still needs far more attention. But what economic historians have
shown beyond any reasonable doubt is that the endlessly repeated mantras of all
varieties of mainstream economics about the ideal setting for economic growth
have hardly any relation to what actually happened in many periods of history.
Hardly any, if indeed any, state has ever confined itself to ‘facilitating’ eco-
nomic life; indeed, they all tried to steer it. I already pointed out that Adam Smith
is claimed to have said, “Little else is required to carry a state to the highest
degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a
tolerable administration of justice.”1306 The British case does not exactly look
like a plain confirmation of this claim. Over most of the period from 1688 to
1815, Britain was at war and its taxes were far from ‘easy’. They steeply increased,
as did public debt. Its administration of justice might have been tolerable, i. e.
relatively speaking and considering the fairly low standards at the time. The state
and the economy were tightly interwoven and the state was quite present in
1306 See note 378.
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several parts of the economy. Industrialising Britain had a state that ‘infra-
structurally’ was very strong and had impressive logistical capabilities. It also
was a very strong nation. It was the strongest, most efficient polity in the world at
the time. It clearly had two faces: a let-well-alone face regarding how the gentry
ran its local affairs and a very interventionist one regarding all matters con-
sidered of national interest. Again, differences with China are striking. Qing
China had never been ‘infrastructurally’ strong and, with the passing of time, it
became even weaker, especially from the 1780s onwards. At times, it was not even
able to fulfil the minimum tasks one might expect of a state. It was even weaker as
a nation. The differences with Britain are enormous, increasingly to the dis-
advantage of China, where, as indicated, the situation tended to deteriorate.
When it comes to infrastructural power, there simply was no state in the world
between roughly 1780 and 1850 that could match Britain. But all Western states
that took off, not incidentally, were much stronger than China and so was the
only Asian state that ‘made it’ or in any case began to make it in the nineteenth
century : Japan. Industrialising Great Britain as a strong infrastructural state and
nation in the end could take all sorts of, sometimes painful, measures that were
deemed necessary for the economy. It, moreover, in the international economy
was actor rather than acted upon. It certainly is no coincidence that countries
that successfully modernised their economies were strong states and nations, in
which governments could mobilise sufficient support and a sufficient consensus
to implement very wide-ranging economic changes was in place.
Because of the permanent competition and many wars, states in Europe
simply could not afford, if they valued their continued existence, not to be strong
and thus try to support their economy. Even if that competition militarily, po-
litically as well as economically was not exactly free and fair, it was nevertheless a
form of competition in which emulation played a fundamental role. Competition
and emulation were not only characteristic of the behaviour of most European
states on an international level. They characterised West European society at
many levels as the ‘sources of social power’, again to use an expression by
Michael Mann, usually were not monopolised, whether we talk about politics,
ideology, the economy or military power. Competition led to a certain freedom
to manoeuvre and a certain protection for subjects as they had exit and voice.
Europe’s dynamism had an important base in this configuration, in which,
internationally speaking, particular states might come out on top but those who
did not constantly had to upgrade not to disappear entirely from the map;
domestically, the state had to bargain constantly with elites – again in particular
and most clearly in the northwest – about the state’s and their interests. If I were
forced to indicate what to my view would be the fundamental cause of the rise of
the West in all its varieties, including the economic Great Divergence, I would
refer to this non-monopolisation but at the same time close interaction of the
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sources of social power, between and within states, and its differing effects in
different contexts. It fuelled Western Europe’s dynamism in the context of which
economic modernisation could and in the right ‘conjuncture’ would occur.
7. Culture
Long-term substantial economic growth is impossible without and mainly
driven by ‘the right’ institutional arrangements. It is very hard to imagine those
institutional arrangements being able to persist effectively when they are in-
compatible with the culture of the society whose institutions they are. In that
sense, culture, too, functions as an ultimate and some might claim even more
ulterior cause of economic development. Whether one decides to do so, I think, is
a matter of choice. Culture, in any case, does not exist in a vacuum: it permeates a
society but on the other hand is also strongly influenced by developments in that
society. In economics, paying attention to culture appears to be experiencing a
revival, although actual research and theorising efforts to really integrate it into
explanatory models are understandably scarce. This is not be unrelated to the
fact that the many claims that have been made for the importance of culture have
shown to be very hard to substantiate. A historian looking for the latest views of
economics on the impact of culture in economic life will not find an unequivocal
answer, let alone an unequivocal answer that provides him or her with a clear
research strategy, methods and empirical outcomes. In practice, we see two
different approaches. The first approach is the one in which societies (civi-
lisations, states, ethnic groups and so on and so forth) are characterised by some
overall cultural characteristics that are then supposed to explain their economic
situation. Whatever may be the value of such an approach in other contexts, it
does not seem to be very helpful for concretely answering the question that is
central to this book. Contrasting Britain and China (or for that matter the West
and the East) as restless versus at rest, individualistic versus collectivist, Prot-
estant versus Confucianist, innovative versus conservative, open versus closed,
certainly need not be senseless or groundless or even wrong as many anti-
Eurocentrists seem to think, but it means generalising at such a high level of
abstraction and using central categories that are so all-encompassing that it is
(all but?) impossible to use them as operational variables in concrete, i. e. time
and place-specific, direct explanations of the phenomenon we want to explain
here. As far as we can judge on the basis of fairly intuitive indicators and cir-
cumstantial evidence, Britain’s culture at the eve of its industrialisation was
clearly more open to change and innovation, more fascinated by ‘progress’,
‘improvement’ and the applicability of useful and reliable knowledge. That must
have made a positive difference. Discussing culture in this context inevitably
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means discussing Weber. In my view, Weber’s mega-cultural claim that the
rationalisation of economic life (read: ‘capitalism’), of public life (read: the legal-
rational, bureaucratic state) and of the mastery of nature and society (read:
science and technology) had been pushed further in ‘the West’ than in ‘the Rest’
still is a very respectable claim that has not been refuted, can be turned into
testable hypotheses and would deserve more systematic comparative empirical
research.
The other approach is one in which, in contrast, the attention is focused on
specific concepts that imply a certain kind of behaviour, certain dispositions or
capabilities. It turned out that their effects tend to be very context-dependent:
that is, if it is at all possible to determine and measure them and their effects for
the periods of time and the regions we are discussing here. That is already
extremely complicated for contemporary society where researchers can use huge
databases, surveys and interviews. Efforts to try and collect such material and
bring it to bear on comparative theses about cultural traits such as in-
dustriousness, discipline, thrift, trust, willingness to innovate, individualism
and so on and so forth still are in their infancy. We may wonder whether we will
ever be able to muster enough of it to really to be able to come up with sufficient
empirical underpinning. To get reliable information dense enough to really
corroborate general theses would seem to be all but impossible for pre-in-
dustrial, pre-statistic societies.
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A coda on Great Britain and China
What I presented in this book when it specifically comes to concrete historical
analysis, at least so I hope, was not a neat arrangement of historical data with the
benefit of hindsight but a systematic comparative analysis of the histories of
Great Britain and China as they emerge from recent research in the light of what
economic theory at the moment teaches us about the sources and engines of
modern economic growth. The text dealt with the importance of geography,
labour, the accumulation of capital in terms of capital goods and money, ex-
change and the allocation of the different means of production, innovation, and
institutions and culture to modern economic growth. It showed enormous
differences between West and Rest. For none of these ‘factors’, the situation in
Qing China during the very long eighteenth century was clearly more favourable
for modern economic growth than it was in Great Britain. For most of them, it
clearly was less favourable. Apart from at the highest level of abstraction, that is,
if it is taken to mean that they all were pre-industrial and had organic economies,
the Californian claim that the advanced regions of Eurasia would have been
regions of “surprising resemblances” in any case for Great Britain and China is
demonstrably indefensible.
The comparative historical analysis informed by economic theory and based
on recent findings by economists and historians presented in this book, in my
view, has shown two things beyond any reasonable doubt. The first lesson is that
the odds that economic growth would emerge in Great Britain were far higher
than that this would happen in China. In my view, the chances that Qing China
would be the first country in the world to industrialise – or even quickly catch up
– were negligible to zero whereas for Britain the chances of a take-off were higher
than anywhere else on the globe. That, of course, does not mean that Britain’s
take-off was ‘inevitable’: it just means that the most likely place where it might
happen was Western Europe, and in particular Great Britain. Industrialisation as
it took place in Great Britain and more in general the modernisation of its
economy can be regarded as a ‘logical’, or, in any case, quite ‘conceivable’
continuation of the route that Britain and its economy had already taken earlier
on: a route of high wages, capital-intensive and energy-intensive production
with ample use of wage labour, of efforts to profit from scale effects in production
and exchange, of specialisation and import substitution, of gearing useful and
reliable knowledge to production and of openness to innovation. Looking at the
trajectories taken by the economies of Great Britain and China it becomes plain
that for these two countries, at least the Great Divergence was not as Peter Perdue
and many others claim “a late, rapid, unexpected outcome of a fortuitous
combination of circumstances in the late eighteenth century” but the outcome of
“a deep, slow evolution out of centuries of particular conditions unique to early
modern Europe”, as they explicitly deny.1307 The economic trajectories of Great
Britain and China over the early modern era were not similar but very different,
their Great Divergence did have deep roots and it was not fortuitous, at least not
in the ordinary sense of the word. The second lesson would be that when it comes
to explaining the Great Divergence, mainstream economic theory with its focus
on free markets, fair competition, and market-supporting institutions including
a ‘minimal’ state, is fairly irrelevant at best and in most respects downright
wrong. Great Britain and all the countries that took off after it, especially in their
international economic relations, were not laissez-faire states. Britain’s state in
any case before and during take-off was not lean and very pro-active in the field
of economic affairs. It can best characterised as ‘mercantilist’ or even ‘devel-
opmental’, as long as these terms are not interpreted too strictly.
The debate on the Great Divergence is still open. The boldness of the claims
made in it is not often matched by the solidity of the empirical evidence. There
are good reasons to expect that many theses will have to be amended or refined
and that the parameters of the debate might substantially change. But what I
hope has become clear in this book is that global economic history and economic
theory could learn a lot from each other. Economics is not a treasury filled with
laws but a box filled with tools. For historians not to use those tools would be
unwise, but for economists to ignore history would be even less wise. In the end,
context, that is, history, is decisive.1308
1307 Perdue, China marches West, 537.
1308 I can only endorse the following quotation by the great economic historian Paul Bairoch:
“If I had to summarize the essence of what economic history can bring to economic science
it would be that there is no ‘law’ or rule in economics that is valid for every period of
history or for every economic structure.” Bairoch, Economics & world history, 164.
A coda on Great Britain and China438
Bibliography
Abel, Clarke, Narrative of a Journey in the Interior of China and of a Voyage to and from
that Country in the Years 1816 and 1817, Cambridge Library Collection 2012, originally
1818.
Abelshauser, Werner, David A. Gilgen and Andreas Leutzsch, eds., Kulturen der Welt-
wirtschaft, Göttingen 2012.
Abernethy, David, The Dynamics of Global Dominance. European Overseas Empires, 1415 –
1980, New Haven/London 2000.
Abramovitz, Moses, “The Search for the Sources of Growth: Areas of Ignorance, Old and
New”, in: Journal of Economic History 52 (1993) 217 – 243.
– Resource and Output Trends in the United States Since 1870, New York 1956.
Acemoglu, Daron, “Growth and Institutions”, in: Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E.
Blume, eds., The Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, second edition; London 2008.
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, “Institutions as a Fundamental
Cause of Long-run Growth”, in: P. Aghion and S. Durlauf, eds. , Handbook of Economic
Growth, Amsterdam /London 2005, Vol. 1 A, 385 – 472.
– “The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change and Economic Growth”, in:
American Economic Review 95, 3 (2005) 546 – 579.
– “The Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern
World Income Distribution”, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (2002) 1231 –
1294.
– “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation”, in:
American Economic Review 91 (2001) 1369 – 1401.
Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail. The Origins of Power, Pros-
perity and Poverty, London 2012.
Adas, Michael, Machines as the Measure of Men. Science, Technology, and Ideologies of
Western Dominance, Ithaca, New York 1989.
Adshead, S.A.M., China in World History, third edition; Houndmills and New York 2000.
– Material Culture in Europe and China, 1400 – 1800. The Rise of Consumerism, London
1997.
Akamatsu, Kaname, “A Historical Pattern of Economic Growth in Developing Countries”,
in: The Developing Economies. The Journal of the Institute of Economics 1 (1962) 3 – 25.
– “A Theory of Unbalanced Growth in the World Economy”, in: Weltwirtschaftliches
Archiv. Zeitschrift des Instituts für Weltwirtschaft an der Universtät Kiel 86, 1 (1961)
196 – 217.
Alesina, Alberto and Eliana La Ferrara, “Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance”, in:
Journal of Economic Literature 43 (2005) 762 – 800.
Allen, Douglas W., The Institutional Revolution. Measurement and the Economic Emer-
gence of the Modern World, Chicago/London 2012.
Allen, Robert C., “Why the Industrial Revolution was British: Commerce, Induced In-
vention, and the Scientific Revolution”, in: The Economic History Review 64, 2 (2011)
357 – 384.
– Global Economic History. AVery Short Introduction, Oxford 2011.
– The British Industrial Revolution in Global Perspective, Cambridge 2010.
– “A Review of Gregory Clark’s A Farewell to Alms. A Brief Economic History of the
World”, in: Journal of Economic Literature 46, 4 (2008) 946 – 973.
– “Agriculture during the Industrial Revolution”, in: Floud and Johnson, Cambridge
Economic History of Modern Britain, 96 – 116.
– “The Great Divergence in European Wages and Prices from the Middle Ages to the First
World War”, in: Explorations in Economic History 38 (2001) 411 – 447.
Allen, Robert C., Tommy Bengtsson and Martin Dribe, eds., Living Standards in the Past.
New Perspectives on Well-being in Asia and Europe, Oxford 2005.
Allen, Robert C. and others, “Wages, Prices, and Living Standards in China, 1738 – 1925: in
Comparison with Europe, Japan and India”, in: The Economic History Review 64, 1
(2011) Special Issue, 8 – 38.
Allen, Robert C., Tommy E. Murphy and Eric B. Schneider, “The Colonial Origins of the
Divergence in the Americas: a Labour Market approach”, in: The Journal of Economic
History 72, 4 (2012) 863 – 894.
Allen, Robert C. and Jacob Weisdorf, “Was There an ‘Industrious Revolution’ Before the
Industrial Revolution? An Empirical Exercise for England, c. 1300 – 1830”, in: The
Economic History Review 64, 3 (2011) 715 – 729.
Amsden, Alice H., The Rise of ‘the Rest’. Challenges to the West from Late-industrializing
Economies, Oxford/New York 2001.
Angster, Julia, Erdbeeren und Piraten. Die Royal Navy und die Ordnung der Welt, 1770 –
1860, Göttingen 2012.
Anstey, Roger, “The Volume and Profitability of the British Slave Trade, 1761 – 1807”, in:
S.L. Engerman and E.D. Genovese, eds. , Race and Slavery in the Western Hemisphere,
Princeton 1975, 3 – 31.
Antony, Robert J. and Jane Kate Leonard, eds. , Dragons, Tigers, and Dogs. Qing Crisis
Management and the Boundaries of State Power in Late Imperial China, Ithaca New
York 2001.
Aoki, M., Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, Cambridge Mass. 2001.
Appleby, Joyce, The Relentless Revolution. A History of Capitalism, New York/London
2010.
Arrighi, Giovanni, Adam Smith in Beijing. Lineages of the Twenty-First Century, London/
New York 2007.
– The Long Twentieth Century. Money, Power and the Origins of Our Time, London 1994.
Arrighi, Giovanni, Takeshi Hamashita and Mark Selden eds. , The Resurgence of East Asia
500, 150 and 50 Years Perspectives, London 2003.
Bibliography440
Arroyo Abad, Leticia, Elwyn Davies, and Jan Luiten van Zanden, “Between Conquest and
Independence: Real Wages and Demographic Change in Spanish Latin America, 1530 –
1820”, in: Explorations in Economic History 49, 2 (2012) 149 – 166.
Ashton, T. S., The Industrial Revolution, 1760 – 1830, London/Oxford/New York 1968,
originally 1948.
Ashworth, William, “Revenue, Production and the Early Modern English/British Fiscal-
State”, in: Simonetta Cavaciocchi, ed., La fiscalit nell’economia europea secc.
XIII – XVIII, Florence 2008, 1045 – 1054.
– Customs and Excise. Trade, Production and Consumption in England, 1640 – 1845,
Oxford 2003.
Aston, T.H. and C.H.E Philpin, eds. , The Brenner Debate. Agrarian Class Structure and
Economic Development in pre-industrial Europe, Cambridge 1985.
Austin, Gareth, “The ‘Reversal of Fortune’ Thesis and the Compression of History. Per-
spectives from African and Comparative Economic History”, in: Journal of Interna-
tional Development 20 (2008) 996 – 1027.
– “Resources, Techniques and Strategies South of the Sahara. Revising the Factor En-
dowments Perspective on African Economic Development, 1500 – 2000”, in: Economic
History Review 61, 3 (2008) 587 – 624.
Austin, Gareth and Kaoru Sugihara, eds. , Labour–Intensive Industrialization in Global
History, London 2013.
Auty, Richard M., Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies. The Resource Curse
Thesis, London 1993.
Bachinger, Karl and Herbert Matis, Entwicklungsdimensionen des Kapitalismus. Klassi-
sche sozioökonomische Konzeptionen und Analysen, Vienna/Cologne/Weimar 2009.
Baechler, Jean, John A. Hall and Michael Mann, Europe and the Rise of Capitalism, Oxford/
Cambridge 1988.
Bairoch, Paul, Victoires et d¦boires. Histoire ¦conomique et social du monde du XVIe siÀcle
 nos jours, Three Volumes. Paris 1997.
– Economics & World History. Myths and Paradoxes, Chicago 1993.
– “The City and Technological Innovation”, in: Higonnet, Landes and Rosovsky, Favorites
of Fortune, 159 – 176.
Balazs, Etienne, Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy. Variations on a Theme, New Haven/
London 1964.
– “China as Permanently Bureaucratic Society”, in: Balazs, Chinese Civilization and
Bureaucracy, 13 – 27.
– “The Birth of Capitalism in China”, in: Balazs, Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy,
34 – 54.
Barbier, Edward B., Scarcity and Frontiers. How Economies Have Developed through
Natural Resource Exploitation, Cambridge 2011.
Barendse, R.J. , The Arabian Seas, 1640 – 1700, Leiden 1998.
Barrett, Ward, “World Bullion Flows”, in: Tracy, Rise of Merchant Empires, 224 – 254.
Barrow, Robert J. , “Democracy and Growth”, in: Journal of Economic Growth 1 (1996) 1 –
27.
Bartlett, Robert, The Making of Europe. Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change, 950 –
1350, London 1993.
Bibliography 441
Baten, Jörg and Jan Luiten van Zanden, “Book Production and the Onset of Modern
Economic Growth”, in: Journal of Economic Growth 13, 3 (2008) 217 – 235.
Bauer, Leonard and Herbert Matis, Geburt der Neuzeit. Von Feudalsystem zur Marktge-
sellschaft, Munich 1988.
Baugh, Daniel A.,“Naval Power : What Gave the British Navy Superiority?”, in: Prados de la
Escosura, Exceptionalism and Industrialisation, 235 – 260.
– “Maritime Strength and Atlantic Commerce. The Use of a Grand Marine Empire”, in:
Lawrence Stone, ed., An Imperial State at War, London 1994, 185 – 223.
Baumol, William J., The Free-Market Innovation Machine. Analyzing the Growth Miracle
of Capitalism, Princeton 2002.
– “Entrepreneurship, Productive, Unproductive and Destructive”, in: Journal of Political
Economy 98, 5 (1990) 893 – 921.
Bayly, Christopher, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780 – 1914, Malden 2004.
Becker, Gary S., Human Capital. A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Ref-
erence to Education, third edition; Chicago 1994.
Becker, Sascha O., Erik Hornung and Ludger Wössmann, “Education and Catch-Up in the
Industrial Revolution”, in: American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 3, 3 (2011)
92 – 126.
Becker, Sascha O. and Ludger Wössmann, “Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital Theory
of Protestant Economic History”, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics 124, 2 (2009) 531 –
596.
Beinhocker, Erich D., The Origin of Wealth. Evolution, Complexity, and the Radical Re-
making of Economics, Boston 2006.
Belfanti, Marco, “Was Fashion a European Invention?”, in: Journal of Global History 3
(2008) 419 – 443.
Belich, James, Replenishing the Earth. The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-
World, 1783 – 1939, Oxford 2009.
Benjamin, Thomas, The Atlantic World. Europeans, Africans and their Shared History,
1400 – 1900, Cambridge 2009.
Bentley, Jerry, “Web Browsing”, in: History and Theory 44 (2005) 102 – 112.
Berend, Ivan, An Economic History of Nineteenth-Century Europe. Diversity and In-
dustrialization, Cambridge 2013.
Berg, Annette van den, Antoon Spithoven and John Groenewegen, Institutional Eco-
nomics: an Introduction, Houndmills Basingstoke 2010.
Berg, Maxine, Luxury and Pleasure in Eighteenth-Century Britain, Oxford 2005.
Berg, Maxine and Elizabeth Eger, eds., Luxury in the Eighteenth Century. Debates, Desires
and Delectable Goods, London/New York 2007.
Berghoff, Hartmut and Jakob Vogel, eds., Wirtschaftsgeschichte als Kulturgeschichte. Di-
mensionen eines Perspektivenwechsels, Frankfurt/New York 2004.
Berman, Harold, Law and Revolution, II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the
Western Legal Tradition, Cambridge Mass. 2006.
– Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, Cambridge
Mass. 1983.
Bernecker, Walther L. and Thomas Fischer, “Rise and Decline of Latin American De-
pendency Theories”, in: Itinerario. European Journal of Overseas History 22, 4 (1998)
25 – 43.
Bibliography442
Bernhardt, Kathryn, Rents, Taxes, and Peasant Resistance. The Lower Yangzi Region,
1840 – 1950, Stanford 1992.
Bernstein, William J., A Splendid Exchange. How Trade Shaped the World, New York 2008.
– The Birth of Plenty. How the Prosperity of the Modern World Was Created, New York
2004.
Bertocchi, G. and F. Canova, “Did Colonization Matter for Growth? An Empirical Ex-
ploration into the Historical Causes of Africa’s Underdevelopment”, in: European
Economic Review, XLVI (2002) 1851 – 1871.
B¦rtola, Luis, Leandro Prados de la Escosura and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Latin American
Inequality in the Long Run”, in: Revista de Historia Econûmica /Journal of Iberian and
Latin American Economic History 28, 2 (2010) 1 – 8.
Biernacki, Richard, The Fabrication of Labour. Germany and Britain 1640 – 1914, Berkeley
1995.
Black, Jeremy, Military Power and the Fate of Continents, 1450 – 2000, New Haven/London
1998.
Black, Jeremy, ed., War in the Early Modern World, 1450 – 1815, London 1999.
Blackburn, Robin, The Making of New World Slavery. From the Baroque to the Modern
1492 – 1800, London/New York 1998.
Blaut, James M., Eight Eurocentric Historians, New York/London 2000.
– The Coloniser’s Model of the World. Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History,
New York 1993.
Blue, Gregory, “China and Western Social Thought in the Modern Period”, in: Gregory
Blue and Timothy Brook, eds., China and Historical Capitalism. Genealogies of Sino-
logical Knowledge, Cambridge 1999, 57 – 109.
Bonar, James, Theories of Population. From Raleigh to Arthur Young, London 1931.
Bonney, Richard, ed. , The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe, Oxford 1999.
Bonney, Richard, ed. , Economic Systems and State Finance, Oxford 1995.
– »Introduction«, in: Bonney, Economic Systems and State Finance, 1 – 18.
Boot, Max, War Made New. Technology, Warfare and the Course of History, 1500 to Today,
London 2006.
Bordo, Michael D. and Roberto Cort¦s-Conde, eds., Transferring Wealth and Power from
the Old to the New World. Monetary and Fiscal Institutions in the 17th through the 19th
Centuries, Cambridge 2001.
Bordo, Michael D., Alan M. Taylor and Jeffrey G. Williamson, eds., Globalization in
Historical Perspective, Chicago 2003.
Borgstrom, Georg, The Hungry Planet. The Modern World at the Edge of Famine, second
revised edition; New York 1972, originally 1965.
Borsay, Peter, “The Culture of Improvement”, in: Paul Langford, ed., The Eighteenth
Century, 1688 – 1815, Oxford 2002, 183 – 212.
Boserup, Ester, Population and Technological Change. A Study of long-term Trends, Chi-
cago 1981.
– The Conditions of Agricultural Growth. The Economics of Agrarian Change under
Population Pressure, Chicago 1965.
Bosma, Ulbe, “European Colonial Soldiers in the Nineteenth Century. Their Role in White
Global Migration and Patterns of Colonial Settlement”, in: Journal of Global History, 4,
2 (2009) 317 – 336.
Bibliography 443
Bowen, H.V., “British Exports of Raw Cotton from India to China”, in: Giorgio Riello and
Tirthankar Roy, eds. , with the collaboration of Om Prakash and Kaoru Sugihara, How
India Clothed the World. The World of South Asian Textiles, 1500 – 1850, Leiden/Boston
2009, 115 – 137.
Brandon, Pepijn, Masters of War. The State, Capitalism, and Military Enterprise in the
Dutch Cycle of Accumulation (1600 – 1795), unpublished PhD thesis at the University of
Amsterdam.
Braudel, Fernand, “õ propos des origines sociales du capitalisme”, in: R. de Ayala and P.
Braudel, eds. , Les ¦crits de Fernand Braudel II. Les ambitions de l’histoire, Paris 1997,
359 – 371.
– A History of Civilizations, New York 1993, first published as a book, in French, in 1987.
– La Dynamique du Capitalisme, Paris 1985.
– Civilization & Capitalism, 15th-18th Century. Three Volumes, London 1981, 1982 and
1984, originally, in French, Paris 1979.
– Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism, Baltimore 1977.
– ed., L’Europe, Paris 1982.
Braun, Boris and Christian Schulz, Wirtschaftsgeographie, Stuttgart 2012.
Bray, Francesca, Technology and Gender. Fabrics of Power in Late Imperial China, Ber-
keley/Los Angeles/London 1997.
– The Rice Economies. Technology and Development in Asian Societies, Berkeley/Los
Angeles/London 1986.
Bremmer, Ian, The End of the Free Market. Who Wins the War between States and Cor-
porations? New York 2010.
Brenner, Reuven, History. The Human Gamble, Chicago/London 1983.
Brenner, Robert P. , “Property and Progress. Where Adam Smith Went Wrong”, in: Chris
Wickham, ed., Marxist Writing for the Twenty-First Century, Oxford 2007, 49 – 111.
– “The Low Countries in the Transition to Capitalism”, in: Peter Hoppenbrouwers and Jan
Luiten van Zanden, eds. , Peasants into Farmers. The Transformation of Rural Economy
and Society in the Low Countries (Middle Ages-19th century) in Light of the Brenner
Debate, Turnhout Belgium 2001, 275 – 338.
– “The Origins of Capitalist Development. A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism”, in: New
Left Review 104 (1977) 25 – 92.
Brenner, Robert P., and Christopher Isett, “England’s divergence from China’s Yangzi
Delta: property relations, microeconomics and patterns of development”, in: Journal of
Asian Studies 61 (2002) 609 – 662.
Brewer, John, The Sinews of Power. War, Money and the English State 1688 – 1783, London
1988.
Brewer, John and Roy Porter, eds. , Consumption and the World of Goods, London 2007.
Brewer, John and Frank Trentmann, eds., Consuming Cultures, Global Perspectives, His-
torical Trajectories, Transnational Exchanges, Oxford 2006.
Broadberry, Stephen and Bishnupriya Gupta, “The Early Modern Great Divergence:
Wages, Prices and Economic Development in Europe and Asia, 1500 – 1800”, in: Eco-
nomic History Review 59 (2006) 2 – 31.
Broadberry, Stephen and Kevin O’Rourke, eds. , The Cambridge Economic History of
Modern Europe, Two Volumes, Cambridge 2010.
Broadberry, Stephen and Kevin H. O’Rourke, “Introduction to Volume 1”, in: Stephen
Bibliography444
Broadberry and Kevin H. O’Rourke, eds. , The Cambridge Economic History of Modern
Europe. Volume I: 1700 – 1870 Cambridge 2010, 1 – 4.
Brousseau, Eric and Jean-Michel Glachant, eds. , New Institutional Economics: a Guide-
book, Cambridge 2008.
Brownlow, Graham A., “Structure and Change: Douglass North’s Economics”, in: Journal
of Economic Methodology, 17, 3 (2010) 301 – 316.
Bruhns, Hinnerk and Wilfried Nippel, eds. , Max Weber und die Stadt im Kulturvergleich,
Göttingen 2000.
Bruland, Kristine, “Industrialization and Technological Change”, in: Floud and Johnson,
Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume I, 117 – 146.
Bryant, Joseph M., “The West and the Rest Revisited: Debating Capitalist Origins, Euro-
pean Colonialism, and the Advent of Modernity”, in: Canadian Journal of Sociology/
Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie 31, 4 (2006) 403 – 444. This text sparked a debate in
Canadian Journal of Sociology/ Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie 33, 1 (2008) with
contributions by Jack Goldstone, Rosaire Langlois, Joseph M. Bryant and Mark Elvin.
Buchanan, J. , What Should Economists Do?, Indianapolis 1979.
Buoye, Thomas M., Manslaughter, Markets, and Moral Economy. Violent Disputes over
Property Rights in Eighteenth-Century China, Cambridge 2000.
Burbank, Jane and Frederic Cooper, Empires in World History. Power and the Politics of
Difference, Princeton 2002.
Buringh, Eltjo and Jan Luiten van Zanden, “Charting the ‘Rise of the West’: Manuscripts
and Printed Books in Europe. A Long-Term Perspective from the Sixth to the Eight-
eenth Centuries”, in: The Journal of Economic History 69, 2 (2009) 409 – 445.
Burke, Peter, A Social History of Knowledge II: From the Encyclopaedia to Wikipedia,
Cambridge 2012.
– A Social History of Knowledge I: From Gutenberg to Diderot, Cambridge 2000.
– Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe, New York 1978.
Cain, Peter J. and Anthony G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688 – 2000, second edition;
Harlow 2002.
Cambridge History of China, Volumes 8 – 11, General Editors, John K. Fairbank and Denis
Twitchett.
Campbell, Gwyn, Structure of Slavery in Indian Ocean Africa and Asia, London 2003.
Capie, Forrest, “The Origins and Development of Stable Fiscal and Monetary Institutions
in England”, in: Bordo and Cort¦s-Conde, Transferring Wealth and Power from the Old
to the New World, 10 – 58.
Cardwell, D.S.L. , Turning Points in Western Technology, New York 1972.
Caton, Hiram, The Politics of Progress. The Origins and Development of the Commercial
Republic, 1600 – 1835, Gainesville 1988.
Cavaciocchi, Simonetta, ed., Prodotti e techniche d’oltremare nelle economie Europee secc.
XIII – XVIII, Prato 1998.
Cerman, Markus, Villagers and Lords in Eastern Europe, Houndmills/New York 2012.
Chang, Chung-li, The Income of the Chinese Gentry, Seattle 1962.
– The Chinese Gentry. Their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society, Seattle/London
1955.
Chang, Ha-joon, 23 things they do not tell you about capitalism, New York 2011.
– Kicking away the Ladder. Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, London 2002.
Bibliography 445
Chang, Pin-tsun, “Chinese Migration to Taiwan in the Eighteenth Century : A Paradox”, in:
Wang Gungwu and Ng Chin-keong, eds. , Maritime China in Transition 1750 – 1850,
Wiesbaden 2004, 97 – 114.
Chao, Kang, Man and Land in Chinese History. An Economic Analysis, Stanford 1986.
Chapman, Stanley, Merchant Enterprise in Britain. From the Industrial Revolution to
World War I, Cambridge 1992.
Chen, Qian, “The Needham Puzzle reconsidered. The Protection of Industrial and Com-
mercial Property Rights”, in: Economic History of Developing Countries 27, 1 (2012)
38 – 66.
Chen, Tsu-yu, “China’s Copper Production in Yunnan Province 1700 – 1800”, in: Eddy van
Cauwenberghe, ed., Money, Coins, and Commerce. Essays in Monetary History of Asia
and Europe (From Antiquity to Modern times), Leuven 1991, 95 – 118.
Chirot, Daniel, ed., The Origins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe. Economics and Politics
from the Middle Ages until the Early Twentieth Century, Berkeley/Los Angeles/Oxford
1989.
Chiswick, Barry R., and Timothy J. Hatton, “International Migration and the Integration
of Labor Markets”, in: Bordo, Taylor and Williamson, Globalization in Historical
Perspective, 65 – 120.
Christian, David, Maps of Time. An Introduction to Big History, Berkeley/Los Angeles/
London 2005.
Chua, Amy, Day of Empire. How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance – and Why They
Fall, New York 2007.
Ch’ü, T’ung-tsu, Local Government in China under the Ch’ing, Cambridge 1962.
Clarence-Smith, William Gervase, The Economics of the Indian Ocean Slave Trade in the
Nineteenth Century, London 1989.
Clark, Gregory, “In Defense of the Malthusian Interpretation of History”, in: European
Review of Economic History 12, 2 (2008) 175 – 199. A response to reviews of his Farewell
to Alms in that same issue.
– A Farewell to Alms. A Brief Economic History of the World, Princeton 2007.
– “What Made Britannia Great? How Much of the Rise of Britain to World Dominance by
1850 does the Industrial Revolution Explain?”, in: Hatton, O’Rourke and Taylor,
Comparative Economic History, 33 – 57.
– “Labour Productivity in English Agriculture, 1300 – 1860”, in: B.M.S. Campbell and
Mark Overton, eds. , Land, Labour and Livestock. Agricultural Productivity in the Eu-
ropean Past, Manchester, 1991, 211 – 235.
– “Economists in Search of Culture. The Unspeakable in Pursuit of the Inedible”, in:
Historical Methods 21 (1988) 161 – 164.
Clark, Gregory and Robert C. Feenstra, “Technology in the Great Divergence”, in: Bordo,
Taylor and Williamson, Globalization in Historical Perspective, 277 – 314.
Clark, Gregory and Gillian Hamilton, “Survival of the Richest. The Malthusian Mechanism
in Pre-Industrial England”, in: The Journal of Economic History 66, 3 (2006) 707 – 736.
Cleveland, John, Poems, London 1651.
Coase, Ronald, “The Nature of the Firm”, in: Economica 4, 16 (1937) 386 – 405.
Coats, A.W., “Economic Thought and Poor Law Policy in the Eighteenth Century”, in:
Economic History Review 13 (1960) 39 – 51.
Bibliography446
– “Changing Attitudes Towards Labour in the Mid-eighteenth Century”, in: Economic
History Review, second series 11 (1958) 35 – 51.
Coclanis, Peter, “Ten Years After : Reflections on Kenneth Pomeranz’s The Great Di-
vergence”, in: Historically Speaking 12, 4 (2011) 10 – 12.
Cohen, H. Floris, How Modern Science Came into the World. Four Civilizations, one 17th-
Century Breakthrough, Amsterdam 2011.
– “The Rise of Modern Science as a Fundamental Pre-Condition for the Industrial Re-
volution”, in: Österreichische Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften 20, 2 (2009) 107 –
132.
– The Scientific Revolution. A Historiographical Enquiry, Chicago 1994.
Colley, Linda, Britons. Forging the Nation, 1707 – 1837, New Haven/London 1992.
Collins, Randall, Weberian Sociological Theory, Cambridge 1986.
Colquhoun, Patrick, ATreatise on the Wealth, Power and Resources of the British Empire in
every Quarter of the World, London 1815.
Conway, S., “Britain and the Impact of the American War, 1775 – 1783”, in: War in History
2 (1995) 127 – 150.
Cook, Harold J., Matters of Exchange. Commerce, Medicine and Science in the Dutch
Golden Age, New Haven 2007.
Cooper, Tim, How to Read Industrial Britain. A Guide to Machines, Sites & Artefacts that
Shaped Britain, London 2011.
Cooter, Robert D. and Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Solomon’s Knot. How Law Can End the Poverty
of Nations, Princeton 2012.
Cortright, Joseph, “New Growth Theory, Technology and Learning. A Practitioner’s
Guide”, in: Reviews of Economic Development, Literature and Practice Nr. 4 (Portland
2001).
Cosandey, David, Le secret de l’Occident. Du miracle pass¦ au marasme pr¦sent, Paris 1997.
Cotterell, Roger, “The Development of Capitalism and the Formation of Contract Law”, in:
Bob Fryer a.o. eds., Law, State and Society, London 1981, 54 – 69.
Cowen, Tyler, The Great Stagnation. How America Ate all the Low-hanging Fruit, Got Sick
and will (eventually) Feel Better, New York 2011.
Crafts, Nicolas, “A Review of Williamson, Trade and Poverty”, in: The Economic Journal
February 2013, 193 – 197.
Crafts, Nicolas and C.K. Harley, “Output Growth and the Industrial Revolution. A Re-
statement of the Crafts-Harley View”, in: Economic History Review 45, 4 (1992) 703 –
730.
Crafts, Nicolas and Terence C. Mills, “From Malthus to Solow: How did the Malthusian
Economy Really Evolve?”, in: Journal of Macroeconomics 31 (2009) 68 – 93.
Craig, Lee, “Comment on ‘From Malthus to Solow: How did the Malthusian Economy
Really Evolve?”, in: Journal of Macroeconomics 31 (2009) 94 – 97.
Craven, Paul and Douglas Hay, “The Criminalization of ‘Free’ Labour: Master and Servant
in Comparative Perspective”, in: Slavery and Abolition 15, 2 (1994) 71 – 101.
Crawfurd, J. , Chinese Monopoly Examined, London 1830.
Crone, Patricia, Pre-Industrial Societies, Oxford/Cambridge Mass. 1989.
Crosby, Alfred W., Ecological Imperialism. The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900 – 1900,
second edition; Cambridge 2004.
Bibliography 447
– The Measure of Reality. Quantification and Western Society 1250 – 1600, Cambridge
1997.
– The Columbian Exchange. Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492, Westport
Ct. 1972.
Crouzet, FranÅois, The First Industrialists. The Problem of Origins, Cambridge 1985.
Dabringhaus, Sabine, Das Qing-Imperium als Vision und Wirklichkeit. Tibet in Laufbahn
und Schriften des Song Yun (1752 – 1835), Stuttgart 1994.
Dam, Kenneth W., The Law-Growth Nexus. The Rule of Law and Economic Development,
Washington 2005.
Darwin, John, After Tamerlane. The Global History of Empire, London/New York 2007.
Das Gupta, Ashin, Merchants of Maritime India, 1500 – 1800, Aldershot 1994.
Daunton, Martin, Progress and Poverty. An Economic and Social History of Britain 1700 –
1850, Oxford 1995.
David, Thomas, Nationalisme ¦conomique et industrialisation. L’exp¦rience des pays de
l’Est (1789 – 1939), Geneva 2009.
Davids, Karel, Religion, Technology, and the Great and Little Divergences: China and
Europe Compared, c. 700 – 1800, Leiden/ Boston 2012.
Davis, Lance E. and Robert A. Huttenback, with the assistance of Susan Gray Davis,
Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire, 1860 – 1912, Cambridge 1986.
Davis, Ralph, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries, London 1962.
Davis, Robert C., Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters. White Slavery in the Mediterranean,
the Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500 – 1800, Basingstoke 2003.
Deakin, S. and F. Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market. Industrialization, Employ-
ment, and Legal Evolution, Oxford 2005.
Deane, Phyllis and W.A. Cole, British Economic Growth 1688 – 1959. Trends and Structure,
second edition; Cambridge 1967, originally 1962.
Delacroix, Jacques and FranÅois Nielsen, “The Beloved Myth. Protestantism and the Rise
of Industrial Capitalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe”, in: Social Forces 80, 2 (2001)
509 – 553.
Deng, Gang, The Premodern Chinese Economy. Structural Equilibrium and Capitalist
Sterility. London/New York 1999.
– Chinese Maritime Activities and Socioeconomic Development; c. 2100 B.C.–1900 A.D,
Westport 1997.
Deng, Kent, China’s Political Economy in Modern Times. Changes and Economic Con-
sequences, 1800 – 2000, London/New York 2011.
– “Why the Chinese Failed to Develop a Steam Engine”, in: History of Technology 25
(2004) 151 – 171.
– “A Critical Survey of Recent Research in Chinese Economic History”, in: Economic
History Review 53, 1 (2000) 1 – 28.
– “The Foreign Staple Trade of China in the Pre-Modern Era”, in: The International
History Review XIX (1997) 253 – 304.
Devine, T.M., “Scotland”, in: Floud and Johnson, Cambridge Economic History of Modern
Britain, Volume I 388 – 416.
Diamond, Jared, Collapse. How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed, revised edition; Har-
mondsworth 2011, originally 2005.
Bibliography448
– Guns, Germs and Steel. The Fates of Human Societies, London 1997.
Dincecco, Mark, Political Transformations and Public Finances. Europe, 1650 – 1913,
Cambridge 2011.
Dixin, Xu and Wu Chengming, eds. , Chinese Capitalism, 1522 – 1840, Houndmills 2000.
Domar, Evsey D., “The Causes of Slavery and Serfdom. A Hypothesis”, in: The Journal of
Economic History 30, 1 (1970) 18 – 32.
Drayton, Richard, Nature’s Government. Science, Imperial Britain, and the ‘Improvement’
of the World, New Haven 2000.
– “Knowledge and Empire”, in: Marshall, Oxford History of the British Empire, 231 – 252.
Drescher, Seymour, “The Williams Thesis after Fifty Years”, in: Northrup, ed., Atlantic
Slave Trade. 141 – 149.
Duchesne, Ricardo, The Uniqueness of Western Civilization, Leiden/Boston 2011.
Dudley, Leonard, Mothers of Innovation: how Expanding Social Networks gave Birth to the
Industrial Revolution, Cambridge 2012.
– Information Revolutions in the History of the West, Cheltenham 2008.
Dunstan, Helen, State or Merchant? Political Economy and Political Process in 1740s China,
Cambridge Mass. and London 2006.
– Conflicting Counsels to Confuse the Age. A Documentary Study of Political Economy in
Qing China, 1644 – 1840, Ann Arbor 1996.
Easterlin, Richard A., “Why isn’t the Whole World Developed?”, in: The Journal of Eco-
nomic History 41, 1 (1981) 1 – 19.
Easterly, William, The White Man’s Burden. Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have
Done So Much Ill and So Little Good, New York 2006.
– The Elusive Quest for Growth. Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics,
Cambridge Mass. 2002.
Easterly, W., and R. Levine, “Africa’s Growth Tragedy. Politics and Ethnic Divisions”, in:
Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1997) 1203–1250.
The Economist Pocket World in Figures, 2013 Edition, London 2012.
The Economist Pocket World in Figures, 2012 Edition, London 2011.
The Economist Pocket World in Figures, 2011 Edition, London 2010.
Elliott, John H., Empires of the Atlantic World. Britain and Spain in America 1492 – 1830,
New Haven/London 2006.
– Spain and its World, 1500 – 1700, New Haven/London 1989.
Elman, B.A., A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China, Berkeley/
Los Angeles/London 2000.
Eltis, David, The Rise of African Slavery in the Americas, Cambridge 2000.
Eltis, David and Stanley L. Engerman, “The Importance of Slavery and the Slave Trade to
Industrializing Britain”, in: The Journal of Economic History 60 (2000) 123 – 144.
Elvin, Mark, Another History. Essays on China from a European Perspective, Canberra/
Sidney 1996.
– “Three Thousand Years of Unsustainable Growth: China’s Environment from Archaic
Times to the Present”, in: East Asian History 6 (1993) 7 – 46.
– The Pattern of the Chinese Past, Stanford 1973.
Emmer, Pieter C., De Nederlandse Slavenhandel, 1500 – 1850, second revised edition;
Amsterdam 2003.
Emsley, C., British Society and the French Wars, 1793 – 1815, London 1979.
Bibliography 449
Engelen, Theo and Arthur P. Wolf, eds. , Marriage and the Family in Eurasia. Perspectives
on the Hajnal Hypothesis, Amsterdam 2005.
Engerman, Stanley L., “British Imperialism in a Mercantilist Age, 1492 – 1849. Conceptual
and Empirical Problems”, in: O’Brien and Prados de la Escosura, Costs and Benefits of
European Imperialism, 195 – 234.
Engerman, Stanley L. and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, Economic Development in the Americas
since 1500. Endowments and Institutions, Cambridge 2011.
Englebert, P., “Pre-colonial Institutions, Post-colonial States, and Economic Development
in Tropical Africa”, in: Political Research Quarterly 53, 1 (2000) 7 – 36.
Epstein, Stephan R., “Craft Guilds in the Premodern Economy : A Discussion”, in: Eco-
nomic History Review 61, 1 (2008) 155 – 174.
– “Rodney Hilton, Marxism and the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism”, in: Past
and Present Nr. 195 (2007) Supplement Issue 2, 248 – 269.
– Freedom and Growth. The Rise of States and Markets in Europe, 1300 – 1750, London
2000.
Epstein, Stephan R. and Maarten Prak, eds., Guilds, Innovation and the European Econ-
omy, London 2008.
Escosura, Leandro Prados de la, “Lost Decades. Economic Performance in Post-In-
dependence Latin America”, in: Journal of Latin American Studies 41, 2 (2009) 279 –
307.
Esteban, Javier Cuenca, “Comparative Patterns of Colonial Trade. Britain and its Rivals”,
in: Prados de la Escosura, Exceptionalism and Industrialisation, 35 – 68.
– “The British Balance of Payments, 1772 – 1820. India Transfers and War Finance”, in:
Economic History Review 54, 1 (2001) 58 – 86.
Etemad, Bouda, Possessing the World. Taking the Measurements of Colonisation from the
Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century, New York 2007.
– “Colonial and European Domestic Trade. A Statistical Perspective over Time”, in: P.C.
Emmer, O. P¦tr¦-Grenouilleau, and J. Roitman, eds. , A Deus ex Machina Revisited.
Atlantic Colonial Trade and European Economic Development, Leiden 2006, 45 – 62.
– De l’utilit¦ des empires. Colonisation et prosp¦rit¦ de l’Europe (XVIe – XXe siÀcle), Paris
2005.
Evans, Eric J. , The Forging of the Modern State. Early Industrial Britain 1783 – 1870,
Harlow 1996, originally 1983.
Evans, Robert, “Some Notes on Coerced Labor”, in: The Journal of Economic History 30, 4
(1970) 861 – 866.
Feinstein, Charles and Sydney Pollard, eds. , Studies in Capital Formation in the United
Kingdom, 1750 – 1820, Oxford 1988.
Feldbauer, Peter, Michael Mitterauer and Wolfgang Schwentker, eds. , Die vormoderne
Stadt. Asien und Europa im Vergleich, Vienna/Munich 2002.
Ferguson, Niall, The Great Degeneration. How Institutions Decay and Economies Die,
Harmondsworth 2012.
– Civilization. The West and the Rest, London 2011.
Fernndez-Armesto, Felipe, Pathfinders. A Global History of Exploration, Oxford 2006.
– Civilizations, London 2001.
Feuerwerker, Albert, Studies in the Economic History of Late Imperial China, Ann Arbor
1992.
Bibliography450
– China’s Early Industrialization. Sheng Hsuan-Huai (1844 – 1916) and Mandarin En-
terprise, Cambridge Mass. 1958.
Field, Alexander James, “The Problem with Neoclassical Institutional Economics. A Cri-
tique with Special Reference to the North/Thomas Model of Pre-1500 Europe”, in:
Explorations in Economic History 18 (1981) 174 – 198.
Fielding, David, and Sebastin Torres, “Cows and Conquistadors: A Contribution on the
Colonial Origins of Comparative Development”, in: Journal of Development Studies 44,
8 (2008) 1081 – 1099.
Findlay, Ronald and Kevin H. O’Rourke, Power and Plenty. Trade, War, and the World
Economy in the Second Millennium, Princeton/Oxfordshire 2007.
Fink, Leon, Sweatshops at Sea. Merchant Seamen in the World’s First Globalized Industry,
from 1812 to the Present, Chapel Hill 2011.
Finlay, Robert, “China, the West, and World History in Joseph Needham’s Science and
Civilisation in China”, in: Journal of World History 11 (2000) 265 – 304.
– “The Pilgrim Art. The Culture of Porcelain in World History”, in: Journal of World
History 9, 2 (1998) 141 – 187.
Flandreau, Marc a.o., “The Bell Jar. Commercial Interest Rates Between Two Revolutions,
1688 – 1789”, in: Jeremy Attack and Larry Neal, eds., The Origins and Development of
Financial Markets and Institutions. From the Seventeenth Century to the Present,
Cambridge 2009, 161 – 208.
Fletcher, Joseph, “Ch’ing Inner Asia c. 1800”, in: John K. Fairbank, ed., The Cambridge
History of China. 10: Late Ch’ing, 1800 – 1911, Volume 1, Cambridge 1978, 35 – 106.
Floud, Roderick and Paul Johnson, eds., The Cambridge Economic History of Modern
Britain, Volume 1: Industrialization, 1700 – 1860, Cambridge 2004.
Flynn, Dennis and Arturo Girldez, “Money and Growth without Development. The Case
of Ming China”, in: A.J.H. Latham and Heita Kawakatsu, eds., Asian-Pacific Dynamism,
1550 – 2000, London 2000, 199 – 215.
Fogel, Robert William, The Escape from Hunger and Premature Death, 1700 – 2100. Europe,
America and the Third World, Cambridge 2004.
– “The Conquest of High Mortality and Hunger in Europe and America: Timing and
Mechanisms”, in: Higonnet, Landes and Rosovsky, Favorites of Fortune, 35 – 71.
Fogleman, Aaron S., “From Slaves, Convicts, and Servants to Free Passengers. The
Transformation of Immigration in the Era of the American Revolution”, in: Journal of
American History 85 (1998) 66 – 76.
Foucault, Michel, Discipline and Punish, New York 1979, originally, in French, 1975.
Fourasti¦, Jean, “De la vie traditionnelle  la vie tertiaire”, in: Population 14 (1959) 417 –
432.
Francks, Penelope, The Japanese Consumer. An Alternative Economic History of Modern
Japan, Cambridge 2009.
Frank, Andre Gunder, ReOrient. Global Economy in the Asian Age, Berkeley/Los Angeles/
London 1998.
Freeman, Chris and Francisco LouÅ¼, As Time goes by. From the Industrial Revolutions to
the Information Revolution, Oxford 2001.
Friedel, Robert, A Culture of Improvement. Technology and the Western Millennium,
Cambridge Mass./ London 2007.
Friedman, Milton and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose, Harmondsworth 1980.
Bibliography 451
Frykman, Niklas, “Seeleute auf den europäischen Kriegsschiffen des späten 18. Jahrhun-
derts”, in: Marcel van der Linden and Karl Heinz Roth, eds., assisted by Max Hen-
ninger, Über Marx Hinaus. Arbeitsgeschichte und Arbeitsbegriff in der Konfrontation
mit den globalen Arbeitsverhältnissen des 21. Jahrhunderts, Berlin and Hamburg 2009,
55 – 84.
Fukuyama, Francis, The Origins of Political Order. From Prehuman Times to the French
Revolution, London 2011.
– State Building. Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century, London 2004.
– Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity, London 1995.
Furniss, Edgar S. , The Position of the Laborer in a System of Nationalism. A Study of the
Labor Theories of the Later English Mercantilists, Boston 1920.
Gaastra, Femme, “‘Sware continuerende lasten en groten ommeslagh’. Kosten van de
oorlogsvoering van de Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie”, in: Gerrit Knaap and Ger
Teitler, eds. , De Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie tussen oorlog en diplomatie, Lei-
den 2002, 81 – 104.
Galenson, David, “The Rise and Fall of Indentured Servitude in the Americas. An Eco-
nomic Analysis”, in: The Journal of Economic History 44, 1 (1984) 1 – 26.
Galiani, Sebastian and Itai Sened, eds., Economic Institutions, Rights, Growth, and Sus-
tainability : the Legacy of Douglass North, forthcoming Cambridge University Press.
Galor, Oded, Unified Growth Theory, Princeton 2011.
– “Towards a Unified Theory of Economic Growth. An Interview by Brian Snowdon”, in:
World Economics 9, 2 (2008) 97 – 151.
– “From Stagnation to Growth; Unified Growth Theory”, in: P. Aghion and S. Durlauf,
eds. , Handbook of Economic Growth, Amsterdam/London 2005, Vol. 1 A, 171 – 293.
Galor, Oded and Omer Moav, “Natural Selection and the Origin of Economic Growth”, in:
Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (2002) 1133 – 1191.
Gardella, Robert, Harvesting Mountains. Fujian and the China Tea Trade, 1757 – 1937,
Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1994.
Gates, Hill, China’s Motor. A Thousand Years of Petty Capitalism, Ithaca/London 1996.
Gauci, Perry, ed., Regulating the British Economy, 1660 – 1850, Farnham, UK/Burlington,
USA, 2011.
Gellner, Ernest, Plough, Sword and Book. The Structure of Human History, London 1988.
GenÅ, Mehmet, “Ottoman Industry in the Eighteenth Century : General Framework,
Characteristics and Main Trends”, in: Donald Quataert, ed., Manufacturing in the
Ottoman Empire and Turkey, 1500 – 1950, New York 1994, 59 – 85.
Gerschenkron, Alexander, Economic Backwardness from a Historical Perspective. A Book
of Essays, Cambridge Mass. 1962.
Getzer, Joshua, “Theories of Property and Economic Development”, in: Journal of Inter-
disciplinary History 26, 4 (1996) 639 – 669.
Gilboy, Elizabeth Waterman, “Demand as a Factor in the Industrial Revolution”, in: A.H.
Cole, ed., Facts and Factors in Economic History, London 1932; also published in R.M.
Hartwell, ed., The Causes of the Industrial Revolution in England, London 1967, 121 –
138.
Gladwell, Malcolm, The Tipping Point. How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference, New
York 2000.
Bibliography452
Glaeser, Edward L., Triumph of the City. How our Greatest Invention Makes us Richer,
Smarter, Greener, Healthier and Happier, London 2011.
Glass, David V., Numbering the People. The Eighteenth-Century Population Controversy
and the Development of Census and Vital Statistics in Britain, Farnborough 1973.
Golas, Peter J. Science and Civilisation in China. Part V, Volume 13, Cambridge 1999.
Goldstone, Jack A., A Peculiar Path. The Rise of the West in Global Context, 1500 – 1850,
forthcoming.
– Why Europe? The Rise of the West in World History, 1500 – 1800, New York 2008.
– “A Historical, not Comparative Method. Breakthroughs and Limitations in the Theory
and Methodology of Michael Mann’s Analysis of Power”, in: John A. Hall and Ralph
Schroeder, eds. , An Anatomy of Power. The Social Theory of Michael Mann, Cambridge
2006, 263 – 282.
– “Efflorescences and Economic Growth in World History. Rethinking the ‘Rise of the
West’ and the Industrial Revolution”, in: Journal of World History 13, 2 (2002) 323 – 389.
– “The Rise of the West – or not? A Revision to Socio-Economic History”, in: Sociological
Theory 18 (2000) 157 – 194.
– “Whose Measure of Reality?”, in: The American Historical Review 105, 2 (2000) 501 –
508.
– “Gender, Work and Culture. Why the Industrial Revolution came Early to England and
Late to China”, in: Sociological Perspectives 39 (1996) 1 – 21.
– Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World, Berkeley/Los Angeles/Oxford
1991.
– “Cultural Orthodoxy, Risk, and Innovation. The Divergence of East and West in the
Early Modern World”, in: Sociological Theory 5 (1987) 119 – 135.
Goody, Jack, Renaissances: The One or the Many, Cambridge 2010.
– The Eurasian Miracle, Cambridge 2010.
– The Theft of History, Cambridge 2006.
– Capitalism and Modernity. The Great Debate, Cambridge 2004.
Gorski, Philip S., “The Little Divergence. The Protestant Ethic and Economic Hegemony in
Early Modern Europe”, in: Lutz Kaelber and Richard Swatos, eds. , The Protestant Ethic
Turns 100: Essays on the Centenary of the Weber Thesis, Boulder Colorado 2005, 165 –
189.
– The Disciplinary Revolution. Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern Europe,
Chicago/London 2003.
Gozzini, Giovanni, Un’idea di giustizia. Globalizzazione e ineguaglianza dalla rivoluzione
industriale a oggi, Turin 2010.
Graeber, David, Debt. The first 5,000 Years, New York 2011.
Grafe, Regina and Alejandra Irigoin, “A Stakeholder Empire. The Political Economy of
Spanish Imperial Rule in America”, in: Economic History Review 65, 2 (2012) 609 – 651.
– “The Spanish Empire and its Legacy. Fiscal Redistribution and Political Conflict in
Colonial and Post-colonial Spanish America”, in: Journal of Global History 1 (2006)
241 – 267.
Greenfeld, Liah, The Spirit of Capitalism. Nationalism and Economic Growth, Cambridge
Mass./London 2001.
– Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity, Cambridge Mass./London 1992.
Bibliography 453
Greif, Avner, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy. Lessons from Medieval
Trade, Cambridge 2006.
Griffin, Emma, A Short History of the British Industrial Revolution, London 2010.
Grigg, D.B., The Transformation of Agriculture in the West, Oxford/Cambridge Mass. 1992.
– The Dynamics of Agricultural Change. The Historical Experience, London 1982.
– The Agricultural Systems of the World. An Evolutionary Approach, Cambridge 1974.
Gruzinski, Serge, Les quatre parties du monde. Histoire d’une mondialisation, Paris 2004.
Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales, “Does Culture Affect Economic Out-
comes?”, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, 2 (2006) 23 – 48.
Guldi, Jo, Roads to Power. Britain Invents the Infrastructure State, Cambridge Mass./
London 2012.
Gupta, Bishnupriya and Debin Ma, “Europe in an Asian Mirror: The Great Divergence”,
in: Broadberry and O’Rourke, The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe,
Volume 1, 264 – 285.
Habakkuk, J.H., American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge
1962.
Habib, Irfan, “Potentialities of Capitalist Development in the Economy of Mughal India”,
in: The Journal of Economic History 29 (1969) 32 – 78.
Hall, John A., “States and Economic Development. Reflections on Adam Smith”, in: Hall,
States in History, 154 – 176.
– Powers and Liberties. The Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the West, London 1985.
Hall, John A, ed., States in History, Oxford 1986.
Hall, Peter, Cities in Civilization. Culture, Innovation and Urban Order, London 1999.
Hall, Peter A. and David Soskice, eds. , Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Advan-
tages of Comparative Advantage, Oxford 2001.
Hall, Robert E. and Charles I. Jones, “Why do some Countries Produce so Much More
Output Per Worker than Others?”, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1999) 83 –
116.
Hanley, Susan B., Everyday Things in Premodern Japan. The Hidden Legacy of Material
Culture, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1997.
Hanson, Victor Davis, Why the West Has Won. Carnage and Culture from Salamis to
Vietnam, London 2002.
Harley, C. Knick, “Trade: Discovery, Mercantilism and Technology”, in: Floud and
Johnson, The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume 1, 175 – 203.
– “Reassessing the Industrial Revolution: A Macro View”, in: Mokyr, British Industrial
Revolution, 171 – 227.
Harper, Marjory, “British Migration and the Peopling of the Empire”, in: Andrew Porter,
ed., The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume 3: The Nineteenth Century,
Oxford/New York 1999, 75 – 87.
Harrison, Henrietta, The Man awakened from Dreams. One Man’s Life in a North China
Village, 1875 – 1942, Stanford 2005.
Harrison, Lawrence E., Underdevelopment is a State of Mind, Cambridge Mass. 1985.
Harrison, Lawrence E. and Samuel P. Huntington, eds. , Culture matters: How Values Shape
Human Progress (New York 2000).
Hartog, Joop and HenriÚtte Maassen van den Brink, eds. , Human Capital. Advances in
Theory and Evidence, Cambridge 2009.
Bibliography454
Hatton, Tim, Kevin O’Rourke and Alan Taylor, eds., Comparative Economic History. Essays
in Honor of Jeffrey Williamson, Cambridge Mass. 2007.
Hayami, Akira, “Industrial Revolution versus Industrious Revolution”, in: Journal of
Japanese Trade and Industry 20, 6 (2001) 48 – 52.
– “The Industrious Revolution”, in: Look Japan 18 (1992) 38 – 43.
– “A Great Transformation: Social and Economic Change in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-
Century Japan”, in: Bonner Zeitschrift für Japanologie (1986) 3 – 13.
Hayami, A. and Y. Tsubouchi, eds., Economic and Demographic Development in Rice
Producing Societies. Some Aspects of East Asian Economic History, 1500 – 1900, Leuven
1989.
Headrick, Daniel R., Power over Peoples. Technology, Environments and Western Im-
perialism, 1400 to the Present, Princeton/Oxford 2010.
– When Information Came of Age. Technologies of Knowledge in the Age of Reason and
Revolution, 1700 – 1850, Oxford 2000.
– The Tools of Empire. Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century,
New York/Oxford 1981.
Heilbroner, Robert L., The Worldly Philosophers. The Lives, Times, and Ideas of the Great
Economic Thinkers, fourth edition; New York 1972.
Hellie, R., Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy, Chicago 1971.
Helpman, Elhanan, The Mystery of Economic Growth, Cambridge Mass./London 2004.
– ed., Institutions and Economic Performance, Cambridge Mass. 2008.
Herbst, Jeffrey, States and Power in Africa. Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control,
Princeton 2000.
Herlihy, David, The Black Death and the Transformation of the West, Cambridge
Mass. 1997.
Hicks, John, A Theory of Economic History, Oxford 1969.
Higonnet, Patrice, David Landes and Henry Rosovsky, eds. , Favorites of Fortune. Tech-
nology, Growth and Economic Development, Cambridge Mass. 1991.
Higgs, Edward, The Information State in England, Houndmills 2004.
Hilton, Rodney, ed., The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism, London/New York 1992.
Hirschman, Albert O., Exit, Voice, and Loyalty : Responses to Decline in Firms, Organ-
izations, and States, Cambridge Mass. 1970.
Hobsbawm, Eric, The Age of Revolution, London 1962.
Hobson, John M., The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation, Cambridge 2004.
Hobson, John M. and Linda Weiss, States and Economic Development. A Comparative
Historical Analysis, Cambridge 1995.
Hodgson, Geoffrey M., “Institutions and Economic Development: Constraining, Enabling
and Reconstituting”, in: De Paula and Dymski, Reimagining Growth, 85 – 98.
Hoffman, Philip T., “Comment on Ken Pomeranz’s The Great Divergence”, in: Historically
Speaking 12, 4 (2011) 16 – 17.
– “Why was it Europeans who conquered the World?”, in: Journal of Economic History 72,
3 (2012) 601 – 633.
– “Prices, the Military Revolution, and Western Europe’s Comparative Advantage in
Violence”, in: Economic History Review 64, 1 (2011) 39 – 59.
Hoffman, Philip T. a.o., “Real Inequality in Western Europe since 1500”, in: The Journal of
Economic History 62, 2 (2002) 322 – 355.
Bibliography 455
Hofstede, Geert, Culture and Organizations. Software of the Mind, Cambridge Mass. 1991.
Holton, Robert J. , The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism, Basingstoke/London
1980.
Hont, Istvan, Jealousy of Trade. International Competition and the Nation State in His-
torical Perspective, Cambridge Mass. 2005.
Hopkins, A.G., “The New Economic History of Africa”, in: The Journal of African History
50 (2009) 155 – 177.
Hoppit, Julian, “Bounties, the Economy and the State in Britain, 1689 – 1800”, in: Gauci,
Regulating the British Economy, 139 – 160.
– “Compulsion, Compensation and Property Rights in Britain, 1660 – 1833”, in: Past and
Present Nr. 210 (2011) 93 – 128.
– “Checking the Leviathan, 1688 – 1832”, in: Winch and O’Brien, The Political Economy of
British Historical Experience, 267 – 294.
– “Patterns of Parliamentary Legislation, 1660 – 1800”, in: The History Journal 39 (1996)
109 – 131.
– “Reforming Britain’s Weights and Measures”, in: The English Historical Review 108
(1993) 82 – 104.
Hsü, Immanuel C.Y., The Rise of Modern China, sixth edition; New York 2000.
Huang, Philip C.C., “Development or Involution in Eighteenth-Century Britain and
China?”, in: The Journal of Asian Studies 61, 2 (2002) 501 – 538.
– The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta, 1350 – 1988, Stanford
1990.
– The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China, Stanford 1985.
Hudson, Pat, “Industrial Organisation and Structure”, in: Floud and Johnson, Cambridge
Economic History of Modern Britain, Vol. I. , 28 – 56.
Huff, Toby E., Intellectual Curiosity and the Scientific Revolution. A Global Perspective,
Cambridge 2011.
– The Rise of Early Modern Science. Islam, China and the West, Cambridge 1995.
Hugill, Peter J. , World Trade since 1431. Geography, Technology and Capitalism, Baltimore/
London 1993.
Humphries, Jane, “Rent Seeking or Skill Creating? Apprenticeship in Early Industrial
England”, in: Gauci, Regulating the British Economy, 235 – 258.
– Childhood and Child Labour in the British Industrial Revolution, Cambridge 2010.
– “Household Economy”, in: Floud and Johnson, The Cambridge Economic History of
Modern Britain. Vol. I, 238 – 267.
Hung, Ho-fung, “Orientalist Knowledge and Social Theories: China and European Con-
ceptions of East-West Differences from 1600 – 1900”, in: Sociological Theory 21 (2003)
254 – 280.
Hunt, E.H., “Wages”, Chapter 6 in: John Langton and R.J. Morris, ed. , Atlas of In-
dustrializing Britain 1780 – 1914, London/New York 1986, 60 – 68.
– “Industrialization and Regional Inequality. Wages in Britain, 1760 – 1914”, in: The
Journal of Economic History XLV, 4 (1986) 935 – 966.
Inikori, Joseph E., Africans and the Industrial Revolution in England. A Study in Inter-
national Trade and Economic Development, Cambridge 2002.
Inkster, Ian, Science and Technology in History. An Approach to Industrial Development,
New Brunswick 1991.
Bibliography456
Irwin, Douglas A., Against the Tide. An Intellectual History of Free Trade, Princeton 1997.
Isett, Christopher Mills, State, Peasant, and Merchant in Qing Manchuria, Stanford 2007.
Jacob, Margaret C., Scientific Culture and the Making of the Industrial West, New York/
Oxford 1997.
Jacob Margaret C. and Matthew Kadane, “Missing, now Found in the Eighteenth Century :
Weber’s Protestant Capitalist”, in: American Historical Review 108 (2003) 20 – 49.
Jacob, Margaret C. and Larry Stewart, Practical Matter. Newton’s Science in the Service of
Industry and Empire, 1687 – 1851, Cambridge Mass. 2006.
Jacobs, Jane, Cities and the Wealth of Nations, New York 1984
– The Economy of Cities, New York 1970.
James, Lawrence, Warrior Race. A History of the British at War, London 2001.
Jay, Peter, Road to Riches or the Wealth of Man, London 2000.
Jerven, Morten, “An Unlevel Playing Field. National Income Estimates and Reciprocal
Comparison in Global Economic History”, in: Journal of Global History 7 (2012) 107 –
128.
Jevons, William Stanley, The Coal Question. An Inquiry concerning the Progress of the
Nation, and the Probable Exhaustion of our Coal Mines, London 1865.
Johnson, Chalmers, Japan. Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State, New York/
London 1995.
Jones, Charles I. , “Was an Industrial Revolution Inevitable? Economic Growth over the
Very Long Run”, in: Advances in Macroeconomics 1, 2 (2001) 1 – 44.
Jones, Eric L., Locating the Industrial Revolution. Inducement and Response, Singapore
2010.
– Cultures Merging. A Historical and Economic Critique of Culture, Princeton/Oxford
2006.
– “Time and Culture in Old-World Economics”, in: The Journal of Economic History 60
(2000) 856 – 859.
– “The Real Question about China: Why was the Song Economic Achievement not Re-
peated?”, in: Australian Economic History Review 30, 2 (1990) 5 – 22.
– Growth Recurring. Economic Change in World History, Cambridge 1988.
– The European Miracle. Environments, Economies and Geopolitics in the History of Eu-
rope and Asia, second edition; Cambridge 1987, originally 1981.
Jutte, Robert, Poverty and Deviance in Early Modern Europe, Cambridge 2006.
Käsler, Dirk, Max Weber: An Introduction to his Life and Work, Chicago 1989, originally
1979.
Kain, Roger J.P. and Elizabeth Baigent, The Cadastral Map in the Service of the State. A
History of Property Mapping, Chicago 1992.
Kalberg, Stephen, Max Weber’s Comparative-Historical Sociology, Cambridge/Oxford
1994.
Kealey, Terence, Sex, Science and Profits, New York 2008.
– The Economic Laws of Scientific Research, London/New York 1996.
Keefer, Philip and Stephen Knack, “Why don’t Poor Countries Catch Up? A Cross-national
Test of Institutional Explanation”, in: Economic Inquiry. Oxford University Press 35, 3
(1997) 590 – 602.
Kelly, Morgan, “The Dynamics of Smithian Growth”, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics,
112, 3 (1997) 939 – 964.
Bibliography 457
Kenwood, A.G. and A.L. Lougheed, The Growth of the International Economy, 1820 – 1960,
London 1971.
Keynes, John Maynard, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, New York
1936.
– “Economic Possibilities for our Grandchildren” in: John Maynard Keynes, Essays in
Persuasion, New York 1963, 358 – 373, originally 1930.
Kiesewetter, Hubert, Das einzigartige Europa. Zufällige und notwendige Faktoren der
Industrialisierung, Göttingen 1996.
King, F. H., Farmers of Forty Centuries or Permanent Agriculture in China, Korea and
Japan, London 1927.
Klein, Herbert S., The Atlantic Slave Trade, second edition; Cambridge 2010.
– “Economic Aspects of the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic Slave Trade”, in: Tracy, ed., Rise
of Merchant Empires, 287 – 311.
Knight, F.H., Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, Boston 1921.
Kocka, Jürgen, Geschichte des Kapitalismus, Munich 2013.
– “Der Kapitalismus und seine Krisen in historischer Perspektive”, in: Jürgen Kocka,
Arbeiten an der Geschichte. Gesellschaftlicher Wandel im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert,
Göttingen 2011, 307 – 322.
Komlos, John, “Thinking about the Industrial Revolution”, in: The Journal of European
Economic History 18, 1 (1989) 191 – 206.
Kremer, Michael, “Population Growth and Technological Change: One Million B.C. to
1990”, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics CVIII (1993) 681 – 71.
Krugman, Paul, Pop Internationalism, Cambridge Mass. 1996.
– “The Myth of Asia’s Miracle”, in: Foreign Affairs 73 (1994) 62 – 78.
Kumagai, Yukihisa, Breaking into the Monopoly. Provincial Merchants and Manufacturers’
Campaigns for Access to the Asian Market, 1790 – 1833, Leiden/Boston 2012.
Kuran, Timur, The Long Divergence. How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East,
Princeton/Oxford 2001.
Lains, Pedro and Ýlvaro Ferreira da Silva, eds. , Histûria Econûmica de Portugal, 1700 –
2000, Three Volumes, Lisbon 2005.
Lal, Deepak, Unintended Consequences. The Impact of Factor Endowments, Culture and
Politics on Long-run Economic Performance, Cambridge Mass. 1998.
Lampe, Klaus, a.o., Das große Buch vom Reis, Munich 1997.
Landes, David, “Why Europe and the West? Why not China?”, in: Journal of Economic
Perspectives 20, 2 (2006) 3 – 22.
– The Unbound Prometheus. Technological Change and Industrial Development in
Western Europe from 1750 to the Present, second edition; Cambridge 2003, originally
1969.
– “Reply to Peer Vries and Om Prakash”, in: Itinerario. European Journal of Overseas
History XXIII, 1 (1999) 8 – 15.
– The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. Why Some are so Rich and Some so Poor, London
1998.
– “What Room for Accident in History? Explaining Big Changes by Small Events”, in:
Economic History Review, second series (1994) 637 – 656.
– Revolution in Time. Clocks and the Making of the Modern World, Cambridge 1983.
– “Japan and Europe: Contrasts in Industrialization”, in: William W. Lockwood, ed., State
Bibliography458
and Economic Enterprise in Japan: Essays in the Political Economy of Growth, Princeton
1965, 93 – 182.
Lane, Frederic, Venice in History, Baltimore 1966.
Langford, Paul, Public Life and the Propertied Englishman, 1689 – 1798, Oxford 1991.
Langlois, Rosaire, “The Closing of the Sociological Mind?”, in: Canadian Journal of So-
ciology/Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie 33, 1 (2008) 134 – 147.
Lee, James Z. and Wang Feng, One Quarter of Humanity. Malthusian Mythology and
Chinese Realities, Cambridge Mass./London 1999.
Legarda Jr., Benito J. , After the Galleons. Foreign Trade, Economic Change and En-
trepreneurship in the Nineteenth-Century Philippines, Madison 1999.
Le Goff, Jacques, Time, Work and Culture in the Middle Ages, second edition; Chicago
1982, originally 1977.
Lehner, Georg, China in European Encyclopaedias, 1700 – 1850, Leiden and Boston 2011.
Leonard, Jane K, Controlling from Afar. The Daoguang Emperor’s Management of the
Grand Canal Crisis, 1824 – 1826, Ann Arbor 1996.
Leonard, Jane K. and John R. Watt, eds., To Achieve Security and Wealth. The Qing Imperial
State and the Economy, 1644 – 1911, Ithaca, New York, 1992.
Lesger, Cl¦, The Rise of the Amsterdam Market and Information Exchange. Merchants,
Commercial Expansion and Change in the Spatial Economy of the Low Countries,
c.1550 – 1630, Aldershot 2006.
Levi, Margaret, “The Predatory Theory of Rule”, in: Politics and Society 10 (1981) 435 –
461.
Levy, David M. and Sandra J. Peart, “Soviet Growth and American Textbooks”, in: Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization 78, 1 / 2 (2011) 110 – 125.
Lewis, W. Arthur, “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour”, in:
Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies 22 (1954) 139 – 191.
Li, Bozhong, The Development of Agriculture and Industry in Jiangnan, 1644 – 1850. Trends
and Prospects, Hangzhou 1986.
Li, Bozhong and Jan Luiten van Zanden, “Before the Great Divergence? Comparing the
Yangzi Delta and the Netherlands at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century”, in: The
Journal of Economic History 72, 4 (2012) 956 – 989.
Lieberman, Victor, Strange Parallels. Southeast Asia in Global Context c. 1800 – 1830.
Volume 2: Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands,
Cambridge Mass. 2009.
– Strange Parallels. Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800 – 1830. Volume 1: Integration
on the Mainland, Cambridge Mass. 2003.
Lieberman, Victor, ed., Beyond Binary Histories. Re-imagining Eurasia to c.1830, Ann
Arbor 1997.
Lin, Man-houng, China Upside Down. Currency, Society and Ideologies, 1808 – 1856,
Cambridge/London 2006.
Lindert, Peter H., Growing Public. Social Spending and Economic Growth since the
Eighteenth Century (Cambridge 2004) Two Volumes
– “Poor Relief before the Welfare State: Britain versus the Continent, 1780 – 1880”, in:
European Review of Economic History 2 (1998) 101 – 40.
Lindert, Peter H. and Jeffrey G. Williamson, “Does Globalization Make the World More
Bibliography 459
Unequal?”, in: Bordo, Taylor and Williamson, Globalization in Historical Perspective,
227 – 276.
– “Revising England’s Social Tables, 1688 – 1812”, in: Explorations in Economic History 19
(1982) 385 – 408.
Lippit, Victor D., The Economic Development of China, New York 1987.
Lipsey, R.G., K.I. Carlaw, and C.T. Bekar, Economic Transformations. General Purpose
Technologies and Long Term Economic Growth, Oxford 2005.
Lipton, Michael, Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development, Cam-
bridge Mass. 1977.
Lis, Catharina and Hugo Soly, Worthy Efforts. Attitudes to Work and Workers in Pre-
Industrial Europe, Leiden/Boston 2012.
– Poverty and Capitalism in Pre-Industrial Europe, 1450 – 1850, Brighton 1979.
List, Friedrich, Das nationale System der politischen Ökonomie (1841), edited and in-
troduced by Artur Sommer, Basel/Tübingen, 1959.
Liu, Justin Yifu, “The Needham Puzzle. Why the Industrial Revolution Did Not Originate
in China”, in: Economic Development and Cultural Change 42, 2 (1995) 137 – 152.
Livi-Bacci, Massimo Population of Europe, Oxford 2000, originally 1998.
Lloyd, Christopher, Jacob Metzer and Richard Sutch, eds. , Settler Economies in World
History, Leiden/Boston 2013.
Lorenzetti, Luigi, Michela Barbot and Luca Mocarelli, eds. , Property Rights and their
Violations / La propri¦t¦ viol¦e: Expropriations and Confiscations, 16th-20th Centuries /
Expropriations et confiscations, XVIe – XXe siÀcles, Bern 2012.
Lovell, Julia, The Opium War. Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China, London/Basing-
stoke/Oxford 2011.
Lucas, R.E. , Lectures on Economic Growth, Cambridge/London 2002.
Lucassen, Jan and Leo Lucassen, “The Mobility Transition Revisited, 1500 – 1900: What the
European Case Can Offer to Global History’”, in: Journal of Global History 4, 3 (2009)
347 – 378.
Lynch, K.A., Individuals, Families and Communities in Western Europe, Cambridge 2003.
Lynn, John, Battle. A History of Combat and Culture, Boulder 2003.
Ma, Debin and Jan Luiten van Zanden, eds. , Law and Long-Term Economic Change. A
Eurasian Perspective, Stanford 2011.
MacAloon, Jim, “The State and Economic Policy in Twentieth-Century Australia and New
Zealand. Escaping the Staples Trap?”, in: Lloyd, Metzer and Sutch, Settler Economies in
World History, 521 – 544.
Macauley, M., “A World Made Simple. Law and Property in the Ottoman and Qing Em-
pires”, in: Journal of Early Modern History 5 (2001) 331 – 352.
Macdonald, James, A Free Nation deep in Debt. The Financial Roots of Democracy,
Princeton and Oxford 2006.
Macfarlane, Alan, The Riddle of the Modern World. Of Liberty, Wealth and Equality,
Houndmills/New York 2000.
– “Ernest Gellner and the Escape to Modernity”, in: John A. Hall and I.C. Jarvie, eds. ,
Transition to Modernity. Essays on Power, Wealth and Belief, Cambridge 1992, 121 –
136.
– “The Cradle of Capitalism”, in: Baechler, Hall and Mann, Europe and the Rise of Cap-
italism, 185 – 203.
Bibliography460
– The Origins of English Individualism, Oxford 1978.
Macfarlane, Alan and Sarah Harrison, “Technological Evolution and Involution. A Pre-
liminary Comparison of Europe and Japan”, in: John Ziman, ed., Technological In-
novation as an Evolutionary Process, Cambridge 2000, 77 – 89.
Macleod, Christine, Inventing the Industrial Revolution. The English Patent System 1660 –
1800, Cambridge 1988.
Maddison, Angus, Contours of the World Economy, 1 – 2030 A.D. Essays in Macro-economic
History, Oxford 2007.
– The World Economy. A Millennial Perspective, Paris 2001.
Magnusson, Lars, Nation, State and the Industrial Revolution. The Visible Hand, London/
New York 2009.
– Mercantilism, Critical Concepts in the History of Economics, Four Volumes, no place
indicated 1995.
– Mercantilism. The Shaping of an Economic Language, London/New York 1994.
Malanima, Paulo, “When did England overtake Italy? Medieval and Early Modern Di-
vergence in Prices and Wages”, in: European Review of Economic History 17 (2013) 45 –
70.
– Pre-modern European Economy. One Thousand Years (10th-19th Centuries), Leiden/
Boston 2009.
– “Energy Crisis and Growth 1650 – 1850: the European Deviation in a Comparative
Perspective”, in: Journal of Global History 1,1 (2006) 101 – 12.
– La fine del primato. Crisi e riconversione nell’Italia del Seicento, Milan 1998.
– Energia e crescita nell’Europa preindustriale, Rome 1996.
Mallory, Walter H., China: Land of Famine, New York 1926.
Mann, Charles C., 1493. Uncovering the New World Columbus Created, New York 2011.
– 1491. New Revelations of the Americas before Columbus, New York 2005.
Mann, Michael, The Sources of Social Power, Volume III. Global Empires and Revolution,
1890 – 1945, Cambridge 2012.
– The Sources of Social Power, Volume II. The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760 – 1914,
Cambridge 1993.
– “The Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, Mechanisms and Results”, in: Hall,
States in History, 109 – 136.
– The Sources of Social Power, Volume I. A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D
1760, Cambridge 1986.
Mann, Susan, Precious Records. Women in China’s Long Eighteenth Century, Stanford
1997.
– Local Merchants and the Chinese Bureaucracy, 1750 – 1950, Stanford 1987.
Manning, J.M. and Ian Morris, eds. , The Ancient Economy: Evidence and Models, Stanford
2007.
Marglin, Steven A., “What Do Bosses Do?”, in: Review of Radical Political Economy 6
(1974) 60 – 112.
Marks, Robert B., The Origins of the Modern World. A Global and Ecological Narrative,
Lanham 2002.
– “Commercialization without Capitalism. Processes of Environmental Change in South
China 1550 – 1850”, in: Environmental History 1 (1996) 56 – 82.
Martin, W., “Outgrowing Resource Dependence: Theory and Developments”, in: D. Le-
Bibliography 461
derman and W.L. Maloney, eds., Natural Resources: Neither Curse nor Destiny, Stanford
2007, 323 – 355.
– “Developing Countries’ Changing Participation in World Trade”, in: Word Bank Re-
search Observer 18 (2003) 187 – 203.
Marshall, P.J. ed., The Oxford History of the British Empire, Volume 2: The Eighteenth
Century, Oxford/New York 1998.
Marx Engels Werke, Berlin 1956 – 1990. Referred to as MEW.
Mathias, Peter, “Financing the Industrial Revolution”, in: Peter Mathias and John A. Davis,
eds. , The First Industrial Revolutions, Oxford/Cambridge Mass. 1989, 69 – 85.
– First Industrial Nation. An Economic History of Britain 1700 – 1914, London 1969.
Matthee, Rudy, The Pursuit of Pleasure. Drugs and Stimulants in Iranian History, 1500 –
1900, Princeton 2009.
Mazumdar, Sucheta, Sugar and Society in China. Peasants, Technology and the World
Market, Cambridge 1998.
McClellan III, James E. and Harold Dorn, Science and Technology in World History. An
Introduction, Baltimore 1999.
McCloskey, Deirdre, Bourgeois Dignity. Why Economics Can’t Explain the Modern World,
Chicago 2010.
– “Review of Clark, A Farewell to Alms”, in: European Review of Economic History 12, 2
(2008) 138 – 148.
– The Bourgeois Virtues. Ethics for an Age of Commerce, Chicago 2007.
McCraw, Thomas K., Prophet of Innovation. Joseph Schumpeter and Creative Destruction,
Cambridge Mass./London 2007.
McGuire, Robert A. and Philip R.P. Coelho, Parasites, Pathogens and Progress. Diseases and
Economic Development, Cambridge Mass. 2011.
McNeill, John R., “The World According to Jared Diamond”, in: The History Teacher 34, 2
(2001) 65 – 74.
– “China’s Environmental History in World Perspective”, in: Mark Elvin and Liu Ts’ui-
jung, eds., Sediments of Time. Environment and Society in Chinese History, Cambridge
1998, 31 – 52.
McNeill, William H., The Rise of the West. A History of the Human Community. With a
Retrospective Essay, Chicago 1990.
– The Pursuit of Power, Oxford 1983.
M¦nard, Claude and Mary Shirley, “The Contribution of Douglass North to New Institu-
tional Economics”, to be published in: Galiani and Sened, Economic Institutions,
Rights, Growth, and Sustainability, already in draft available at http://hal.archives-
ouvertes.fr/docs/00/62/42/97/PDF/2011–Menard_Shirley_North_and_NIE–CUP.pdf
M¦nard, Claude and Mary M. Shirley, eds., Handbook of New Institutional Economics,
Heidelberg 2008.
Mendels, F.F., “Proto-Industrialization: The First Phase of the Industrialization Process”,
in: The Journal of Economic History 32 (1972) 241 – 261.
Meredith, David and Deborah Oxley, “Condemned to the Colonies. Penal Transportation
as the Solution to Britain’s Law and Order Problem”, in: Leidschrift 22, 1 (2007) 19 – 40.
Micklethwait, John and Adrian Wooldridge, The Company. A Short History of a Revolu-
tionary Idea, New York 2003.
Bibliography462
Milanovic, Branko, The Haves and the Have-Nots. A Brief and Idiosyncratic History of
Global Inequality, New York 2011.
Milgate, Murray and Shannon C. Stimson, After Adam Smith. A Century of Transformation
in Politics and Political Economy, Princeton/Oxford 2009.
Milionakis, Dimitris and Ben Fine, “Douglass North’s Remaking of Economic History : A
Critical Appraisal”, in: Review of Radical Political Economics 39, 1 (2007) 27 – 57.
Mills, Greg, Why Africa is Poor. And what Africans can do about it, Johannesburg 2011.
Minami, Ryoshin, Power Revolution in the Industrialization of Japan: 1885 – 1940, Tokyo
1987.
Mintz, Sidney, Sweetness and Power, New York 1985.
Mitch, David, “Education and Skill of the British Labour Force”, in: Floud and Johnson,
Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume I, 332 – 356.
– The Rise of Popular Literacy in Victorian England. The Influence of Private Choice and
Public Policy, Pennsylvania 1992.
Mitchell, B.R. and Phyllis Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, Cambridge 1962.
Mitterauer, Michael, Why Europe?: The Medieval Origins of its Special Path, Chicago 2010,
originally, in German, Munich 2003.
Moe, Espen, Governance, Growth and Leadership. The Role of the State in Technological
Progress, 1750 – 2000, Ashgate 2007.
Mokyr, Joel, “Intellectual Property Rights, the Industrial Revolution and the Beginnings of
Modern Economic Growth’”, American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, May
2009, 349 – 355. This text is available on Mokyr’s website.
– The Enlightened Economy. An Economic History of Britain 1700 – 1850, New Haven/
London 2009.
– “The Institutional Origins of the Industrial Revolution”, in: Helpman, Institutions and
Economic Performance, 64 – 119. Also available at his website http://faculty.wcas.
northwestern.edu/~jmokyr/Institutional-Origins-4.PDF
– “The Intellectual Origins of Modern Economic Growth”, in: The Journal of Economic
History 65 (2005) 285 – 351.
– “Accounting for the Industrial Revolution”, in: Floud and Johnson, The Cambridge
Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume I, 1 – 27.
– “Why was the Industrial Revolution a European Phenomenon?”, in: Supreme Court
Economic Review 10 (2003) 27 – 63.
– The Gifts of Athena. Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy, Princeton/Oxford
2002.
– “Innovation and its Enemies. The Economic and Political Roots of Technological In-
ertia”, in: Olson and Kähkönen, A not-so-dismal Science, 61 – 91.
– “The Industrial Revolution and the Netherlands: Why did it not happen?”, in: De
Economist 148 (2000) 503 – 520. The text is also on Mokyr’s website.
– ed., The British Industrial Revolution. An Economic Perspective, second edition;
Boulder 1999.
– “Editor’s Introduction: The New Economic History and the Industrial Revolution”, in:
Mokyr, British Industrial Revolution, 1 – 132.
– “Dear Labor, Cheap Labor and the Industrial Revolution”, in: Higonnet, Landes and
Rosovsky, Favorites of Fortune, 177 – 200.
Bibliography 463
– The Lever of Riches. Technological Creativity and Economic Progress, New York/Oxford
1990.
– Demand versus Supply in the Industrial Revolution”, in: The Journal of Economic
History 37, 4 (1977) 981 – 1008.
Moor, Tine de, and J.L. van Zanden, “Girl Power. The European Marriage Pattern (EMP)
and Labour Markets in the North Sea Region in the Late Medieval and Early Modern
Period”, in: Economic History Review 63, 1 (2009) 1 – 33.
Moore Jr. , Barrington, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in
the Making of the Modern World, Boston 1966.
Morgan, Kenneth, Slavery, Atlantic Trade and the British Economy, 1660 – 1800, Cam-
bridge 2000.
Morris, Ian, Why the West Rules – for Now. The Patterns of History and what they reveal
about the Future, London 2010.
– “Latitudes not Attitudes. How Geography Explains History”, in: History Today 60, 11
(2010).
Moulier-Boutang, Yann, De l’escalavage au salariat. Êconomie historique du salariat brid¦,
Paris 1998.
Muchembled, Robert, Popular Culture and Elite Culture in France, 1400 – 1750, Baton
Rouge 1985, originally 1978.
Muldrew, Craig, Food, Energy and the Creation of Industriousness. Work and Material
Culture in Agrarian England, 1570 – 1780, Cambridge 2011.
Mumford, Lewis, Technics and Civilization, New York 1939.
Mumy, Gene E., “Town and Country in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations”, in: Science
and Society 42, 1 (1978 – 1979) 458 – 477.
Mun, Thomas, England’s Treasure by Forraign Trade, London 1664.
Murphy, Kevin M., Andre Shleifer and Robert Vishny, “The Allocation of Talent. Im-
plications for Growth”, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 2 (1991) 503 – 530.
Murray, Charles, Human Accomplishment: The Pursuit of Excellence in the Arts and Sci-
ences, 800 B.C. to 1950, New York 2003.
Murray, Williamson A. “The Industrialisation of War, 1815 – 1871”, in: Parker, Cambridge
Illustrated History of Warfare, 216 – 241.
Musson, A.E. and Eric Robinson, Science and Technology in the Industrial Revolution,
Manchester 1969.
Nasar, Sylvia, Grand Pursuit. The Story of Economic Genius, New York 2011.
N’Diaye, Tidiane, Der verschleierte Völkermord, Reinbek 2010, originally Le g¦nocide voil¦,
Paris 2008.
Needham, Joseph, Clerks and Craftsmen in China and the West, Cambridge 1970.
– The Grand Titration. Science and Society in East and West, London 1969.
Needham, Joseph and Colin A. Ronan, The Shorter Science and Civilisation in China, 5
Volumes, Cambridge 1980 – 1995.
Needham, Joseph, and others, Science and Civilisation in China, Cambridge 1956 – 2008,
24 volumes to date.
Nef, John U., War and Human Progress, Cambridge Mass. 1950.
Ni, Shawn and Pham Hoang Van, “High Corruption Income in Ming and Qing China”, in:
Journal of Development Economics 81, 2 (2006) 316 – 336.
Nieboer, H.J. , Slavery as an Industrial System, New York 1971, originally 1910.
Bibliography464
Nordhaus, “Do Real Wage and Output Series Capture Reality?, The History of Lighting
Suggests Not”, in: Timothy Bresnahan and Robert Gordon, eds. , The Economics of New
Goods, Chicago 1997, 29 – 70.
Norman, E. Herbert, Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State. Political and Economic
Problems of the Meiji Period, New York 1946.
North, Douglass C., Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton/Oxford
2005.
– “Prologue”, in: J.N. Drobak and J.V.C. Nye, eds., The Frontiers of the New Institutional
Economics, San Diego/London 1997, 3 – 12.
– “Institutions”, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, 1 (1991) 97 – 112.
– Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge 1990.
– Structure and Change in Economic History, New York/London 1981.
North, Douglass C., William Summerhill and Barry R. Weingast, “Order, Disorder and
Economic Change: Latin America versus North America”, in: Bruce B. de Mesquita and
Hilton L. Root, eds., Governing for Prosperity, New Haven 2000, 17 – 58.
North, Douglass C. and Robert P. Thomas, The Rise of the Western World. A New Economic
History, Cambridge 1973.
– “An Economic Theory of the Growth of the Western World”, in: Economic History
Review 23 (1970) 1 – 17.
North, Douglass, John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders. A
conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History, Cambridge 2009.
Northrup, David, Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism, 1834 – 1922, Cambridge
1995.
– ed., The Atlantic Slave Trade, third edition; Florence Kentucky, 2010.
Nunn, Nathan, “Culture and the Historical Process”, in: Economic History of Developing
Regions 27 (2012) 108 – 126.
– “Slavery, Inequality and Economic Development in the Americas. An Examination of
the Engerman-Sokoloff Hypothesis”, in: Helpman, Institutions and Economic Per-
formance, 148 – 180.
– “The Importance of History for Economic Development”, in: Annual Review of Eco-
nomics, Annual Reviews 1 (2009) 65 – 92.
“The Long-term Effects of Africa’s Slave Trades”, in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics
123, 1 (2008) 139 – 176.
Nunn, Nathan and Diego Puga, “Ruggedness: The Blessing of Bad Geography in Africa”,
in: Review of Economics and Statistics 94, 1 (2012) 20 – 36.
Nunn, Nathan and Nancy Qian, “The Potato’s Contribution to Population and Urban-
ization. Evidence from a Historical Experiment”, in: The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 126, 2 (2011) 593 – 650.
– “The Columbian Exchange: A History of Disease, Food, and Ideas”, in: Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 24, 2 (2010) 163 – 188.
Nunn, Nathan and Leonard Wantchekon, “The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in
Africa”, in: American Economic Review 101, 7 (2011) 3221 – 3252.
Nye, John V.C., War, Wine, and Taxes. The Political Economy of Anglo-French Trade, 1689 –
1900, Princeton/Oxford 2007.
O’Brien, Patrick, “The Contributions of Warfare with Revolutionary and Napoleonic
France to the Consolidation and Progress of the British Industrial Revolution”, in:
Bibliography 465
Larry Neal and Jeffrey Williamson eds., History of Capitalism, Cambridge 2013,
forthcoming. A version of it has been published on the Internet as a Working Paper of
the Department of Economic History of LSE: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/economicHistory/
workingPapers/2011/WP150.pdf.
– “Historical Foundations for a Global Perspective on the Emergence of a Western Eu-
ropean Regime for the Discovery, Development, and Diffusion of Useful and Reliable
Knowledge”, in: Journal of Global History 8, 1 (2013) 1 – 24.
– “The Triumph and Denouement of the British Fiscal State. Taxation for Wars against
Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, 1793 – 1815”, in: Storrs, Fiscal-Military State,
147 – 200.
– “Taxation for British Mercantilism from the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) to the Peace of
Paris (1783)”, in: Torres Snchez, War, State and Development, 295 – 356.
– “Inseparable Connections. Trade, Economy, Fiscal State, and the Expansion of Empire,
1688 – 1815”, in: Marshall, The Oxford History of the British Empire, 53 – 77.
– “Political Preconditions for the Industrial Revolution”, in: Patrick O’Brien and Ronald
Quinault, eds., The Industrial Revolution and British Society, Cambridge 1993, 124 –
156.
– “The Foundations of European Industrialization: From the Perspective of the World”,
in: Jos¦ Casas Pardo, ed. , Economic Effects of the European Expansion, 1492 – 1824,
Stuttgart 1992, 462 – 502.
– “The Costs and Benefits of British Imperialism, 1846 – 1914”, in: Past and Present
Nr. 120 (1988) 163 – 200.
– “Do we have a Typology for the Study of European Industrialization in the XIXth
Century?”, in: The Journal of European Economic History 15 (1986) 291 – 333.
– “European Economic Development: The Contribution of the Periphery”, in: Economic
History Review, second series 35 (1982) 1 – 18.
O’Brien, Patrick and Stanley L. Engerman, “Exports and the Growth of the British
Economy from the Glorious Revolution to the Peace of Amiens”, in: Solow and En-
german, British Capitalism and Caribbean Slavery, 177 – 208.
O’Brien, Patrick and Leandro Prados de la Escosura, eds. , The Costs and Benefits of
European Imperialism from the Conquest of Ceuta, 1415, to the Treaty of Lusaka, 1974.
Twelfth International Economic History Congress Madrid 1998. Special Issue of Re-
vista de Historia Econûmica XVI (1998).
O’Brien, Patrick and Bartolom¦ Yun-Casalilla, with Francisco Comn Comn, eds., The
Rise of Fiscal States. A Global History, 1500 – 1914, Cambridge 2012.
Ogilvie, Sheilagh, Institutions and European Trade. Merchant Guilds, 1000 – 1800, Cam-
bridge 2011.
Ogilvie, Sheilagh and Markus Cerman, eds., European Proto-Industrialization. An In-
troductory Handbook, second edition; Cambridge 1996.
Olson, Mancur, “Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations Are Rich and Others
Poor”, in: Olson and Kähkönen, A not-so-dismal Science, 37 – 60.
– “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development”, in: Olson and Kähkönen, A not-so-dis-
mal Science, 119 – 137.
– Power and Prosperity. Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships, New York
2000.
Bibliography466
– The Rise and Decline of Nations. Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities,
New Haven 1982.
Olson, Mancur and Satu Kähkönen, A not-so-dismal Science. A Broader View of Economies
and Societies, Oxford 2000.
Olsson, O., and D.A. Hibbs, Jr. , “Biogeography and Long-run Economic Development”, in:
European Economic Review 49 (2005) 909 – 938.
Ormrod, David, The Rise of Commercial Empires, Cambridge 2003.
O’Rourke, Kevin H. and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization and History. The Evolution of
a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy, Cambridge Mass./London 1999.
Osborn, Anne, “Property, Taxes and State Protection of Rights”, in: Zelin, Ocko and
Gardella, Contract and Property in Early Modern China, 120 – 159.
Oshima, H.T., Economic Growth in Monsoon Asia. A Comparative Survey, Tokyo 1987.
Osterhammel, Jürgen, “Gesellschaftliche Parameter chinesischer Modernität”, in: Ge-
schichte und Gesellschaft 28 (2002) 71 – 108.
– China und die Weltgesellschaft. Vom 18. Jahrhundert bis in unsere Zeit, München 1989.
Overton, Mark, Agricultural Revolution in England. The Transformation of the Agrarian
Economy 1500 – 1850, Cambridge 1996.
Mark Overton, a.o., Production and Consumption in English Households, 1600 – 1750,
London 2012.
Pacey, Arnold, Technology in World Civilization. A Thousand-Year History, Oxford 1990.
Palmer, S.H., Economic Arithmetic. A Guide to the Statistical Sources of English Commerce,
Industry and Finance 1700 – 1850, New York 1977.
Pamuk, Sevket, “The Black Death and the Origins of the Great Divergence Across Europe,
1300 – 1600”, in: European Review of Economic History 11 (2007) 289 – 317.
Pamuk, Sevket and Suleyman Ozmucur, “Real Wages and Standards of Living in the
Ottoman Empire, 1489 – 1914”, in: The Journal of Economic History 62 (2002) 292 – 321.
Park, Nancy E., “Corruption in Eighteenth-Century China”, in: The Journal of Asian
Studies 56 (1997) 967 – 1005.
Parker, Geoffrey, ed. , Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare, Cambridge 1995.
Parthasarathi, Prasannan, Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not. Global Economic
Divergence, 1600 – 1850, Cambridge 2011.
– “Agriculture, Labour, and the Standard of Living in Eighteenth-Century India”, in:
Allen, Bengtsson and Dribe, Living Standards in the Past, 99 – 109.
– “Review Article: The Great Divergence”, in: Past and Present Nr. 177 (2002) 275 – 293.
– “Rethinking Wages and Competitiveness in the Eighteenth Century : Britain and South
India”, in: Past & Present Nr. 158 (1998) 79 – 109.
Passin, Herbert, Society and Education in Japan, New York 1965.
Patriquin, Larry, Agrarian Capitalism and Poor Relief in England 1500 – 1860: Rethinking
the Origins of the Welfare State, Basingstoke 2007.
Paula, Silvana de, and Gary A. Dymski, eds. , Reimagining Growth. Towards a Renewal of
Development Theory, New York 2005.
Pearson, Michael N., “Merchants and States”, in: Tracy, Political Economy of Merchant
Empires, 41 – 116.
Perdue, Peter C., China Marches West. The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia, Cambridge
Mass./London 2005.
Perkins, Dwight, Agricultural Development in China, 1368 – 1968, Chicago 1969.
Bibliography 467
P¦tr¦-Grenouilleau, Olivier, Les traites n¦griÀres. Essai d’histoire globale, Paris 2004.
Peyrefitte, Alain, Du “miracle” en ¦conomie. LeÅons au College de France, Paris 1995.
– La soci¦t¦ de confiance, Paris 1995.
– L’empire immobile ou le choc des mondes: r¦cit historique, Paris 1989.
Pinto, Isaac de, An Essay on Circulation and Credit in Four Parts and a Letter on the
Jealousy of Commerce translated by S. Baggs, Farnborough 1969, originally 1774.
PolÀse, Mario, The Wealth& Poverty of Regions. Why Cities Matter, Chicago/London 2009.
Pollard, Sidney, Peaceful Conquest. The Industrialization of Europe 1760 – 1970, Oxford
1981.
– The Genesis of Modern Management. A Study of the Industrial Revolution in Great
Britain, London 1965.
Pomeranz, Kenneth, “Ten Years After : Responses and Reconsiderations”, in: Historically
Speaking 12, 4 (2011) 20 – 25.
– “Women’s Work, Family and Economic Development in Europe and East Asia: Long-
Term Trajectories and Contemporary Comparisons”, in: Arrighi, Hamashita and Sel-
den, The Resurgence of East Asia, 124 – 172.
– “Beyond the East-West Binary. Resituating Development Paths in the Eighteenth-Cen-
tury World”, in: Journal of Asian Studies 61, 2 (2002) 539 – 590.
– “Is There an East Asian Development Path? Long-Term Comparisons, Constraints, and
Continuities”, in: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 44 (2001)
322 – 362.
– The Great Divergence. China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy,
Princeton 2000.
– The Making of a Hinterland. State, Society, and Economy in Inland North China, 1853 –
1937, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London 1993.
Poovey, Mary, A History of the Modern Fact. Problems of Knowledge in the Sciences of
Wealth and Society, Chicago/London 1998.
Porter, Bruce D., War and the Rise of the State. The Military Foundations of Modern
Politics, New York 1994.
Porter, Michael, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New York 1990. I used the re-
published version of 1998 with a new introduction.
Porter, Roy, Enlightenment. Britain and the Creation of the Modern World, London 2000.
Postma, Johannes, The Dutch in the Atlantic Slave Trade 1600 – 1815, Cambridge 1990.
Potter, J. , “The British Timber Duties, 1815 – 60”, in: Economica 22, New Series Nr. 86
(1955) 122 – 136.
Powelson, John P., Centuries of Economic Endeavor. Parallel Paths in Japan and Europe
and their Contrast with the Third World, Ann Arbor 1994.
Prados de la Escosura, Leandro, “Lost Decades. Economic Performance in Post-In-
dependence Latin America”, in: Journal of Latin American Studies 41 (2009) 2, 279 –
307.
Prados de la Escosura, Leandro, ed. , Exceptionalism and Industrialisation. Britain and its
European Rivals, 1688 – 1815, Cambridge/New York 2004.
Prak, Maarten, and Jan Luiten van Zanden, eds., Technology, Skills and the Pre-modern
Economy in the West and the East, Leiden/Boston 2013.
Putnam, Robert D., together with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, Making De-
mocracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton 1993.
Bibliography468
Quataert, Donald, ed., Consumption Studies and the History of the Ottoman Empire, 1550 –
1922. An Introduction, New York 2000.
Quinn, S., “The Glorious Revolution’s Effect on English Private Finance. A Micro-His-
tory”, in: The Journal of Economic History 61 (2001) 593 – 615.
Rapp, Richard T., “The Unmaking of the Mediterranean Trade Hegemony”, in: Journal of
Economic History 35 (1975) 499 – 525.
Rawski, Evelyn S., Education and Popular Literacy in Ch’ing China, Ann Arbor 1979.
Reardon-Anderson, James, Reluctant Pioneers. China’s Expansion Northward, 1644 – 1937,
Stanford 2005.
Reinert, Erik S., “Review: Power and Plenty”, in: Journal of Global History 4 (2009) 512 –
514.
– How Rich Countries Got Rich… and why Poor Countries Stay Poor, New York 2007.
– “The Other Canon and Uneven Growth. The Activity-Specific Element of Economic
Development”, in: De Paula and Dimsky, Reimagining Growth, 52 – 82.
– ‘The role of the state in economic growth’
Reinert, Sophus A., Translating Empire. Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy,
Cambridge 2011.
Reis, C.A., “Economic Growth, Human Capital Formation and Consumption in Western
Europe Before 1800”, in Allen, Bengtsson and Dribe, Living Standards in the Past, 195 –
227.
Ricardo, David, On the Principles of Political Economy, and Taxation, London 1817, re-
printed by Penguin Harmondsworth 1971, edited by R.M. Hartwell.
Ridley, Matt, The Rational Optimist. How Prosperity Evolves, paperback edition, London
2011.
Riello, Giorgio, Cotton. The Fabric that Made the Modern World, Cambridge 2013.
Ringmar, Eric, Why Europe Was First. Social change and Economic Growth in Europe and
East Asia 1500 – 2050, London/New York 2007.
Ringrose, David A., Spain, Europe and the Spanish Miracle, 1700 – 1900, Cambridge 1998.
Robertson, D.H., “The Future of International Trade”, in: Economic Journal 48 (1938) 1 –
14.
Rodger, N.A.M., The Command of the Ocean. A Naval History of Britain, 1649 – 1815,
London 2004.
Rodrik, Dani, The Globalization Paradox. Why Global Markets, States, and Democracy
can’t Coexist, Oxford 2011.
– One Economics, Many Recipes. Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth,
Princeton/Oxford 2007.
Rodrik, Dani, Arvid Subramanian and Francesco Trebbi, “Institutions Rule. The Primacy
of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development”, in: Journal
of Economic Growth 9 (2004) 131 – 65.
Rogers, Nicolas, “Vagrancy, Impressment and the Regulation of Labour in Eighteenth-
Century Britain”, in: Slavery and Abolition 15, 2 (1994) 102 – 113.
Romer, Advanced Macroeconomics, Boston 2006.
Rosen, William, The Most Powerful Idea in the World. A Story of Steam, Industry, and
Invention, New York 2010.
Rosenberg, Nathan and Luther E. Birdzell, How the West Grew Rich. The Economic
Transformation of the Industrial World, New York 1986.
Bibliography 469
Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent, “The Development of Irrigation in Provence”, in: The Journal of
Economic History 50 (1990) 615 – 638.
Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent and Roy Bin Wong, Before and beyond Divergence. The Politics of
Economic Change in China and Europe, Cambridge Mass./London 2011.
Ross, E.A., The Changing Chinese. The Conflict of Western & Oriental Cultures in China,
New York 1911.
Rossum, Matthias van, and Karwan Fatah-Black, “Wat is winst? De economische impact
van de Nederlandse trans-Atlantische slavenhandel”, in: Tijdschrift voor Sociale en
Economische Geschiedenis 9 (2012) 3 – 30.
Rostow, Walt W., The Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifesto, London
1960.
Rothschild, Emma, “The English Kopf, 1832”, in: Winch and O’Brien, Political Economy of
British Historical Experience, 31 – 60.
Rowe, William, China’s Last Empire. The Great Qing, Cambridge Mass./London 2009.
Roy, Tirthankar, “Knowledge and Divergence from the Perspective of Early Modern
India”, in: Journal of Global History 3, 3 (2008) 361 – 388.
Rule, John, The Labouring Classes in Early Industrial England 1750 – 1850, London/New
York 1986.
Sabel, Charles and Jonathan Zeitlin, eds., World of Possibilities. Flexibility and Mass
Production in Western Industrialization, Cambridge 2002.
Sachs, Jeffrey D. , The End of Poverty. Economic Possibilities of our Time, New York 2005.
Sachs, Jeffrey D., Andrew D. Mellinger and John L. Gallup, “The Geography of Poverty”, in:
Scientific American, March 2001, 70 – 75.
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Andrew Warner, “The Curse of Natural Resources”, in: European
Economic Review 45 (2002) 827 – 838.
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and A.M. Warner, “Sources of Slow Growth in African Economies”, in:
Journal of African Economies 6, 3 (1997) 335 – 376.
Saito, Osamu, “An Industrious Revolution in an East Asian Market Economy? Tokugawa
Japan and Implications for the Great Divergence”, in: Australian Economic History
Review 50, 2 (2010) 240 – 261.
Sassen, Saskia, The Global City. New York, London, Tokyo, Princeton 1991.
Schlefer, Jonathan, The Assumptions Economists Make, Cambridge Mass./London 2012.
Schlüter, Andre, Institutions and Small Settler Economies: A Comparative Study of New
Zealand and Uruguay, 1870 – 2008, Vienna 2013.
Schumpeter, Joseph A., Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York 1942). I quote
from the fifth edition, published in London in 1976.
– Business Cycles : A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist
Process, New York 1939.
– Theory of Economic Development. An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest and
the Business Cycle, Cambridge. Mass. 1936.
Schurman, Franz H., “Traditional Property Concepts in China”, in: Far Eastern Quarterly
15 (1956), 507 – 516
Schurz, L. William, The Manila Galleon, New York 1939.
Schwarz, D. Leonard, London in the Age of Industrialisation. Entrepreneurs, Labour Force
and Living Conditions, 1700 – 1850, Cambridge 1999.
Bibliography470
Sen, Gautam, The Military Origins of Industrialisation and International Trade Rivalry,
London 1984.
Shammas, Carole, “The Revolutionary Impact of European Demand for Tropical Goods”,
in: John J. McCusker and Kenneth Morgan, eds. , The Early Modern Atlantic Economy,
Cambridge 2000, 163 – 185.
Sharma, Ruchir, “Broken BRICs. Why the Rest stopped Rising”, in: Foreign Affairs 91, 6
(2012) 2 – 8.
Shaw, William H., Marx’s Theory of History, London 1978.
Sheridan, R.B., “Wealth of Jamaica: A Rejoinder”, in Economic History Review 21 (1969)
46 – 61.
Shiue, Carol H. and Wolfgang Keller, “Markets in China and Europe on the Eve of the
Industrial Revolution”, in: American Economic Review, 97, 4 (2007) 1189 – 1216.
Sieferle, Rolf Peter, The Subterranean Forrest. Energy Systems and the Industrial Revolu-
tion, Cambridge 2010, originally in German Munich 1982.
Sieferle, Rolf Peter and others, Transportgeschichte. Der Europäische Sonderweg. Volume I,
Münster/ Hamburg/Berlin/London 2008.
Sigaut, F., “La Chine, L’Europe et les techniques agricoles (Note critique)”, in: Annales ESC
44 (1989) 207 – 216.
Simon, Julian L., The Great Breakthrough and its Cause, Ann Arbor 2000.
– The Economics of Growth, Princeton 1977.
Sivramkrishna, Sashi, “Ascertaining Living Standards in erstwhile Mysore, Southern
India, from Francis Buchanan’s Journey of 1800 – 01. An Empirical Contribution to the
Great Divergence Debate”, in: Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient
52 (2009) 695 – 733.
Skidelsky, Robert, Keynes. The Return of the Master, London 2009.
Skinner, G. William, “Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China”, in: Journal of Asian
Studies 24, 1 (1964) 3 – 43; 24, 2 (1965) 195 – 228; 24, 3 (1965) 363 – 399.
Smil, Vaclav, Energy in World History, Boulder/San Francisco/Oxford 1994.
Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, originally
1776. I quote from the Liberty Fund Edition; Indianapolis 1981.
Smith, Richard J., China’s Cultural Heritage, The Qing Dynasty 1644 – 1912, second edi-
tion; Boulder 1994.
Solow, Barbara L., “Caribbean Slavery and British Growth. The Eric Williams Hypothesis”,
in: Journal of Development Economics 17 (1985) 99 – 115.
– ed., Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System, Cambridge 1991.
Solow, Barbara and Stanley Engerman, eds. , British Capitalism and Caribbean Slavery. The
Legacy of Eric Williams, Cambridge 2004.
Sombart, Werner, Krieg und Kapitalismus, Munich 1913.
Soto, Hernando de, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Why
it Fails Everywhere Else, New York 2000.
Sowell, Thomas, Conquests and Cultures. An International History, New York 1999.
Spadafora, David, The Idea of Progress in Eighteenth-Century Britain, New Haven/London
1990.
Spierenburg, Pieter, The Broken Spell. A Cultural and Anthropological History of Pre-
Industrial Europe, New Brunswick 1991.
Spufford, Francis, Red Plenty. Inside the Fifties’ Soviet Dream, London 2010.
Bibliography 471
Stangeland, Charles Emil, Pre-Malthusian Doctrines of Population. A Study in the History
of Economic Theory New York 1966, originally 1904.
Stark, Rodney, The Victory of Reason. How Christianity Led to Freedom, Capitalism, and
Western Success, London 2005.
Stasavage, David, States of Credit. Size, Power and the Development of European Polities,
Princeton/Oxford 2011.
Steedman, Carolyn, Labours lost. Domestic Service and the Making of Modern England,
Cambridge 2009.
Steensgaard, Niels, “Commodities, Bullion and Services in Intercontinental Transactions
before 1750”, in: Hans Pohl, ed., The European Discovery of the World and its Economic
Effects on Pre-Industrial Society, 1500 – 1800. Papers of the Tenth International Eco-
nomic History Congress. Edited on Behalf of the International Economic History As-
sociation, Stuttgart 1990, 9 – 23.
Stein, Burton, A History of India, Oxford/Malden 1998.
Steinfeld, Robert J. , Coercion, Contract and Free Labour in the Nineteenth Century,
Cambridge 2001.
– The Invention of Free Labour. The Employment Relation in English and American Law,
Chapel Hill 1991.
Stiglitz, Joseph, The Price of Inequality. How Today’s Divided Society Endangers our Fu-
ture, London 2012.
Storrs, Christopher, ed., The Fiscal-Military State in Eighteenth-Century Europe. Essays in
Honour of P.G.M. Dickson, Farnham, UK/Burlington, USA, 2009.
Studer, Roman, “India and the Great Divergence. Assessing the Efficiency of Grain Markets
in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century India”, in: The Journal of Economic History, 68,
2 (2008) 393 – 437.
Studwell, Joe, How Asia Works. Success and Failure in the World’s Most Dynamic Region,
London 2013.
Sugihara, Kaoru, “Labour-Intensive Industrialization in Global History”, in: Austin and
Sugihara, Labour–Intensive Industrialization in Global History, 20 – 64.
– “Labour-Intensive Industrialization in Global History. The Second Noel Butlin Lec-
ture”, in: Australian Economic History Review 47 (2007) 121 – 54.
– “The East Asian Path of Economic Development. A Long-Term Perspective”, in: Arrighi,
Hamashita and Selden, The Resurgence of East Asia, 78 – 123.
Sun, E-Tu Zen, “Ch’ing government and the mineral industries before 1800”, in: The
Journal of Asian Studies 27, 4 (1968) 835 – 845.
– “Mining labor in the Ch’ing period”, in: A. Feuerwerker, R. Murphey and M.C. Wright,
eds. , Approaches to Modern Chinese History, Berkeley 1967, 45 – 67.
Tagliacozzo, Eric and When-chin Chang, eds., Chinese Circulations. Capital, Commodities,
and Networks in Southeast Asia, Chapel Hill 2011.
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, New York
2007.
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Epilogue: A rise of the East?
*
Peer Vries, University Vienna
During the last twenty years of my career I have been studying the ‘rise of the
West’. That of course is somewhat ironic as these years witnessed its sharp
decline and a steep ‘rise of the Rest’. In this text I will use my historical
knowledge to interpret that rise. The ‘Rest’ of course is a vague category. Even the
so-called BRIC countries, that as a rule hold centre stage in reflections on current
global economic change, are a variegated lot. Brazil seems a case of its own. At
the moment it still primarily is a supplier of raw materials (agricultural prod-
ucts, fuel and minerals) but it clearly has a much broader potential. Russia’s
wealth largely is resource-based. Some two-thirds of its exports consist of fuels,
some ten per cent of metals. One may doubt whether its rise actually is a good
example of economic development. I will confine myself to the two Asian BRIC-
countries, India but first and foremost China, that economically overshadows all
other BRICs. They both have a huge population and relatively few resources and
they are the countries where the most consequential structural changes are
occurring. That does not mean they are similar : in real terms India’s GDP per
capita is only about half that of China and the total value of its exports only about
one sixth.
I gladly leave it to others to discuss the “patterns of history and what they
reveal about the future.”1309 As late as the 1960s, experts as different as Soviet
premier Nikita Khrushchev and American Nobel-Prize winning economist Paul
Samuelson ‘knew’ that the economic future belonged to the Soviet Union. In the
1970s, Harvard Professor Ezra Vogel wrote about ‘Japan as number one’ and
mused about the lessons America could learn from that country.1310 At the end of
the 1990s, many experts claimed the Asian miracle was over. It was only some ten
years ago that Jeremy Rifkin published The European dream, arguing that the
European Union was an economic superpower rivaling the U.S., with the po-
* Der Epilogue meines Buches ‘A rise of the East?’ 479 – 493 ist bereits publiziert worden als
‘Decline of the West – Rise of the East?’, Journal of Modern European History 11, 3 (2013)
315 – 328.
1309 Ian Morris, Why the West rules – for now. The patterns of history and what they reveal
about the future (New York 2010).
1310 Ezra Vogel, Japan as number one. Lessons for America (Cambridge Mass 1979).
tential to become a full world superpower.1311 At about the same time there were
endless debates about Standort Deutschland because people were insecure if not
downright pessimist about the economic prospects of the country that now is the
strongest economy of the West. I am not going to predict a future that by
definition is unpredictable. I will confine myself to interpreting the current ‘rise
of the East’ on the basis of what I know about the ‘rise of the West’. The focus will
be on structural developments in the ‘real’ economy, not on finance. That is
discussed extensively in other contributions.
We do not need to speculate about a possible decline of ‘the West’, here
defined as Western Europe plus the so-called Western offshoots: it is an un-
mistakable fact. ‘The Rest’, or at least big parts of it, is quickly catching up.
Already now over half of global GDP is produced in countries that are not
member of the OECD. Especially the position of Western Europe is deteriorating
fast. In 1870, at its ‘height’, it earned one third of global GDP. In 2003, that had
become less than one fifth. The situation did not improve over the last decade.1312
Figures 1 and 2. Source: The Economist, August 6 – 12, 2011, Economic Focus
An increasing amount of trade no longer involves the West at all.1313 Its relevance
is also quickly shrinking in terms of population. (See Table 2.) The West now is
just one of the players on the global economic stage. Unsurprisingly it no longer
is much of a role model. The idea, that with its mountains of debt, millions of
unemployed and total lack of orientation, it could teach ‘the Rest’ about ‘good
governance’ and ‘development’, has become preposterous. The future looks
1311 Jeremy Rifkin, The European dream: How Europe’s vision of the future is quietly eclipsing
the American dream (Cambridge 2004).
1312 I base myself on figures taken from: Angus Maddison, Contours of the world economy, 1 –
2030 AD. Essays in macro-economic history (Oxford 2007) 381 and The Economist. Pocket
World in Figures 2013 (London 2012).
1313 The Economist, January 19 – 25, 2013, ‘Developing country trade’, page 64.
Epilogue: A rise of the East?480
brighter for the Beijing Consensus, ‘Asian’ values and state capitalism than for
the Washington Consensus, ‘Western’ values and free market-capitalism.1314 The
sense of confusion this has generated is striking: people in the new emerging
countries overall are more optimist about their economic situation than people
in the old West and the idea that one is better off with a market economy is more
popular in China than in Western countries.1315 Niall Ferguson, fierce defender of
Western civilization, has begun to worry about Western degeneration.1316
But let us focus on ‘hard’ economic data. What really counts for most people
when they discuss the wealth and poverty of nations is their real income. In that
respect – on which I will focus in this text – we have to qualify the idea of Western
‘decline’. There still is a lot of catching up to do for ‘the Rest’, even for BRIC
countries.
Real per capita income for the year 2010, United States = 100










Not by accident, the number of people wanting to migrate to the West is still
huge. There, moreover, is an increasing number of Western firms that ‘repatriate’
activities as global wage gaps that made it profitable to leave the West have
become smaller and disadvantages of outsourcing and offshoring have also
become evident.1317
But the tide clearly is turning. Can and will it turn so much that China or India
might fully catch up with the West or even surpass it? In answering that question
1314 Stefan Halper, The Beijing consensus. How China’s model will dominate the twenty-first
century (New York 2010); Ian Bremmer, The end of the free market. Who wins the war
between states and corporations? (New York 2010) and The Economist, January 21, 2012,
‘Special Report: State capitalism. The visible hand.’
1315 http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/12/pervasive-gloom-about-the-world-economy/
1316 Niall Ferguson, Civilization. The West and the rest (London 2011) and idem, The Great
Degeneration. How institutions decay and economies die (Harmondsworth 2012).
1317 The Economist, January 19 – 25, 2013: Special Report. Outsourcing and offshoring.
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we have to realize that, as economic historians emphasize the economic gap
between the West and the Rest that characterised the global economy since the
Industrial Revolution was very ‘abnormal’. Never before had global differences
in income been so enormous. The gap between the wealthiest parts of the world
and the poorest ones before industrialisation had never been more than five to
one. At the moment, GDP per capita in real terms in several African states is less
than one-fiftieth that in the United States.1318
Figure 3. Based on information in: Angus Maddison, The world economy. A millennial
perspective (Paris 2001).
Most mainstream economists too have always considered this huge gap ‘ab-
normal’. In their view it could not last because it actually ‘should’ not have
emerged to begin with. In their view the increase of intercontinental economic
exchanges since the beginning of the nineteenth century should have led to
global convergence as, with increasing wealth, countries get bigger stocks of
capital and become more vulnerable to decreasing returns to extra investment.
Poorer countries, in contrast, that have smaller capital stocks and can import up-
to-date capital goods, would profit from higher returns to investment and are
thus supposed to catch up. In reality, however, for many decades very few ac-
tually did.
1318 See e. g. The Economist. Pocket World in Figures 2013 Edition, 27.
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1. How did the West rise?
Discussion whether ‘the Rest’ will catch up is likely to profit from an analysis of
how ‘the West’ rose to begin with. What caused its substantial and sustained
growth that emerged with industrialization and gave it an unprecedented global
lead?1319 Many scholars still emphasize capital and capital accumulation. Those
of course were important. Empirical analysis, however, has shown that, by far,
most of the growth in the West since the Industrial Revolution was not a matter
of extra inputs but of innovation. This innovation in turn thrived on human
capital. Its role in Western economic growth and development too was pivotal.
Raising productivity and increasing production only makes sense when demand
changes and increases too. It did: The Western world became known as a con-
sumer society. Rising population also played its role. It had a positive effect on
the supply of human capital as well as on consumption. Western growth, to
conclude, also got substantial impulses from further integration and extension
of markets: nationally, internationally and between continents. Global trade
grew faster than global production.
All these motors of growth would have been to no avail without cheap energy
and resources. Western economies ‘rose’ at a time when global supplies of energy
and resources were large and growing. As a whole, the West till World War II,
exported energy.1320 Great Britain’s rise to global economic primacy has even
been explained by simple reference to its ‘ghost acreages’ provided by coal and
colonies.1321 Countries like the USA or Germany in this respect were less de-
pendent on imports but all growing economies needed and found ample and
cheap supplies of energy and raw materials.1322 The great divide between rich and
poor nations tended to coincide with that between wealthy (Western) countries
specializing in producing and exporting manufactured goods and poor coun-
tries (in the Rest) specialising in producing and exporting raw materials. In-
dustrialising counties for a long, decisive period of time had a comparative
advantage in manufacturing and services that often led to a ‘de-industrializa-
tion’ of ‘the Rest’.1323
In terms of ultimate causes the rise of the West is based on the presence of
1319 The debate on the origins of the Great Divergence is immense and complicated. I can only
refer to my forthcoming book Escaping poverty. Origins of modern economic growth
(Göttingen 2013).
1320 Paul Bairoch, Economics and world history. Myths and paradoxes (Chicago 1993) Part II.
1321 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence. China, Europe and the making of the modern
world economy (Princeton 2000).
1322 Edward B. Barbier, Scarcity and frontiers. How economies have developed through natural
resource exploitation (Cambridge 2011).
1323 Jeffrey G. Williamson, Trade and poverty. When the Third World fell behind (Cambridge
Mass. and London 2011).
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certain institutions. Most economists agree that for long-run economic growth
institutions are decisive. Opinions differ widely when it comes to what in-
stitutions matter and how exactly they matter. Debates focus on the role of the
state and the market. Amongst economic historians, in contrast to economists
and other social scientists who continue to be under the spell of classical and
neoclassical traditions, the view is gaining the upper hand that rising Western
economies almost without exception had strong governments, which were able
and willing to mobilise lots of resources and people and backed up their
economies with their power.1324
2. Will Western growth persist?
If the factors just referred to have been at the basis of Western economic primacy,
what are the odds that it might persist? It is not reassuring that several econo-
mists think the Western world faces decreasing returns to innovation. In their
view the costs of research and development increase whereas its effects dimin-
ish.1325 I personally would not go as far as to claim that innovation indeed is no
longer driving growth. But the fact that it fuelled Western growth over the last
centuries is no guarantee it will do so in future. There are some reasons for
pessimism.1326 One of them is the fact that the potential to increase productivity
differs between economic sectors. In advanced economies it tends to be lower in
the service sector – that in turn tends to be larger the wealthier a country is –
than in other sectors. Many activities in the service sector suffer from ‘Baumol’s
disease’. They are very labour-intensive and provide little opportunity for
technological innovation. Their productivity hardly grows if at all as but they
must pay competitive salaries. This can have a dampening effect on overall
growth.1327 Advanced economies face the challenge to permanently upgrade
their economies. How can they continue to do so and still generate overall
1324 For views that I in this respect endorse, see Ha-joon Chang, Kicking away the ladder.
Development strategy in historical perspective (London 2002); Ronald Findlay and Kevin
H. O’Rourke, Power and plenty. Trade, war, and the world economy in the second mil-
lennium (Princeton and Oxford 2007); Erik Reinert, How rich countries got rich…and why
poor countries stay poor (New York 2007) and, for the concept of a strong, ‘infrastructural’
state Michael Mann, The sources of social power, four volumes, passim.
1325 Tyler Cowen, The Great Stagnation. How America ate all the low-hanging fruit, got sick and
will (eventually) feel better (New York 2011) and The Economist, January 12 – 18, 2013: The
great innovation debate, pages 9 and 19 – 22.
1326 See for staunch optimism, Matt Ridley, The rational optimist: how prosperity evolves (New
York 2007).
1327 For Baumol’s cost disease, named after economist William Baumol, see http://en.wiki-
pedia.org/wiki/Baumol%27 s_cost_disease
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growth? Not everyone can become a well-paid internationally competitive
specialist.
Some scholars also refer to decreasing returns for education. It is no longer
evident that more education will lead to more productivity.1328 There might not
be much unused talent left in the West anyhow and many Westerners focus on
studying ‘the wrong subjects’. This applies to higher education. Levels and
standards of general education often deteriorate. The fact, that in most Western
countries population hardly grows if at all, whereas it certainly grows old, does
not help either.1329 When it comes to consuming no one can beat the Westerners.
They have indulged in enormous overspending, private as well as public, and
incurred staggering debts. Over the last thirty years, from 1980 to 2010, in
eighteen advanced economies, the ratio of their added debts of households, non-
financial corporations and government to their added GDP is estimated to have
increased from 167 per cent to 306 per cent. Total household debt in those
countries in 2010 amounted to 90 per cent, their total non-financial corporate
debt to 113 per cent, and their government debt to 104 per cent of GDP.1330 Trying
to cure the current financial crisis in the West with yet more spending is like
giving a bottle of whisky to an alcoholic.
Over the last centuries, Western economies clearly profited from the ex-
tension of their markets. At the moment though, they seem to be more at the
losing end of globalisation and the advantages of European economic integration
have turned out to be very doubtful. A new global economic order is in the
making. Whatever the outcome: the West will no longer be able to like in its
heydays force other parts of the world into a peripheral position. It, first and
foremost Europe, lacks the military, political or financial power. As a former
imperialist region that is bankrupt, the West definitely need not count on much
sympathy. Other global players like China have more money and a less burdened
past. When the West rose, it profited from relatively cheap energy and resources.
Now Europe, apart from Russia, has become a major importer of energy and of
many resources. For Europe’s Western offshoots the situation is quite different.
Institutionally the West also looks to be in deep trouble. Many critics of the
prevailing capitalist order attribute its predicaments mainly to neo-liberalism,
which they associate with casino capitalism, deregulation and a withdrawing
state. In some sectors state regulation and intervention have indeed diminished.
1328 See e. g. the classic text by Lance Pritchett, Where has all the education gone? There are
several versions on the Internet.
1329 See e. g. ‘Going grey’, http://www.oecd.org/insights/37966982.pdf. Consulted on 14 – 06,
2013.
1330 Stephen G. Cecchitti, M.S. Mohanty and Fabrizio Zampolli, ‘The Real Effects of Debt’, Bank
for International Settlements Working Papers No 352, September 2011, http://www.bi-
s.org/publ/work352.pdf page 7. Consulted on 28 – 05, 2013.
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But to lay all the blame with ‘neoliberalism’ is very one-sided. Neither before, let
alone during the current financial crisis, have we witnessed an overall with-
drawal by the state. Western states are as present as ever during the last decades if
not even more, whether one looks at taxation, government debt, the number of
state-employees or legislation.1331 To contrast state capitalism in a rising ‘Rest’
with neoliberal free-market capitalism in a declining West is an indefensible
caricature. In Germany in 2009 government spending accounted for 48 percent
of GDP and in the United States for 42. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy,
the Netherlands, and Sweden all had even higher government spending relative
to GDP than Germany. In China government only spent 23 percent of GDP. The
results are similar if one focuses on the share of GDP accounted for by gov-
ernment purchases of goods and services. In Germany it amounted to 18 per-
cent, in the United States to 17 percent and in China to only 13 percent. When it
comes to state investment China indeed looks a clear example of state capitalism.
In 2008 gross fixed capital formation accounted for by the public sector
amounted to 21 percent of its GDP. The equivalent figures for developed Western
countries are vanishingly small. In the West the state is a spendthrift, borrowing
money to pay for goods and services, not an investor.1332 Western governments
and firms will no longer be able to compete with emerging economies in terms of
foreign direct investment. Western states at the moment definitely are part of the
problem rather than the solution. But the current shift in relative economic
strength of West and Rest would also take place if the Western governments
would behave differently.
3. Will Eastern growth persist?
What about the other side of the equation? Ruchir Sharma sees signs that the rest
already “stopped rising”.1333 Whether that indeed is the case, is an empirical
question that we cannot decide here. But what does the situation in China and
India looks like when it comes to their motors of growth? The fact, that in-
novation was the main motor of growth in the West should in any case tone down
optimism about a smooth further rise of ‘the Rest’. Up until now, innovation only
played a fairly minor role in it. In 1994 Paul Krugman claimed that the growth of
1331 The Economist, March 19 – 25, 2011, Taming Leviathan. A special report on the future of the
state.
1332 For these figures see Niall Ferguson, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/09/
we_re_all_state_capitalists_now and The Economist article referred to in the previous
note, page 4.
1333 Ruchir Sharma, ‘Broken BRICs. Why the Rest stopped rising’, Foreign Affairs 91, 6 (2012)
2 – 8.
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Asia’s new industrialising countries to a very large extent was a matter of in-
creasing inputs, of “perspiration, not inspiration”, and would therefore ceteris
paribus peter out.1334 Now 20 years later, that looks somewhat hasty. But China’s
real GDP per capita is still ‘only’ at the level of Western Europe some 50 years ago.
India in this respect lags behind 100 year. The real gap still has to be closed. An
influential group of Japanese economic historians has repeatedly – somewhat
like Krugman but with a more positive twist – claimed that East Asia’s take-off
and growth were primarily a consequence of the input of large amounts of
industrious and skilled labour.1335 The Japanese case, however, shows that ‘in-
dustriousness’ can only get an economy to a certain level of wealth. When the
country after World War II began to attain Western income levels, its growth was
based on the massive input of advanced capital and energy. Its economy had
already been set on a pad of up-grading earlier on.1336 Labour-intensive pro-
duction can easily become a dead-end street. Besides, the relative labour surplus
on which it is based can disappear. There are signs that this is happening in
China and that its labour is becoming scarcer and more expensive.1337 In this case
that apparently provides a stimulus to focus more on human capital and upgrade
production as shows in increasing investment in education and research and
development. There are no reasons whatsoever why China, or India, would in
principle have to be less innovative than the West and there is still a lot of
catching up possible with existing technology. But upgrading is never a smooth,
automatic process.1338
There also still is a lot of room to catch up for emerging economies when it
comes to consumption. In China public investment is enormous. The same goes
for Chinese investments, public or private, abroad. Between 2005 and July 2012,
Chinese companies invested 460 billion US dollars across the globe, 340 billion
of which in the developing world.1339 Private Chinese consumption, however, is
still quite low. A shift from investment to consumption clearly would have
1334 Paul Krugman, ‘The myth of Asia’s miracle’, Foreign Affairs 73 (1994) 62 – 78, page 66.
1335 For a recent discussion see Gareth Austin and Kaoru Sugihara, eds., Labour-intensive
industrialization in global history (London 2013).
1336 As is described in Kaname Akamatsu’s famous flying-geese model. For a brief synthesis
see Karl Bachinger and Herbert Matis, Entwicklungsdimensionen des Kapitalismus.
Klassische sozioökonomische Konzeptionen und Analysen (Vienna, Cologne and Weimar
2009) chapter 3.2.
1337 The Economist January 26 – February 1, 2013: ‘China’s labour force starts to shrink’, 48 –
49.
1338 Several economists are convinced that emerging economies might get caught in a middle-
income trap. Others don’t. See The Economist February 16 - 22, 2013: ‘Middle-income
claptrap’, page 64.
1339 Juan Pablo Cardenal and Heriberto Araffljo, China’s silent army. The pioneers, traders,
fixers and workers who are remaking the world in Beijing’s image (London 2013) 5.
Originally La silenciosa conquista china (Barcelona 2011)
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consequences but as compared to the West neither government nor consumers
are short of money. The same goes for many firms. Whether consumers abroad
will continue to buy so many products from China or other emerging economies
of course is hard to predict but up until now the emerging economies are clearly
profiting from globalization.
Western industrialization that was at the basis of rising Western wealth re-
quired revolutionary changes and increases in the use of energy and resources.
Even if China and India manage to revolutionize their production, can they also
manage to acquire the energy and resources they need? The rise of the West was
the rise of a relatively small part of the world’s population and it happened in a
relatively ‘empty’ and quite poor world.
Tables 2. Source: Angus Maddison, Contours of the world economy, 1 – 2030 AD. Essays in
macro-economic history (Oxford 2007) 376 and 378. The figures are rounded. Western
population as a percentage of world population will be even lower now.
Population of the West in millions Population of the world in
billions
1820 145 1820 1
1913 370 1913 1.8
1950 480 1950 2.5
2003 740 2003 6.3






The world’s population has now passed 7 billion. China and India alone have
some 2.5 billion inhabitants.
Global GDP in real terms increased about sixty-fold between 1820 and 2003.
That required a huge amount of extra energy and resources and makes one
wonder about ‘limits to growth’. If China and India would become as rich as the
USA, they alone would produce a real GDP about twice as big as that of the entire
globe at the moment.1340 Their immediate energy- and resource-requirements
already are and will be even more immense. Their growth rates have been and
will in any case for the near future continue to be very high. These are the figures
for Western Europe’s growth of real income per capita.
1340 The data for these comments are from Maddison, Contours of the world economy, 376 and
379, and The Economist Pocket World in Figures 2013, pages 132 and 158.
Epilogue: A rise of the East?488
1820 – 1870 1.68 %
1870 – 1913 2.11 %
1930 – 1950 1.19 %
1950 – 1973 4.79 %
For China over the period 1973 – 2003, the rate was 7.34 %. Since then it on
average was even higher. For India over the period 1973 – 2003 it was 5.20 %.1341
The emerging economies exert a growing demand for energy and resources in
a world that is far more crowded and that consumes far more than at the time
when the West rose. That means that ceteris paribus – always the fundamental
clause as no one can predict what innovations might take place in creating,
finding, and using sources of energy and other resources – they simply, by
growing, will drive up primary product prices. Wealthy countries in the modern
world almost without exception have been countries that acquired most of their
income by adding value in manufacturing and services, using lots of primary
products and energy in the process. They behaved, in ‘Wallersteinian’ terms, as
core economies in a global economy in which peripheral economies specialized
in producing primary goods.1342 China’s strategy at the moment is strikingly
similar to that of the West in the colonial era and its relations with Africa, Latin
America and parts of Asia remind strongly of core-periphery relations.1343 It
exchanges its cheap manufactures against raw materials, often wiping out the
industries in the countries it trades with. To be able to do so it needs and imports
enormous amounts of energy and other resources. But can one really have a
global economy where more than half if not two-thirds of the population acts like
inhabitants of the global ‘core’? Who then will provide the cheap inputs?
At the beginning of the twenty-first century in a globalised economy large
countries with a huge population cannot simply copy what relatively small
countries or regions with a relatively small population did in the nineteenth
century. Halfway the nineteenth century, industrialising Britain with some 20
million inhabitants imported about half of its food and raw materials whereas it
exported about half the cotton cloth it produced. It was the workshop and even
more the service centre of the world. Such a strategy simply would not have been
a realistic option for China at the time. It had some 400 million inhabitants in a
world with some 1.3 billion inhabitants. It would in the end have made its import
1341 All these growth rates are taken from Maddison, Contours of the world economy, 380. GDP
in China and India of course was much lower than in Western Europe.
1342 For Wallerstein’s ideas see his World-systems analysis. An introduction (Duke University
Press 2004).
1343 See e. g. Cardenal and Araffljo, China’s silent army, passim, in particular 68 – 72 and the
Epilogue. For a rebuttal of the idea that the world is becoming ‘Chinese’ see David
Shambaugh, China goes global: the partial power (Oxford 2013).
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prices skyrocket and it export prices plummet. Will it really be different now that
the country has 1.4 billion inhabitants and the world 7 billion?
Can emerging economies reach Western income levels when that means
consuming energy and resources at Western levels? Will they not, especially
when they have huge populations, sap their own growth, as they will be con-
fronted with high and rising prices of energy and raw materials? Let me briefly
comment on the energy situation. According to a recent report by British Pe-
troleum, an additional 1.3 billion people will need energy by 2030.1344 World
income in that year is expected to be roughly double the 2011 level in real terms.
Global energy consumption is assumed to increase with 36 per cent between
2010 and 2030. This estimate, based on historical extrapolation and parallels,
assumes that energy intensity in terms of energy input per unit of production
will converge on the lowest level over the globe (Because worldwide competition
and exchange of technology will push it down) and further decrease (As his-
torical data show that extra growth will cost relatively less energy) and that with
further development more economies will become service economies. (Whose
energy consumption is relatively lower than in industrial economies). It also
assumes that with rising prices increased demand can be met as long as com-
petition is present to drive innovation, unlock resources and encourage effi-
ciency. It, however, says nothing about how high prices might become and what
the impact of those prices and of the new energy imbalances might be on
different parts of the world, the question that interests us here. Energy pro-
duction will grow in all regions but Europe, i. e. except Russia. Over the period to
2030, the US will presumably become nearly self-sufficient in energy, thanks to
the revolution in shale gas and tight oil production there. China and India will
become increasingly import-dependent with China heading to match Europe as
the world’s leading energy importer by 2030. It will replace the US as the world’s
largest oil importing nation already in 2017. Is it too farfetched to assume that
energy prices will substantially increase and that this will hit importing coun-
tries harder so that the future of China, India (and Europe!) will in that respect
look bleaker than that of regions with an energy surplus? Would not similar
comments apply when it comes to all kinds of resources?
A study by Goldman Sachs on the basis of qualified extrapolations came up
1344 BP, Energy outlook 2030 (London 2012) http://www.bp.com/extendedsectiongen
ericarticle.do?categoryId=9048887& contentId=7082549. A historical perspective is
provided by Christof Rühl and others, ‘Economic development and the demand for en-
ergy : a historical perspective on the next 20 years’, Energy Policy 50, November 2012, 109 –
116.
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with the following predictions of the growth of real GDP per capita between 2006
and 2050.1345
Growth of real GDP per capita between 2006 and 2050
Table 3. Source: BRICS and beyond, Goldman Sachs study of BRIC and NII nations
November 23, 2007.
Brazil 879 % United States 206 %
Russia 1,137 % United Kingdom 207 %
India 2,550 % France 208 %
China 2,432 % Germany 197 %
It also comes up with figures for many other countries showing huge growth
rates. One simply cannot help asking how our world is supposed to find the
affordable energy and resources to sustain such growth. But even if we would
simply accept these extrapolations most Westerners would still be wealthier per
capita than inhabitants of the BRIC countries.
Real income per capita in 2050, United States = 100
Table 4. Source: BRICS and beyond, Goldman Sachs study of BRIC and NII nations
November 23, 2007.
Brazil 54 United States 100
Russia 85 United Kingdom 86
India 23 France 82
China 54 Germany 74
Let us finally make some comments on the institutional preconditions of growth
in the Rest. The Western world institutionally is in an extremely serious crisis.
But is the situation better in China, to again focus on the most important BRIC?
What are its prospects? Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson emphatically
claim that growth in countries with extractive institutions – and many of the
countries that currently rise including China would have such institutions –
simply cannot persist.1346 The historical support for the thesis of an in-
compatibility of growth and extractive institutions is not exactly overwhelming
1345 I took these figures from BRICS and beyond, Goldman Sachs study of BRIC and NII
nations November 23, 2007.
1346 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why nations fail. The origins of power, prosperity
and poverty (London 2012).
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and the mechanisms it assumes are far from obvious.1347 When it comes to future
developments their work contains a fair amount of wishful thinking. They deny
the possibility of long run growth in exclusive situations. Suppose they are right:
how long is the long run? Serious economic historians know that no major
economy ever rose to hegemony with laissez-faire strategies and staunchly de-
fending free and fair trade. Power and profit have always been strongly inter-
connected in economies heading for primacy. Capitalism to a surprisingly large
extent has always been state capitalism, combining visible and invisible hands,
in the end trusting the former more than the latter. Whatever the links between
growth and economic or political inclusion: there are no reasons to soon expect
a democratic China. The country’s elites are not at all interested1348 and China’s
government in terms of resources is in a much better position than its Western
counterparts. The global financial crisis only hit it marginally. That crisis ac-
tually only made it stronger as it now can profit even more from its enormous
financial reserves.
4. Some educated guesses
The engines of Western wealth are faltering. Looking at the current state of its
economy and comparing that with that of emerging economies like those of
China or India it is very hard to not be quite pessimist about Europe’s future, in
particular if substantial and broadly accepted structural reforms are not
forthcoming. Its growth looks hard to sustain with faltering innovation, a huge
service sector, a stagnating population that is aging very fast, a very unbalanced
labour market, an enormous public and private overconsumption, a negative
energy and resource balance, many institutional problems and a quickly de-
creasing international political, military and financial leverage.1349 In the rest of
the West at least the situation with regard to resources and energy and the
demographic situation looks better. For China, to again focus on that emerging
country, there still is room for catching up technologically. The country still has
some cheap labour reserves and ample possibilities to develop human capital.
Private consumption can increase very substantially when people are no longer
1347 For an extensive critique I refer to my ‘Does wealth entirely depend on inclusive institu-
tions and pluralist politics? http://technologygovernance.eu/eng/the_core_faculty/work
ing_papers/
1348 See. e. g. James Mann, The China fantasy. Why capitalism will not bring democracy to
China (New York 2007) and Cardenal and Araffljo, China’s silent army, 40 and 263 – 265.
1349 For an assessment of the Western predicament that is not exactly optimist see Stephen D.
King, When the money runs out. The end of Western affluence (New Haven and London
2013).
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forced to save by the state and by lack of welfare arrangements. The state still
disposes of enormous reserves. The major and very real threat to its sustained
growth – apart of course from all sorts of more or less (un)predictable domestic
or international ‘accidents’ or ‘crises’ that tend to accompany unequal growth
and sharply rising inequality – in my view will be scarcity and rising prices of
energy and resources.
My hunch would be that we enter a kind of neo-Malthusian world where the
limited availability of resources will constrain growth and make it more prob-
lematic. That world will also be neo-mercantilist in the sense that just like during
the heydays of European mercantilism economic rivalry between countries over
scarce resources and policies of beggaring one’s neighbour will become rife. I am
not exactly happy about it but I would not be surprised if the global economy of
the twenty-first century would in these respects be more like that of the eight-
eenth century before industrialization than that of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries.
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